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CORRIGENDA 
p. 7 line 18 for '14, 600' re:id '14, 600, 000' . 
p.28 line~ 2-7 quotation marks 'the intensity of 
cy;npathy'. 
in 
footnote L to ~ea<l: C.B. Schedvin Australia and the 
Great Depression (Sydney, 1970), p.53. 
p.47 line 13 
p. 5 7 1 ine 24 
for 'ten' read 'seven or eight'. 
after 'collieries4 •. read 'Allowing for 
variations in wage rates and additional 
payments between mining districts and from 
pit to pit it is possible to provide a 
general picture of movements in wage rates 
in New South Wales collieries. The award 
rates of labourers (underground and surface) 
fell from 108s - Ills 6d per week in 1929 
to 105s - 108s 6d in 1933. Similarly wage 
rates for wheelers fell from 109s 6d - 115s 
per week to 105s - 112s per week'. 
[Commonwealth Labour Reports, 1929-33] 
lines 24-5 for - 'As a consequence of this decision 
p.76 line 20 
p.80 line 18 
line 19 
p.83 line 25 
p.91 line 18 
the weighted ' read 'The weighted ... ' 
for '8"175' read '8,175' 
after 'basic wage' read - 'On the other hand, 
the Commonwealth basic wage was subject to 
automatic quarteriy cost of living adjustments 
so that (as prices fell) there was a continual 
reduction in the Commonwealth basic wage'. 
delete 'This was in spite of the fact that, 
in August 1931, - read - 'On top of this 
after 'company's argument' read - 'The 
effect of the court's decisionwas a cut in 
award rates which, for some classifications 
reached as much as twenty-seven per cent. 
Wage rates for ironworkers' assistants, for 
example, fell from [5 per week in 1929 to 
[3.12.4d in 1933' [Commonwealth Labour 
Reports, 1929-33]. 
for 'affect' read 'effect' 
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p.92 
p.93 
line 15 and ) for 'In Wollongong Nhere the problem 
lines 1-2 ) was most acute, rents remained at the 
p.92 line 13 
point reached after the opening of the 
steelworks in 1928' - read 'In Wollongong, 
however, rents fell byaTiiiost one-fifth'. 
for 'coalming' read 'coalmining' 
p.125 footnote 1 - for '1931' read '1930' 
p.185 line 16 for 'Federal Labor' read 'Independent' 
p.194 line 25 for 'preimary' read 'primary' 
p.202 line 19 for 'affects' read 'effects' 
p. 202 lines 20-4 for 'l·loney costs were lmvcred in a relative 
sen~and the incomes of primary producers 
raised. As a consequence the momentum or 
industrial expansion shifted to the metal 
industries' read '~loney costs were lowered 
in a relative sense and the momentum of 
industrial expansion sl1ifted to tl1e metal 
industries'. 
p.234 line 23 for 'The threefold' read 'A substantial' 
p.272 lines 27-8 for 'The failure of wages to keep pace wlth 
thccost of living' read 'The failure of 
wages (except those orliiCn affected by 
automatic adjustments to the Commonwealth 
basic wage) to keep pace witl1 the cost of 
living, .. ' 
p.277 lines 4-5 de:.· :.e sentence 'For its part ... I11dustrial 
Comm-i. sion' . 
line s. after 'substant'· Aly reduced' read 'Par its 
part the FIA agreed to refer aflTuture 
disputes with the company to the Industrial 
Commission and tile union regained registration 
wi~h the Comraission in January 1937' 
p.285 line 27 for 'allayed thi3 dissatisfaction' read 
'allayed dissatL•faction wh'!re federal award 
workers were conc~rned' 
line 32 for 'all FIA members' read 'men 0n federal 11war• 
p.315 line 11 for 'legalisation' read 'legislatiun' 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines both the response of the Wollongong 
labour movement to the depression of the 1930s, and the 
influence of the depression experience upon the movement's 
organisation 3ttitudes and actions in the years 1928-39. 
Accordingly, conclusions have been drawn about the 
relationship between working and living conditions and the 
changing political and industrial demands of Wollongong 
workers. Even so, the thesis does not purport to be either a 
social history of Wollongong workers or a history of labour. 
The decision to confine the study to one area of !:o·v; 
South Wales was based partly on the belief that the pr~cise 
effects of and reactions to the depression were determined 
by local conditions. Moreover, geographical limitation 
allowed these particular local elements in the response to 
the depression to receive closer analysis. Wcllongon;r offered 
an especially interesting area of study. A rural-mining 
community, the district had not fully shared in the general 
Australian prosperity of the early 1920s. The announcement 
in 1926 that the Lithgow steelmakers G. and C. Hoskins planned 
to shift their works to a new site at Port Kembla, five miles 
from the township of Wol:.ongong, was therefore welcomed as 
an augury of better times. In the event, the timing could 
scarcely have been more unfortunate, for befor·e the transfer 
of plant and men was complete, Austrdlia was engulfed by the 
depression. Yet despite the limited amount of work available, 
men continued to drift into the district looking for 
employment. As a consequence, thE. depression was a tirir: of 
sustained population 9rowth. The haphazard and unplanned 
developments of these years resulted in an acute housing 
shortage, desperate living conditions and industrial pollution. 
The 1930s were therefore a period of fundamental economic and 
social change. All sections of society experienced 
difficulties in adjusting to the problems associated with the 
birth of au industrial town. 
viii 
The hordes of men looking for work at Port Kembla after 
1926 compounded the problems of trade union leaders already 
confronted with the difficult task of establishing union 
organisation in a new industrial sphere during a period of 
growing unemployment. Moreover, the depression struck before 
a strong Trades and Labor Council which could co-ordinate 
the activities of individual unions, was firmly established. 
One concern of this thesis is to discover the process by 
which Wollongong unions came to act together on matters of 
common interest. The depression experience is seen as 
sharpening workers' consciousness of their collective 
interests as distinct from those of other sections of suciety. 
The term 'working class' has been used in the thesis as a 
general term to describe the various categories of workers 
when acting in common. 
As with any slice of local history, .the initial problem 
was to establish the area to be studied. Wollongong, as it 
is now known, dates from 1947. In that year, the township 
and muni~ipality of Wollongong was joined with three adjacent 
local government areas to form the City of Greater Wollongong. 
The decision to amalgamate the four .local government areas 
was based on a realistic appraisal of both the district's 
history and current developments. From early in the 
nineteenth century the township of Wollongong had been the 
administrative and financial centre for the district. The 
establishment of the steelworks helped strengt.hen this 
position and promised to give the district a Btronger economic 
base. 
In the title and throughout the thesis 'Wollongong' has 
been used in its modern form to indicate the entire district. 
In an important sense, however, this usage is misleading. So 
imbued were contemporaries with the intense parochialism of 
the individual communities that people from settlements a few 
miles apart considered each other outsiders. This 
parochialism was conditioned historically by the manner in 
which the separate communities had grown up around the 
coalmines that gave them life. Yet even now there is scarcely 
a Wollongong identity. Many locals still consider themselves 
to belong to Coledale or Bulli or Port Kembla and only 
secondarily t.o Wollongong. 
'·' 
Once the area of study was defined the problems of 
statistical and political boundaries asserted themselves. 
Since the boundaries used in this study are those of local 
goverrunent areas many sections of the Commonwealth Census 
ix 
are directly applicable. The district also corresponded 
almost exactly with two state electorates named, at various 
times, Illawarra, Wollongong or Bulli. In the 1930s 
Wollongong was only part. of the federal electorate of W".criwa. 
Similarly, production and employment figures for the New South 
Wales coal industry were collected by mining districts and, 
while the soFthern mining district is largely contained 
within t.'le 'follongong area, there were often one or two 
small collieries operating outside the Wollongong district. 
To this extent production and employment figures used 
throughout the text are slightly inflated. 
Documentary evidence for a history of the T"/ollongong 
labour movement is sparse. This is partly a reflectiCTn of 
the disruptive affect of the depression upon trade unions and 
labour organisations generally, and partly endemic to local 
history. B: . .- h the Illawarra Trades and Labor Council and 
the Port J{f ... •. · . ..i branch of the FIA ceased to function during 
the depn·,ss;~un. F. t best most miners' lodges met infrequently. 
The reccrds uf the national executive bodies of the FIA and 
the Miners' Federation are almost complete but local branch 
records a=e meagre or n~in-existent. The minute books of the 
Port Kembla FIA branch could not be located. Few minute 
books of individual mine lodges survive. Th~ records of the 
so~therP mining district executive body are missing for the 
period 1933-8. Moreover, those minute books which have 
survived are 0::ten not very informative. The activities of 
the coalminers fortunately received good coverage in both 
local newspapers, the Illawarra Mercury and the S0uth Coast 
Times. Until the F\lblication by the FIA of their own 
broadsheet, ':he .§teel & Meta!. Wo:.:ker, information on the 
ironworkers is sparse. 
Employers' records have provided an almost complete 
picture of the impact of the depression upon production and 
to a lesser extent employment at the Port Kembla industrial 
plants. There are nevertheless significant gaps in the 
x 
information available. Little material remains on the 
operation 
in 1935. 
Manager 
of the steelworks before Hoskin5 merged with BHP 
BHP mode available some of the Port Kembla General 
Business Sheets for the period after 1935. As well 
the company answered queries on specific points. The records 
of the Port Kembla companies (Metal Manufactures and ER & S) 
are more comprehensive than those available for the 
steelworks. Both companies provided access to their records. 
The most serious gap in the records of the employers was the 
almost total lack of information available on the coal 
companies and their marketing associatior1, the Southern 
Colliery Proprietors' Association. To some degree, however, 
this deficiency was made good by the report of a Royal 
Commission into the New South Wales coal industry published 
in 1930. 
A further difficulty, related to the problem of sources 
and common to all local histories, was the 'normality' or 
'abnormality' of Wollon~ong in its attitudes. Should the 
historian of a locality explain events ir- •_erms of lccal 
peculiarities or by reference to wider forces stirri1r9 in 
the country as a whole? To some extent this difficulty was 
lessened by the existence of histories of the two unions 
which dominated the Wollongong labour movPment in the 1930s, 
the FIA and the :·liners' Federation. 1 Together these two 
works provide a frame of reference against which the actions 
of Wollongong coalminers and ironworkers may be set. In 
other ar~as, however, the body of secondary literature remains 
slight. Tlrnre is as yet no history of the New South Wales 
labour movement after 1920, nor a general. hi.stcry of New 
South Wales. Consequently, it has sometimes proved necessary 
to dwell upon the main background events. 
The use of oral evidence has helped overcome some of 
the deficiencies of the written and printed sources. The 
pitfalls of oral history are well known and nee'l not be 
detailed heL·e. Yet the testimony of participants may be 
1Robin Gollan, The Coalminers of New South Wales (Melbourne, 
1963); J.A. Merritt, 'A History of the Federater1 Ironworker.s' 
Association, 1909-1951', Ph.D. Thesis (Australian Naticnal 
University, 1967). 
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subjected to much the same checks as other forms of 
evidence. It may be examined for internal inconsistencies 
or bias, tested against what fra<;'11ents of the written record 
remain or compared with the recollections of those who shared 
similar experiences. As a general observation the 
recollection by participants of events, well documented 
elsewhere, appear surprisingly accurate in their recall of 
the detail and sequence of events. This in itself is some 
indication of the depression's impact upon workers in 
Wollongong. Oral evidence was especially useful in helping 
to put flesh on the bones of such secret organisations as 
the Unemployed Workers' Movement and the New Guard. 
Finally, the emphasis throughout is on the unique 
features of the Wollongong labour movement's depression 
experience. Some attempt has been made to suggest the points 
at which Wollongong e):perience is different from that of 
other districts. In the absence of similar studies in other 
locations meaningful comparison has not been possible. 
.. 
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE BffiTH AND EARLY PP.OBJ..EMS OF AN INDUSTP.IAL TOWN 
The Wollongong-Port Kembla community is located on a 
narrow coastal plain some sixteen miles long and, until it 
reaches Lake Illawarra in the south, nowhere more than five 
miles wide. Bounded to the north and west by a steep scarp 
averaging 1,300 feet in height the district forms a 
geographic unit. The Illawarra scarp has had a profound 
influence upon the district's history. It formed a barrier 
against early penetration and settlement and hindered the 
development of overland communication with Sydney. The shale 
and sandstone strata of the scarp, ho~ever, overlay 
substantial coal measures which were later proved to exist 
under the whole central region of New South Wales outcropping 
in the north near Newcastle and in the south near Wollongong. 
A surface manifestation of the Illawarra deposits was 
discovered at Coalcliff in 1797 but commercial exploitation 
did not follow for a further fifty-two years. During the 
second half of the nineteenth century the adits in the 
Illawarra scarp led to substantial coal measures. The coal 
was removed downhill by the early railways whose course 
followed that of the streams drainin~ eastwards. 1 Settlements 
straggled along the railways southwaras towards the artificial 
2 harbour at Wollongong. 
In 1921 the Wollongong district, co-extensive with the 
municipalities of Wollongong, Central Illawarra, Northern 
Illawarra and the Shire of Bulli, had a population of 32,381 
and an area of 171,456 acres. 3 More than half of this 
1For a more detailed treatment' of the early development of 
the local coal industry see l<'in5.fred Mitchell, 'The Miners of 
Southern New South Wales: a hiA'c,,.ry of the union to 1900', 
M.A. thesis (University of Nc-;1 i'''i'.gland, 1964), pp.1-13. 
2catherine Doyle, 'Localisati<:m of Industry in Coastal 
Regions in New South Wales' , l\t:stralian Geogi:apher, Vol. l, 
Part 2, Novem),>1~.r: 1929, p.45. 
3census of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1921, pp.368-9. 
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population l.~ 7ed in small settlements such as Coalcliff, 
Helensburgh, Clifton and Bulli which grew up in the coastal 
foothills around the pits that gave them life. By the 
mid-1920s there was an almost continuous line of settleme:.t 
for a distance of seventeen miles north of the township of 
2 
1 Wollongong. To English novelist D.H. Lawrence, the son of a 
Nottingham coalminer,· writing in 1922 while living at 
Thirroul, the villages appeared more like mining camps than 
regular settlements. The bungalows were 
... sprinkled about like a great camp, close 
together, yet none touching, and getting thinner 
towards the sea ..•. The place was half and half. 
Tl:ere were many tin roofs - but not so many. 
There were the wide, unmade roads running so 
str~ight as it were to nowhere, with little 
bungalow homes half-lost at :·.he side.2 
Rudimentary and unpretentious though the coalmining 
communities were the extraction of coal had, as yet, Lawrence 
·.1rote, hardly disfigured the landscape. 3 
The township of Wollongong at the southern extremity of 
the coalfield and co-extensive with the municipality of the 
same name had a population of 6,708 of whom some 5,000 lived 
in the closely built-up parts of the town where the 
population density ranged from 500 to as many as 3,000 per 
square mile. 4 But even here there were wide differences 
between the sparsely settled areas on the fringes, 
particularly on the poorly drained narrow coastal plain, and 
the more heavily populated low hills upon which the township 
was built. The main thoroughfares of the township were 
narrow and hilly and the business houses lacked the 
ostentation of mercantile or industrial wealth. A service 
town for a growing dairying industry in the mid-nineteenth 
century Wollongong retained this function in later years. 
Civic positions were still almost exclusively the preserve of 
commercial and landed families whose associations with the 
1catherine Doyle, op.cit., p.45. 
2 D.H. Lawrence, Kangaroo (2enguin, 1968 edition), p.89. 
3
rbid., p.88. 
4
catherine Doyle, op.cit., p.46. 
. . - . . 
~~c~ea~c~ =~~~ ~~=1~. 
lr:. t1ie 
3.ll \,\.'Jrkcr.s \,·ere ,,·orking in ()l" '11)()\lt L11c i.ili11cs, ,,·11ilc in l11e 
Eulli Si1ire fort~· per cent of tl1c tnalc ,,\_1rk-force ,\·ere so 
• . ., 
engagca. 
livelihood 
1
rbid. 
T11c co~l ind us tr)·, 110,,·cvcr, it1 f luc11c<?l1 llH? 
of a much g1·eater number Lh.,n Lhis. The 
2 I~ 
Illawarr;:i Mcrcurv, 4 December 1920. 
I 
3The 1921 census do,cs not enumerate g;:iinful.ly employed males 
but classifies the 111"?!,J.e work force by in<lu,;Lry as a propo1:tio11 
of the total m;:ile p~Jul;:ilion. Ccilcul;:itions bcise<l on Lher-e 
figures show th;:il close lo twenty-five per cent of the lol;:il 
male population were eng;:igecl in the mining o [ co;:i 1. S i.nce 
roughly twenty per cent of the male populcition in l'J;~l were 
either between the ;:iges of 0-J.5 yean1 or over 70 yrcars LL 
follows th;:it ;:it lc;:isl thirty-•;ix per cent ol y.,infully 
employed m;:ilcs were working in Ute coal ind us Ll:y. Ccnsu ..£~ 
the Commonwe;:ilth of /\u!;Lralia, 1921, pp.J7U-;~. See al' 
Appendix A: Distribution of male work force by imluslr}, 
1921-33, p.341. 
4 Ibid. 
,... -· .. -. ' ,. •' . ·'. .. 
transportation of coal had stimulated the volume of rail 
traffic and in 1921 railway workers constituted a further 
4 
ten per cent of the ma!e population whose livelihood was 
directly linked with that of the southern coal industry. 
Indeed entire communities with their local shops - grocers, 
butchers and so on - depended wholly or in large degree on the 
coal industry. 
The economic fortunes of the coal industry during the 
1920s made this dependence an extremely unfortunate one. The 
demand for ~cal had increased with population and industry in 
the Australian colonies. Australian internal demand, however, 
was from the outset less important for thre southern district 
becoiu.;e the 'quality' of the coal was such that it was 
restricted in the main, both at home and overseas, to use in 
ships' bunkering. 1 The demand for coal depends in the first 
instance on its quality or chemical composition. The presence 
or absence of various elements in a coal determine whether or 
not it will be used for a particular purpose and, therefore, 
whether or not buyers will prefer .it t•o other coals. Southern 
coal which had a lower percentage of ·volatile hydrocarbons 
than northern coal gave off less soot and was more suitable 
for ships' boilers, where the narrow flues and tubes were 
easily blocked. 
The very characteristics which gave southern coal an 
advantage in steamship use placed it at a disadvantage in 
other markets. Factory boilers, railway engines and gas-
making required coal which contained a high percentage of 
volatile hydrocarbons and which would cake in the fire. Since 
northern coal more nearly met these requirements southern coal 
initially found little favour i.n Australian internal markets. 
The largest consumer in New South Wales, the government, 
took relatively little coal from the southern district which 
could underquote competitors but could not offer suitable coal. 
Until 1890 coal from Lithgow, ninety miles west of Sydney, and 
not local coals were used on the Illawarra :SOilway, and 
( ' ~ II 
1 '-._) 
I am indebted to Mr C. Fisher for allowing me to read his 
unpublished manuscript, 'Limits on the market for Southern 
District Coal, 1870-80'. 
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Wollongong gasworks used southern coal only when it was mixed 
with northern. Cokeworks tended to use only the poorer 
quality coal which would otherwise have wen dumped into the 
sea. The characteristics of southern coal which made it 
u!"'acceptab.le in the Australian internal market also made it 
1.nacceptable for foreign domestic markets. 
Regular contracts for steamships' bunker coal, for ocean 
going and coastal vessels, ·together with exports to foreign 
ports formed the hard core of southern busines~ but ev~n 
though this trade grew, it was never large enough to keep all 
the mines working continuously. Excess capacity was thus a 
characteristic feature of the district's mines towards the 
end of the nineteenth century and it led to frequent closure 
of them. Such intermittent working resulted in relatively 
high production costs. To avoid these costs and to keep 
their mines working full-time the southern mineowners competed 
for government contracts. Such competition forced down both 
the selling price and the hewing rates paid to miners. The 
general picture of southern mining remained substantially 
unchanged throughout the early years of the twentieth century, 
though the construction of an artificial harbour at Port 
Kembla in 1903 increased the district's ability to compete 
with Newcastle for the export trade and, as the volume of coal 
required by the railways grew, the marginal quality of 
southern coal was offset by proximity to railway depots. 
Nevertheless the bunker trade remained the principal market 
1 for southern coal. 
In the early 1920s however, competition for external 
markets intensified as Australia was drawn into what Maulden 
has termed 'the world war in coal' 2 stemming directly from t~e 
loss of Australia's export markets during the First World War, 
which were not later regained. The AuEt:ralian export trade 
which, between 1900 and 1913 had accounted for approximately 
thirty per cent of total output, had by 1927 fallen to 
1Mines Department Reports, 1927-1930. 
2 F.R.E. Maulden, The Economics of Australian Coal (Melbourne, 
1929), p.2. 
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thirteen per cent. The fall was due partly to a decline in 
coal consumption as countries importir.g Australian coal 
develo~ed substitute resources; partly, to fuller development 
by importing countries of their own resources; partly, to the 
increasing competition from cheap labour countries such as 
South Africa, the East Indies, India and China; and also to 
the irregular deliveries of Australian coal. 
The bunkering-trade upon which the sout!·,.ern mines were 
so reliant suffe.r.ed, the coal companies alle~:.:•d, particularly 
from increased South African competition. As an incentive for 
mining companies to enter the bunkering market the South 
African Government offered a rebate of 7s 9d pc: ton of 2,000 
pounds on all surplus South African coal taken aboard for 
bunkering at ports of the Union. 1 Government encouragement 
was one advantage for South Africa, strategic location another. 
A considerable number of ships sailed the southern routes 
between the seaboard centres in Europe, America and Africa on 
the Atl;:-ntL: side and African, Indian, East Indian and 
Australian ports bordering the Indian Ocean to the east. The 
union's ports were well situated to take advantage of this 
trading pattern. Durban alone developed a bunker trade half 
as large again as the volume to which bunker sales had fallen 
in Australia. To combat South African inroads southern owners 
demanded similar rebates on bunker coal transported by rail, 
and sought the reduction of port and harbour dues. 2 By 19 . .?7 
rail charges on coal had increased by between thirty-eight to 
ninety-six per cent and coal owners were quick to 
point to the pegging of wool freights and the comparatively 
slight increases, of between five and forty per cent, on wheat 
and livestock carried by rail. 3 Rebates, however, would not 
have diminished the South African advantage to any serious 
extent. Moreover, a Tariff Board inquiry reached the 
conclusion that the effect of the South African rebate on 
1Ibid., p.139. 
2Illawarra Mercury, 6 July 1928. 
3Ibid. 
Australian bunker sales was negligible. 1 Further, a 
diminishing demand for bunker coal was inevitable since more 
than half the world's ships in construction were motor ships 
propelled by internal c0mbustion engines. 2 
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The loss of coastal and overseas bunkering trade meant 
that southern coal ":.--:es were forced to compete with northern 
mines and among themselves for a larger share of internal 
trade. To add to their misfortunes the Australian mining 
industry was an acute case of the general malaise that 
2££ect.ed the Australi<· economy at the end of the war and the 
years immediately afterwards. It did not improve. Australian 
demand ior New South Wales coal had fallen away as other 
states, especially Victoria, developed their own resources. 
A further diminution stemmed from the increasing development 
and extended use of alternative sources of power. Australian 
coal mines were simply producing more coal than the country 
required. The estimated productive capacity of New South 
3 Wales mines was 14,600 tons. 
4 
amounted to only 9,460,000. 
The markets offering in 1928 
It was calculated by a Royal 
Commission in 1929 that the southern district employed 1,374 
more miners than were needed. 5 
The generally inferior quali·cy of Illawarra coal 
seriously weakened the competitive ability of southern mines. 
Throughout the curly depression years although employing 
one-quarter of New South Wales miners the southern district 
se•:ured only twelve and a hulf per cent of government coal 
1cPP, 1932-4, Vol.III, p.347. The report showed that only 
35 of the 488 vessels belonging to the overseas Shipping 
Representatives Association to arrive in Australia in 1931, 
had bun~ered in South Africa. See also A.G.L. Shaw and G.R. 
Bruns, The Australian Coal Industry (Melbourne, 1947), p.15. 
2Mauldon, op.cit., p.139. 
3Transcript Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and 
Arbitration: Bellambi Coal Co. Ltd, and ot:1ers versus 
Australasian Coal and Shale Employees Federation. Evidence 
p.4, 15 August 1930. 
4 Ibid. 
5Report of the Royal Commission on the Coal Industry (Sydney, 
1930), p.135. 
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contracts. Smaller mines, particularly those in the southern 
portion of the district suffered on two counts; they could 
neither offer sufficient quantities of coal nor coal of 
suitable quality. The Mt Keira mine, for example, did not 
win its first railway contract until 1932 and even then the 
consignment 
2 
and slack. 
was rejected because it contained excessive fines 
Though the company consistently quoted lower 
prices than its competitors it was unsuccessful in further 
bids for government contracts. 
The nature of the mining enterprises operating in the 
southern district compounded these problems. There were two 
main types of company. The first were dominated by shipping 
interests whose directors were often associated with banking 
and financial houses and in other coal companies within 
Australia and overseas. Coal companies of the second type 
were more independent concerns which provided coal for 
specific local markets. The Metropolitan Coal Company was an 
example of the first category. It was controlled by Huddart 
Parker Industries which operated a fleet of twenty coastal 
steamers. As well Huddart Parker held a majority interest in 
hebburn Ltd, which owned collieries in northern New South Wales. 
Through an interest in the Adelaide Steamship Company it was 
linked by directorships, common shareholdings and by 
partnership with BHP. Two shipping companies, Mcilwraith, 
McEachern Ltd, and Burns Philp and Company Ltd, were the 
principal shareholders in the Bellambi Coal Company. Further, 
the Melbourne Steamship Company substantially owned the Mt 
Pleas~nt and North Bulli collieries. Coalcliff and Mt Keira 
mines were controlled by E.J. 
company which was also linked 
Vickery and Sons Ltd, a Sydney 
. h h' . 3 wit numerous s ipping concerns. 
1Mt Keira Colliery Annual Reports, 1928-33 (Australian National 
University Archives Series 59/5) ; South Coast Times, 
22 September 1933. 
2Ibid. 
3This paragraph is based on the following sources: Mt Keira 
Colliery Annual Reports, 1928-35 (Australian National University 
Archives Scries·59/!\}; A.G.L. Shaw and G.R. Bruns, The 
Australian Coal Industry (Melbourne, 1947), pp.58-9; M.H. 
Ellis, A Saga of Coal (Sydney, 1969), passim; W.J. Mitchell, 
'Wharf Labourers their Unionism and Leadership 1872-1916', 
Ph.D. thesis (University of New South Wales, 1973), p.197. 
" 
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The Wongawilli colliery is the best example of an 
independent mine standing outside this shipping interest. It 
was purchased in 1916 by G. & C. Hoskins the Lithgow iron and 
steel makers. 1 Since its entire production was used by 
Hoskins, Wongawilli was a 'captive pit'. In general the 
remaining collieries which were not directly connected with 
shipping interests provided coal for various public utilities 
including the state railways department and for gas-making 
plants. 
The predominance of the shipping interests had two 
important consequences. In the first place, profits from 
shipping and other enterprises enabled many coal proprietors 
to sustain continued losses in the trading of their mines. 
Secondly, the ability of the owners to live off reserves and 
earnings from ot.'1er sources was a major obstacle to any 
attempted rationalisation of the southern coal industry. There 
was only a limited degre(e of co-operation between the owners. 
Some of the shipping companies negotiated reciprocal agreements 
to ensure a cons·~ant supply of coal for their ships. The 
majority of the coal owners were also joined in the Southern 
Colliery Proprietors' Association. It was through this body 
that they made joint representations to federal and state 
arbitration courts. Generally, however, the int:erests of the 
owners conflicted more often than they converged. 2 
The struggle for diminishing markets expressed itself so 
far as the workers were concerned in extreme intermittency of 
employment, so that while wage rates had increased 
consistently from 1914 onwards actual earnings did not keep 
pace. Between 1914 and 1928 rates for miners and w:ieelers 
increased by one hundred and thirty per cent and one hundred 
and one per cent respectively whereas, for the same period, 
the cost of living increased by sixty and seventy per cent and 
the average wage for all industries by eighty-two per cent. 
Allowing for variations from district to district and from pit 
to pit, a broad picture of miners' earnings for the financial 
1sir Cecil Hoskins, The Hoskins Saga (Sydney, 1969), pp. 79-81. 
2 See Maulden, The Economics of Australian Coal, pp.75-80. 
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year ending 30 June 1928 may be obtained from the report of 
the 1929 Royal Commission. The Commission examined net 
earnings for three broad categories of workers: miners, 
machinemen, shooters and fillers; other underground workers 
(excluding staff anc boys); and workers above ground 
(excluding staff and boys). Men in the first category worked 
an average of six days per fortnight and earned £8 19s 7d; 
those in the second category, 'other underground workers', 
earned £8 18s 7d by working 8.3 days a fortnight; those in the 
t11ird category, 'workers above ground' received £9 18s 2d for 
working 9.6 days a fortnight. In other words intermittency of 
.•mployment reduced actual earnings especL.illy for underground 
workers. This at a time when the basic wage was £8 lOs Od per 
fortnight.~ 
Thus on t:1e average southern district miners received a 
little above the basic wage although a large proportion 
received less than the average for all industries. Some 
t·,·enty-one per cent of mineworkers received less than the 
basic wage and about fifty per cent received less than the 
av~:rage for all industries. l\t the other end of the scale 
about five per cent, the majority of.whom were contract 
workers, received more than £13 a fortnight and a little more 
than one per cent received above £20 per fortnight. Nearly a 
quarter of the district's miners were, in 1928, living below 
what was commonly accepted in Australia as subsistence level. 
In their effort:o; to achieve more regular employment a:-:d 
better working conditions the miners were able to summon 
considerable industrial and politicai support. In the first 
place, Wollongong coalm'. •·'~>:e organised as the southern 
district of the MinerL . eu .... ~ •· .. Jn a national union of miners 
which had r,pen formed in 1916. l. Each pit wi:.hin the coalfield 
elected a lodge secretary and committee to represent them in 
discussions with individual mine managers. Further, each 
lod~e sent a representative to a district delegat~ board. 
1Royal Commission on the Coal Industry, p.133. Southern 
salaries are inflated by the inclusion of overtime rates. 
2There were three New South Wales districts of the Miners' 
Federation: a northern district centred on the Newcastle 
coalfield; a western district based on the Lithgow area; and 
the southern district centred on Wollongong. 
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This body was presided over by two permanent and salaried 
officials - a district president and secretary. Both 
executive positions were elected in an annual ballot ,Jf all 
southern miners. There were other unions, such as the 
Deputies and Shotfirers' Association, the Federated Engine 
Drivers and Firemen's Association, and the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union, with a handful of members at each colliery. 
It was the Miners' Federation, however, which dominated the 
local labour movement. 
As weil as performing the ordinary industrial functions 
of a trade union the southern miners assumed a central role in 
working class political organisation in the Wollongong 
district. Their influence was fortified by the structure and 
rules of the ALP. Members of unions affiliated to the party 
were entitled to vote at pre-selectit'~·. ballots for the 
election of ~ parliamentary candidate to represent the 
electorate in v'hich they resided. 1 Partly as a consequence of 
this Wollongong had returned a coalminer to the state 
parliament since 1891. In that year J.B. Nicholson, the then 
southern miners' secretary, was one of thirty-six successful 
candidates in Labor's initial venture into the parliamentary 
field. 2 Nicholson was scare .. : ly a reliable party man and he 
defied the party when it declared against conscription in 1916. 
In the 1917 state election he stood as a Nationalist candidate 
and was defeated by W.A. Davies who was, like Nicholson before 
him, secretary of the southern district prior to entering 
l . . 3 po itics. 
The attitude of southern miners towards participation in 
politics, however, fluctuated throughout the 1920s. The 
involvement of the Miners' Federation in the One Big Union 
(OBU) , a projected alliance of national unions did not 
1For a discussion of ALP b£anch organisation see D.W. Rawson, 
'The Organization of the Australian Labor P~rty, 1916-1941', 
Ph.D. thesis (Melbourne Uni•1ersity, 1954), pp.116-8. 
2For details of Nicholson's political career see Win Mitchell, 
'John Barnes Nicholson: ~l. S. W. Southern Miners' Labour Member, 
1891-1917', Lrtbour History, no.10, May 1966, pp.13-9; Bede 
Nairn, Civilisinu ·'.:'.:;pitalism: the Labor Movement in N~outh 
Wales 1870-1900, especially pp.67, 103, 203. 
3
see Win Mitchell, op.cit. 
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necessarily imply a move away from politi<.cs. The OBU aimed to 
elimi~~te the craft system, to prevent internecine rivalry 
between small unions and to remind workers that the proper 
object of their animosity was the capitalist class. Its 
leaders also hoped to pave the way for the eventual control of 
industry by workers. Yet, unlike the International Workers of 
the World (IWW) it~ syndicalist forerunner, the OBU did not 
abjure political action. 1 
After 1928 a small section of southern coalminers, 
principally the Militant Minority Movement (MMM) a loose 
organisation of rank and file miners influenced by the 
Communist Party did, however, profess a syndicalist disi:rust 
of political action. 2 As economic conditions worsened 
throughout the 1920s most miners shed their anti-political 
prejudices. For whereas unions which relied on direct action 
alone seemed able to operate effectively only when there was a 
sellers' market for labour, the parliamentary Labor party 
could continue to press the claims of the unions regardless of 
the eco11omic climate. C1.:msequently, between 1922 and 1925 the 
leadership of the Miners' Federation swung firmly behind the 
ALP. A.C. Willis, the federation'~ foundation president, 
emerged from the faction fighting which beset the state ALP 
during the 1920s as one of the inner controlling group. The 
shift back towards reliance upon the political wing of the 
movement was att<lcked by MMM spokesmen and received only 
qualified support from many other miners. Whatever their 
reservations, most ~oalminers realised, however, that Labor 
was the only party with a chance of forming a g9vernmcnt which 
might legislate in their favour. 
1see Ian Bedford, 'The One Dig Union 1918-1923', in Ian Bedford 
and Ress Curnow, Ini l:iative and Organization (Melbourne, 1963) , 
pp.5-4~. 
2 In the Wollongong district the MMM, which was formed in 1928, 
was numerically insignificant. Mr D. •r.i.rnmins and Mr L. 
Boardrr.an, who were both active members of the movement, 
estimate that there were between fifteen and twenty supporters 
on the south coast during the 1920s. Interviews, 8 June 1972, 
7 September 1972. 
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The division between those coalminers who favoun~d 
greater use of the strike and those who preferred a more 
cautious policy is evident from their reactions to the 
declining demand for Australian coal. All miners agreed that 
they faced the greatest economic crisis in the history of their 
industry but were divided as to how it should be met. 
southern miners' officials accepted the claiM of their 
employers tha~ the price of coal was too high to compete with 
overseas rivals. Few miners, however, were willing to accept 
the suggesti011 of the Southern Colliery Proprietors' 
Association that wages should be cut to allow a reduction. 
Rather, they resorted to a conspiracy theory and southern 
district president, F. (F;-,~d) Lowden, claimed that the price 
of Australian coal was artificially inflated by 'secret 
commissions and a multiplicity of selling ag~'nts' • 1 
Whatever explanations miners offered for the coal crisis 
the most pressing problem was to find a means of protecting 
their livelihood. A minority advocated a general stoppage to 
bring the own2rs to their knees and force a government enquiry. 
The Miners' Federation, however, was in chronic financial 
difficulties and unable to finance existing local disputes let 
alone a general stoppage. In March 1926 the executive of the 
federation announced that while its strike levy of one and a 
quarter per cent was bringing in £2,800 a fortnight, £6,000 was 
? 
needed to finance current (iisputes. - In the same year the 
southern district contributed nearly £10,000 to the Miners' 
Federation and almost £4,000 in 1927 or a total of 
approximately £14,000 for the two years. 3 During the same 
period, however, intermittency and relief payments from the 
federation exceeded £16,000. 4 southern officials in an effort 
to explain the imbalance, argued that as intermittency had 
increased since 1925 so too had the number of small strikes. 
More fr~quent strike action, was, they claimed, at least 
1 Illawarra Mercury, 3 May 1928. 
2 Report of Second Miners' Convention, Sydney, 12-28 June 1928, 
p.109. 
3Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
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partly attributable to the federations' decision in 1925 to 
pay strike-money from the first day of a stcppage. 1 Miners, 
the officials alleged, were beginning to look on strike-pay as 
a kind of intermittency payment or •.memployment relief. 
The increasing inability of the Miners' Federation to 
meet the demands of lodges not only r-roduced a corresponding 
loss of confidence in the executive but also employers, 
sensing the weaker financial position of the federation, were 
encouraged to effect economies in working conditions. They 
also began to adopt a tougher line in on-the-spot negotiations 
with the miners for special payments. Further, limited funds 
compelled the federation to adopt 2 policy of selecting 
particular grievances on which it was prepared to make a sto,nd 
while at the same time dampening requests for s_trike action on 
other perhaps equally good grounds. In 1928 the federation 
supported a five-month strike at Coalclif f over payments in 
'deficient' areas, but refused to sanction a strike on a 
similar question by Mt Keira miners until the Coalcliff issue 
had been settled. 2 In the event the Coalcliff dispute was 
lost at a cost of £9,000 to the federation and Mt Keira miners 
were compelled to ta:;e up their grievances with an unreceptive 
Arbitration court. 3 
The restraints which inadequate financial support from 
the federation placed on the workers were obvious to all miners 
and the solution was equally clear: levies could be increased 
to meet liabilities or payments could b., reduced. !n June 
1928 a convention assembled to consider these alternatives and 
the possible reorganisation of the federation along more 
centralised lines. In the convention debates southern 
representatives supported the existing leadership and 
advocated a reduction in payments. On both stands they were 
opposed by delegates who broadly shared the views of the MMM. 
All southern delegates supported A.C. Willis when he called 
1Ibid., p.110. 
2Ibid., p.109. 
1 Ibid. 
. \ 
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somewhat inconsistently for opposition to the centralisers and 
for a less parochial attitude by the districts. 1 On the 
question of ta.ctics southern delegates were united: militant 
policies could be applied only when accompanied by real 
strength. In times of unemployment a prudent policy of 
co-operation with the Arbitration Court might be wiser. 
Displaying a charact ristically pragmatic approach most miners 
sought to shelter under the arbitration umbrella. A. Southern, 
summed up moderate thinking when he asked: 
I want to know what chance we have to win [by 
. strike action]. Of eleven lodges we have 4,000 
miners and about 1,000 working four shifts a 
week while the remaining 3,000 are working 21; 2 days a week. They are clamouring for work and 
demanding strike pay be paid them ...• 2 
In his view and that of other southern delegates the 
answer was clear. Direct action was, for the present, an 
absurd policy. The federation was not strong enough to go 
into a fight and win. Moreover, E. Best, a Mt Keira delegate, 
went so far as to suggest that strikes would be less frequent 
3 if strike-pay was withheld until the fifth week of a stoppage. 
Predictably southe!:"n representatives rejected the proposition 
of the MMM that districts should be abolished and replaced by 
a central executive possessing full powers to deal with all 
the matters which, under the existing constitution, fell to 
the districts. In their view such a move would diminish and 
not increase rank and file control of the executive which was 
the main plank of their policy. Moreover, the motion, 
presented by northern delegates, to abolish the districts was, 
as Goll.an says, 4 no self-denying ordinance but rather a 
takeover bid. The new ex8cutive was to be based in Newcastle. 
Viewpoints expressed at the conference revealed that southern 
miners were more united in support of a defensive policy than 
their northern counterpar.ts. In the end, though divisions 
were revealed, moderate counsels prevailed. 
1Report of the Second Miner:;_' Convention, p.8. 
2
rbid., p.108. 
3
rbid., p.109. 
4Robin Gollan, The Coalminers of New South Wales: A History of 
the Union, 1860-1960 (Melbourne, 1963), pp.183-7. 
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Goverrunent action in July 1928, however, led many to 
question continued caution and to consider more seriously 
strike proposals. The conservative New South Wales premier, 
T.R. Bavin was alarmed at the state of the coal industry. He 
initiated conferences of owners and unions which were held in 
August and October. During the course of these discussions 
Bavin put forward a tentative solution for the coal crisis. 
His plan involved a 4s per ton reduction of the internal 
selling price of Maitland coal with a further reduction of ls 
for export coal. Price-cutting was to be financed by the New 
South Wales goverrunent bearing 2s of the cost, the Commonwealth 
government the ls on coal exported and the remaining 2s to be 
borne equally by the coal proprietors and the miners. 
In January 1929 southern miners unanimously rejected 
Bavin's proposal and denounced all suggestions that wages 
should be cut. The central executive of the Miners' 
Federation formally condemned the plan on 5 February and 
sought the establishment of a Royal Commission. Ten days 
later the Associated Northern Collieries gave their employees 
fourteen days' notice and announced that they would reopen 
their mines when the miners were prepared to accept a twelve 
per cent wage reduction for piece-work and ls per day less 
for ddily workers. So began a stoppage of sixteen months 
which was to have serious repercussions for the entire 
industry. 
In keeping with federation policy, J.T. Sweeney and 
F. Lowden, southern district officials, restrained militant 
demands for a general strike. Declaring that 'while in this 
struggle as in all others the workers should move together in 
1 
one direction and be controlled from the one centre', Lowden 
insisted that the fighting front should be kept as short as 
possible. Miners should continue working until otherwise 
advised by·the Federation. 2 The Federal executive agreed that 
the dispute should be confined to the north, and financed by a 
1Illawarra Mercury, 16 March 1929. 
2Ibid. 
-.~, 
twelve and a half per cent levy on southern and western 
district miners. 1 
17 
While some were willing to demand a general strike, even 
more opposed the 'iniquitous percentage system•. 2 Corrimal 
and Excelsior lodges refused to pay the levy. Lowden claimed 
that the lodges were not defying the executive but merely 
withholding the levy until federation tactics were explained 
3 to them. But despite Lowden's attempt to gain time and the 
confident assertions of the Labor Daily that all levies were 
being paid, many miners remained reluctant to accept 
voluntarily what northern miners were fighting to avoid - a 
twelve and a half per cent reduction in wages. 4 
Southern collieries, however, were soon to benefit from 
the closure of the northern mines. During early April 
intermittency was s::.ill apparent at Mt Keira, Mt Kembla and 
Mt Pleasant, 5 the smaller mines to the south of the coalfield. 
By the end of the month even these mines, however, were 
working better time. For the first pay-period in May all 
mines except Scarborough were fully operative. 6 For many 
the first time in two years that they had drawn miners it was 
'full time'. 7 While there were variations from pit to pit it 
was common for men to draw £15 per fortnight and some earned 
as much as £18 per fortnight. 8 With more work and wages 
southern miners were able to see advantages in contributing 
to maintain locked-out northern miners and the levy became 
less difficult to collect. 
1The Newcastle Colliery Association, The Cessation of Work at 
the Northern Collieries, pamphlet n.d. p.28. 
2 Illawarra Mercury, 12 April 1929. 
3Ibid., 19 April 1929. 
4Labor Daily, 9 May 1929. see also: Illawarra Mercury, 
5 April 1929. 
5 Illawarra Mercury, 5, 12 April 1929. 
6
south Coast Times, 26 April 1929. A pay-period consisted of 
ten working-days. 
7sydney Morning Herald, 14 May 1929. 
8 rllawarra ~cury, 3 May 1929. 
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The full implications of the northern dispute were 
nevertheless clear to all southern miners. Should the north 
be defeated reductions in the south would quickly follow. For 
this reason they hoped that the hearings of the Royal 
Commission, set up in June 1929 by state and federal 
governments, would enable them to win public support for an 
investigation of owners' profits. Southern miners despaired, 
however, when the coal commission announced that unlike the 
Sankey Commission 
to the public. 1 
in Britain they would close their hearings 
The last real hope seemed to rest with the 
election of a Labor Government in the October federal 
elections. The re-opening of the northern collieri~s on the 
pre-lockout basis was confidently expected to be the first 
action of the federal Labor party should it be returned to 
power. To hasten this end the central council voted £1,000 
towards Labor's campaign expenses. 2 
But Labor in power turned out to be a disappointment. 
For while the party gained a large majority in the House of 
Represent~tives, it held only seven of the thirty-six seats 
in the Senate. This was a situation which during 1929 and the 
early months of 1930 made it powerless to act decisively on 
the coal crisis. Southern miners were in no mood to 
appreciate the Scullin government's predicament. They 
advocated an immediate withdrawal from the ALP and advised the 
Miners' Federation to demand the return of its £1,000 
contribution to the party's election fund. 3 
Negotiations in the north continued, but it was now clear 
that the federation's policy of limiting the struggle had 
failed. Southern miners were more ready to listen to charges 
of disloyalty and hypocrisy levelled against their leaders 
and more inclined to accept the argwnent of the MMM that only 
a general stoppage would halt the catastrophic defeat in which 
they found themselves. Lowden's argwnent that loyalty meant 
carrying out the combined unions' policy of continuing 
1rbid., 5 July 1929. 
2Miner.s' Federation Central Council Minutes (CCM), 
24 September 1929. 
3r11awarra Mercury, 6 December 1929. 
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production and providing financial support ior miners in the 
north gained nothing in conviction by frequent repetition. 1 
1n December 1929 the Nationalist Government of New South Wales 
determined to re-open the northern mines with non-union labour 
,3nd despatched an armed police contingent to enforce its 
decision. This aggression strengthened the influence of 
general strike advocates. The death of a young miner, Norman 
Brm-m, shot during a clash between police and pickets at 
Rothbury, heightened emotions and underscored the militant 
argument that further government attacks could only ))e 
1dthstood by widening the strike. 2 
Soutrern district officials called an immediate stop-
work. More than 1,000 miners attended to mark the death of a 
comrade 'foully murdered by servants of the coal owners and 
the Government• 3 the victim, miners said, of a 'judicial murder 
by a hired assassin'. 4 Feeling ran high and a South Bulli 
spokesman was counted out when he advocated a return to work. 
Militant spokesmen felt Bavin's recent public admission that 
coal supplies were running low gave them a strategic advantage. 
They could paralyse the country's coal supplies and compel 
direct intervention by the federal government.. Militants 
claimed that officials had led a retreat by stubbornly 
clinging to a policy of non-extensi.on. 5 Moreover, they 
claimed it was federation policy to adopt direct action when 
conciliation failed - and never before had conciliation failed 
so demonstrably. The rank and file must give the lead 
officials had failed to provide and declare their support for 
a seneral strike. MMM leaders backed their convictions with a 
definite plan. Two delegates from each lodge were to attend a 
delegate board meeting and summon a special convention to 
control a nation-wide coal strike and establish rank and file 
1
rbid., 30 November 1929. 
2For a detailed treatment of the events at Rothbury see 
Miriam Dixson, 'Rothbury' in Robert Cooksey (ed.), The Great 
Depression in Australia, pp.14-26. 
3Labor Daily, 18 December 1929. 
4Ibid. 
5
rbid. 
,-
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corrunittees. The delegate board should then form itself into 
a district council of action with authority to add to its 
number representatives from other unions. 1 
When put 
506 to 452.?. 
to the vote these proposals were defeated by 
Apart from the Labor Daily representative, 
R. Allen, newspaper reporters were excluded from the meeting 
and it is difficult to gauge the degree of support for a 
general strike. Allen, an unemployed coalminer ana ~~lM 
sympathiser, claimed that although the movement's proposals 
were rejected most miners favoured strike action and that 
disagreement was confined to questions of timing and 
organisation. 3 His view underplays the continuing support for 
the official federation policy of non-extension. An anonymous 
South Bulli miner probably expressed the doubts of the 
majority when he· asked the source and the extent of financial 
support southern miners could expect should they strike. 4 
In the event 'a sizeable majority• 5 supported an immediate 
return to work. 
If the miners were, as Allen suggests, divided only in 
their attitude towards an irrunediate general strike they were 
more nearly unanimous in their denunciation of the Federal 
Labor Government. Militants accused Labor politicians of 
merely administering the affairs of the capitalist state for 
the benefit of employers yet at the same time asked that they 
declare a state of ~ational emergency to demonstrate continued 
6 
support for Australian workers. 'I'he Coalcliff Lodge 
likewise demanded 
... that they [the Federal Labor Government] discard 
their garb of strict neutrality and utilise every 
means in their power with the object of driving 
1
rbid., 18 December 1929. 
2Ibid. 
3
rbid. 
4 Ibid. 
5sydney Morning Herald, 18 December 1929. 
6Labor Daily, 18 December 1929. 
the scabs from Rothbury and forcing the 
mineowners Io re-open the mines upon pre-stoppage 
conditions. 
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Lowden, Sweeney and other southern district officials were 
embarrassed by the belligerence of the protests and though 
requesting more action from the Federal Government took care 
to modify the censure in their public statements. 2 
Throughout the Christmas holiday period representatives 
of the northern district MMM stumped the southern coalfield 
urging support for an immediate general strike confident in 
the belief that a stoppage of six weeks would compel the 
Federal Government to intervene and nationalise the mines. 3 
Strike advocates were now speaking to an audience more 
inclined to accept some of their conclusions. Excelsior 
miners, after hearing northern militants, decided not to 
return to work on 6 January. 4 Old Bulli workers voted by 211 
to thirty-three to cease work while Corrimal miners agreed, 
5 though with some hesitation, to endorse the strike proposills. 
Lowden, previously unyielding in his support for non-
extension declared that the 'psychological moment• 6 for strike 
action had arrived. Miners in the smaller south':'rn mines 
which had only belatedly begun to regain lost trade favoured 
a twenty per cent levy. 7 At a special delegate board meeting 
S'J.lTllTloned to consider the general strike Excelsior mine.::s 
moved that the Federal Council sanction an 'immediate all 
out•. 8 The proposal was lost by a 'substantial margin• 9 
though there was general support for a motion threatening a 
strike at some later and unspecified time. 
l Illawarra :·lercury, 27 D( :ember 1929. 
2Tb"d ~ J. • 
3 Sydney Morning Herald, 6 J_.:mary 1930. 
4
rbid., 8 January 1930. 
5Ibid. 
6 Illawarra Mercury, 10 January 1930. 
7 Sydney Morning Herald, 14 January 1930. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
,; . 
Strike action had only limited possibilities. To reap 
full advantage of their fortuitous market monopoly southern 
coal proprietors were anxious to avoid stoppages. Ir;deed, 
such was their anxiety that they offered miners bonus 
payments for strike-free performancer. and sought to snspend 
h . ·a l the customary C ristmas holi ay break. In these 
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circumstances the threat of a strike would appear to be a 
viable alternative. But lack of competition since the 
beginning of the northern lockout had merely allowed 
recovery, not expansion. For many of the smaller mines the 
upswing in trade came too late. In April 1929 the Bellambi 
Coal Company declared they could find no buyers for coal on 
hand and returned £200,000, or half its paid up capital, to 
shareholders. 2 The following month it was rumoured th~t the 
South Kembla mine was to go into liquidation and miners 
complained that the company was three weeks in arrears with 
3 ,. · · d. M b th wages. ..lining operations c2ase in ay ut. ere was no 
immediate liquidation. An attempted restart in June proved 
abortive and the company finally went into receivership in 
4 September. Further, the Bulli Colliery and Cokeworks, which 
had operated at a loss to shareholders since 1926, estimated 
a deficit of £270 for the financial year ending 31 December 
1929. 5 
The court wrangles continued until March 1930 and the 
position of northern miners worsened further when the State 
Government stopped all unemployment relief on the northern 
coalfields. Southern militants continued to call for a 
general strike but on 3 May the Central Council of the Miners' 
Federation decided to o~der a return to work in the north to 
avert inevitable defeat. 6 To many Wollongong district miners 
1;11awarra Mercury, 29 November 1929. 
2Ibid., 5 April 1929. 
3Ibid., 24 May 1929. 
4
rbid., 22, 29 November 1929. 
' 
"soulh C<XtSL 'l'imcs, 5 April 1930. 
6
ccM, 3 ~k1y 1930. 
of miLLtant sympathies capitulation could have been avoided 
by an 'all out' policy. 
The federation's policy ot non-extension allowed 
2J 
greater earnings by southern miners, but weakened still 
further their bargaining position on matters affecting 
working conditions. To minimise the danger of gas and coal 
dust explosions the Mines Department, following American 
precedent, introduced compulsory stone dusting in mines 
subject to dangerous gas concentration. 1 Miners objected and 
~rgued that while the practice could be an effective 
safeguard against explosion it was in itself a health hazard 
and contributed to the increasing number of lung disorders 
common among older miners. 2 Moreover, local miners so 
affected could not claim compensation under the Silicosis 
Act which applied only to the county of Cumberland. .Medical 
opinion was divided on the question but investigations .. 
3 Wales tended to support ~he miners' claims and consequently 
in June 1929, the southern delegate board instructed miners 
to refuse to carry out stone dusting. 4 The following month 
two South Kembla miners were dismissed for implementing the 
ban. The colliery manager, A.E. Sellars, was adamant; 
failure to accept stone dusting would be met by a closure of 
the mine. The Illawarra Mercury decried the apparent 
intransigence of both sides and foretold a lengthy strike. 5 
The prediction was based on past performance rather than 
current trends for southern officials had shown themselves 
to be wedded to the idea of non-extension. By confining t];,·, 
strike to the north massive wage-cuts might be avoided. A 
stoppage in the south could only serve to jeopardise this aim. 
1Mines Report, 1928, pp.69-70. 
2 Illawarra Mercury, 7 May 1929. 
3
s. Lyle Cummins, ~oal Dust & Stone Dust And its Effects on 
the Health of the Workers, n.d. (South Coast Times Print, 
Wollongong), passim. 
4 Illawarra Mercury, 14 June 1929. 
5sydney Morning Herald, 8 July 1929; Illawarra Mercury, 
12 July 1929. 
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Not surprisingly the delegate board reversed its earlier 
decision and rather than disrupt the flow of money to 
distressed northern miners withdrew the ban on stone dusting~ 
Similarly disputes over payments for men working behind coal 
cutting machines at Coalcliff were dampened and lodge 
officials were powerless to prevent owners employing 
newcomers to the district to replace absentees or me!l on 
t . 2 compensa ion. 
The 1920s was a decade of declining and uncertain 
markets for the southern coal industry relieved only by a 
fortuitous revival at its close. To some extent, however, 
the collapse of the coal industry was offset by the expansion 
of secondary industry. Before World War I, despite its 
coastal location and proximity to major coal measures, the 
Wollongong-Port Kembla district had scarcely been affected by 
industrialisation. Throughout the nineteenth century rhe 
lack of adequate shipping facilities retarded industrial 
growth. small jetties at Coalcliff, Bulli and Wollongong 
offered poor berthing depths, only limited protection in 
other than calm weather and were incapable, except at 
considerable expense, of .enlargement. '!'his handicap had been 
acknowledged in 1897 when a parliamentary corrmittee 
recommended the construction of a deep-sea harbour at Port 
Kembla in the oelief that proxbnity to a major coalfield, a 
strategic market location between the two major centres of 
population (Sydney and Melbourne) and the availabilit. -::if 
cheap land would attract industry to the district. 3 
The Electrolytic Refining and Smelting company (Ek & S) 
agreed fully with the committGe's assessment, and in 1907, 
1
svdney Morning Herald, 15 July 1929. 
2rllawarra Mercury, 22, 2'l November 1929. 
30 Report together with Minutes of Evidence, Appendices, and 
Plans Relating to the Proposed Construction of a Deepwater 
Harbour at Port Kembla', Journal of the Legislativf! Council 
of New South Wales, 56, Part 3, Session 1897, pp.369-86. 
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four years after the initial harbour. construction was 
completed, began preparations for the establishment of a 
copper smelting plant near the new port. Though posse~sing 
no general advantage over Newcastl~ in proximity to copper 
supplies (at Mt Morgan and Cloncurry in Queensland; Mt Lyell 
in Tasmania; and Cobar, Mt Hope and Mt Royal in Sou'-:·· 
Australia) Port Kembla was nevertheles~ closer to Sydney and 
Melbourne mc·,:·kets. Moreover, land prices at Port Kembla 
were lo~ and as ~here W< no industry in the district the 
company hoped that coa::. c-ners would welcome a home market 
and supply at relativ'"J.. cheap rates the coal to gener<J.te 
electricity for the purpose of refining the copper anodes. 1 
The refinery made ste.ady if unspectacular progress until 
ti:e outbreak of war in 1914 when the Federal Goverrun~nt 
b~came alarmed at the inability of the existing base-metal 
industry, which was vital to the production of munitions, to 
meet the emergency conditions. Goverrunent concern 
intensified when it became clear that the entire base-metals 
inu.rket was controlled by a small group of German firms 
working closely together. They maintain-··' .. heir hold by 
means of long-term contracts as was cust0 ... ::::cy in view of the 
large outlay involved in smelting works and the importance 
of continuity of sunply. One-third of the shares in the Port 
Kembla refinery were held by Aaron airsch and Son of 
Frankfurt-on-Main who, unL.l war began, had purchased the 
larger share of the refined copper. 2 To free the copper, 
lead and zinc industries from German control, the Federal 
Government in May 1916 passed the Trading with the Eneny 
Act, and pushed all three reaC::'ngs of the Enemy Contracts 
Annulment Act through the House of Representatives in one 
3 day. 'l'he latter Act allowed any party to a contract w:.th a 
firm owned or cont.rolled by enemy citizens to file it with 
1Electrolytic Refine:r:y and Smelting Company Directors Minute 
Books, December 1907. 
2M.H. Ellis, Metal Manufactures Limited: A Golden Jubilee 
History, 1916-196( (Sydney, 1966), p.4. 
3
cPP, LXXVJ. 2884 (IR) , 2955-3249 ( 2R) , 3 308 ( 311.) . 
'·" 
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the Attorney General for declaration as an enemy contract, 
whereupon it would be cancelled. But uncertainty as to the 
effectiveness of the Act and a reluctance to surrender long-
term German contracts led ER & S and other base-metal interests 
to hesitate before co~plying with the Act. W.M. Hughes, the 
Attorney-General, eventually wru •. J compliance from the Port 
Kembla works by threatening to declare it an enemy company. 1 
The show of strength had the desired effect and the Port 
Kembla company submitted its foreign contracts for annulment. 
The way was now clear for the Government to completely 
reorganise the Australian metal industries. The first step 
was the creation of the Australian Metal Exchange. Export of 
any metals other than gold or silver, except throt:.t~;.'1 a member 
of the exchange ~as prohibited under the wartime controls. 
The Government encouraged the formation 
~ake over and enlarge existing works to 
and lead produced in the Commonwealth. 
of new companies to 
process the copper 
The establishment of 
Metal Manufactu;:0s for the fabrication of brass, wire, 
telephcne cables, tubes, plates and alloys was part of this 
activity deliberately encouraged by the government. The new 
2lant was built alongside the Port Kembla refinery from which 
it obtained its copp1,r supplies. Production commer • .::ed ; u 
·'<<:>ril 1918 and the first order was received the following 
2 
''·)nth. 
During the manufacturing company's early trading years 
demand for its products remained constantly high. The 
extended use of electricity was one of the outstanding 
developments of the 1920s, a decade which saw a large-scale 
conversion in Australia of lighting, of machinery, and of 
household appliances to electric power. Of greatest benefit 
to .r-:.:tal Manufactures was the extension of telephone 
services. In 1919 there were 2,256 telephone exchanges in 
;. Australia but by 1927 the number had risen to 5,482 .. ~' With 
.. 
~' . ',~ 
·''•' ~· .. ~'.::1~F 
1Ellis, Metal Manufactures, p.10. 
2 Metal Manufactures Annual Reports 1919; Ellis, [1Q_tal 
Manufactures, p.22. 
3Ibid . 
.. 
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l ), increased government expenditure in this sphere Metal Manufactures' fin'lncial position was secure for there was 
some sort of undertaking that the Postmaster-General's 
Department would purchase all its cable requirements from 
the company. It appears that Hughes promised the firm in 
27 
1916 a ten-year monopoly of Commonwealth cable requirements. 1 
Tenders for contracts with the Postmaster-General'~ Department 
were required to state the country of origin of thE· copper 
and preference was given to those manuf?. ·.:urers us:cng 
Australian copper. 2 In 1920 this preference system worked in 
the following way: the price per ton of copper wire was 
calculated b1• taking the price of electrolytic copper in 
London and adding £57 10s for the Port Kembla manufacturing 
3 
cost. At this time, the manufacturing cost in Britain and 
4 America was about £35 per ton. Protection was formalised in 
the Greene Tariff 0f 1921. 
Preference in government contracts, tariff protection 
and the expanding demands of the electrical industry thus 
ensured a rapid expansion in the company's output. In 1925 
production of wire reached 8,000 tons and, with 3,000 tons of 
cable and slightly less than 1,000 tons of tube, total 
production was close to 12,000 tons. 5 The 1925 output was, 
however, not repeated in the succeeding three years. 
Expansion gave way to the enforced idleness of much of the 
plant and the labour force. In 1926 orders from the General 
Post Office fell drastically. To some extent demand up until 
1925 had been abnormal and associated with the setback to 
public utilities during the war. By 1925 supply had caught 
1
commonwealth Stores Supply d.nd Tender Board (C.P. 370, 
Series 4), Business Paper, Meeting, 25 January 1921, p.3. 
2 Ibid. , pp • 2-3 . 
3Parliamentary Committee on Public Works, CPP 1920-21 v. 
Evidence of J.M. Crawford, State Engineer, Postmaster-
General' s Department, New South Wales, 15 December 1920, p.104. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Metal Manufactures Annual Reports, 1926. 
/,~ 
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up with demand. Moreover the intensity of import 
competition increased sharply. Despite a thirteen per cent 
increase in the British Preferential Tariff between 1924-5 
and 1928-9 (and a similar increase in the general tariff), 
manufacturing profits were eroded as a result of the steep 
fall in import prices and the failure of domestic costs to 
move in sympathy. 1 Whatever the reason for the diminishing 
orders the result was a decline in the overall production of 
wire and cables by 2,500 tons compared with the previous 
year. 2 The following year output was less than that for 
1923. 
Employment figures varied with production. In the 
first 
100. 3 
year of operation the company employed a work-force of 
By 1925, the peak production year, the nwnber of 
employed increased to 800. 4 In the following eighteen months 
this figure dropped b~ck to 600 and sections of the work-
force experienced intermittency as parts of the plant closed 
5 foL· periods of up to two months. Worst hit was the 
telephone cable department which ceased production in 
6 November 1926 and did not restart until the following January. 
t"\n expansion of the tube factory's output allowed the company 
to operate until mid-1930 without further reduction in the 
7 
number employed. 
The decline in copper manufacturing was reflected in 
J 
sev:·rely reduced activity at the smelting works. Wartime 
demand had forced the price of copper up to £108 per ton and 
1Ibid., o.24. See also C.B. Schedvin, Australia and the 
Great Depression (Sydney, 1970), pp.53-6. 
2Estimate from graphs published in Metal Manufactures Gazette, 
June 1939, p.11. See Appendix B: Production at Metal 
Manufactures, 1927-1936, p.342. 
3
see Appendix c: Metal Manufactures Limited Average Annual 
Nwnber of Employees, 1919-1944, p.343. 
4 Ibid. 
5Metal Manufactures Directors Reports, 1927; Illawarra Mercury, 
12 January 1927. 
6Ibid. 
7Metal Manufactures Gazette, June 1939, p.11. 
th•? 1:ompany prospered. 
fisure of 23,058 tons. 1 
In 1918 production reached its peak 
Between 1918 and 1923, however, 
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the value of Australian copper prices fell by eighty per cent 
following the collapse of copper prices in the world market. 
In the six years after the war the price of copper was 
halved, the sharpest fall occurring between 1920 and 1921 when 
the average price fell from £110 to £75 per ton. 2 This 
decline in price was accompanied by the exhaustion of 
Australian copper deposits. From 1911 onwards ER & s 
obtained its blister-copper from an associate the Mt Lyell 
Company. When Australian copper supplies dried up the Port 
Kembla works were kept alive by the refining of Mt Lyell 
3 
copper. To avoid the expense of refining at Port Kembla, 
the Tasmanian company, however, established their own 
refinery. In 1928 the new refinery drew the first cathode of 
copper from the precipitation tank and thereafter the Port 
Kembla plant became little more than a ghost refinery confined 
in the main to melting down sheets of Tasmanian cathode 
4 
copper wire into bars for use by Metal Manufactures. 
The late 1920s offered a bleak prospect for Wollongong 
workers. The future seemed to be linked with a wasting 
mineral asset in diminishing demand. The decision of Hoskins 
Ltd, to transfer their iron and steel plant from Lithgow to 
Port Kembla was therefore hailed as an augury of better '-, L•es. 
The Wollongong Chamber of Commerce hopefully predicted the 
birth of 'a new Birmingham• 5 on the south coast. Wollongong 
1Ellis, Metal Manufactures, p.4. 
2 . t Mines Department Reper s, 
3Electrolytic Refining and 
see also Geoffrey Blainey, 
pp.260-1. 
1921-2. 
Smelting Directors Minutes, 1928: 
The Peaks of Lyell (Sydney, 1954), 
4 Blainey, The Peaks of Lyell, p.261. 
5
:;:11awarra Mercury, 7 March 1928. 
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would cease to be a rural-mining service centre and become 
the nucleus of a 'steeltown•. 1 Coalminers working short-time 
were gratified at the prospect of the fuller pay packets of 
'a high wage industry'. 2 Both expectations appeared on the 
surface to be well grounded. 
Hoskins, though no match 
producer of iron and 
1920 reached 120,000 
steel. 
tons. 3 
for BHP, were an important 
Their pig-iron production in 
In terms of steel Hoskins were 
relatively less significant and from 1923-4 their steel 
output figures averaged about 55,000 tons or between 
one-quarter to one-seventh of BHP's production. The firm 
employed between 1,500 and 3,000 men. Net p~ofits for the 
period 1921-5 averaged £92,000 per annum, and total assets 
d 4 . 5 were value at £2m. However, as Merritt suggests, 
reasonable profits did not blind Hoskins to the problems of 
the Lithgow site: the iron ore reserves in western New South 
Wales, on which the firm relied, were almost exhausted; 
Lithgow coal was unsatisfactory and had to be mixed with 
coastal coal to obtain a satisfactory coke; freight costs on 
both raw materials and finished products were becoming a 
serious handicap; and the plant had been badly planned and 
could not be regarded as an integrated iron and steel works. 
In 1924 Hoskins purchased 400 acres of land at Port Kembla 
which, with a deep-water harbour and proximity to the 
company's coke works at Wongawilli and limestone deposits 
some sixty-seven miles inland at Marulan, seemed likely to 
improve their competitive position. 6 
1
south Coast Times, 14 April 1928. 
2 Illawarra Mercury, 7 March 1928. 
3 Prospectus of Hoskins Iron & Steel Co. Ltd, 1926, p.3. 
4Hoskins Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. <~company brochure, 1925), 
p.15. 
5J.A. Merritt, 'A History of the Federated Ironworkers' 
Association of Australia, 1909-1952', Ph.D. thesis 
(Australian National University, 1967), p.79. 
6
sir Cecil Hoskins, The Hoskins Saga (Sydney, 1969), 
pp.88-112. The land was originally part of the 
W.C. Wentworth estate . 
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However, there were considerable difficulties. The New 
south Wales government had to be convinced that the 
construction of a railway line from Port Kembla inland to 
Marulan, involving a climb of 2,000 feet over the Illawarra 
scarp, was an economic proposition. The undeveloped Port 
Kembla site was swampy and required drainage, the harbour 
needed dredging and wharves and jetties had tc be built. In 
1923 Charles Hoskins, managing director of the company, 
persuaded the New South Wales Parliamentary Standing conunittee 
on Public Works that the railway line to Moss Vale would 
justify the estimated expenditure of £854,024. 1 The 
government accepted Hoskins' argument that the railways would 
earn £100,000 in freight charges in the first year of 
operation with increasing amounts in s·..icceeding years but 
required a guarantee that the works would be in progress 
before the line was started. 2 
The construction of the new steel plant proved to be 
beyond the company's resources and Hoskins began negotiations 
with Dorman Long and Co. Ltd, a large British Steel firm with 
engineering branches in Australia, Baldwins Ltd, another 
British steel firm and Howard Smith Ltd, shipowners and coal 
merchants of Melbourne. In 1928 a new company, Australian 
Iron and Steel Ltd (AIS), was formed. This was an important 
development both in the iron and steel industry and for Lie 
district. Here was a new company with a good site backed by 
four experienced firms. Yet the strange nature of the merger 
1
see Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works. 
Report with Minutes of Evidence, Appendices and Plan 
Relating to the Proposed Railway from Moss Vale to Port 
Kembla, PP (NSW) 1923, Vol.111, p.445. Also Moss Vale to 
Port Kembla Railway Act (No. 63 of 1924) and Moss Vale to 
Port Kembla Railway Ratification Act {No. 21 of 1927). 
2Ibid. 
The Port Kembla steelworks and surroundings, 1928, 
No, 1 blast funiace is in the left foreground, 
North of Tom Thumb Lagoon {centre) is the township 
of IVollongong, 
A section of the construction site at Port Kembla, 
Foundations for the No, 1 open-hearth furriaco, 1929, 
AIS 
AIS 
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1 
caused much comment. No new capital was provided Jo•,· ~he new 
partners. Dorman Long brought into the new company its 
assets in Australia, principally engineering shops in 
olelbourne and Sydney but excluding its Sydney Harbour Bridge 
contract. For these assets they received £195,536 in cash 
and 203,500 in ordinary shares plus the transfer from the 
Hoskins' family of 396,000 ordinary shares. Thus Dorman Long 
received £396,400 for goodwill and the use of its research 
results and selling agency in Australia. 2 Baldwin's Ltd, 
;orovided a 'hea•1y steel rolling mill for which it received 
100,000 ordinary shares and £68,000 in cash. Howard Smith, 
which was to be the shipping and selling agency of the new 
business, took up 350,000 ordinary shares for cash and was 
given a further 50,000 by the Hoskins family. 3 
Undercapitalised from the outset, the firm ran into 
financial difficulties almost inunediately. The cost of 
mining iron ore leases obtained on Cockatoo Island and Keelan 
I~lands in the Yampi Sound proved prohibitive and in July 
1928 AIS was forced to negotiate a ten-year contract for 
iron ore supplies with its competitor, BHP. 4 Until the 
company's battery by-product ovens were completed coke had to 
be purchased at a higher cost. These problems were 
compounded by the sheer difficulty of transporting plant from 
Lithgow to Port Kembla, and by costly mistakes in construction 
1Hoskins brought into the new venture all its assets which 
had a net tangible value of £2,215,131 on 30 November 1927 
and for these received £1,771,400 in £1 shares and 325,000 
preference shares and balance in ordinary shares. The 
preference shares were for the preference shareholders in the 
old company and the 1, 446, 400 ordinary shares were for the 
Hoskins' family of which 396,400 were given to Howard Smith 
and 50,000 to Dorman Long. This transfer of shares, was the 
extraordinary feature of the transaction. It seems clear 
that these payments to Dorman Long and Howard s: .. ith were for 
their goodwill. See Colin Forster, Industrial Development 
in Australia 1920-1930 (Canberra, 1964), pp.138-9; Melbourne 
llerald, 24 May 1928. 
2 Forster, Industrial Development, p.139. 
, 
"Ibid. 
4Hoskins, The Hoskins saga, p.110; Neville R. Wills, .f:conomic 
Development of the Australian Iron and Steel Industry 
(Sydney, 1948), p.80. 
and planning. Hundreds of tons of cement left uncovered 
became unusable after rain and had to be blasted from the 
ground. A rolling mill built on inadequate supports began 
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to sink. Worse still, the sharp fall in demand for steel 
came just at the time when the trar1sfer of men and equipment 
began in earnest and it was found more profitable to continue 
steel production at Lithgow until 1930. 1 
The construction of the steelworks at Port Kembla marks 
the emergence of Wollongong as an important non-metropolitan 
industrial centre. After 1928 the dominant social, political 
and economic forces were essentially the products of an 
increasingly urban-industrial environment and society's 
efforts ~o come to terms with that environment. There were 
contradictions in the initii\l responses of the Wollongong 
community to the changing nature of local society. Nost 
workers welcomed new opportunities of employment, but some 
spoke out against the 'evils of industrial society and 
industrial capitalism•. 2 All businessmen were pleased by the 
prospect of increased trade. Rural property owners were 
gratified by soaring land prices but they had misgivings about 
the introduct:·.on of a new and rowdy element to the industrial 
work-force which would alter the nature of existing society. 
The depression struck before these contradictions and 
hesitations could be resolved. The Wollongong community was, 
therefore, confronted with the difficult task of coping with 
the problems of a new industrial society amidst economic 
collapse. 
The most obvious change to accompany industrial growth 
was an expansion of the district's population from 32,381 in 
1921 to 42,853 in 1933, 3 an increase of thirty-two per cent 
1 Forster, Industrial Development, p.139. 
2 Illawarra Mercury, 27 June 1930. 
3 Census, Commonwealth of Australia, 1921, 1933. 
JI 
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compared with an increase of twenty-one per cent for the 
country as a whole. The increase was greatest in the 
township of Wollongong (sixty-nine per cent) and in the 
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l industrial sector of Central Illawarra (fifty-seven per cent) • 
The population of the mining villages and rural areas 
increased relatively little; the shire of Bulli registered a 
net loss of males in the intercensc-,1 period. 2 Some, seeing 
no future in the pit-top communities, moved closer to the 
growing industrial area at Port Kembla. Yet it was external 
not internal migration which provided the increased pool of 
industrial workers required in the district. Between 1921 
3 
and 1933 there was a net growth by migration of 5,540. The 
copper industry attracted out of work copper miners from 
.'!t Morgan in Queensland; Hoskins transferred several hundred 
"1en from their Lithgow plant to Port Kembla. But in the main 
immigrants came from other parts of New South Wales. 
Thousands of Sydney unemployed sought work at the steelworks. 
This flow of immigrants emphasises the scarcity of work 
throughout Australia in the latter 1920s. The majority of 
newcomers were unskilled migratory workers looking for 
employment as construction labourers at the Port Kembla 
steelworks. Their arrival ir.creased the m<:. '·' predominance of 
'>'lollongong society and permanently altered the population 
structure. According to the 1921 census males outnumbered 
females in almost every age group; in aggregate there were 
16,847 men and 15,634 women - or a four per cent surplus of 
males. By 1933 the male surplus had increased to six.per 
cent. Change was great0st in Central Illawarra where, by 
1933, fifty-five per cent of the population were males. ·rhe 
imbalance, which was most marked in the twenty to twenty-nine 
1
see Appendix D: Population Change in Wollongong, 1921-1933 
(Figure 1), p.344. 
2Ibid. (Figure 2) ,pp. 345-8. 
3This figure was calculated by using the vital statistics 
method. The long period between available census figures 
(1921 to 1933) rendered the use of life tables difficult if 
not impossible. Ibid. (Figures 2 and 3), pp.345-50 • 
l ... / 
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age 
men 
group, emphasises the fact that most migrants were young 
in search of work. 1 
Port Kembla was unprepared for the flow of migrants 
that occurred in the 1920s and the lack of planning 
associated with the birth of the industrial town influenced 
t.1e environment of working-class life, for at least a further 
generation. It '"'as, as Bernard Barrett has written of a 
3imilar industrial area, 'crippled from bir~h·. 2 The central 
problem was a lack of housing. As early as 1909 Metal 
I·lanufactures acknowledged the housing shortage and purchased 
homes from nearby areas and transported them to Port Kembla. 
The company later built thirty-eight houses for officials and 
employees and discussed with the Port Kembla Traders' 
Association the possibility of a municipal housing scheme. 
But such piecemeal efforts brought little relief. 3 
Shortage encouraged improvisation, squatting on crown 
land, and makeshift dwellings. In 1927 the Municipality of 
Central Illawarra made a determined effort to stamp out 
4 temporary camps at Port Kembla. Twenty-one demolition 
orders were executed but a further seventy-two humpies 
remained. 5 Even the more permanent structures were little 
more than huts of about 400 square feet divided into two units 
and occupied by as many as thirteen people. In their 
original state these rough structures lacked lining, had a 
canvas ceiling and were open at the eaves and gables. It 
11bid. (Figure 2) ,pp. 345-8. 
2 Bernard Barrett, The Inner Suburbs: the evolution of an 
industrial area (Melbourne, 1971), p.3. Barrett argues that 
many Australian industrial or slum areas are not so much the 
result of the gradual decay of originally fashionable 
suburbs as areas which were spoilt from the outset. 
3Metal Manufactures Gazette, June 1939, pp.25 and 42; Metal 
Manufactures' Directors Minutes, 16 September 1924, 
14 October 1924, 11 October 1928; Illawarra Mercury, 
12 July 1928, 10 August 1928. 
4Municipality of central Illawarra Minute Books, 13 April 
1927. 
5 rbi~., 9 April 1927. 
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was common to find in them a centrai room with a fire place, 
used as a general living room and kitchen, with roughly 
hewr. partitions dividing the remainder into bedrooms. 
Housing scarcity and improvisation was compounded by 
poor surroundings. North and south of the settlement were 
two stretches of water; Tom Thumb Lagoon and Lake Illawarra. 
B~th were shallow and their low lying shores swampy. To 
2v~id the unhealthy margins early housing had hugged the 
h!gher ground. Newcomers in the 1920s were left with the 
swampy and damp lower ground. Already unhealthy conditions 
were exacerbated by primitive sanitary provisions. Grease 
traps constructed to receive bath water were too small and 
frequently overflowed forming foul smelling bogs and breeding 
grounds for rats. Open drains from the longer established 
hill top dwellings took their natural course down the slopes 
ilnd through the yards of houses below, and spilled across 
footpaths. The flats became, on the admission of local 
health authorities, 'unfit for human hdbitation' . 1 An open 
drain which Lraversed half the settled area carrying waste 
drainage from the south east portion of Port Kembla to the 
sea frequently silted up wi·. '1 sand or debris and waste water 
ran across the streets creating further bogs. Effluent from 
the septic tanks of local hotels fl0wed directly into an 
d . 2 open storm-water rain. 
These insanitary conditions brought disease. In the 
sunune~ of 1928 there were seven cases of typhoid fever noted 
at Port Kembla and a more widespread epidemic was feared. 3 
Yet only the most crude remedial action was taken; liberal 
quantities of disinfectant were bucketed into hollows 
surrounding the main drain. 
Lack of habitable housing coupled with sanitary neglect 
diverted industrial workers to Wollongong and the northern 
mining villages in search of acco!111llodation. Her~ too 
1Ibid., 9 July 1930. 
2Ib'd l. • 
3Ibid., 11 December 1928. 
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squatting on public or private land pre-dated the depression 
and the growth of secondary industry. Throughout the 1920s 
rudimentary galvanised iron ci.nd earthern-floored huts were 
erected along creek banks on the bush slopes above the 
Coledale railway. These bush squatters were too poor to 
affora any sort of legal tenancy and latecomers were usually 
. d' . 1 in an even worse con 1t1on. 
Shire officials had previously ignored the rate-evading 
squatters though, as their number increased, there w~- less 
toleration. A survey of illegal dwellings by the shire 
council in 1929 revealed insanitary conditions, sub-letting 
and over-crowding. It was alleged that a desire to evade 
local government liabilities rather than poverty explained 
the growing humpy settlements. 2 The report instanced a 
married couple with nine children and a permanent boarder 
sharing two rooms and a closed verandah. Three of the 
. k 3 occu2ants were in constant wor . 
'·' Local government authorities were unprepared for the 
~:; 
industrial growth of the 1920s; none more so than the 
municipality of Central Illawarra where administrative 
resources and methods were more suited to a nineteE' ·.h 
century rural community than to a growing industrial area. 
For thirty-eight years the business of local government had 
been in the hands of town clerk, G. (George) Lindsay. Though 
Lindsay was a capable man, his business methods relied more 
on ~ood memory and local knowledge than on conventional 
office practice. The rapid changes of the 1920s demanded 
more sophisticated procedures. The council's administration 
was by 1928 in a state of chaos: correspondence was unfiled, 
contract accounts were eighteen months behind, rate demands 
unissued and money banked in •,o1rong accounts. Rate 
liabilities were impossible to estimate for receipts had not 
been issued. Moreover, tP~ council's affairs were 
complicated by the probl · ::1 of title. Though there had been 
1Bulli Shire Minute Beaks, 2 April 1928. 
2
rbid., 6 June 1929. 
? 
~Ibid. 
J 
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considerable land speculation, large areas purchased by 
speculators had reverted to the original owners. In numerous 
inst.;nces allotments purchased from subdividers were 
forfeited. Still other would-be land purchasers were 
struggling to meet payments to subdividers and were simply 
unable to pay rates. In these circumstances rate collection 
was always difficult, if not often impossible. Fifty per 
cent of rat:s for the 1928 financial year were written off 
and by October 1929 the council was within a few pounds of 
l it' ov. -draft limit and could n<>t pay accumulated accounts. 
Local government organisation had broken down. In July 1929 
the New South Wales Local Government Department investigated 
the administrative crisis in Central Illawarra. The 
department concluded that council staff was unable to cope 
? 
with the demands of a growing municipality.·· 
Inefficiency, neglect and c>Verwork all help explai:-i the 
disorder that existed. A 'pick and shovel' policy was put 
frrward in 1929 by W.J. Macken as a solution to the council's 
difficulties. 3 Macken, a brash university-trained 
replacement for Lindsay, urged stringent economy and in a 
thirteen page report outlined a plan to improve administration 
and balance the budget. Solvency would, he estimated, take 
three years to attain. The depression did not cause a 
decrease in local government work; the number of rate 
assessments remained constant; the requirements of the Local 
Governme: '. Act did not alter; r.:Qrrespondence increased as 
rate reminders multiplied with ratepayers h : .. 1ting f ... r work 
changing their addresses and purchasers of land on time-payment 
frequently forfeiting their rights wi '·nout the knowledge of 
the council and still others .oaying by instalment.;. 4 Macken' s 
programme was simple. Retrenchment WGuld cull uut the 
1Municif.>ality of central Illawarra Minute Books, 4 October 
1929. 
2Ibid., 8 July 1929. 
3Ibid., 6 December 1929. 
~Ibid. 
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inefficient workmen and a modernised office routine would 
produce l'E?tter and cheaper administration. 1 
39 
The council decided to accept Macken's proposals. Some 
male clerical assistants were dismissed, others were replaced 
by junior females and still others were downgraded. Reforms 
in office r:it.nagement, however, often simpl:i: increased the 
( work-load for permanent professional and semi-professional 
staff: the engineer left his drawing board to process rate 
demands; the health ir.spector delivered routine messages and 
paid out wages to the council's outside staff. 2 Constant 
supervision was the touchstone of Macken's policy as it 
~ffected wor.kmen. Without supervision he declared 'it was 
left to the individual employee to yield the council's 
interes ·' 3 
The establishment of an iron and steel plant at Port 
Kembla and the anticipated industrial development exposed 
also the inadequacy of local trade union organisation among 
skilled tradesmen and unskilled workers alike. The typical 
union for skilled workers such as boilermakers, engineers, 
bricklayers and carpenters consisted of a small sub-branch 
with no paid 
from Sydney. 
o~ficials, and visited monthly by organisers 
The same was true for the unskilled labourers 
in the copper industries. The Australian Workers' Union 
(AWU) had preference in the awards of both companies, but 
local organ~satiJ~ was weak. F.H. (Fred) Finch, secretary of 
the Port Kemble> ~nch, was employed full t. · J at Metal 
Manufactures ,me.; .1ad little time to devote to organising 
labc'urers at the steelworks. 4 Co-ordination of union activity 
was diffi··.,·1.:1 t in such circumstances and in June 1926 the 
Wollongong ALP branch, aware that a flood of non-union labour 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid., 2 December 1929. 
3
rbid., 6 December 1929. 
4
rnte;;:view with Mr F.H. Finch, 10 August 1971. 
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could further undermine the bargaining power of local workers, 
had attempted to establish a trades and labor council. 1 The 
support of the coalminers was essential to the council's 
success and, even after the formation of a cc.uncil in 1928, 
lodges were slow to offer their support. 2 Their attitude to 
the corning of iron and steel was somewhat ambivalent. They 
hoped that the development of new industries would provide 
alternative employment but were reluctant to support the new 
body fearing that cheir freedom of action could be thereby 
restricted. Yet events both local and national were 
conspiring to break down the separatist att.itude of tne 
miners. 
The actions of the Nationalist Government, with S.M. 
Bruce as Prime Minister, seemed to provide evidence that a 
determined effort was being made to curtail union freedom and 
prepare the way for wage-cuts. In November 1925 Bruce won an 
election on a platform which included a 'law and order' 
prograrnrne. Bruce introduced a Crimes Act which declared 
revolutionary and seditious associations unlawful and 
strengthened the Cornrnonwealth Government's hand for dealing 
with strikes and strikers in industries affecting trade, 
cornrnerce and Commonwealth public services. 3 Moreover, in 
April 1926, the High Court brought down a decision 
establishing the priority of Commonwealth awards over state 
legislation4 and a month later Er.uce announced that he would 
seek increased industrial powers for the Cornrnonwealth 
parliament. The defeat of this proposal at a subsequent 
referendum seemed only to strengthen Bruce's belief in the 
need for a strong Federal court. Subsequently, in June 1926, 
1New South Wales Trades and Labor Council Minutes, 3 June 
1926. 
2 Coledale Lodge Minutes, 22 June and 28 July 1926. 
3A. Wildav"ky, 'The 1926 Referendum' in Studies in Australian 
Politics, by A. Wildavsky and D. Carboch (Melbourne, 1958), 
pp.8-9 and G. sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law, 
1901-1929 (Melbourne, 1963), pp.267-8 and 290. 
4 Cowburn's Case, 37 Commonwealth Law Reports, p.466ff. See 
also G. Sawer, op.cit., pp.292-3. 
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Parliament passed an amending act reconstituting the court 
and giving its judges tenure for life, thereby enabling them 
to resist external pressure in their decisions and awards. 
The most critical step, however, came in December 1927 when 
the Attorney-General, J.G. Latham, introduced a further 
amending bill desiqned to extend conciliatory activities, 
reduce overlapping between Federal and State awards and deter 
strikes. The bill envisaged a court empowered to approve 
lockouts in industries where there were sectional strikes, 
order secret ballots for union elections if asked to do so by 
ten members, refer the issues involved in industrial disputes 
to secret ballots, and disallow union rules if it judged them 
oppressive or restrictive. For their part federal unions were 
to be held responsible for the actions of branch officials 
and made liable for penalties imposed during strikes. 
Picketing was to be severely limited and the bill also 
proposed that the Arbitration Court should consider, except 
where the basic wage was concerned, the probable economic 
effect of its decisions on the community in general and upon 
the industry concerned. 1 
Labour leaders throughout Australia reacted sharply to 
these proposals which in their view cvnstituted a deliberate 
attack on unionism. Wollongong tr;,de union officials were 
conscious of the need to co-ordinate local union organisation 
to meet this challenge. The failure of the new steelworks 
to absorb out-of-work coalminers, and the continued influx of 
men drawn to Port Kembla by real estate agents' extravagant 
estimates of the company's need for labour emphasised the 
need for action. Always conscious of labour costs Hoskins 
was hostile towards unions. Working conditions at the Lithgow 
plant were uniformly bad and the works gained a reputation as 
a bloodhouse. 2 The decision to transfer as many of the 
10. carboch, 'The Fall of the Bruce-Page Government', in 
A. Wildavsky and D. Carboch, Studies in Australian Politics 
(Melbourne, 1958), p.123, and sawer, op.cit., pp.268-9 and 277. 
2Letters of Mr c. Tannock (President of the Sydney branch of 
the Federated Irunworkers' Association 1924-6; Secretary of 
FIA 1926-46 and President 1953-5). I am indebted to 
Dr J.A. Mer;itt for allowing me to use and cite his 
correspondence with Mr Tannock. 
~\ ,_, 
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Lithgow employees as possible to Port Kembla ensured that 
the bitter industrial re!ations would continue at the new 
site. Union organisers were refused entry to the construction 
ar:;a. 1 Moreover, with hundreds seeking labouring work at the 
plant gates each day, Hoskins was able to dispense with 
troublesome workers and employ non-union labour. With the 
formation of AIS Hoskins applied to the Federal Arbitration 
court and the New South Wales Industrial Commission for award 
variations. Workers alleged that the company was launching 
an attack on the basic wage standard and attempting to 
establish industry awards. 2 
Unions for more skilled workers were better able to 
protect their members. In May 1929 the Federated Ironworkers' 
Association (Fli\) approved the formation of a new sub-branch 
~t Port Kembla and in June an interim-executive was elected 
headed by the former Lithgow branch secretary, J. Ward. 
Aided by a subsidy from the association's federal council, 
~e sub-branch made good progress and by November had doubled 
its initial membership of fifty. 3 In January 1930 the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) claimed one hundred 
financial members at the new plant. 4 Nevertheless by the end 
of 1929 it was estimated that only thirty per cent of the 
workers at AIS were union members. The AWU had made little 
headway among navvies at the steelworks where, in late 1929 
nearly 500 non-union labourers were employed. 5 
In the absence of strong union or !anisation at the job 
level the Trades and Labor Council assumed a more important 
role. Rapidly deteriorating economic conditions made its 
task difficult at Port Kembla but the council made some 
progress with piecemeal attempts to extend unionism and to 
consolidate existing union strength throughout the remainder 
l Illawarra Mercury, 8 May 1929. 
2AEU, Monthly Reports, June 1928, p.8. 
3 Illawarra Mercury, 22 November 1929. 
4AEU, Monthly Reports, January 1930. 
5 Illawarra Mercury, 6 December 1929. 
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of the district. Efforts were made to encourage unionism 
among shop assistants1 and in 1929, a Building Trades Group 
was established. 2 Late in 1929, the council could claim 
fourteen affiliated unions. 3 In large degree this initial 
response was a reflection of uncertainty among workers and 
fear that wage reductions and unemployment would become more 
general. Indeed, the council came to be viewed by many as a 
relief dispensing organisation. 
Two events, however, helped the Labor council 
consolidate its position. In September 1928 the council 
supported and organised the Wollongong branch of the ALP's 
first major campaign in local politics and in the early 
months of 1929 initiated cmd led a strike by Wollongong and 
Port Kembla timberworkers. Growing unemployment throughout 
1929 tended to make coalminers more aware of the influence 
which local at:thoritie.s had over their livelihood. In the 
:irst place, ::nunicipal and shire councils decided to whom 
an:i. on what conditions relief work would be granted. 
:·!oreover, th<, establislunent of the Hoskins iron and steel 
plant led to a sharp rise in land values, and during 1928 a 
4 
record number of 299 new bu:.J..~ ;.,,,,., were erected in Wollongong. 
As growth within the municipali~y was expected to continue, 
prospective Labor councillors argued that unemployed workers 
should share this apparent prosperity. They advocated 
increased municipal borrowing to absorb local unemployment. 5 
The nomination of Labor candidates drew shrill protests 
from press and public alike. Known Labor supporters 
condemned the introduction of political party warfare into 
the civic life of the community, and publicly declared their 
support for the Progressive candidates. 6 J. Kelly, a sitting 
1
south Coast Times, 4 July 1929. 
2 Illawarra Mercury, 13 December 1929. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid., 7 December 1928. 
5Ibid. 
6
rbid. 
It 
c0uncillor and Labor sympathiser, rejected overtures to 
accept Labor. nomination and criticised the introduction of 
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. . . . . 1 
;:iolitics ~.nto municipal affairs. Labor candidates countered 
by declaring the Wollongong Municipal Council a 'one family 
civic show' which claimed to 'rule by divine right'. 2 '.!'he 
sole qualification for membership of this 'closed clique', 
labour spokesmen alleged, was a long family connection with 
the district. Labor's challenge was a threat to 'antiquated 
ideas dammed in a lake of parochialism•. 3 
Progressive candinates, saw their opponents as 
'outsiders' with littJe -take in the town who were trying 'to 
sweep in when there was a little prosperity about'. 4 In 
defending their past record sitting members stressed long 
association with the town and contrasted their administrative 
dnd commercial acumen with their opponents' lack of business 
experience. They played on the fear of property holders by 
suggesting that a Labor council would increase rates to meet 
the high interest payments which would inevitably result from 
their rash borrowing. 5 Investors would be frightened off and 
6 land values 'would plummet'. More positively, the 
Progressives advocated the raising ::>f a £45,000 loan for road 
development but claimed that repayments would be met without 
increasing rates. All road works, councillors pledged, 
would employ day-labour and would not be contracted out. In 
this way the local unemployed could be given work at a 
7 
minimum cost to ratepayers. 
In the event the Labor ticket W<> rejected at the polls. 
In seeking to explain their failure · "~feated Labor 
candidates accused the existing councillors of having 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid., 14 December 1928. 
3
south Coast Times, 7 December 1928. 
4 Illawarra Mercury, 7 December 1928. 
5Ibid. 
6 
Ibid., 30 N~vember 1928. 
7 Ibid. 
'manipulated' the voting regulations. 1 The 1928 municipal 
elections were the first to be fought under the adult 
franchise and compulsory voting introduced by the Lang 
2 government. 
on state and 
Whereas most councils had accepted enrolment 
federal electoral rolls as a basis for local 
registers, the Wollongong Council demanded that all 
applications for enrolment be sworn before a Justice of the 
Peace. But the problem was less a matter of public 
regulation tban of private attitude. The majority of the 
Wollongong workers, then as now, regarded local body 
elections as 'squabbles of little or no importance•. 3 
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The municipal election was barely over when timber 
workers throughout Australia ceased work in protest against 
the Lukin timber award. While attention in the Wollongong 
district ce "."ed almost exclusively on the coal crisis, 
elsewrere i '\ustralia Labor was preoccupied with the timber 
strike. Justice Lukin' s award of January 1929 put an end t.o 
the forty-four hour week city timber workers had enjoyed 
since almost all other unions had lost it in 1922-3. 
Consequently local workers along with most Labor supporters 
saw the award as a well chosen fjrst step in a general attack 
on the shorter working week. Not only did the new award 
lengthen hours but it also cut wages and permitted the 
substitution of youths for adults. Basic rates and margins 
for skill were reduced by between Ss and 10s, reductions in 
wages of boy labourers in the bush section ranged from 16s 
to 20s and the permissible ratio throughout the industry of 
juvenile to adult labour was increased from one to eight to 
4 
one to four. Moreover, the award provided for contract 
work and for piece-work or time bonus. These alternatives 
were held to permit 'speed-up', and to allow the by-passing 
of the unions. 
1Ibid. 
2 F.A. Larcombe, Local Government in New South Wales (Sydney, 
1955), pp.64-8. 
3 Illawarra Mercury, 14 December 1928. 
4
see Miriam Dixson, 'The Timber Strike of 1929', Historical 
Studies, Vol.10, n.40, pp.479-92. 
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The workers were not long in answering the virtual 
challenge contained in the new award. A strike began in 
Sydney on 31 January, when men were 'locked out' for refusing 
to observe the new award. It was not, however, until 15 ~larch 
that Wollongong and Port Kembla timberyards closed. 1 
Timberworkers in the district had for some time been working 
forty-eight hours for ·hrty-eight hours pay, and were 
generally reluctant to strike. They did so only after much 
goading by the Sydney and Illawarra Trades and Labor 
councils. 2 Wollongong timberworkers stated that they would 
continue to 
3 
unchanged. 
o.ffected by 
work forty-eight hours only if wages remained 
About forty-five men and five timberyards were 
the stoppage. 
From the outset the dispute was organised by the 
Illawarra Trades and Labor council to which the timberworkers 
elected two delegates. To meet what i.t described as 'the 
onslaught of the owning class' and the 'anti-working class 
legislation• 4 of the Bruce Government the council established 
J. series of local defence committees to relieve distress and 
publicise the nature of the crisis for workers. 5 Despite 
these efforts finance was rarely, if ever, adequate. 
Coalminers, though now working better time, found the twelve 
o.nd a half per cent levy for the northern miners crippling 
enough without contributing to a timberworkers' strike fund. 
The meagre financial support underlined the weakness of 
unionism in the district. S. (Steve) Best, organising 
. 
secretary for the council and previoucly a Mt Kembla miner, 
complained that the 500 labourers at Port Kembla were 
contributing neither to the timberworkers' strike nor to 
locked-out northern miners. 6 Although mass demonstrations by 
pickets briefly improved morale and strengthened the 
1 Sydney Morning Herald, 16 March 1929. 
2 Illawarra Mercur.y, 16 March 1929. 
3
rbid. 
4 Ibid., 7 April 1929. 
5Ibid. 
6
rbid. 
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solidarity of the strikers, it was clear that local 
'cim1oerworkers could not continue much longer. In 3eptember, 
.,,;1en workers sought ~turn, the tLuber trade was slack. 
~:er< hants were willil;·J to re-emplcy workers only as business 
revived. 1 While awaiting better times, workers could do 
little but seek work elsewhere or join the ranks of the •new 
unemployed'. 2 Though theLe were claims of victimisation, 
-.:hey were powerless to press '•.heir case. 
The attempts by Wollongong trade union officials to 
co-ordinate labour organisation at Port Kembla were thwarted 
by the onset of depression. This is clearly demonstrated in 
t'.1e attempts of unions to assist the unemployed. Despite a 
ten per cent unemp.:.oyment rate throughout the 1920s there was 
:10 planned policy to prevent unemployment and the pov~rty 
".·:hich accompanied it. In New South Wales the common method 
of meetin9 the needs of the jobless was through the haphazard 
allocation ., :· relief work. In special cases of need relief 
rations were issued by the police. 
Intermittency of employment was a common feature of 
Australian mining life in the 1920s; indeed it was almost 
constant in southern mining experience. In the absence of 
any substantial government assistance to the workers mine 
lodges established a network of relief committees throughout 
the southern district and placed an embargo on 'outsiders' 
gaining employment until all local miners were working full 
time. 3 By 1926 however, when the Coledale colliery closed 
down, it became obvious that miners on short-time could not 
be reabsorbed by the coal industry and tha~ alternative 
employment must be sought. .Meanwhile, temporary employment 
was needed and mine officials adopted what had become a 
familiar expedient and requested relief work. Complete gangs 
of miners were employed throughout the district on road 
levelling. Initially men so employed considered themselves 
temporarily relocated coalminers and continued to pay 
l South Coast Times, 10 June 1929. 
2 Illawarra .Mercury, 11 September 1929. 
3 Coledale Lodge .Minutes, 22 July 1928. 
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:inancial contributions to the southern district fighting 
:und and the federal levy. 1 In some instances lodges made up 
':he difference between relief pay and the basic wage. They 
endeavoured also to regulate conditions of employment, and 
fined workers who accepted work at weE '-~ends as iarm or 
2 general labourers. 
By the early months of 1928, however, the scale of 
ur:employment had increased to a point where lodges could no 
longer confidently expect relief work. More than 1,000 
miners were out of ·-;erk and a further l, 200 were working 
intermittently. 3 Moreover, the pool of unemployed had 
increased, swelled by men arriving in the district from other 
;:iarts of New South Wales and from Queenslancl and Victoria. 
I.edges made direct appeals to local government authorities 
2nd in March a public meeting was called by the Wollongong 
Council to examine the unemployment problem and to suggest 
remedies. 
Trade union officials suggested that the jobless should 
be employed on the construction of the Moss Vale-Port Kembla 
railway line. Work had commenced in March 1927 with ':he 
cle2ring of an access road and it was estimated that 1,100 
men would be required. 4 But the nineteen miles of track to 
be laid between Mt Murray and Unanderra traversed a rise of 
over 2,000 feet through rough and heavily timbered country. 
The Railways Department, which had guaranteed Hoskins that 
the line would be complete by 1932, was already behind 
schedule and preferred, in the main, to employ experienced 
railwaymen or miners whose skills could be utilised in 
tunnelling work. 5 Selection based on the possession of 
6 
specific skills meant the abandonment of the 'rotary system'. 
1 Ibid., 22 June 1928. 
2Ibid. 
3 Illawarra Mercury, 3 February 1928. 
4 Ibid. 
5Ibid., 10 March 1928. 
6Employment on relief work in order of registration at ? 
Labour Exchange. 
This, together with the sight of gangs of Sydney railway 
workers passing through Wollcngong, increased local 
resentment. Spokesmen for ~he One Big Union of Unemployed 
protested and asked the unemployed not to accept work from 
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the Main Roads Board until thG board resumed its earlier 
m:actice and employed men in the order they had registered at 
the Wollongong Labour Exchange. The protests were ignored as 
there was no sh;,rtage of men looking for work. However, to • 
avoid the possible harrassment of its officials or of men 
given work, the board 
the labour exchange. 
by letter. 1 
abandoned the customary 'pick-up' at 
Thereafter, men were offered employment 
When they ha0 failed to secur- railway construction 
work, the unemployed had no alt-.:rnat:ve but to cl.imour at 
council doors. Local municipal and shire coun~ils were 
limited in the amount of relief work they could offer. They 
could seek Main Roads Board approval for further expenditure 
on thoroughfares which were part of the main roads network; 
they could raise loan money to step up their own works 
programme; or they could petition the Department of Labour 
and Industry for a direct grant to provide relief work. The 
Main Roads Board, however, was an early victim of government 
expenditure cuts. The board was established by the Main 
Roads Act (1924) to co-operate with local authorities in the 
maintenance and construction of main highways. It derived 
its finances from special taxes on motor vehicles and petrol 
sales, from a government grant to be not less than £115,000, 
from municipal and shire council contributions calculated at 
a halfpenny in the pound on the unimproved capital land 
. . 
2 l 2 value, and by parliamentary loan appropriation. In 9 8 the 
New South Wales Government withdrew the annual grant made 
from the consolidated Revenue Fund and the regulations 
1Main Roads Board File, IE 28/58; Daily Guardian, 14 August 
1928. 
2H.H. Newell, 'Road Engineering and its Development in 
Australia 1788-1938', Journal of the Institution of Engineers, 
Australia, Vol.10, Nos 2 and 3, February and March 1938, 
pp.279-93; A.G. Close, 'Relief Work on Developmental Roads', 
Main Roads, Vol.II, No.l, pp.8-9. 
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controlling the board's loan repayments were tightened. 1 
Moreover, country municipalities c>.nd shires were not as were 
their metropolitan counterparts, able to borrow and meet 
both interest and loan payments from Road Board funds. 
The expansion of council activities was scarcely a 
realistic alternative. While th~ Wollongong Municipality 
benefited from a short-lived rise in land values which 
accompanied the arrival of the iron and steel industry, local 
body funds hardly ever rose above the irreducible minimum. 
In July 1929 the Department of Labour and Industry, deluged 
by requests for aid from local governments, refused to 
sanction furthar grants, although it was willing to continue 
'd' l 2 provi ing can money. 
Throughout the early months of 1928 road work was the 
conunon lot of unemployed miners. In April the Main Roads 
Board offered to employ three hundred miners on road 
construction work at Nowra and Waterfall. 3 Lodges were asked 
to provide the names of men, preferably married, in need of 
work. The preference shown coalminers drew protests from 
unemployed labourers at Port Kembla and prompted them tc form 
' a branch of the one Big Union of the Unemployed. · The 
est·blishment of the union was, in large degree, the work of 
R. (Robert) Shayler, a Sydney-based communist who travelled 
south almost daily to organise w.ollongong unemployed. His 
success emphasises the inadequate attempts of local trade 
union officials to assist the unemployed labourers of Port 
Kembla. 
Shayler declared that the objective of the union was 'to 
organise the ·11orkers irrespective of colour, nationality or 
calling•. 5 The union denounced preference given coalminers 
as 'a veiled at'\.empt to divide the workers'. He asked local 
1Newell, op.cit., February 1938, pp.60-1. 
2Bulli Shire Minute Books, 7 July 1928. 
3 Illawarra Mercury, 13 April 1928. 
4 Ibid. 
5Ib' ' ia. 
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miners to refuse the work offered. 1 The southern district 
miners' secretary, J.T. Sweeney, countered by claiming that 
the efforts of miners' lodges were aimed at finding 
em?loyment for all workers and alleged that many miners had 
refused to accept the work. 2 But for most miners eighteen 
months' intermi ttency justified special treatment. certain]·· 
they felt more deserving than ·newcomers' to the district who 
had experienced but five or six weeks without wv::-k. 
After June 1928 requests to the Main Ro.3.ds Board for 
:urther construction work were rejected and indications were 
':'1at only maintenance work requiring few men would follow. 3 
From this point the unemployed made greater demands on local 
authorities. Local municipal a:1d shire covncils maintained 
small permanent staffs which the.Y supplemented with casual 
labour for specific jobs. It wa:> the rule that casual 
labourers, so employed, retained no priority once dismissed 
and councils were able to adopt the practice of taking on 
unemployed workers in these temporary positions. 4 Yet 
humanitarianism was tempered by economic reality. The 
workless were offered casual labour in terms of a definite 
policy: to avoid payment. of travelling costs men were to be 
given work as near to their homes as possible; efficient 
gangs were not to be split up merely to assist the absorption 
o: the unemployed; and councils reserved the right to give 
9reference to skilled men. 5 Unemployed miners, many of whom 
had during the 1920s worked short periods as counci' 
labourers, were contemptuous of claims that council work 
required any skill whatever and demanded that local 
authorities step up their works programme and distribute 
<; 
available work to the unemployed If money was short then 
councils should borrow. Funds were limited and councillors, 
1Ihid. 
2Ibid., 20 April 1928. 
3B•~lli Shire Minute Books, 24 June 1928 • 
4Ibid., 25 July 1928. 
5Ibid. 
6Ibid., 4 A~gust 1928. 
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\. 
1\ chary of increasing borrowing, maintained that unless they 
were careful in their supervisi~n ratepayers woo1ld not get 
value for money. Loan repayments could only be met by 
increased rat"\,;'... Moreover, t'-,e Department of Labour and 
Icidu::.try reqaired thac seventy-five per cent (later eighty 
p·- cent) of loan money be :-pent on wages. 1 This meant that 
i.-,.::al bodies were very cautious of raising such loans for 
developmental works which involved considerable .. ..-:penditure 
on materials and equipment. Loans rais':!d to ass.st the 
unemployed therefore tended to be for small amount3 varyj-g 
between £1, 000 and £4, 000 and were used ·~o carry out work 
which had a high labour content such as gravellinJ roads or 
c:..earing c1rains. 2 In December the Wollongon:j Municipal 
Council negotiated a £1,000 loan which it used to give three 
r.undred men a week's road work before Christmas. 3 Nevertheless 
the number of unemployed continued to grow. A Wollongong 
Labour Exchange spokesman claimed that thirty 'strangers' 
4 
registered each day. 
By the end of 1928 the outlook for u-~mployed workers was 
bleak. No new roadworks were planned ar ..• rrent works were 
coming to a close. For the first time, ne •. spaper •zditorials 
commented on the grim prospects of workers facing the next 
Wollongong winter without '"Ork and called for public meetings 
to organise the collection of distress funds, blankets and 
clothing to supplement relief ration~ issued by the police. 
But with the partial recovery of the coal mines in April 
agitation for relief work waned. The unemployed union which 
emerged in 1928 had subsequently disintegrated as its members 
received relief work and with the miners working full-time 
the unemployed were disorganised and powerless. Their weak 
1Municipality of Wollongong Minute Books, 7 December 1928. 
· ~·n:.d., 21 December 1928 and Bulli Shire Minute Books, 
., ')er.ember 1928. 
3Municipality of Wollongong Minute Books, 7 December 1928. 
4 Illawarra Mercu_!Y, 14 January 1929. 
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position reflects the nature of Wollongong labour 
organisation and society ln the late 1920s. They were part 
of the new industrial work-force which was neither fully 
accepted by the COllllTiunity nor adequately represented within 
the labour movement. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
WORKERS AND THE DEPRESSION 
It is conventional to date the depression from the 
international stock-market crash of 1929. 1 For most 
Wollongong workers, however, 1929 was not a year of any 
particular significance. It was a year marked by subdued 
optimism rathe- ·han by despair. Southern coalmines were 
busier than · h°"·, had been at any time in the 1920s, and at 
Po~·t Kembla a steelworks was gradually taking shape. Much 
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-.:. was expected of the steelworks. Coalminers hoped that, when 
'.:ully operative, the ·;al required by the new plant would 
compensate for the ev~ntual loss of the temporary market-
advantage which the lockout of northern coalminers gave 
southern collieries. Shopkeepers and businessmen were 
confident that the influx of newcomers looking for work at 
Port Kembla would stimulate spending and provide the fi.rst 
real prosper>.ty sin"e the war. Consequently, if Wollongc·.1g 
workers as~~ciate the onset of depression with any single 
event it is the shutting down of blast-furnace 'Emily' at 
easter-weekend 1930. 2 As a result more than one thousand men 
were paid-off and, although many were re-emoloyed shortly 
'fterwards, the dismissals shattered the hopes of an entire 
community. 
In real terms, however, the later and more gradual 
down-turn experienced by the coal industry had greater impact 
on the local economy. The ont.p·,11c of the southern mining 
district fell from ?,258,808 tons in 1929 to 981,964 tons in 
1
see, for example, L.J. ~ouis and Ian Turner, The Depression 
of the 1930s (Melbourne, 1968), p.l. 
2Illawarra Mercury, 9 April 1930. The blast-furnace had been 
'chri.stened' the 'Emily' after M'.l'.'s Emily Hoskins, the widow 
of C.H. Hoskins (1851-1926), the frmnder of the family steel 
business. Mrs Hoskins performed the off.~cial lighting 
ceremony when the blast-furnace was bl'?w:1-in on 28 August 
1928. ~ee Sir Cecil Hoskins, The Hosk~ns Saga, p.97. 
P.._, :.;_f~~· 
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1931. 1 Production had not sunk so low since the 1890s. The 
northern lockout delayed the full impact of the depression 
on the southern field but by so doing served only to exacerbate 
the problem of overcapacity which had become acute in the 
late 1920s. Apart from a recovery in 1929, associated with 
the cessation of work in the north, the number of miners 
~mployed in the southern district declined annually from 
5,293 in 1926 to 2,822 in 1933. 2 During the latter year mines 
worked on average 231 days or SS days more than in 1928. But 
in mid-1930 when the ncn:thern mines entered the market 
southern trade fell away drarnatically. 3 In June southern 
miners averaged only 11.8 days work per month and the year's 
4 
average fell to 146.2 days. In the seven months following 
the return to wor1". in the north, a total of 70S days were 
worked or an average of two days per week at each colliery. 
'·.•erage work days reached their lowest point the following 
year when mines operated for 122.S days. The 1929 figure was 
not reached again until 1939 and not before close to half the 
work-force had been displaced. 5 
Unlike coalmining districts in other countries faced 
\,ith the same problems of overcapacity and reduced demand, 
New south Wal.-s did not seek a solution in a system or output 
quotas as a means of maintaining prices by restricting supply. 
In conseque:~1ce the price of coal fell from 19s a ton in 1928 
to 15s 4d a ton in 1930, to 13s Sd in 1932 and to a rock 
bottom lls a ton in l93S. 6 But even then prices failed to 
1Mines Depar_trnent Reports, 1929-32. See Appendix E: Black 
Coal Production for Australian Coalfields, 1925-39, p.361. 
2 ... d :r '•>.t • 
3 See Chapter One, p.22. 
4
calculated from Mines Department Reports. See Appendix G: 
Average Number of Days Worked per Month in the principal 
~ullieries of the Southern Coalfield, p.363. 
SS . ee Appendix F: The 
employed in southern 
number of mines operating and men 
collieries, 1926-38, p.362. 
6For a comparison of British and Australian methods of 
adjusting to the lessened demand for coal see A.G.L. Shaw, 
'The Australian coal Industry, 19?9-1939', Economic Record, 
Vol.19, pp.46-63, June 1943. 
• ,: : : . ' ,•;1"' 
56 
adjust output to den,,:, .d. Capacity still vast ... y exceeded 
market requirements a,nd the individual mini'<·\~ companies wei:e 
too small to absorb such crippling blows. Yet despite the 
rapid deterioration of idle mines the number of collieries 
operating on the southern field remained stable between 1931 
and 1936. It seems clear that during the' depression mining 
companies survived on their past income and on enterprises 
other than the production of coal. 1 Mines were kept open, in 
many cas~s, at substantial loss. Judge Drake-Brockman 
estimated the average loss in capital invested :.-, coal 
production between 1931 and 1937 at three per cent. 2 
Wh! .e the number of inines i.emained constant3 ownership 
did not. Between 1931 and 1936 repeated losses on trading 
forced three collieries to sell out. Mt Keira and Bulli 
mines were purchased by AIS with an eye more tu future 
expansion of the steel industry than in the hope of any 
irrunediate financial return. The South Kembla colliery which 
::com 1927 had been struggling to pay wages and u~1der continual 
threat of non-recognition by the Miners' Federation, was 
purchased by a group 
attempt to cut their 
of s~rd!'"ley trawling operators as 
4 
own costs. 
an 
To say that the ~ustralian coal industry operated under 
'keenly competitive conditions• 5 during the 1930s is an 
understatement; it was a classic illustration of cut-throat 
marketing. Local consumers - mainly the copper processing 
and manufacturing companies - played off one mine against the 
other in forcing down prices. ER & S resisted being drawn 
into long-term contracts for its coal supplies, preferring to 
140 ~ (1939), p.367. 
2Ibid., p. 383. 
3 . h See Appendix F: T e 
employed in southern 
number of mines operating and men 
collieries, 1926-38, p.362. 
4
southern District Management Board Notes (DMB), 27 January 
1932; W.J. Penrose to manager, South Kembla Colliery, 
14 November 1932; Sydney Morning Herald, 8 February 1932. 
5 Shaw, op.cit., p.60 . 
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take advantage c.-f what they termed 'irregular prices' 1 
Annual government contracts for the supply of coal to 
railways and gas-works stimulated further price-cutting. 
Failure to win a goverrunent contract often meant a temporary 
closure for a struggling mine; the Mt Pleasant colliery 
ceased operations immediately its tender was rejected in 
August 1933, and after a similar failure Coalcliff 
2 temporarily closed the following year. Southern mines, 
especially the smaller pits, suffered disproportionately in 
this struggle for markets. Bunk.er coal sales continued to 
fall wit~ declining international and coastal trade. 
~!oreover, the inadequacy of the Port Kembla harbour meant a 
further loss of trade. Steamships prevented by heavy seas 
3 from berthing were frequently diverted to Newcastle for coal. 
To keep their mines operating the coal comp.anies cut 
expenses. Since labour constituted almo~c two-thirds of mine 
overhead owners compensated themselves for falling prices by 
reducing wages. In August 1930 southern collieries sought a 
reduction of fifteen per cent in the hewing rate and of 6d 
in day rates. They claimed these cuts were essential if they 
were to compete with northern collieries. The court, however, 
while accepting the c1y wage claim awarded the same 1212 
per cc:,1t cut for contract workers which it bad previously 
handed uown to northern collieries. 4 As sequence of 
tt' s decision the weighted average nominal 11age rate for a 
full week's work in the mining industry ns a wr le fell from 
£5 10s 7d in 1929 to £4 l7s in 1933. 5 However, the major 
saving in labour costs came from employing fewer men rather 
1Electrolytic Refining and Smelting Company: General 
Superintendent's Annual Report for the year ended 25 October 
1932. 
2 Illa;.;arra Mercury, 8 August 1933, 18 February 1934; Record 
Book, 17 August 1933. 
' 
"south coast Tirr~, 12 August 1931; Illawarra Mercury, 
12 December 193c\; DMB (Notes), 3 August 1931. 
4 
29 QIB. (1930). p.387. 
5 Commonwealth Year Book, · ~29-1933. 
,., ~ , . ) . ' -. . , . . . ' ' . '" 
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than from reducing wages. Between 1930 and 1935 the cost of 
wages and salaries per ton fell by nearly one-third from 
10.52 shillings to 7.77 shillings. 1 
Unemployment had been severe in the 1920s but by the end 
of 1930 the number of dismissals reached an unprecedented 
level. In July, five collieries began to retrench and by the 
end of the month 1,300 miners, or one mineworker in three, 
was without work. 2 Such massive dismissals were used by 
.. 
employers as a means of culling out fractious and 
'inefficient' workers. Lodge officials, often among those 
dismissed, coulc not always prevent arbitrary dismissals but, 
in the main, were successful in insisting that workers should 
be cavilled out in order of seniority. 3 Re-employment on the 
same terms was more difficult to ensure. Some mine-managers 
refused to acknowledge any seniority claims once an employee 
was dismissed. 4 Often mines were idle for lengthy periods 
and lodges frequently ceased to function. When operations 
were renewed, managers took the opportunity to discriminate 
against the ragged and frail, against the grey of hair and 
against the unruly. For the ageing and for workers with 
compensation-records reinstatement was especially difficult. 
Colliery managers were reluctant to re-employ such men who 
might suffer further injury and increase the company's 
compensation costs. Many companies refused to accept medical 
board reports certifying men fit for work and preferred 
examination by a company doctor who was invariably more 
r~~Jrous and more likely to reco·mend a return to light duties 
1New South Wales Year Books and Exhibit 117 in Coal Miners' 
Case Commonwealth Arbitration court, 1938-9. See also Shaw, 
op.cit., pp.51-63. 
2Labor Daily, 7 November 1930. 
3The system of 'first on-last off' operated throughout all 
New South Wales coalfields. 
4Record Book (W.J. Penrose, secretary southern ~istrict of 
Miners' Federation), 11 April 1933. Australian National 
University Archives, deposit El65/1S/2. 
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only. With a certification such as this compensation payments 
ceased and thP. company need not offer re-employment. 1 
Behind these dismissals and the attempts to minimise 
compensation costs was the desire to reduce production to the 
needs of a shrunken market and to increase efficiency so as 
to lower costs. Between 1930 and 1935 the cost of salaries 
and wages per ton was cut back by one-third. 2 The mining of 
only the most economical workings and the cnrtailing of 
developmental projects partly explains this reduction, but 
rnuch of the saving was achieved at some cost to working 
conditions. 
A common economy measure was to employ deputies as 
shif tworkers repairing airways and clearing roadways so as to 
reduce the nwnber of shiftmen required. 3 At one level this 
was merely a recurrence of attempts by coal owners to take 
advantage of perennial demarcati~n problems between the 
Deputies and Shotfirers' Association and the .Miners' 
Federation. The incid~-nc-e of protests by miners suggests, 
however, that in its depression context the dispute involved 
more than job demarcation. .Miners complained that deputies 
were so encumbered with shiftmen's duties that safety 
inspections became cursory and dangers unnoticed. A pair of 
miners at the end of their shift reported an accumulation of 
gas in a new tunnel. The report book next day showed that 
the gas had been cleared away. The miners suspected, however, 
that it W<..; 
... a little bit too much to shift such a body of 
gas in the time. But it was the time when the 
depression was on and there was rationir:g - and 
the next day the pit worked we found, when we 
examined the place that it had been cleared away 
and we found the reason why. One of the places 
had f2llen in and .•. caused the gas to be driven 
away. 
1Ibid., 3 June 1932, l August 1933. 
2 See p.58. 
3Davidson Commission, evidence given by .M.M. Fitzgibbons, 
G December 1938, pp.351-2; <lso evidence given bys. Platts, 
2 December 1938, pp.340-2. Record Book, 31 January 1934. 
~~idsor. _Jmmission, evidence given by William Waugh, 
2 December 1938, p.325. 
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Underground conditions in a coalmine are so various and 
unpredictable that a job described in an agreement often 
n corresponds in only a rough and ready way to the work 
2ctually done. As a consequence coalminers, whether contract 
workers at the coal-face or elsewhere underground, are more 
frequently than most other workers thrust into the position 
of bargaining with their ·~·nployers. In these on-the-spot 
negotiations the miners' p~sition is exceedingly weak unless 
strengthened by the power to withr.old th;ir labour. Union 
disintegration during the depression reauced the effectiveness 
of threatened strike action as a negotiating weapon and 
enabled the coal propri~tors to pay scant regard to 
individual bargainers. 
The cutting of losses often manifested its.~lf in an 
apparently callous indifference to the safety of workers. 
This was clearly indicated in the struggle between miner and 
employer over the placing of roof supports or props in 
underground workings. Lodge officlals claimed that miners 
should, in the interests of mine-safety, have the unchallenged 
right to erect props wherever they t~iought necessary. 1 The 
owners, however, refused to concede any initiative to 
individual miners and maintained that only a deputy might 
direct the erection of props. 2 But conditions in a mine may 
change rapidly and an app0trently solid roof may within 
minutes break up. In the current dispensation deputies were 
frequently encumbered with miscellaneous new duties and 
11nable to attend quickly to such vital matters. Miners were 
therefore often faced with an invidious choice: they could 
erect props and accept the possibility of non-payment; they 
could retreat from the dangerous ~ection of the mine and seek 
permission to mine another place; or they could risk 
continuing in unsafe conditions. 
two or three days a week found it 
l . 3 ast-named course of action. 
Contract-miners working but 
difficult to avoid the 
1
rbid., evidence of Ernest Richard Browne, l December 1938, 
p.315. 
2Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
[ 
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In another field, working economies brought the prospect 
of increased danger. Owing to lessened use and consequent 
deterioration of ventilating facilities, the total quantity 
of air passing t .rough the collieries, particularly in mines 
working at a considerable distance from the tunnel mouth, 
diminished appreciably during the depresLion. Evidence was 
produced by the district check-inspector which showed that as 
much as fifty per cent of the inflow of air was lost into the 
return flow before it reached the coal-face. 1 The prefe~:ence 
shown by mine-managers for. the cheapar brattice rather than 
1·:ooden doorways or brick stoppings greatly contributed to 
the loss of air. Further, boys employed as 'trappers' to 
open and shut underground doorways so as to regulate the 
air-flow and prevent rushes of air which were extremely 
dangerous in the notoriously gassy southern mines, were among 
the first retrenched 2 
All New South Wal.:s mines were to a greater or lesser 
degree affected by the problem of coal dust. In the view of 
Dr c. Badham, the New South Wales medical officer of industrial 
hygiene, who had mad·· a special study of the affect of coal 
dust on the health of miners, southern district coalminers 
3 
were subjected to a 'phenomenal exposure to dust'. In 1931 
Badham examined 471 South Coast miners for symptoms of 
'coalminer's lung•. 4 Of those examined 192 or twenty-five 
1Ibid., evic.ence of Alexander Thomas Richardson Emery, 
southern district check-inspector, 20 September 1938, pp.36-7. 
2rbid., evidence of c. Shipton, 9 December 1938, p.401. 
3Ibid., evidence of Dr Charles Badham, 12 January 1939, 
p.525. See also, coal Dust and Stone Dust and its Effects on 
the Health of Workers, a pamphlet issued by F. Lowden and 
W.J. Penrose, respectively president and secretary of the 
Southern District Branch of the Miners' Federation; and 
Heal th (Journal of the Commonweal th Department of Heal th) , 
Vol.IX, No.5, May 1931, pp.33-4. 
4 l' d d' · The term 'coalminer's lung' was app ie to a con ition 
whir.h, medical experts believed, could be 'distinguished 
pathologically' and by chemical analysis from miner's 
silicosis. Its most significant characteristic is a 
deposition of coal-dust in the lymphatics of the lung. See 
Davidson Commission, p.523. 
a 
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per cent exhibited a 'fine type of fibrosis of the lungs•. 1 
:.:edical bo~wds, however, were reluctant to grant full 
compensation to 'dusted' miners in all but chronic cases, on 
~he grounds that there had been insufficient research into 
the causes and long-term effects of the disease. As a 
result, between 1931 and 1938 only 33 of these miners 
received compensation2 and the belief grew among miners that 
medical board indifference presented 'dusted' miners with a 
harsh alternative: they could cease work and accept the dole 
or they could return to work 'to die quickly'. 3 
Management policy of attempting to eliminate all 
maintenance costs except those essential to continued 
production exacerbated the dust problem. The condition of the 
\·:oode- <>kips which carried coal to the surface deteri0rated 
to a point where they sometimes acted as a more or lt'··:.. 
coarse sieve. Fine coal particles and dust poured onto 
c:nderground roadways cread.ng a further hazard to health. 
,\ccumulated dust was rarely removed from the workings and 
often merely shovelled to one side. 4 Attempts to settle dust 
by watering were sporadic and crude. For example, a cask 
;;i th water trickling from a side tap was dragged on a slide 
along the floor of the mine. 5 
Southern district union officials were, like union 
leaders elsewhere in Australia, as unsuccessful in preventing 
attacks on working conditions as they were incapable of 
acting as a defensive bulwark for the miners' standard of 
living. Miners had plenty of warning to brace themselves for 
a struggle they knew was coming. As Lowden " ' earlier 
predicted, the defeat of northern miners was prelude to 
1n 'd ' ' 'd avi son Commission, evi ence uZ Dr Charles Badham, 
12 January 1939, p.522. 
2Ibid. 
3 rb~d 'd f w J ~--re;l president Corrimal Miners' 
... . , ev i ence o • • ' . - "' , 
Lodge, 1 December 1938, p.JlO. 
4Ibid., evidence of Clement Shipton, Corrimal miner, 
9 December 1938, p.400. 
5Ibid., evidence of John Thomas Coltman, president of 
Mt Keira Miners' Lodge, 28 October 1938, p.266. 
. . ':., ' ' - " : ·_. . - '' ' . ' ' . . 
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wage cuts throughout Australian coalfields. When, in June 
1930, southern owner-:- lodged their log of claims1 the 
southern district mar,agement board formally rejected the 
owners' claims and threatened to strike rather than accept a 
2 
w2ge-cut. 
In large measure the objections voiced by Lowden and 
Penrose however valid they might be, were in the circumstances 
part of a desperate game of bluff. At the time the owners' 
log was served, Bulli miners were on strike. Preliminary 
discussions between district officials and the Bulli mine 
management seemed to reveal what the mine~s thought was an 
excessive anxiety to restart the mine as seen as possible. 
If this were so, the miners could adopt the age-old employer 
tactic of divide and rule. Accordingly, the district 
management board offered to work any mine which preserved 
3 
current wage rates. Hopes of discord amongst the employers 
evaporated when the board meeting was interrupted by a phone 
c&ll from L.E. Blair, managing director of the Bulli company: 
he would not re-open his mine until wages were reduced. 4 
With their rather desperate tactics defeated the union 
leaders wer~ left with little room to manoeuvre. They 
claimed th.t: Blair's statement had converted a strike into a 
lockout and decided that Bulli miners should therefore be put 
on the federal relie£ rates. 5 
In fact the united front which owners presented against 
union attempts to divide their ranks was too strong to be 
breached by such tactics a~d the miners were compelled to 
accept arbitration. The award subsequently handed down by 
the Arbitration Court provided that northern wage and 
contract rates namely a twelve and a half per cent reduction 
should apply on all New South Wales coalfields and rejected 
1For details of their claim see p.57. 
2 DMB, 15 June 1930. 
3
rbid., 17-18 June 1930. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid. For the Central council's refusal .see CCM, 
5-9 August 1930. 
... 
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the owners' claims for a fifteen per cent reduction. 1 
Lowden's reaction to the courts decision was to advise miners 
to remain at work, at least until the Federal Council had 
spoken. 2 In view of its debilitated financial position the 
council advised against a stoppage. 3 In an attempt to 
forestall militant protests Lowden predicted that th~ 
Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), an ~ssembly of key 
unions, would, when it met on 9 September, declare a general 
strike 'to defeat the onslaught of the employing class•. 4 
However, while critical of the Labor Government's inability 
to protect workers' interests, the ACTU rejected proposals for 
a general strike. 
Deprived of support from his own federal body and other 
powe1: ful unions Lowden' s only al terna ti ve was to adopt the 
strateg" devised during the northern lockout: restricted 
' ~r:Lke action si:pported by loc,,._l and federal. levies. Such 
limitations meant that the strike in the depression became an 
essentially defensive instrument. Men W•:re called out, in 
most instances, to resist further wage erosion rather tha~ to 
press for positive ends, whetl1er pol:" ·cal or industrial. I~ 
1930 Lowden supported and hel.ped organise a ten month-long 
strike at Coalcliff. Conditions at the colliery mirrored 
those elsewhere on the coalfield but this particular strike 
was provoked by the question of payments made to men filling 
skipE behind coal-cutting machines. In 1914, when the 
machines were introduced at the mine, a special rate for 
fillers of ls 4d per ton was negotiated. As a depression 
economy measure, however, fillers were increasingly asked to 
perform mining duties, indeed to such an extent that a general 
crosi.on of ...,ages resulted. Moreover, the dismissal of six 
miners for alleged inefficiency threatened the miners' \ 
principle of seniority through which some check on the 
improper use of retrenchment could be maintained. Had these 
1 29 £!ill. (1930), p.387. 
2
sydney !•lorning Herald, 20, 21 August 1930; Labor Daily, 
21 August 1930. 
3CCM, 28-29 August 1930. 
4
sydney Morning Herald, 21 August 1930. 
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dismissals become a precedent, more managers may have purged 
k f ·1 1 their wor - orce at wi 1. Lowden endorsed the Coalcliff 
miners' decision to hold a stop-work meeting. On the one 
hand he demanded an immediate conference with the management 
and on the other hand he ask1ad the federal council to meet at 
once to grant financial support. A series of abortive 
meetings with the owners followed, and on 9 June Coalcliff 
miners strur;k. 2 
r:-e Coalcliff proprietors refused to consider either 
the reinstatement of the dismissed miners or to recognise any 
demarcation problem concerning the respective duties of 
fillers and miners. They were prep;ired for and confident of 
withstanding a lengthy strike for two reasons. Firstly, they 
saw opposition to coal-cutting machines as only another 
instance of the miners' hostility towards mechanisation which 
in their view was essential to the lowering of production 
costs per ton and to the long-term restruc~uring of the coal 
i~dustry. In the second place, most of their orders could !:Je 
transferred to their other local colliery, Mt KE"ira. In 
:'ovember, J.B. Vickery a director of the collie:..y, made clear 
the company's determination to stand firm. He declared that 
he would close the mine and dismiss the whole staff rather 
than give in to the miners. 3 Lowden countered with a 
dc::laration that the miners too were prepared for a lengthy 
'k 4 stri e. 
By Janua~y 1931, however, the latter were ready to 
negotiate. The Federal council, which had financed the 
strike, considered cutting relief pi•.yments by half and 
e:-:presscd the hope that strike:i:s would be eligi.ble for the 
dolc. 5 Meanwhile, Lowden sought a conference before an 
ir. ·'.pendent arbitrator. Though initially refusing to accept 
arything less than a hearin9" before the Arbitration Court, 
1Labor Daily, 29 August 1930. 
? 4 DMD, 17-16 June 1930. 
3 Sydney Morning Herald, 1 November 1930 • 
.i.bid. 
5
ccM, 3-8 February 1931. 
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Vi.ckery grudgingly settled for the pr:.vate arbitration of 
£.H. Coneybeer, a Commonwealth Arbitration commissioner. 1 
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The settlement reached was a partial victory for the 
miners and c.. ,-:.ndication of official tactics. Fillers were 
awarded ls 37'4d a ton, or an increase on a sixteen-ton basis 
of ls Sd or ls 9d pe::: day. 2 Many miners probably agreed with 
the verdict of the conservative pl'e;1s which described the 
outcome as a pyrrhic victory, for t' ). mine restarted with 
less than a third of the pre-strike wrk-force. 3 In spite of 
the retrenchment, militant spokesmen professed to find in the 
outcome of the strike justification l'~r thej : laims that a 
4 general st~ike would bring all owners to the~r knees. 
Despite the qualified success of the Coalcliff strike, it 
was clear that the Federal Council's decision to cut relief 
~ yrnents placed severe limitations on Lowden's already 
restricted powers of manoeuvre. Moreover, the pe~iodic 
closure c · collieries as contracts expired gave added weight 
to the employers' claims that strikes could only lead to the 
cancellation of remaining orders and the eventual closure of 
still further mi11es. Tog(,ther with the presidents of the other 
mining districts, Lowden, in June 1931, producec an assessment 
of the problems facing the Federation and their im?lications 
for unionism at the district level. 5 A Central ...:ouncil meeting 
in early June had appointed a committee and directed it to 
report on the fellowing issues: 
... finance, l•;v.ies, organization on t:he job, the 
recent reductions and their general effect, the 
prooosals of Council t•.) preserve and if possible 
make better present wages and conditions, thP ("'ost 
of running the ~'~·ganization from a District an·!. 
Federation point of view, the absolute necessity 
1DMB, 16 Fehrua:i:~ 1931. 
2F illing r2.tes had ooen reduced by the Beeby Award from li.- ·Id 
to ls 2d !Jer ton. 
3
sydney Morning' Herald, 8 P.pril 1931. 
4Labor Daily, 9 April 193.l. 
5
ccM, 2-6 June 1931. 
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of carrying on the Federation under the Ru~es, and 
the need fo7 local information being supplied to 
the Federation through the local District Office. 
Periodical statements regarding matters in 
different districts.! 
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As presented, the report acknowledged the disintegration 
which already had taken place and admitted a forty per cent 
loss of membership. 2 In such circumstances the committee 
felt that any attempt to enforce the payment of levies to the 
Federal body was futile. 3 Districts were in future to 
finance their own stoppages, wi1:;.ch were, as a general rule, 
to be avoided. Individual lodge commit.tees were instructed 
to be more vigilant than they had been in the past and to 
prepare themselves to defend working conditions. 4 
The districts, however, were incapable of assuming the 
limited and defensive role envisaged by the federal executive. 
The necline in income which accompanied falling membership 
subjected the internal machinery of the districts to Eevere 
st:-ilin. Officials' ~alaries were cut by twelve and a half 
per cent in 1930. 5 While the following Fehruary the District 
Management Board asked lodges to pay the wages of their 
6 d0lec;ates. Yet at th.• same meeting acknowledging the 
futility of the request, the Board resolved to meet on 
Saturdays at theil'" own expense. 7 
In part, seeking financial aid from the lodges was a 
retaliation against the inability or in,some cases the 
unwillingness of lodges to pay their dues. By March 19?.l 
1rbicl.. 'J."he full committee comprised: D. Rees (General 
President), T. Hoare (Northern District), F. Lowden (Southern 
District), c. Roy (Western District), W. Youn~ (Victoria?), 
F.A. Miller (Barrier), C. Kilpatrick (Queensland). 
2Review of the Position of the Australasian Coal and Shale 
Employees' FP.derati0n and the Findings of the Co~mitte~ 
(Sydney, 1931), p.2. 
6
··b"d J. l. • I 
7 
Ibid. 
p.4. 
.16 i."ebruary 1931. 
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lodge contributions to the district were more than £1,000 in 
1 
arrears. Many lqdges now existed in name only and those 
which survived were le~s concerned to pay arrears than to 
seek the remission of dues for miners struggling to make £2 
a week. The Bulli lodge igno=ed repeated requests for the 
payment of dues, and after a series of threats was expelled 
h d . . 2 from t e istrict. 
While Lowden and other signatories of the 1931 report 
envi~·aged a lengthy def•::·wi.'f" period to avoid further 
deterioration, they hoped that the Coal Bill proposed by the 
New South Wales Labor Government would provide safeguards 
against further wage reductions and initiate positive gains 
for miners. 3 The Bill introduced in 1931 by J.M. Baddeley, 
Minister of Mines and earlier president of the Miners' 
Federation, owed its inunediate origin to the recommendations 
of the 1929 Royal Commission. Its report advocated the 
establishment of a Coal Industry Board and Baddeley' s Bill 
proposed such a board, armed with wide powers. Coal fro>". 
individual mines was to be classified according to quality and 
contracts allocated by districts. Where district allocation 
w~s not sufficient to permit nine days' work each fortnight, 
the Bill empowered the board tv close mines either 
tempr-arily or permanently. '!'he standard rate of dividend was 
to ~e regulated and its upper limit fixed at ten per cent to 
prevent 
Profits 
the accumulation of huqe reserves by the owners. 
in excess of this fig,~re were to be used for tr.'..: 
benefit of the industry generally. The Bill was hotly debated 
by the Opposition.who demanded 'a little more business 
. b . 4 
in 
Government and a little less Government in usiness. Coal 
owners stigtl'atised the Bill as 'Sovietization' and scoffed at 
suggestions that A.C. Willis, Ba1..i<iel0y' s partner in the early 
1
rbid •• 31 March 1931. 
2Ibid., 28 Jam.: . . r:y 1931, 18 July 1931, 11 November 1931. 
\ . cviev,r of the Position, p. 5. 
4 . NSW PD, Vol.129, p.5600. The quotation was borrow1;d from 
President Hartling, S.E. Morison and H.S. Cornmager, The Growth 
.of the American Republic (Ncaw York, 1953 ec'1.), Vol.II, p.523. 
,.. ....oiillilR,>>•m-,;,· __ ,.,. __ ~---· ... ·a·,..--------
·- ·-::a 
.•. ·"!':) 69 
days of the Miners' Federation, should be the Coal Board's 
first chairman. Though the Bill was passed by both houses, 
the Stevens Government, which came into office in May 1932, 
did not present it for royal assent. 1 
Rank and file opinion in the southern district supported 
,. official policy as set forth in the Review of the Position. 
There was little enthusiasm among so•lthern miners for a 
general strike proposal advanced in 1932 by the Federation 
eY.ecutive in support of Victorian state miners at Wonthaggi. 
When their mine was declared a state inst:.:umentality by the 
Victorian government they faced a twenty per cent reduction 
in day wages and contract ra .. 2 Aggregate meetings of 
southern miners ignored militant strike proposals and 
preferred instead to heed the warnings of the elderly general 
secretary, Dan Rees, that to expect help from other unions 
would be 'relying on a broken reed'. 3 Strikers, he went on, 
could expect no financial assistance and would have to fight 
'on their stomach' • 4 When put to the vote the general ;;~:: i>te 
proposal was rejected by 83•1 to 202. 5 
The reluctance of established union officials to endorse 
a general strike and their denunciation of desperatiQn 
strikes at the lodge level was in turn condemned by spokesmen 
for the MMM ;iz 'defeatist'. 6 Scarcely twc score in number in 
the Wollongor.g district and directed by commLmist leaders, 
the movement viewed the depression and especially wage-cutting 
-----·--
1Ibid., Vol.126, pp. 28' 0-2841, 2871-2883; Vol.127, pp. 3808-
3822; Vol.128, pp.4684-4688, 5124-5137; Vol.129, pp.5445-5510, 
5498-5510; Vol.130, pp.6656-6667, 6797-6801; Vol.131, 
pp.7701-7717, 8018-8032; Vol.133, p.2. 
2
ccM, 6-10 S·~::itember 1932. 
0 
,~.lawarra Mercu;:y_, 16 September 1932 · 
. [bid. 
5CCM, 26-28 Se.pte;nw:r. 1932. 
6?.cd Leader, 14 SeptE:mber 1932 • 
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as a chance to radicalise the masses. They sometimes 
professed little or no interest in settling workers' 
~1111\ediate grievances and opposed the intercession of 
'reformist' mediators. Critical of the timidity of the 
:>:iners' Federation, militant spokesmen declared that 
• •• the duy of the office boum .. ufficial is past. 
The workers need men of action who will give a 
lead, men who will come out and fight for their 
class, whether on the question of free speech 
the imposition of wage cuts or anything that 
tends to worsen the conditions of the working 
class.l 
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The militants, however, were unsuccessful in their 
attempts to win official positions within the union. In the 
1931 district elP~tions they campaigned vociferously for 
their ticket. Tr ..... decision of the 68 year old J. T. Sweeney 
to retire in December 1931 led to a strenuous contest for his 
post. In the event the militant minority candidate, 
W. Challenger polled lightly and W.J. Penrose, who had been 
for fourteen years secretary of the Mt Kembla lodge and a 
supporter of moderate counsels, was elected. 2 Thereafter 
there was no change in union leaders, demonstrating the 
meagre local influence of industrial radicals. 
Union stability during the depression may be ·~xplained 
in several ways. Immersed though they were in the day-to-day 
details of union administration, local officials were not 
entangled in red tape or overwhelmed with book v.:.:irk as their 
critics claimed. Nor did they lose sight of workers' needs. 
On the other hand militant spokesmen had no forum within the 
ranks of working miners except for irregular pit-top 
meetings. They gained most of their slender and unreliabJ.;• 
support from cavilled out miners, many of whom were now 
itirterant searchers for work. Moreover, militants did not 
speak with one voice a~d offered no clear alternative policy 
to that adopted by the officials. Stripped of class slogans, 
protestations of offi·=ial treachery and 'lyinJ defeatism'; 
1 l.Llawarra Mercury, 10 December 1931. 
2Ibid., 11 December 1931. 
3 Red Leader, 14 September 1932. 
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•.heir demands were, on many points, scarcely distinguishable 
those of the officials. Both condemned Labor politicians 
for their ina~tivity, and both demanded such immediate 
reforms as t~'.'J introduction of a quota system to ensure a 
mo::e equal distribution of government coal contracts between 
· 't 1 Fth distr1c s. ur er, even the more constructive suggestions 
;iut forward by militants proved unworkable. Their policy of 
concentration of authority at the district level was, by 
cheir own admission, a failure. 2 It neither stimulated rank 
and file participation in any general policy of direct action 
nor did it lead to greater unity. 
Union stability, however, owed more to the experience 
and ability of the depression leaders than to the weakness of 
the opposition. An IWW sympathiser during the war years 
(1914-1918) F. (Fred) Lowden could not be r.egarded as a 
moderate. In 1917 he was arrested and churged with the 
attempted murder of a 'loyalist' railwayr.tan during the railway 
strike of that year. It was later provr,d that he had been 
the victim of a deliberate plot. 3 During the depression he 
did not hesitate to endorse the more radical activities and 
attitudes of the la.bour movement. In 1931 he moved not to 
send a delegate to the state ALP Conferer.ce as a protest 
against ; failure of the Lang government to help the 
unemployeu. 4 He chose to support the Unemployed Workers' 
Movement rather than the non-communist Un.employed Workers' 
Union, and took part in the fight of the unemployee for the 
5 
right of free speech. The d.•legate board under h:... 
chairmanship voted to pay the fines of convicted unemployed 
and avowed communist protesters, though this action was not 
always appreciated by those who wished to appear as working 
1 Illawarra Mercury, 10 August 1931; Record Book, 8 May 1934. 
2Mt Keira Lodge Minute Books, 28 September 1929. 
3
see Ian Turner, Sydney's Burning (Melbourne, 1967), pp.92-4. 
4DMB, 10 July 1931. 
5 See Chapter Three, pp.117-49. 
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l 
class martyrs. Moreover, Lowden, Sweeney and later Penrose 
administered union rules with a fine combination of humanity 
,~!Jd business sense, in which the former predominated. 
Co~lclif f miners who had been paid-oft ten we~~~ before a 
strike were issued with strike relief dockets; miners in debt 
to storekeepers were allowed to overdraw their strike relief 
vouchers; incapacitated ~niners whose compensation payments 
ceased during the strike were similarly placed on relief 
1 . 2 is ts. 
Nevertheless, Lowden was prepared to clash openly with 
militants who sought to promote desperation strikes. When 
Bulli miners came out in June 1933, ostensibly to secure the 
reinstatement of an elderly compens .. ted miner, Lowden 
dem~nded an immediate return to work. 3 The decision to 
strike had been taken at a hastily convened lodge meeting 
4 
which was also reported to be poorly attended. The stoppage 
came at a time when federation officials were beginning to 
feel that distress and unemployment made it difficult to 
accomplish anything worthwhile. They asserted darkly that 
there were 'forces at work' and so many factions that a 'big 
5 body of men don't really know where they are' Lowden 
denounced factionalism and convened an emergency meeting of 
the lodge at which he advocated an immediate resumption. 
The colliery had closed f0r five months in the latter part of 
1930 and resumed operations at twenty per cent of its 
depr~ssion output. The miners suggested, and the management 
1For example, John Hitchen, a volatile and temperamental 
communist, convicted of taking part in an illegal procession, 
took umbrage at the board's action in paying his fine and 
had to be forcibly removed from a later board meeting at 
which he became violent. He later failed to see why the 
board should refuse his application for a personal loan. 
See DMB, 16 April 1930, 15 May 1930. 
2CCM, 23, 24 April 1931. 
-, 
"Daily Telegraph, 8 June 1933. The miner concerned had been 
declared fit for work by a medical board but was refused 
;:ork by the company. 
4 S·;dney Morning Herald, 8 June 1933. 
5
ccM, 7-11 February 1933. 
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~ad accepted, rationing of available work to prevent 
retrenchment and the mine co1!tinued to operate by virtue cf 
small government contracts. A stoppage now, in Lowden's 
viev:, would mean the loss of present contracts and another 
closure of the mine. 1 The owners agreed with his assessment 
~s did the great majority of miners. They now voted bv 220 
to 24 to return to work. 2 • 
Rationing or work-sharing although conunonplace and as 
often implemented at the request of the miners as by the 
dictates of the proprietors, was not acceptable to the 
militants. In June 1931 Mt Kembla miners accepted a plan put 
forward by their employers which advocated that the work-
force be divided into two equal sections, and that the groups 
work ten days in rotation. In December of the same year, the 
:·iiners' Federation endorsed the acceptanc- of work-sharing at 
South Bulli mine. Employers who offered to ration work 
cl~imed chey did so for humanitarian reasons. The militant 
~iners, however, argued plausibly that when workers agreed to 
share available work they, rather than the employer, were 
contributing to unemployment relief. To them rationing was a 
'dying form of capitalism', and an attempt to 'make the poor 
keep the poor• 3 by allowing the employer to maintain his 
rate of profit and avoid absenteeism. 
Claims by militants that union leaders ignor:d their 
unemployed members had little or no foundation. I~ June 1930 
district officials asked lodges to consider how long cavilleu-
out miners should retain membership of the union. Some lodges 
favoured the retention of membership until a permanent job was 
found, but most preferred to limit the period of unemployed 
4 
membership to six months. While conceding unemployed miners 
the riqht to vote on most lodge affairs many wished to exclude 
them from the :Uscussion of all financial matters. 5 In 
l Sydney Morning Herald, 9 June 1933. 
2Ibid. 
3 Red Leader, 15 February 1933. 
4DMB, 12 December 1930; Illawarra Mercury, 18 December 1930. 
5Labor Daily,. 19 September 1931. 
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, or3ctice there were great difficulties in the way of continued 
e:fective participation by the unemployed in union affairs 
whatever restrictions were imposed. Meetings were often at 
inconvenient times and few unemployed could afford train fares 
~o the pits. The existence of such obstacles gave rise to 
the claim that the workless were being deliberately excluded 
:rom union affairs. But even where transport to meetings was 
;:i.>:ovided, as it :.requently was, unemployed men felt their time 
1·:as better spent looking for work elsewhere. 
Two developments, however, appeared to strengthen a 
conviction widely voiced among retrenched miners that there 
were three classes - the bosses, the workers and the workless. 
The first of these was the failure of the men at work to 
maintain the darg, 1 a mining custom limiting daily out_··,t, 
and the second was the readiness with which shiftworkers 
accepted overtime. In September 1932, Scarborough miners 
voted 'two to one' to lift the darg, and in the following 
~onths many other mines did likewise. 2 Militants demanded 
~hat the lifting of the darg be met by a district stoppage, 
but they were opposed by Lowden. He pointed to the reserve 
·,rmy of potential strike-breakers at the gates, and emphasised 
his warning by asserting that a strike would issue in the 
3 debarring of all miners from the dole. Rather than employ 
additional shiftworkers managers frequeI•tly offered overtime. 
They claimed they did so because the miners' policy of 
requiring fourteen days' notice of dismissal prevented their 
1The expression derives from feudal times when the set task 
to be carried out by a serf was known as daywerk or daywork. 
The darg developed historically as an important element in 
the self-imposed discipline peculiar to the conditions of 'he 
industry. It \-:as instigated to curb employers' efforts to 
work mirers for long hours when trade. was good and then . 
dismiss them and to eliminate exce>sive competition between 
contract miners. For a fuller treatment see Robin Gollan, 
The Coalminers of New South Wales, pp.24-5. 
~Svdney Morning Herald, 16 SeptemJ;er 1932, ~ 07tober ~932; 
I;ccord Book, 12 January 1934; pavidson Commission, evidence 
of Clement Shipton, 9 December 1938, p.401; Red Leader, 
26 October 1932. 
3Red Leader, 26 October 1932. 
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offering a few days' work to cavilled-out shiftmen. 1 
Whatever the reason, unemployed shiftmen could not be expected 
to see the equity of such an unequal division of available 
work. The extraordinary difficulty of balancing the claims 
of all parties was an ever present problem during the 
depression. 
Of the Port Kembla metal industries the copper refinery 
and manufacturing plant were the first to be affected by 
decreasing employment opportunities. Domestic depression in 
:he metal trades preceded world contraction. The period 
1925-8 was one of stagnation especially in the copper 
industries. There were veveral reasons for this. Firstly, in 
the ea.rly post-war years the industry over-invested in plant 
extension. Secondly, overseas companies became more 
co:npeti tive as Australian price-levels were sustained above 
~he continued downward trend of import prices. Finally, the 
exhaustion of Australian copper mines meant a recession for 
refining and manufacturing alike. 2 
· The performance of the Port Kembla copper industry 
reflected what was happening in the indust~y generally. The 
problem was most evident at the refinery. After the closure 
of the Mt Morgan mine and the establishment by the Mt Lyell 
>lining and Railway Company of its own refinery in Tasmania, 
3 
confidence in continued operations at Port Kembla evaporated. 
The efficient working of the plant depended on maintaining 
smelting operations at a minimum level of 'between thirty-five 
and fifty per eel".': capacity', 4 The r·. •lisation of even this 
limited objective rested on the already doubtful. assumption 
that a steady supply of ore would be forthcoming from 
l Recore Book, 27 May, 26 July 1932. 
2see Sch~<lvin, Australia and the Great Depression, pp.59-62. 
' 
"E.A. White's report to Sir Colin ¥raser. (Broken Hill 
Associated smelters Pty. Ltd.), ER & S Files, 20 June 1928. 
4 Ib' ' l.C. t p .13 • 
c 
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cloncurry gougers. 1 In 1926 the corr.pany :-.ad established a 
sermanent office in Cloncurry where gougers' ore was weighed, 
sanpled and assayed by the Queensland government ~nd .then 
sol:'! to the highest bidder. Competition fro:n ove.ri,eas buyers 
was keen but the ER & S policy of making full paym.~nt at 
surchase gave it an advantage over other buyers. 2 By 1930, 
:oowever, the Clonc•.-".ry mines were yielding only low grade 
ores. ?ailing a sharp rise in the price of copper which would 
:'.1a:.:c continued mining profitable, closure seemed imminent. 
:.·.oreover, the decision cf the Queensland state government to 
::copen the Ch:i.l:!.agoe smelters increased com9etition for the 
ores that were mined. A monopoly of the market for the new 
sneltcr was assured when the Queensland government withdrew a 
seventy-five per cent rebate on rail freight of gougers' ore 
a~d increased the freight charges on the Cloncurry-Townsville 
,_-2ilway from 12s 3d per ton to 40s 3d 9er ten. By contrast, 
ore could now be r~iled to Chillagoe, almost twice the 
::istance, for 2r s per ton. Consequently, the company's copper 
;:c;rchases from Cloncurry slwnped. The company's intake of 
copper fell from 16,606 tons in 1929 to 8.175 tons in 1930. 3 
:·i~ally, in July 1931 the Cloncurry offi~e was closed and the 
:iurchase of ore from the district ceased. 4 The search for an 
alternative supply of copper ore proved abortive. The mining 
o: deposits at Milburn Creek, Moonta (South Australia) and 
:·iineral Hill mine, Condobolin (New South Wales), was found too 
costly. 5 From 1931 onwards therefore copper bearing material 
coming to Port Kembla was limiten to copper matte from Broken 
!!ill Associated Smelters, residues from Mt Lyell and 
whatever scrap metal the company could purchase. 
output from the copper manufacturing industry, apart 
from a brief recovery in 1929, he-.l similarly ceased to grow 
1Ibid.' p.9. 
2Ibid., p.10. 
3ER & S Directors' Reports (Company Files), 1929 
4 Ibid., 1931. 
5Ibid., 1929, 1931, 1932. 
--·---------------------------------
1930. 
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before the de1.cession. Government contracts for copper wire 
needed in electric pm;er development schemes and for the 
requirerne!.. of state railway departments, which had 
stimulated expansion until the mid-1920s declined almost 
overnight. Lack of orders for telephone cable restricted the 
,:ilant to h;:,.lf its normal capacity and brought about its 
eventual closure in January 1931. Railway orders dropped by 
as much as eighty-one per cent. 1 So dependent was the company 
on government expenditure that, although orders from the 
manufacturing and trading sector remained at nearly their 
?revious level, overall production for tJ-,e year ending 
31 :>larch fell by thirty-six per cent. 
Between ~larch 1931 and July 1933 total prodncticc: fell 
by a further 32. 5 per cent. During the same pei: f.od the 
telephone cable factory resumed spasmodic operations, 
:iroducing only 314 tons or seven per cent of its 1929 
production. Wire and cable production fell sixty-five per 
cent below the 1929 figure. Only tube production increased 
during the depression. Water and sewerage work were 
encouraged by relief councils appointed in 1932 to recommend 
work suitable for the relief of unemployment. Such projects 
more nearly met their criteria that only so-called prodnc'~ive; 
or self-liquidating, projects could be considered. 2 
The decreasing Australian market for the company's 
oroducts was accompanied by growing overseas competition. 
Falling copper prices on the London market enabled English 
mining c<>rnp nies to exploit the C"heaper African copper 
supplies. Priced at £65 10s per ton in 1928, copper fell to 
£39 lls per ton ir. 1931 and to £36 13s per ton the following 
year. 3 Lower overseas copper prices had the cftect of 
reducing the protection afforded by the z.d-valorem duties on 
the company's products. At the same time, M<'tal Manufactures 
1Metal Manufactures General Manager's Report (Company Files), 
14 May 1931. 
2Loan (Unemployment ~1.elief Bills), No.l & 2 CPD, VoJ..134, 
pp.404-5, 1281-2. 
\1etal Manufactures General Manager's Reports (Company Files) , 
l'.)30-3. 
was com.'llitted to a long-term agreement with the local 
=efinery which pegged the price at a high unifo=m level. 
'i'his agreement weakened appeals by Metal Manufactures for 
increased tariff protection. 1 
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In these circumstances no large scale re-organisation 
was possible, though to keep the plant running more 
continuously a~d to lower operation costs, some attempt at 
diversification was made. 0•1anti ties 0[ brass wire and 
tinned copper were produced but neither on a large scale. 2 
The cost of the alloy was too high to encour .. .;c greater 
:oroduction of brass wire and there was no substantial market 
for ,inned copper. 
As a result of these trends in production, emp.1.oyment in 
the Port Kembla copper industries slumped and became more 
intermittent. T.n 1926 the refinery employed 450 men; by 1928 
this had feyllen to 150, and a year later to 100. Between 
1930 and 1933 the plant required less than 100 men. 3 
Furr.aces were operated i.n i:<..>tc. tion and it was company policy 
'.0 employ as few permane:1t employees as possible. 4 Casual 
labourers were employed when the furnaces operated, but were 
dismissed immediately they ceased to function. When the 
smelter shut down, all men, apart from those needed to 
maintain the plant before the next campaign5 and those most 
difficult to repJ.ace such as feeders, skimmers and cranemen, 
were dismissed. Possession of even these 
Wils no guarantee of permanent work and it 
skills, however, 
became 
common for all men to be dismissed as a campaign 
increasingly 
6 
ended. At 
1Ibid., 14 May 1930; Metal Manufactures Directors' .Minutes 
(company files), 19 March 1930. 
2
:·1ctal ~!a:'.Ufactures General M;;.:-1ager' s Reports (company 
files), 14 May 1931 . 
., 
~ER & S, General Supn:tintent's Reports, 1928-39. 
4E.l\. White's report to sir Colin Fraser (ER & S Piles), i;.24. 
5 b !\ campaign was a full cycle of the process where y a 
shipment .of copper-ore passed through •.'le blast-furnaces of 
the smelting stage and then the refinery. 
6E.A. White's report to sir Colin Fraser, pp.24-5. 
j. 
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best, even experienced men worked twenty-six weeks a yea.r 
c~ring the period 1930-3. What employment they did receive 
car.1e unevenly. During smelter campaigns men frequently 
worked seven days a week. When the campaign ceased, a few 
cCtys' work in the yards as labourers finally gave way to 
'><eeks of unemployment. 
The constant flow of workers through the plant had the 
effect of increasing the accident rate. The number of 
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'i :iccidents which resulted in a loss of working time increased 
., 
> f~om 60 in 1930 to 80 in 1932 and to 101 J ~· 1935. E:-:pressed 
~s acciat~ts per thousand man-days worked, the increase was 
:ram 0.67 to i.'4 or a doubling of the rate. 1 Inexperienced 
r:ien were frequently 1-iurnt with molten metal. 
Employment in the copper manufacturing plant fell from 
582 in 1929 to a low point of 211 in 1932. Recovery was g:::.:idual 
t!wL·eafter, but by 1936 the number employed was only two-thirds 
of the 1929 figure. The retrenchment of unskilled operators 
Wils more ar'bitrary than among the coalminers. Although the 
1926 Award provided a blueprint for retrenclunent-married men 
<lnd returned soldiers were to b<" given preference over single 
men though length of service was to be considered - the AWU 
W<ls not sufficiently strong to enforce its observance. 
Company policy was simply to close complete parts of the 
~lant as orders ceased, dismissing entire sections of its 
cc1ployees. The sudden collapse of telephone cable orders, 
for example, was followed by the dismissal of one hundred 
women operators. Three years later, only eight women had 
2 been re-employed. 
While mac·•ine operators possessed no real skills which 
would ensure re-employment, their position as operators was 
immeasurably better than that of the unskilled labourers. 
Some m.'lchine operators did develop a certain deftne~ s which 
made them marginally more productive. Labourers on the other 
'.1<:t:H:: had no bargaining strength. Their job::; had be;;n tenuous 
1ER & S, General Superintendent's Report, 29 October 1940. 
2 · L' 't d Sec Appendix c: Metal Manufactures imi·c 
Number of Employees, 1919-194'1, p.343. 
Average Annual 
~hroughout the 1920s. A shiftir'. group, they had obtained 
intermittent work as copper arri.vc>d for treatment and if 
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they were fortunate more leng;:h:t· r>'riods as construction 
1-:orkers. They drifted from one p: <int to another at Port 
Kcmbla, picking up a few days' wor}: at each. They then often 
r.ioved on, l~turning later. 1 They represented a difficult 
group for ~he unionists to organise and seriously undermined~_..--..­
attempts by wharf labourers to establish their right to worJ< 
company wharves. 2 Their places in the yards were sometimes 
:oaken by opr~rators who returned to their machines once 
?reduction picked up. Least affected were craftsmen, 
engineers, fitters and turners, a.1. though carpenters employed 
in the manufacture of cases and drums were less secure in 
~heir jobs. Clerical and administre>.tive staff, though 
3 
r.'.l tioned, remained at much the same level in numbers. 
Wage levels for operators and labourers held constant 
until the dismissal, in May 1932, of the Lang Labor Government 
•,:hich had refused tci authorise cuts in the basic wage. This 
was in spite of the fact that, in August 1931, the Full 
!lench of the Arbitration Court, acting in the best interests 
of the nation as it understood them, reversed the precedent 
of twenty years and made an arbitrary cut in the basic wage. 
After listening to len3thy arguments from both employees and 
employe;· ,, , the court issued its verdic'..: on 22 January .:.931. 
The unde·:consumption argument of the un •ns was rejected in 
favour (Jf the orthodox economists' testl.n•uny which maintained 
that a reduc~ion in wage costs woc:ld benefit all industries 
"nd would eventually result ::..n the absorption of the 
unemployed. 
by July 1931 
into line. 
State Tribt« .,ls followed the Court's example and 
all states apart from New South Wales had fallen 
1
.'\n examination of employ;aent-cards and day-books at Mt:tal 
:Olanufactures and ER & S ·is the basis for this paragraph. 
2south Coast B:r.anch Waterside Workers' Federation Minute 
B00ks, 14 April 1932 • 
., 
0 Metal Manufactures Employment. figu.,·es 1930-3, as supplied 
by the co;,;upany. 
·-
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However, on 13 May 1932, the governor of New south Wales, 
sir Philip Game, dismissed Lang for a breach of federal law 
and invited B.S.B. Stevens, leader of the united Australia 
Party, to form a ministry. Stevens called on the cc::c;ntry 
Party to form a Coalition cabinet and almost immediately 
ordered an enquiry into the living wage. As a result of the 
enquiry, the adult male wage rate was reduced fr0m £4 2s Gd 
to £3 10s per week. In May 1933 it was reduced to £3 8s Gd 
and in October of the same year to £3 Gs Gd. 1 
!n the period until the lowering of Award Rates in New 
South Wales, ~he operators bore the brunt of attempts by 
employers to limit expenditure. The delay in extending the 
~ut in the living wage to New South Wales had the effect of 
bringing skilled craftsmen below the level of their labouring 
assistants. 2 Award rates for labourers employed in Port 
Kembla industries were established subject to the continued 
payment of bonuses. With the business decline of t~e mid-
and late 1920s, the employers found it convenient to argue 
that bonus payments did not make the operators piece-workers 
but were an example of 'profit-sharing•. 3 Disputes over bonus 
payments were common enough, and the introduction of new 
machinery was invariably followed by adjustments of bonus 
rates. During the depression, however, it was the company's 
desire to counteract what its general manager termed 'the 
long-delayed enquiry into the state living wage• 4 and not 
mechanisation that explains bonus reductions. In April 1930 
the Port Kembla branch of the AWU complained that bonus 
quotas were being systematically adjusted upwards. 5 By 1933 
1see Schedvin, Australia rm.:i. the Great Depression, pp.215-G, 
345-50. 
2see Amalgamated Engineering Union, Monthly Reports, March 
1932, ;;i.5. 
3H.R. Lee to J.P. Caddy (Metal Manufactures' Files), 25 August 
1933. 
4Metal'Manufactures General Manager's Report (company files), 
2~ September 1932. 
5F.H. Finch (AWU secretary), to J.P. Caddy (Metal 
Manufactures Files) , 29 April 1930. 
-'t 
82 
::Onus rates had been cut by an averaqe c= fifty per cent, or 
2s per day, an amount more ~han equal to t~c wage-cuts 
L~posed by the Federal Court. 
The erosion of bonus payments ~2de to labourers and 
machine operators was accompanied by an attack on special 
payments. Various expedients were used to avoid the payment 
of margins for special classes of work. The terms of 
._, employment for most labourers included a 'mixed-function' 
clause which stipulated that where a labourer in the course 
of his day's work performed more than one category of labour, 
his daily rate of pay should :be that of the higher ~ 
classification. Union leaders complained unsuccessfully 
that either the higher rates were paid only for the time 
spent on the job or that no extra payment was made. 
For most copper wo~kers as for the great majority of 
Wollongong's coalminers the early 1930s constituted a 
depression within a depression. Unlike the coalminers, 
~owever, men employed in the copper industries, especially the 
u!"lskilled or semi-skilled, were not always certain of 
obtaining a share of such work as periodically became 
~vailable. Competition for work at Port Kembla was intense. 
Even men who had worked at the copper plants since immediately 
a:ter the war were to be found among the ranks of the 
unemployed drifting around Port Kembla in the early months of 
1930. 
Men engaged in the iron and steel : ·dustry were on the 
whole the worst hit by declining employment opportunities. 
AIS, caught in the middle of transferring· its plant from 
Lithgow, were total!~• unprepared for and unable to adjust to 
the reduced market for its products. Construction work at 
Port Kembla was incomplete and the plant was not ready for 
full-scale production. The building and construction industry 
throughout Australia came to a standstill almost overnight 
und AIS which relied extensively upon demand for its heavy 
steel, foundry iron and pipes, were confronted with near 
'. empty order books. The company I unlike BHP I did not have 
ontlets to the Australian iron and steel products market and 
~.' 
with the diminution of traditional markets the firm found 
itself in the invidious position of competing with BHP for 
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the remaining available markets. It was an uneven contest. 
The integrated BHP steelworks were capable of more efficient 
operations than the half-finished Port Kembla works. Further, 
the competitive ability of AIS was reduced by higher labour 
costs. In 1928 the Lithgow wages board had been extended to 
include the Port Kembla works1 and most of the wages and 
classifications were taken over from Lithgow, where wages 
had always been higher than in Newcastle. They were also 
higher for individual margins and there was a 3s a week 
loading for holidays worked and for unpaid lost-time. In 
1926, because of the u:tremely arduous conditions of work at 
Lithgow, the loading had been increased to 7s a week. 2 
When the depression struck Port Kembla, AIS applied for 
a ten per cent wage-cut to offset its disadvantages in 
co:npetition w:i.th BHP, claiming that because the Lithgow-Port 
Kcmbla award~ were higher than the Newcastle award, BHP had 
substantially lower labour costs. Although Port Kembla as a 
new plant naturally did not have as many classifications as 
Newcastle, AIS in comparing the awards in 1931 claimed that in 
: forty-three cases out of sixty-nine the Port Kembla award was 
above that of the NewcastlE: award. Conversely, only in 
eighteen cases was the Newcastle award higher than Port 
3 Kembla' s. The court accepted the company's argument. It 
seems clear, however, as Helen Hughes points out, that 
differences in wages were only a minor factor in explaining 
the inability of AIS to compete with BHP which clearly 
established itself as the sole supplier of the Australian 
market for iron and steel. 4 Even in good times, the attempt 
by Hoskins to transfer an entire steelworks would have been 
1NSW Arbitration Reports, 1928, pp.221-3. 
2see Helen Hughes, The Australian Iron and Steel Industry 
1848-1962, p.114. 
3Nsw Arbitration Reports, 1932, pp.275-6. 
4Helen Hughe~, The Australian Iron and Steel Industry 
1848-1962, p.114. 
' 
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a bold and costly venture. In times of economic depression 
it proved in almost all respects a costly failure. Until 
1931, the company had to use its Lithgow 3leel furnaces 
because it was unable to complete the open-hearth 
installations at Port Kemhla. Failure to pay a dividend to 
shareholders between 1930 and 1933 undermined attempts to 
raise more ca.pi.tac. rn the depressed financial market. Calls 
for additional .~,;·.ds were made in 1932 and age\in in 1933 hut 
the sums raised were never enough to put the works into 
operation. 
Production at Port Kemhla after March 1930 was spasmodic. 
In April the company announced that lessened demand had led 
to the accumulation of stocks and that work in all 
departments was to cease temporarily. 1 Thereafter the plant 
operated unevenly and departments worked only as long as was 
needed to ._,omplete an order. Only the spun-pipe department 
maintained anything like constant performance. It produced 
water and sewerage pipes from 4 inches to 20 inches internal 
diameter used extensively in government-organised relief 
work. A review of production figures demonstrates the course 
of the slump. In 1929 slightly more than 130,000 tons of 
pig-iron were produced hut by 1931 annual production reached 
only 47,000 tons and fell further to 37,000 the following 
year. 2 Steel production dropped further and more quickly, 
falling from 49,000 tons in 1930 to 18,000 tons the following 
year. 3 
Va.riations in the amount of work available at the 
steelworks had a greater impact on the district than any 
other local industry. The table of average daily employees4 
shows continued growth from 750 in 1929 to 1,500 in 1933. 
1
sydney Morning Herald, 9 April 1930. 
2AIS Annual Reports, 1930-4. See also Helen Hughes, The Iron 
and Steel Industry 1848-1962, p.195. 
3see Appendix H: AIS Production and Employment Figures, 
1929-39, p.364. 
4Ibid. 
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?!1ese fi.gures, however, conceal the ac~'..lal irn9act of reduced 
9~oduction at the steelworks on the level of 2oca! 
~~ployrr.ent. Cons~ruc~ion work had aCded to ~be work-force 
u!1-:.il, by t!le latter part o~ 1929, the s"':ee2.\-Jor~s emp~oycd 
: , 500 ni.en, excluding st.a ff rr.em!:>ers, anC \'las second only to 
the mining companies as a source of employment. In April 
1930 when the blast-furnace was closed down and construction 
,,·o=k terminated, all l, 500 employees were dismissed. 1 Within 
~ ~onth the spun-pipe depar~~ent restarted with one hundred 
::")n, and shortly afterwards the blast-furnace restarted and a 
:urther 500 men were employed. The respite was shortlived. 
:n October the blast-furnace was again closed down and 
throi;ghout 1932 the reduced work-force was :=ationed two weeks 
. " 2 ~n _our. Such was the plight of the company that staff were 
cO'."C!'elled to work at the bench and the Labor Daily reported 
::.:10.t 1 the chief elect:?:"ician and t11e chief chemist a!"ld the 
research officer pull the ashes away from ".he boiler'. 3 
:-:canw'1ile a "body of men in excess of l, 000 was thrown into a 
state of near-permanent unemployment. 
Despite the dismissals, the steelworks continued to 
att!"ac' men looking for work. Itinerant searchers for work 
d!"ifted into Port Kembla from all parts of eastern Australia 
cind set up camp on t:r:e only tract of free land within view of 
the steelworks. This •,::1s an ill-drained, swampy area which 
late= achieved notorietj as the Flinders Street unemployed 
cam9. With men at the gate and -'Ompany struggling to keep 
cifloa.t, working conditions for those fortunate enough to be 
on the inside deteriorated. 
1 ~Svdney Morning Herald, 9 April 1930. 
L Tllawarra Mercury, 6 October 1932. 
3Labor Daily, 22 April 1932. This report was confir1~ed by 
interviews with men who worked at the steelworks dur i.ng 
the depression. Especially valuable wa~ an interview with 
Mr A. Kruger (17 January 1972), now assi.stant manager at 
ER & s, who in 1932 was an assistant chemist at AIS. 
. i 
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The works were known locally as a 'blood.'1.ouse' or '"'he l -
3utcher' s Shop' • The attempts to carry on cor:s-truction work 
~longside normal production led to a chaotic ana potentially 
Ca~~erous situation on t~e site: equipment was precariously 
?laced, tools were left lying around. It was not surprising 
that a continual stream of a~cidents both minor and serious 
occurred. Production workers were in general poorly 
s~?ervised. A court inquiry into a double fatality in the 
rolling mills in 1933 laid much of the blame on the lack of 
. h~ 2 overs2..g -... . Inexperienced workers were involved in many of 
the accidents but company policy compounded the problem . 
\•:":1en ne\ .. ' orders were receiV(~rJ., it was cheaper to offer 
exis'<:ing workers overtime than to employ further hands. 
Consequently, it was co:runon for men to work double shifts, 
~any leaving their homes (often as far north as Helensburgh) 
2t 5 a.m. They re'<:urned home at 11 p.m., and reported at the 
works again at 7 a.m. the next morning. Fatigue almost 
certainly contributed to the growing accident rate. Another 
company economy had potentially dangerous consequences 
and aroused the fear and resentment of workers who manned the 
?~o.nt 1 s railway engines. Instead of a crew of two, a single 
he could not :nJ.n was expected to stoke and drive, and hence 
::cep continuo'.1s watch for men crossing the lines. There were 
also co:r.plaints by workers that scaffolding erected on the 
construction sites was dangerously inadequate. 3 
Eow did the unions react to this situation? In general 
they offered only token resistance. Unionism survived 
reC1sona':Jly intact on the coalfields because it was firmly 
rooted in the social fabric of the mining communities which 
l 
-Tannock J~tters op.cit. and f.RQ, Vol.19, March 1936, p.383. 
This viewpoint has been perpetuated in the works of 
contemoorary novelist and historian Kylie Tennant. See The 
Battlei:s (Sydney, 1971 edition), p.389. 'If it'7 ':1nything 
like Port Kembla .•• I'd sooner stay away. Men waiting round 
the steel works, so that when a chap is killed they could get 
his job. ' 
2
south Coast Times, 14 January 1934. 
o"b"t'"'a""i"°· n'-'--°"a=s"""e"t'-'o"-"'f=f:-:i;.gures for accidents 
3 Illawarra Mercury, 14 August 1928. 
I have been unable to 
at thG steelworks. 
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susta~ned it and because ~ine~s were steeped in its 
:.r~d:..:t.ians · ~raditions of ~h:._s kind had not the time to take 
~oot ~t ?ort Kernbla. Workers in t~e copper industry for 
ex2.m:-;>le, ::eceiveC. li t:tle p!'otection from the Ari\~. '!1hroughout 
1930 cues became increasingly hard to collect and when in 
early 1931 the union secretary, F.H. (Fred) Finch, was 
c.:.sm:..ssed from the rr.c.nufacturi.ng plant the union continued to 
exist in little but name. Unemployed for twelve months, 
?inch eventually found. work as a clerk with tbe municipality 
of Cent:::al Illawarra and never returned to union affairs. 1 
Those who remained at work at the refinery and at the 
mc.nufacturing plant later elected representatives to continue 
nego':.iations with tbe employers but there \oias little to show 
:or t:-tese ,efforts. In 1932 when the Port Kembla companies 
sougnt to cut wages by 9d a. day, to remove the holiday clause 
and to reduce wages paid youths and females, local 
organisers appeared willing to accept cuts in juniors' rates 
~n the hope of forestalling other reductions. Belated support 
:rom tbe AWU central council, however, forced the companies 
':.o go before the Industrial Commission. 2 
The craft unions were more successful in retaining their 
ne:nbers. Membership of the AEU grew during the depression 
from 180 in 1930 to 212 by 1932 and to 257 in 1933. 3 The 
increase in Membership, however, added little to local union 
solidarity. Most new members were fitters and turners who 
nad been dismissed in Sydney and came south looking fer work 
4 
erecting the new steel plant at AIS. Commonly the men 
arrived in Port Kembla without their families, set up 
temporary camps near the steelworks and returned to their 
Sydney homes at the weekends. What organisation existed at 
1Interview with Mr F.H. Finch, 22 January 1972. 
2ILR. Lee (Australian Mines and Metals Associations, New 
Souto Wales Branch) to J.P. Caddy (Metal .Manufactutes' f'Jles), 
25 November 1932. 
3AEu, .1:!2.!!.tJ:lly Report accounts for September 1930, 1932, 1933. 
There was n:> return from the Port Kernbla branch in 1931 .. 
4Ibid. 
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?ort Kembla collapsed with the wholesale dismissals in May 
1 
1931.- In the absence of the supervision provided by law, 
~he Port Kembla companies were able to avoid paying a 5s 
al:owance for daily hiring and to ignore oreference to 
'1nionists. 2 Despite a brief recovery rJf ~erk in October the 
' C.istrict organiser found it impossible tc. :.::evive the branch. 3 
The systematic working of overtime was indicative of the 
collapse of unionism at the steelworks and served to produce 
:'1rther resentment among unemployed workers. J. Ward, the 
!.'Ii\ secretary, sought with diminishing success to retain 
what degree of solidarity there was in the ranks; organising 
the shifting, undisciplined mass of desperate men who drifted 
around Port Kembla was a difficult task. The unskilled 
labourers, many of them itinerants humping their swag in 
search of work, could not be brought into the ranks. Many 
returned to Sydney at the weekends and this made it difficult 
to organise a campaign among them. 
ac:ively discouraged the extension 
Moreover, the company 
of 
labourers: men seeking employrr.ent 'on 
carefully scrutinised.4 
unionism among 
the hill' were 
casual 
In 1930 Ward, in his role as local secretary, reported 
to the federal council of the FIA that his branch was unable 
to ;:>ay capitation fees of £17 12s 6d and sought financial 
aid from the New South Wales state executive. 5 Until 1932 
the branch continued to exist in name only: workers could 
sL~;:>ly not pay their dues. The nucleus of a new branch 
lT . 
.. b::.d., May 1931, i;;.12. 
2Ibid., May 1931,pp.ll, 13, March 1933, p.12. 
; 
~!biu., October 1931, p.12. 
L,:t.en who did their ti-"lle 'on the hill', when interviewed, 
thought that company vetting of workers especially at the 
steelworks extended as far as 'spying' on the activities of 
the unemployed. 
5New South Wales State Executive Cou.ncil Minutes, Vol.1, 
8 November 1930, pp.249-50 and 3 January_l931, ,P·2?2· Also 
1931 Council Report. Cited by J.A. Merritt, A History of 
the Federated Ironworkers' Association of Australia, 
1909-1952', p.174. 
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persisted, though tenuously, in the spun-pipe department and 
union officials hoping to reconstruct the branch in 1932 
concentrated their efforts in this department and in the 
10 inch merchant mill which was transferred from Lithgow to 
Port Kembla in 1932. 1 An appeal was made in September 1932 
by the FIA executive for the restoration of the 7s industry 
allowance which had been lost in 1930. Their eventual 
success rejuvenated dispirited local unionists and led to an 
a~tempt by the State Executive to re-estabiish the Port 
Kembla branch. 
In the election of branch officials conducted by members 
of the state executive, ~he previous secretary, Ward, was 
defeated by a more militant nominee of Irish descent, 
T. (Paddy) McDonald. 2 The defeat of Ward was indicative of 
t~e changing mood amongst unionists. In 1931 he had been 
elected president of the Illawarra Trades and Labor Council 
and though unemployed for long periods he struggled to hold 
the branch together. Ward worked for the jobless but, unlike 
McDonald, he did not align himself with the more radical 
unemployed protest movement which reached its peak during the 
summer of 1931. 3 
Individually then, unions were pre-occupied with their 
internal affairs and could offer little opposition to wage-
cuts or the erosion of working conditions. Collectively 
their achievements were meagre. Established to co-ordinate 
and direct union activities in the district, the Illawarra 
Trades and Labor council tended after 1930 to function merely 
as a sounding board for worker discontent and its inac1:ion 
1Illawarra Mercury, 8 July 1932. 
Arrowsmith, 20 February 1972. 
Interview with Mr £. 
2There were 117 ballot papers issued and 113 returne~. 
McDonald received 68 votes, Ward 42, and three were 7nformal. 
See Merritt, 'A History of the Federated Ironworkers 
Association of Australia, 1909-1952', pp.177-8. 
3
see Chapter Three, pp.115-49. 
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; was an indication of the confusion among mem:ber unions. The 
council passed resolutions condemning the imposition of a 
'·. 
ls in ~he pound tax on all wages as iniquitous, 1 criticised 
the lack of organised unions at the steelworks and advocated 
a bounty on all bunker coal not purchased in Australia. 2 
?rom June 1930 onwards· the bulk of the council's 
celiberations concerned not the workers but the workless. 
The smaller and less organised unions continue~, 
however, until 1931, to seek the support of the '.Crades and 
Labor Council. In November 1930, for example, the South 
coast Branch of the Printing Industry Employees' Union of 
Australia (PIEUA) voted to affiliate with the council so as 
·~o provide a means of safeguarding our inte~ests• 3 and in 
the hope that the council would encourage unions to support 
local printers. In the same month the newly constituted 
South Coast Meat Employees' Union affiliated in an effort to 
obtain more support for their attempt to prevent local 
bt·tchers from supplying Sydney shops with meat while that 
city's slaughtermen were on strike. 4 The more general trend, 
however, was towards disaffiliation. Some unio.1s, such as 
the individual mine lodges, ceased to send delegates because 
they could no longer pay the affiliation fee. Others broke 
with the council because it no longer appeared capable of 
o:fering any real assistance. G.W. Slo~;n, represe.ntativu of 
the watersiders, resigned from the council because, he said, 
'it had in no way functioned for this Branch'. 5 With some 
nissivings the watersiders elected a new delegate, H. McEvoy, 
to the council. At the same time, however, they issued an 
ultimatum: if the council failed to assist the union in its 
struggle to have its members admitted to work on the company 
l Record Book, 23 May 1933. 
2 Illawarra Mercury, 8 July 1933. 
3Ibid., 7 November 1930. 
4Tb'd 
- l. • , 
5 South 
:>!inute 
28 November 1930. 
Coast Branch of the Waterside 
Books, 31 July 1931. 
Workers' Federation 
'• 
. 
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jetties at Port Kembla they would withdraw from the council. 1 
Before it could do so, the Trades and Labor Council ceased 
to function. After 1931 the council continued as a paper 
body only. The volatile, energetic and now unpaid council 
secretary, S. (Steve) Best remained at his post throughout the 
depression. Best, himself on the dole, was a vigorous and 
consistent advocate for the unemployed. He led demonstrations 
and protest marches, filed petitions, wrote a volume of 
letters denouncing wnat he described as the callous 
indifference of governments to the needs of the unemployed. 
Be 1·1as the first unemployed man arrested in Wollongong for 
leading an 'illegal' procession. 2 
Union militancy during the depression was in the main 
confined to words. The depression crippled unions as 
collective bargaining instrumerits. Unemployment was too 
great a problem <:or the labour movement to tackle on its own; 
government intervention was needed. 
Statistics make it pcssible to assess the affect of the 
depression on the life of •,•orkers in the Wollongong region. 
A general picture of earninsti for the year ending 30 June 
1933 may be gained from the Conunonwealth Census. One 
breadwinner in five declared no income for the year. Of those 
declaring some earnings, twenty-four per cent received less 
than £52, fourteen per cent between £52 and £103, thirteen 
per cent more than £103 but less than £155. Of the 
twenty-eight per cent fortunate enough to earn more than £:L::: :' 
(or roughly the basic wage), twelve per cent received less 
than £259. Slightly more than one in ten had an income 
1Ibid. 
2 See Chapter Three, pp.117-8. 
I 
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exceeding £260. 1 This was the situation when government-
sponsored relief works were beginning to absorb the unemployed 
and industry was on the upturn. Local destitution was 
·: greatest in the coalmining villages of Northern Illawarra and 
Bulli where a quarter of the breadwinners declared no 
earnings and a total of seventy-five per cent earned less 
t!-ian £1 a week. 
The shortage of adequate housing a serious problem in 
the 1920s worsened rapidly during the depression. Between 
1921 and 1933 the number of private dwellings inr.reased by 
3,224 from 6,913 to 10,137, but this increase still did not 
keep pace with the influx of workers. 2 Apart from the grave 
situation in the coalming districts the housing shortage had 
the effect of maintaining average weekly rentals at their 
pre-depression levels. 3 In Wollongong where t~e problem was 
1This paragraph is based on Census of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, !933. There is some discrepancy between those 
classi::':ied .i ;1 the census as breacwinners in the 'Industry: 
:-:ales and Females tables' (pp.110-125), and the number so 
classified in the 'Income Tables' (pp.141-150). Almost 
cer':uinly the statistics mask the true level of destitution 
cspeciully at Port Kembla. It is possible, for example, that 
workers from Sydney who camped at Port Kembla sent in returns 
to Sydney. 
2The number of dwellings at the 1921 and 1933 census and the 
increase by local government area was as follows: 
Local Government Area 1921 1933 Increase 
Central Illawarra l, 180 2, 161 981 
Northern Illawarra 1,405 l, 824 419 
Bulli 2,923 3,558 635 
Wollongong 1,405' 2,594 1,189 
Source: Census of Commonwealth of Australia, 1921, pp.1497-
1500; Census of Commonwealth of Australia, 1933, 
pp.1934-7. 
3Average weekly rentals by local government area for 1921 and 
1933 were as follows: 
Local Government Area 1921 1933 
Central Illawarra lls lOd lls 9d 
Northern Illawarra 9s lld 9s 3d 
Bulli 14s Gd 16s lOd 
Wollongong l2s ld 9s 6d 
Source: census of commonwealth of Australia, 1921, pp.1497-
1500; census of commonwealth of Australia, 1933, 
pp.1934-7. 
~:.~::-;;; 
.; 
most acute, rents remained at the point reached 
opening of the steelworks in 1928. 
after the 
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The eviction of employees from their homes for non-payment 
of rent does not, however, seem to have been used by employers 
as a weapon against workers. Most mining companies allowed 
arrears to accumulate. The Mt Kembla management in 1934 
waived all back rent owed by its employees. 1 The more general 
procedure, howe:-\l'er, was to garnishee wages when production 
resume:'\. At Pert Kembla, MeLal Manufactures, which had 
financed housing loans for employees, adjusted loan repayments 
downwards, extended the repayment period and waived rents 
during periods of unemployrnent. 2 AIS erected huts for their 
workers, rented them at 3d per week and set aside an area to 
be used as a vegetable plot. 3 Whether the motive for these 
examples of rent remission was charity or frank recognition 
that rents could not be collected and that they affected only 
a fraction of the workers is not the point; the stereotype of 
the uncompromisingly greedy landlord has not much substance in 
depressed Wol'.1.,.··:·1ong. 
In the c··>t '.Inin.l.ng villag.~s those who received most work 
were those who least needed it. The seniority custom 
favoured me~ who had lived in the district for some time. 
Such men had established h::imes and found it less difficult 
thar. most to lower expectations to those more appropriate to 
a subsistence economy. The house-cow, vegetabl~- yarden, 
fowl-yard and small fishing boat were part of a way of life 
that had been developed to offset irregular employment. 
Conversely, the c<eniority clause operated against the recent 
British immigrant and against r.he younger married man with 
children. At Port Kembla, apart from a small group of skilled 
tradesmen who had begun work in the copper industry in the 
early 1920s, few workers had been able to establish anything 
more than a rudimentary household. It was these men who 
suffered r::ost during the long periods of unemployment which 
soon engulfed them. 
1Record Book, 14 March 1934, 18 February 1935. 
211,etal Manufactures Directors' Minutes (company files) , 
10 June 1931. 
3 Illawarra Mercury, 8, 15 May 1931. __ ...... _ 
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CHAPTER THREE 
TF..E UNE!>IPLOYED: 1930-3 
During the 1920s Wollongong workers had come to accept 
periods of unemployment as a fact of life. Until 1928, when 
the loss of markets by southern collieries resulted in the 
retrenchment of coalminers, such unemployment as existed was 
able to be absorbed by public works schemes. 1 Between 1930 
and 1932, however, the number of men out of work reached 
unprecedented proportions. By mid-1932 there were 6,900 men, 
or roughly one-third of the male work-force, registered as 
2 
unemployed. A year later 4,508 Wollongong workers declared, 
in Co~~onwealth Census returns, that they were currently 
looking for work. 3 These statistics, particularly the census 
:igures, almost certainly i1ide the true level of unemployment. 
Nevertheless, they indicate in crude terms +::tc' pressure :·-.. ;.w 
placed on existing sources of relief. 
In the early months of 1930 the relief of distre=sed 
'liorkers remained a local responsibility. The first line of 
defence was the combined resources of the family and 
neighbours whose recognition of need was immediate and 
personal. The loss of work by the breadwinner put pressure 
upon his wife and older children to seek work. Some married 
women, who accepted separation from their husbands and 
children as a sacrifice necessary for the general well being 
of the family, were able to find work in Sydney as domestic 
servants. 4 Available statistics do not reveal whether the 
average number of wage earners per family rose or fell during 
l See Chapter one, pp. 4 7-53. 
2N.S.W. Industr:a~ Gazette, Vol.xlix, p.1097. 
3census of the commonwealth of Australia, 1933, Vol.1, 
pp.136- 40. 
4rnterview with Mrs J. McQuire, 4 February 1973. 
.-,' 
the depression. In the 1933 Conunonwealth Census, however, 
close to 450 women declared themsel'1es to be unemployed. 1 
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It seems likely, therefore, that the combined employment 
prospects of the family were little better than those of the 
~readwinner. Moreover, the charity of friends and neighbours, 
since it depended as much upon the whim of the. giver as upon 
the need of the receiver, was too disorganised to have any 
real impact. At best, most families seem to have been able 
to survive on their own resources for little more than a few 
months. 
The second line of defence was the local conununity - the 
established private relief organisations or the public 
1· agencies financed partly out of rate revenues and partly from 
local contributions. In Wollongong social assistance 
available to the poor was limited to the religious charities. 
Churches established unemployment funds to help 'local people 
in need'. 2 The Methodist congregation was asked to provide a 
meal a day or week according to their means, 3 while the 
.. 
' 
Salvation Army and St Vincent de Paul Society distributed 
rations and clothing to needy famili~s. 4 In the main, however, 
the religious charities sought to care for their own. To a 
large extent their inability to offer much help is a further 
com.~entary upon the unplanned haphazard growth of the town. 
The transformation of Wollongong from a country service· centre 
to a steeltown was not accompanied by any expansion in the 
social activities of the churches. The catholic church, for 
example, remained part of the Sydney diocese and was capable 
of no local initiative which required substantial expenditure. 
Protestant church councils reflected the thinking of the old 
'country' order and not the new industrial one. Moreover, 
1census of the commonwealth of Australia, 1933, Vol.l, 
pp.136-40. 
2Illawarra Mercury, 15 April 1930; Church Minute Book 
(St Michael's Anglican Church, Wollongong), 28 April 1931, 
20 April 1932, 26 April 1933. 
3 
.!1.lawarra Mercury, 15 April 1930. 
., 
4Ibid., 13 June 1930. 
) 
< 
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the distress amo~g their own congregations was enough to 
absorb any resources they were able to muster for celief. 1 
Their efforts, furthermore, secured only a half-hearted 
response from local businessmen. 
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Like most governments the New South Wales Government was 
slow to_ apprehend the i:;ize of the economic problem which 
confronted it. Consequently, legislation for the relief of 
unemployment reflected the current belief that a slight 
readjustment in economic relationships was all that was 
required. The Bavin government imposed extra taxation to 
create funds for food relief schemes and for the financing of 
relief works. Commonly known as a wages' tax it was a levy 
of 3d in the £ upon all wages and income. The New South Wales 
government then created a skeleton organisation to grapple 
with the problem. To administer the fund an Unemployment 
Relief Council was appointed. Food relief d~pots were 
established throughout the state to distribute rations to the 
2 . 
unemployed. But while the government formuldted its relief 
programme the demands of the unemployed grew. The initiative 
for the .moment clearly rested with the civic leaders within 
each local community. 
Local authorities had little money and therefore in 
practice, were ineffectual. The Central Illawarra 
:·lunicipality offered negligible assistance to· its unemployed. 
In 1929 the council reverted to what town clerk W.J. Macken 
colourfully described as 'a pick and shovel policy' 3 which 
was more concerned with balancing the budget than with 
providing relief. 4 For this reason the increasing number of 
1Documentary evidence of the churches' role in relief schemes 
is soarse. Of some use for writing this paragraph were: 
Church Minute Books (St Michael's Anglican Church, Wollongong), 
1872-1946· Parish News (Osborne Memorial Church of St Luke's, 
Dapto and' All Saints', Albion Pa:>:-l·:i, September 1922-May 1940; 
St Luke's Women's P.irochial Gui\ d ;Hnute Book, 18 September 
1925 to 19 February 1935. 
2 ' . 
See F .A.· Bland, 'Unemployment R"·l.\.ti;f in Australia', 
International Labour Review, VoLUX, No. l, PP· 23-57 · 
3central Illawarr,;i Municipality Minute Books, 12 December 1929. 
4rbid., 7 December 1929, 8 February and 6 June 1930. 
. / 
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unemployed in the· developing industrial complex at Port 
:zembla appealed to the nearby Wollongong Municipality for 
help. Though not faced with an economic crisis of the 
magnitude which confronted the new industrial area its 
?rosperity was more apparent than real. A Mayoral Relief 
Fund established in 1926 was exhausted within two years by 
the demands of destitute coalminers. 1 Council policy for 
assisting the unemployed, as far as it had one, aimee. at 
providing work for 'householders•. 2 In large measure this 
was a secular version of the position adopted by the churches 
and was based on the assumption that existing unemployment 
.:as simply another visitation of the periodic bouts of work 
scarcity which had beset the district throughout the 1920s. 
11.::,. (Bill) Howarth, the conservative Wollongong mayor, 
?Jblicly disclaimed council responsibility for ';:hose who 
3 
migrated from town to town' and demanded that tr.e steelworks 
accept some of tl:e respcnsihility for the increas::..1g number 
of unemployed entering the district. 4 
Howarth' s persistent refusal to accept responsH>'..lity 
for migratory unemployed drew sharp criticism from local 
labour spokesmen who demanded that the council play a more 
active part in alleviating distress. 5 In answer to a more 
general demand for action, the council announced a scheme 
which it declared would encompass all um'mployed and eliminate 
the previous 
unemployed. 
distinction betwee1, local c.·.d migratory 
The proposal, lik8 many local attempts to 
grapple with the problem of increasing unemployment was 
' laudable though ill-conceived and impractical. The 
inescapable problem was money. The council had previously 
declared itself financially unable to offer employment on 
council work. To finance his scheme, therefore, Howarth 
1 Illawarra Mercury, 28 November 1928. 
2wollongo~g Municipality Minute Books, 7 December 1928. 
3
n1awarra Mercury, 15 April 193?. 
4
rbid., 13, 20 June 1930. 
5
rbid., 15 April 1930. 
,., . 
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argued that the cost should be voluntarily borne by the 
corn~unity. Employers and employees were asked to contribute 
at unspecified intervals to an unemployment fund. CommuniT.y 
contributions were to be subsidised by the council and, it 
was hoped, by the State Government. 1 
Support for the council scheme was negligible. Apart 
from the Wollongong Traders' Association which was willing 
to support any scheme to rejuvenate spending, employers chose 
to ignore the proposal. 2 Whatever chances the scheme had of 
obtaining any degree of worker support were destroyed when 
council spokesmen, acknowledging the likelihood that lack of 
funds would cripple their project, suggested the unemployed 
should accept £2 a week, the minimum income permitted 
applicants for relief rations. Neither union officials nor 
unemployed leaders were willing to accept this proposition. 
sp~aking for coalminers, already contributing twelve and a 
half per cent of their wage to sustain locked-out northern 
miners, Lowden denounced the scheme as an endeavour to shift 
the burden of relief to those least able to bear it. 3 A 
meeting of the unemployed ridiculed the plan and declared 
itself against any suggestion that the unemployed should 
accept less than the basic wage. 4 
After the poor reception given to its relief scheme the 
Council abdicated all responsibility to the voluntary 
charitable organisations. In June, however, at the federal 
Government's request it again summoned a public meeting to 
consider the co-ordination of food and clothing distribution. 
Apparently smarting from the adverse reaction to his earlier 
scheme, Howarth restated his original di,.,tincti.on between 
local and migratory unemployed. Indeed, in the course of 
debate he narrowed still further his definition of 'local' 
5 
unemployed so that it encompassed only rate-payers. To these 
1Ibid., 22 April 1930. 
2Ibid. 
3
rbid., 15 April 19,30. 
4Ibid., 8, 15 April 1930. 
5
rbid., 13 June 1930. 
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'citizens' Howarth offered, upon formal application, the 
charitable assistance of a Citizens' Relief committee, an 
organisation composed of representatives of the churches and 
public bodies. 1 Though he later widened this definition of 
ci' .. .i.zenship to include householders of three to six months 
residence Howarth continued to regard transients as a federal 
or state responsibility. This was an attitude which many 
workers ·shared. Every transient who entered the district was 
one more competitor for available work. 
Towards the end of June 1930, as the coal mines began 
to suffer from the renewed competition of northern mines, the 
number of unemployed increased dramatically and opposition 
to !·!owarth's policy escalated. The mayor's abrasive 
personality sharpened the conflict. Denouncing criticism by 
the unemployed as ill-informed, he blamed the unresponsive 
und obstructive attitude of the unemployed for the eventual 
shelving of the voluntary scheme in April. 2 His fur·~her 
demand that the collection of food and clothing be restricted 
to 1 autllorised 1 
;i.ttack upon 
:novement. 3 
the 
persons was interpreted as a deliberate 
unemployed relief ventures of the labour 
Moreover, the discontent of 
momentum when Howarth publicly 
the unemployed 
proclaimed what many gathered 
had long 
keep the 
suspected: that the Council's prl.me concern was to 
jobless off the streets and if possible to isolate 
them on the outskirts of the township. In April, when the 
Illawarra Trades and Labor Council asked that a camping 
ground be set aside for the unemployed, Howarth side-stepped 
the request and suggested a site at Port Kembla away from 
permanent settlement. 4 Thereafter, he refused to debate the 
issue. 5 Although unw"'..lling to accept delegations from the 
unemployed, it was not his aim to antagonise the coalminers 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid., 20 June 1930. 
3Ibid. 
4Wollongong Municipality Minute Books, 7 April 1930. 
5Ibid., 19 June 1930. 
and he eventually accepted Lowden as a negotiator. He 
remained, nevertheless, nard to shift and continued to 
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disclaim responsibility for transients. 
evidence to the contrary Howarth denied 
local residents were among the homeless. 
Despite abundant 
that 'bona fide' 1 
If there were any 
,> he preferred to arrange housing for th<:i\i rather than 
establish an unemployed camp within the township. 2 
To the unemployed Howarth's policy appeared inhumane and 
based on a stubborn refusal to accept the realities of 
changing local circumstances. He was, declared R. (Robert) 
Shayler, an itinerant conununist organiser, 
, ... hiding the nasty and ugly blots that appear 
around this district, that was renowned for its 
scenery. Wollongong is now a steel town, and 
must produce an environment like all other 
steel towns the world over - that is hospitals, 
chemist shops, soup kitchen [sic] and slums etc., 
in abundance which are evidence of a decayed and 
dying system. 
This is the price we must pay for the 
high-;st express5.on of ·'civilization', namely, 
steel production; and you, Mr Mayo~-, c~nnot 
escape these things under this system. 
Howarth, however, was not rejecting industrialism as 
impractical or necessarily evil. Rather he was moving towards 
advocating an embargo on internal migration until better 
times returned.. Movement from t.ho cities to rural areas was 
common in the early years of the depression but since 
agriculture was as depressed as industry, 'back to the land', 
despite its bucolic appeal was no general solution to 
joblessness. In some respects the Wollongong district 
appeared to offer as good a compromise as any other New South 
Wales town. By settling on the outskirts of the township 
the unemployed could attempt to live off the land and, at 
the same time, be close to an industrial complex and possible 
employment. 
1
rbid. 
2Ibid. 
3Illawarra Mercury, 27 June 1930. 
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Howarth's attitude to the unemployed was not shared by 
the :::-ernaining local authorities within the district. Both 
the municipality of Northern Illawarra and the Bulli Shire 
established and maintained camps for the homele:;s •1 At Port 
~ernbla, where an acute housing shortage accentuated the 
problem, municipal leaders, though willing to provide a 
camping site, were reluctant to maintain or sup1~rvise it. 
T~ey considered that this task would be best carried out by 
some ;eligious organisation. However, a direct appeal to the 
Salvation Army failed to produce a firm commitment and the 
council then called for government financial assistance. 2 
Encouraged on the one hand by promised government financial 
aid and apprehensive lest unauthorised camps should mushroom, 
t~e municipality decided to construct a camp for single men 
.1nd another for married couples. Each was maintained from 
council funds and supervised by a camp committee whose 
formation the council directed and which it assisted to draw 
up a set of camp regulations. 3 
A further yardstick by which the unemployed could gauge 
the sympathy of local authorities was the readiness with 
which they used loan-funds to provide relief work. Apart 
from employing a gang of 'citizens', the Wollongong Council 
refused to countenance any expenditure from its loan fund to 
4 provide work for the unemployed. In contrast, the Northern 
Illawarra Municipality, in April 1930, voted to distribute 
5 the remaining loan work amongst the unemployed. Work was to 
be rationed and each worker was to receive twenty days' 
employment. The unemployed were asked to operate their own 
6 
employment roster. 
1Northern Illawarra Municipality Minute Books, 3 June 1930; 
Bulli Shire Minute Books, 14 July 1930. 
2central Illawarra Municipality Minute Books, 14 May 1930. 
3Ibid., 11 June 1930. 
4 Illawarra Mercury, 15 April 1930. 
5Northern Illawarra Municipality Minute Books, 22 April 1930. 
6Ibid. 
f, 
and 
102 
For the Bulli Shire Council the problem of unemployment 
the need to provide relief was delayed until rnid-1930. 
The shire council had, during this six months' respite, 
gained a reputation for an enlightened approach to workers• 
1, ;:i::oblems. Throughout the early months of 1930 it had refused 
to increase the working hours of its employees from forty-four 
to :arty-eight hours per week in accordance w:·.th the 
Industrial Arbitration (Eight hours' Act 1930) and the Public 
services (salaries Reduction) Act. Instead it paid forty-
eight hours' wages for forty-four hours' work. 1 In so doing 
I• 
i:: drew upon itself the criticism of both the New South Wales 
.Local Government Association and the Main Roads Board which 
:1lleged that the council was misusing government funds by 
p:iying above award rates. 2 The criticisms were ignored and, 
·•hen confronted in June with an increasing number of 
unemployed, the council at first endeavoured to continue its 
benevolent policy. FollO\;ing the example of Northern 
Illa·.'1arra the Bulli Shire recognised a work register submitted 
to it by the unemployed and voted to accept labour exclusively 
~rom this source. 3 But in July the council conceded the 
impossibility of preserving the award wages of permanent 
employees and at the same time provide work for the jobless. 
Consequently permanent staff were asked to forego marginal 
rates and to accept forty-four hours' pay for forty-four 
4 ,,, . d5 hours' work, and unemployeu work was ratione • 
The breakdown of local resources, public and private, 
Government inaction and the inadequacy of food rations left 
the unemployed little choice but to provide their own relief. 
In the beginning, direction was given by the existing labour 
organisations such as the Trades and Labor Council, the 
1Julli Shire Minute Books, 3 Febru~ry, 17 March, 14 April 
1930; Sydney Morning Herald, 7 April 1930. 
2Bulli Shire Minute Books, 14 April 1930. 
3
rbid., 23 June 1930. 
i 4 i. Ibid., 21, 28 July 1930. 
5Ibid., 28 July 1930. 
i"' 
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:·liners' Federation and to a lesser degree by the ALP branches. 
In March 1930 the Illawarra Trades and Labor council 
organised a local branch ~f the One Big Union of the 
Unemployed whose proclaimed objective was to safeguard 
employment at trade i..;·.i.on rates for its members. 1 However, in 
a short time a new set of leaders emerged from the ranks of 
lehe unemployed. These leaders were newcomers to the district 
and, in the main, convinced communists. The most belligerent 
0.f them was Robert Shayl o.!r. Coming to Wollongong from 
S7dney, late in 1929, Shayler quickly gained a reputation for 
his outspoken defence of the unemployed. He becar.ie secretary 
of the Wollongong One Big Union of the Unemployed. 
In May he launched a South Coast division of the 
Unemployed Workers' Movement, one of a number of communist 
party organisations formed, in accordance with Comintern 
directions issued in 1926, 'to act as a bridge to the masses'. 
Shayler poured Marxist scorn on what he saw as the 
platitudinous patronage of the local authorities. 2 Soup 
kitchens, doles and clothing depots were, in his view, of 
little benefit to the unemployed. They hindered the 
development of working class consciousness. Unemployment, he 
continued, was now a permanent feature of the capitalist 
system and the only real solution was a radical reconstruction 
of society. For Shayler the cause of the depression was 
clear enough: improved methods of production had created a 
permanent unemployed army; mechanisation had solved the 
problem of production but not the difficulty of distribution. 3 
Such arguments alarmed administrators, strengthened 
their belief that only 'genuine' residents deserved assistance 
and precipitated a confrontation between Shayler and Howarth. 
Shayler labelled the Wollongong mayor the 'Mussolini of the 
South Coast' and alleged that Howarth had usurped the 
authority of the council and established a personal 
dictatorship. Had he not personally refused to sanction an 
l Il.lawarra Mercury, 30 March 1930. 
2 Ibid., 
3 b' I id. , 
27 June 1930. 
27 January 1930. 
.. : . ' ... ,. ' .. ,, .. : ' . - ,. ~ . ' 
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unemployed camp within the municipality, declined to hear 
unemployed deputations and insisted on perpetuating the myth 
that there were no Wollongong unemployed in need of housing? 
shayler referred to other municipalities which were providing 
camp sites, and co-operating fully with the unemployed at a 
time when the Wollongong workless were being evicted from 
. h 1 their omes. 
Howarth's persistent refusal to hear deputations from 
the unemployed seemed to confirm a growing suspicion among 
the jobless that relief policies were influenced by official 
reluctance to help those who were thought to be undeserving. 
!. In an open letter to Howarth complaining of political bias 
in the treatment of the unemployed, Shayler asked: 
.. 
l .t 
' .. 
. ' ., 
••• what is our crime? If we say or do anything 
that the law does not allow we can be prosecuted. 
What more do you want? Is not your argument in 
its final analysis a material one? Are you not a 
share partner in this framework called capitalism, 
a system that exists on the degradation of men, 
women and children, and no amount of charity is 
going to solve the problem. 
It is for expressing our opinion that we are 
penalised L~day, for we are out of harmony with 
the existing code of ethics. Every age has had its 
social reformers persecuted and to the eternal 
credit of the rebels who revolted against the 
petty tyrants of the day, they have always risen 
to the occasion.of facing the situation and 
triumphing over their tyrants. We will triumph 
over ours, but in doing so we realise that some 
will have to pay the penalty. 2 
Sh':!.yler frequently ran to excess in his diatribes agair.st 
local authorities. He demanded that the Wollongong Council 
recognise the harsh realities of unemployment and ridiculed 
official reluctance to enter into public debate with the 
unemployed. He also challenged Howarth in ~he name of 'human 
brotherhood' to throw light on 
... the dark spots of civili~ati~n and don't 
hide your head like an ostrich in the sand. 
Admit that you cannot meet our argument in the 
open and that the weapon you intend to use is 
the ~eapon that all tyrants have used in the 
1south coast Times, 9 May 1930; Illawarra Mercury, 27 June 
1930. 
• 2Illawarra Mercury, 11 July 1930 • 
~""~:~," 
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past, that is, suppression gaol and the 
o I hangman s rope. And in the words of a man 
that struck terror into the minds of some of 
the greatest tyrants that ruled England in the 
la7t c7ntury( John Boyle O'Reilly, when he 
said, Ours is a noble doctrine; it teaches 
all are brothers; it teaches all are free. 
Our voices will be heard.'l 
Howarth countered such outbursts by pointing to their 
destructive rather than constructive intent and called for 
greater co-operati9n from the unemployed. 2 
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There was a degree of desperation in Howarth's appeals 
for by mid-winter municipal relief - private and public -
was at the end of its resources. Those unemployed who had 
hitherto been dependent on the local community, were now 
compelled to turn to self-help ventures. Since April, the 
Unemployed Workers' Movement, despite Shayler's opposition to 
any form of charitable aid, developed an extensive relief 
programme. The movement was in fact the first self-help 
organisation in the field pre-dating the more orthodox and 
more selective aid distributors, the Citizens' Relief 
Associations. For this reason the Unemployed Workers' 
:·!ovement enjoyed an immediate and extraordinary growth. In 
~lay 1930 leaders claimed a membership of 3,000. 3 As the 
movement developed, three objectives became clear: se].f-help, 
relief and employment at trade union rates. 4 :~was later to 
add a fourth - political action. Members throughout the 
district were organised into fourteen branches. Each branch 
elected two representatives to sit on a district council 
which in turn sent delegates to a state council in Sydney. 
1Ibid., 27 June 1930. John Boyle O'Reilly (1844-90), was an 
Irish-American. An ardent revolutionist he became a member 
of the Fenian organisation known as the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood. He was transported in 1867 to Bunbury, Western 
;\ustralia. He subsequently escaped and organised an 
expedition which rescued i:>.ll the Ir.i.sl: military political 
prisoners from the Western Australia convict establishmento 
(1876). That Shayler should appeal in the words of an Irish-
Cacholic, revolutionist is indicative of widt.?sprcad ca1ppo::t 
among militant labour for the 'Irish cause'. 
2Ibid. 
> ~Ibid., 2 May 1930. 
4Ibid. 
:~ 
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AS a rule, though not invariably, executive control of the 
branches was in the hands of communists. Within this 
structure, individual branches were fully autonomous: size 
and organisation Varied from branch to branch. There were in 
, most cases no dues although some branches introduced a 
voluntary levy of ld a week. 1 
The tightly knit homogeneous mining communities which 
nurtured the Unemployed Workers' Movement during the winter 
months of 1930 were well adapted for co-operative ventures. 
Isolated settlements built around the pits which gave them 
2.Lfe, the mining villages had over the years developed a high 
degree of social organisation. More than any single 
institution the union provided this strong sense of community. 
It was the unio~ which in times of recession found relief 
•,;ork for redundant miners, which organised and distributed 
food relief and which provided some degree of organisation 
foe t~e unemployed. It was this structure and tradition of 
self-help which the Unemployed Workers' Movement utilised in 
2 i"s relief programme. 
The range and success of these efforts does much to 
explain why, despite niggardly government relief, there was 
no widespread starvation on the coalfields. Each unit of 
the ui;cmployed Workers' Movement leased, or more commonly 
simply used, cro;-m land for communal vegetable plots which 
provided food both for destitute families and soup kitchens. 
·reams of men operated small fishing boats or caught rabbits. 
To house the homeless, groups of miners constructed bush 
settlements of 'white cir.: . .:.·• ,.- the hill slopes above the 
mining villages. Bush t:: Jx~r " . 0 felled and used for the 
fr&mewcrk. Tv this rough frame old cement bag~ were fixed 
with clouts and, after being soaked several times and left to 
dry hard in the sun, were painted white with lime. Sassafras 
levelied with an adze provided the floorboards and old 
galvanised .iron the roof. Sewing guilds were established in 
1r t ' ' n erviews with Mr 
Blacklock and Mr A. 
D. Timmins, Mr L. Boardman, Mr H. 
Speed. 
2 For a fuller account of the social role of the miners' 
lodges see Chapter one,pp.47-53 and also DMB, 17-18 June 1930. 
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·, 
~·· disused shops, private homes or sometimes old sheds to help 
clothe the ragged. 1 
Communal spirit rather than communism was the movement's 
hallmark. So well did its self-help programme operate that 
Howarth, the movement's chief antagonist, denounced it as 'like 
the Salvation Army adding to its strength by soup kitchen 
conversions'. 2 Self-help, however, often took the form of 
organised criminality. Before regulations governing dole 
distribution were tightened during 1931-2, bicycle troops were 
organised. A team of men set out on a grand tour of dole 
depots collecting rations as they went and 
with provisions for general distribution. 
systematically plundered railway waggons. 
returning home 
Another group 
One member of the 
group now recalls his involvement in t":e operation: 
In the first place something went wrong with the 
dole and l had to go and see a man named Butlin 
who was in charge of the relief depot and I had 
to go to Wollongong. I walked from Coledale to 
Wollongong, where I met Butlin and we argued and 
argued. Anyway it got that way that trouble 
started. Windows were smashed, chairs were broken 
up and the police came and arrested me and sent 
word that I was arrested in Wollongong to Fred 
Lowden, President [of the· Southern District] of 
the Miners' Federation. He was telephoned by a 
man named Mullins and he came and bailed me out. 
I was tried and got nine days for disorderly 
conduct and damage to Government property. Of 
course, I did my nine de.ys and after that I knew 
'che people around about, friends of mine for years, 
who were jumping the railways'for coal. I jumped 
the railways before I went on the track, for 
different stuff. So I just went on my own and 
jumped them. They would go one night and I would 
go another night and gradually we merged together. 
I told them 'There is too much stuff going· we've 
• • got to get caught.' Foodstuffs and clothing were 
the main things we got. We'd go.to Scarborough, 
to the signal box, where the freights slowed up as 
they came out of the tunnel. Then threw them off 
between Coledale and Austinmer and collect them 
later and take them up the bush. There was one 
night we got a lot of stuff banked ~p ready to . 
throw off and the train stopped at Coledale Station, 
which it had never done before. The guard walked 
along the line and t~ere were all these boxes on 
1
rnterviews with Mr H. Blacklock, Mr D. Timmins, 
~~ L. Boardman and Mr J. McQuire. 
2
south Coast Times, 7 July 1932. 
to~ of the tarpaulin. They knew that it was 
<;i ·,_,_ng of~ between Coledale and Austinmer. This 
lovked like the end of it. We did a couple more 
but about a fortnight afterwards they came and 
searched ~he places. There was nothing at my 
place. Mine was all buried in the bush; tobacco, 
tea, sugar. The only thing I felt sorry for was 
that there was a picnic parcel sent down to some 
campers at.Kiama among the stuff. We had plenty 
of food while that was going on. Eventually the 
police came and searched. I was up the bush. 
They had the other three; Jack, Bud and Dick, and 
of course I was the last one to be picked up.l 
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The Unemployed Workers' Movement also became notorious 
for its opposition to the eviction of workers from their homes 
for non-payment of rent. A common tactic was to prevent the 
landlord's agents from shifting the tenant's furniture by 
placing a twenty-four hour picket on the house. If a landlord 
attempted to sell a house and use this as a justification for 
evicting a tenant the Unemployed Workers' Movement used a 
series of stratagems to prevent a sale. Where a public auction 
was held its· 'heavy-weights' threatened prospective buyers and 
hinted that they might set fire to the house if the auction 
i;., continued. A final ruse of the movement 1 s men was to outbid 
i· 
'· , 
all others and, when the crowd dispersed, declare inability to 
pay. Such tactics brought them into conflict with the police 
and earned them a reputation as troublemakers. In 
justification of these illegal tactics their spokesmen declared 
that the dole was 'a system designed to create criminals' . 2 
In a sense these multifarious activities indicate that 
the poor of Wollongong were better able to tighten their 
belts and fend for themselves in hard times than those of 
most areas in Australia. A further example of the better 
resources that the mining communitie · had built up for 
themselves were the co-operative stores to be found 
throughout the coalfields.. From September 1930 the 
co-operative stores endeavoured to protect the unemployed from 
the fu.1 l harshness of relief regulations· An applicant could 
1Recorded interview with Mr D. Timmins, 4 August 1971. 
2 · f . t . E . 11 This paragraph is based on a se:ies o in er~ie~s. specia y 
useful were those with Mr F.H. Finch, Mr D •. Timmins and 
Mr A. Speed. see also Northern Illawarr~ M7nute Books, 
15 July, 19 July 1932 for material on evictions. 
•I 
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;:eceive t.he dole only. after he had been unemployed for 
fourteen days and registered for seven at the nearest Labour 
Exchange. Here he was issued with his registration card to 
be presented a~ his Food Relief Depot on the appointed day. 
Initially the food relief depots were few and far between 
and men were required 
a hardsh.'.p in itself. 
criterion for relief. 
to walk considerable distances, often 
Need, not unemployment, was the 
Tc qualify, an unemployed man had to 
rep.lise all property save his house. rurther, income over a 
fixed upper limit disqualified an applicant, and the earnings 
of each member of the family were taken into account when 
calculating such income. Although separate coupons were 
issued for presentation to the butcher, baker and grocer, the 
co-operative stores allowed the unemployed to 'eat out' the 
dole as they pleased. It was not until November 1932 that 
this practice became more general throughout the state. 1 It 
was then that a cash order system replaced the issue of food 
coupons and a wider choice of foods were offered and dole 
recipients were given more freedom in deciding how and where 
they would spend their allowance. 
The degree of organised self-help on the coalfields was 
not to be found among the transient unemployed. No reliable 
c-:nsus of transients was ever made although it was conunonly 
estimated in 1930 that their number had reached 1,000 and 
t t:>ut by 1934 this number had doubled. 2 At the outset the 
migrants were, in the main, single men drawn to the district 
by the hope of finding work at the steelworks. 3 Increasingly, 
however, the district attracted families not so much searching 
for work as fleei:r.~f froN its absence in their home towns and 
i 
I ( 
1For a detailed account of relief procedures during the 
Depression see F .A. Bland, 'Unemployment Relief in J,1.ls tralia' 
International Labour Review, Vol.XXX, No.l, July l9J4, 
pp.23-57. 
2central Illawarra Municipality Minute Books, 9 April 1930; 
Illawarra Mercury, 11 February 1934; Record Book, 14 May 1934. 
3see Appendix D: Population Change in Wollongong, 1921-33 
{Figures 2 and 3i ,pp.345-50; Conunonw1calth census, 1933. 
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hoping to live off the land. 1 In early 1934, a clergyman 
who visited.the major unemployed camps estimated that one in 
~hree of the in11abitants were children under sixteen years 
2 
of age. 
Conditions of life among the transients in the camps, 
both official and unofficial, were primitive, nowhere more 
so th:m at Port Kembla. Shacks and huts appeared almost 
overnight. They were made of packing cases, pieces of 
corrugated iron, hessian and whatever lengths of timber could 
be scrounged or stolen .. Most were without water supplies and 
lacked adequate sanitation: there was no collection of 
garbage, privies were open and improvised and inadequate in 
number. There was only sporadic shelter against the elements 
and during w~nter months the areas surrounding the humpies 
'· became disease-ridden bogs. Especially notorious was the 
Flinders Street camp. It grew up on the only available 
vacant land within view of 'the hill', where men stood all 
day in the h9pe of getting a few days' work at the steelworks. 
The humpies huddled in a swampy drainage easement where 
typhoid and dysentery were endemic. In the summer months, 
when heat and flies combined to spread infection, children 
were especially susceptible to gastric disorders. 
The official camp sites were only marginally better. 
Early in 1931 the Municipality of Central Illawarra admitted 
its failure to restrict humpy settlement to the assigned 
camping areas and threatened, failing government financial 
aid, to leave the transients to their own devices. As an 
im.~ediate step, the council voted to demolish all pumpies 
still at the construction stage and also exiE·ting structures 
which failed to comply with basic health standards. 3 
Nevertheless, construction continued to outstrip demoll.tion. 
Twelve months later the council engineer recommended t:bat.,. 
1AEu, Monthly Reports, January 1931. 
2 Record Book, 14 May 1934. 
3central Illawarra Municipality Min"·::e Books, 9 January 1931. 
t 
i 
1\ 
111 
This 
... in view of the great danger of an outbreak 
of di><ease and for the safe':.y of the campers 
themselves it would be desirable to concentrate 
the camps in a position where a Proper sanitary 
service could be provided and some sort of 
supervision exercised.l 
proposition was accepted and a more vigorous effort was 
made to exercise some control over the transients. To begin 
with a camp inspector was appointed. He was charged with 
compiling a register of all camps, preventing the 
establishment of new humpies, enforcing existing health 
regulations as they applied to camps and removing all camps 
which did not meet council's 1.·equirements. 2 Moreover, the 
council made it clear that such camps as existed were for 
unemployed persons only: unmarried occupants of humpies in 
regular work were to be given twenty-four hours' notice to 
find other accommodation. The council offered to provide 
sanitary services for 6d a week, but warned that the service 
would be withurawn if employed persons continued to occupy 
camps in the district. 3 
,. 
Yet despite increased vigilance the number of bag 
shanties continued to grow and conditions in the camping 
areas worsened. Moreover, the cold, wet winter of 1932 
brought sickness, disease and death to the camps. Diphth~ria 
was rampant among children and the number of infant deaths 
4 
caused by lung diso~ders rose sharply. 
1rbid., 13 January 1932. 
2Ibid., 10 February 1932. 
3Ibid., 28 January 1932. 
4Eleven infants died from lung disorders in 1932. This was 
six more than in 1931 and seven more than in 1933. The number 
of infant deaths (all deaths in the first year of life) 
declined between 1928 and 1932. This decline, however, was 
matched by a comparable drop in the number of :ecorded live 
births. The infant mortality rate (number of infant deaths 
per 1,000 live births) shows a significant increase. 
Year Live Births Infant Deaths Mortality Rate 
1928 693 33 47.6 
1930 678 32 47.2 
1932 609 31 50.9 
1934 635 35 55.l 
I am indebted to Miss K. Merrett who provided this information 
which she collated from the bir~hs and d7aths registers held 
at the Bulli and Wollongong Registry Offices. 
-. 
' I 
' I 
~. 
112 
Alarmed by the now obvious deterioration in the health 
of the camp dwellers, the council called for a report from 
l 
the Board of Heal th• 'rhe Board's enquiry recommended what 
the.council had long advocated; stricter supervision and the 
removal of camps on private land or near residential areas. 2 
It was a further six months, however, before the recommendations 
were implemented. /; new camp site, later known as the 
'official camp' on the beach-front east of Comaditchy lagoon 
was selected. With more than two hundred and fi:i:ty 'camps' 
within its boundaries and with the handicap of limited finances 
the council faced an L~possible task in attempting to shift 
the campers. The council began by demanding that. Wollongong 
accept responsibility for its own destitute and establish its 
o~~ camp. It also refused permits for the erection of new 
camps to 'residents' of other municipalities. 3 Thereafter, 
council policy was to attempt a piecemeal relocation of humpies. 
The first proposal was to shift men with families from 
Flinders Street. 
Resistance, however, was widespread. Families with few 
possessions were concerned to hold on to what they had. The 
new camp site was more distant from the steelworks and many 
felt that such a shift would lessen the possibility of finding 
work. In the case of single campers the council temporised; 
where persuasion failed, the administrators bided their time 
until men went on the track or abandoned their camps for any 
length of time. Their humpies were then burnt to the ground. 4 
The health inspector continued to visit the camp daily and 
disinfectant was sprayed around the more offensive pools of 
stagnant water which lay permanently around the camp, but in 
general it was made clear 
given to those determined 
that scant assistance would be 
to remain at Flinders Street. 5 
1central Illawarra Municipality Minute Books, 11 May, 31 March 
1932. 
2Ibid., 28 June 1932. 
3 b' I id., 14 June 1933. 
4rnterview with Mr F.H. Finch who, after ~93~, was responsible 
to the council for the control of camps within the 
municipality. 
5central Illawarra Municipality Minute Books, 14 June 1933. 
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conversely, to avoid a repetition of the Flinders Street 
plague-spot, closer attention was paid to the supervision of 
the new camp. The council supplied water, constructed toilet 
blocks, provided a few showers and endeavoured to engender 
some sort of conununity spirit by organising competitions and 
awarding prizes to the best sections of the camp. 1 
The debate throughout 1932 and 1933 on how best to cope 
with the hur.tpy settlements coupled with the establishment of 
the official camp reflects not only the improving economic 
climate, but also the council's changing attitude towards the 
unemployed. Whereas previously it was inclined to denigrate 
the jobless as an unwanted drain upon its finances the council 
came to see them as a nucleus for a reconstructed industrial 
community at Port Kembla. Increasingly it began to concern 
itself with 'turning tramps into taxpayers'. A logical first 
step was the provision of more permanent housing, and from 
mid-1933 onwards the council requested government assistance 
for its own projects. The new policy was justified in the 
following terms: 
••• housing in a district like Cent[ral] Illawarra 
with an assured population is the most direct and 
practical means of improving the general standard 
of living and finding work for the unemployed, the 
work being found not only in building operations 
but also in supplying the following: a) Building 
materials and raw materials for the making of those 
materials, b) Furniture and fittings, c) Electric 
light water and other services, <l) Household and 
personal necessities and comforts encouraged by 
living in decent homes.2 
However, the suggestion that the State Government should 
construct 500 homes at an individual cost of £350 
received curt consideration by a government overwhelmed by 
. . 3 
similar requests from harassed local authorities. 
Elsewhere in the district the supervision and control of 
bumpy settlements was a lesser problem. Rather than create 
one major camp as Central Illawarra had done the remaining two 
1rnterview with Mr F.H. Finch, 6 August 1971. 
2ccntral Illawarra Municipality Minute Books, 8 November 1933. 
3
rbid., 27 June, 8 November 1933. 
'. 
local authorities sought to limit camp size~ In December 
1930 the Municipality of Northern Illawarra restricted the 
Fairy Meadow camp to twenty tents, each of which provided 
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,. shelter for four men. Although it later orovided a further 
ten tents, at no time were there more than seventy men in the 
camp. 1 Dispersal rather than concentration remained stated 
policy and camps on private land were condoned. However, the 
council insisted on the provision of adequate sanitation, and 
often forced benevolent landowners to evict campers. 2 The 
Bulli Shire was the most tolerant of the local authorities. 
It abandoned earlier attempts to shift the bush dwellers and 
established good relationships with campers in its district. 3 
But for all local governments the degree of assistance 
offered the unemployed and especially to the transients had 
• to be balanced against ratepayers' complaints that people were ,. 
'coming into the district to compete with local people who 
paid rates and carried the burden of control of the area'. 4 
The depression gave the unemployed plenty of time to 
think. Did their thoughts turn to a basic change in the 
economic system which had dealt with them so harshly? A 
growing number of Australians asked themselves this question 
conservatives with fear and radicals with hope. Would the 
jobless organise themselves as the shock troops of revolution? 
Would left-wing political groups, notably the communists, do 
it for them? 
The conservative business and professional men who 
controlled the Wollongong Council were vigilant in the defence 
of their entrenched position in relatively prosperous times. 
They proved even more so in times of financial crisis. The 
1Northern Illawarra Municipality Minute Books, 16 December 1930. 
2south Coast Times, 28 July 1933; Northern Illawarra 
Municipality Minute Books, 16 June 1933 • 
3Bulli Shire Minute Books, 5 January, 31 August 1931. 
4Northern Illawarra Municipality Minute Books, 20 April 1931; 
Bulli Shire Minute Books, 6 March 1931. 
.. 
..... 
nomination in 1928 of a full Labor ticket to contest the 
municipal elections drew sharp criticism from incumbent 
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councillors. Workers, they claimed, lacked administrative 
experience and in any case politics should be kept out of 
local government. The attempts of the newly-formed Illawarra 
Trades and Labor Council to extend union coverage to 
unorganised workers and to co-ordinate union strength seemed 
to foreshadow an attempt to alter the social structure of the 
community. The first open clash between the Trades and 
Labor Council and the Wollongong Council occurred in November 
1929 when the workers asked for the council's permission to 
co~memorate the twelfth anniversary of the Russian revolution 
with a street procession. The request was rejected and the 
civic leaders asked for police assistance should its ban be 
. d l ignore • 
The political conflict broadened when the council refused 
to allow a street march by the visiting Kurri-Kurri Pipe Band 
to collect aid for locked-out northern miners. 2 A further 
application in February was rejected by Howarth without 
recourse to the full council. 3 The band in fact played and 
the council prosecuted. Howarth refused the intercession of 
either the Trades and Labor Council or t'nE.! Miners' Federation. 
Neither organisation, he asserted, was connected in any way 
wilh the men about to be prosecuted. The procession was a 
deliberate breach of the law and no acceptable excuse could 
be presented. The council subsequently endorsed Howarth's 
4 
action with only one dissenting vote, although four aldermen 
. 5 had previously voted against any prosecution. 
The prosecution of the bandsmen brought a sharp rejoinder 
~ from F. (Fred) Lowden who warned that, 
' 
1i1cllongong Municipality Minute Books, 7 November, 5 Decernbe;.: 
i 1929. , .. 
2Ibid., 30 January 1930. 
3Ibid., 24 February 1930. 
' 
"' 4Tb'd 27 February, 13 March 1930. 
- J. • I 
5Ibid., 11 March 1930. 
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••• if the council persisted with the prosecutions 
then the gloves would be off; the miners and the 
whole of the trade unionists of the Coast will 
operate a black ban, May Day demonstration will 
be moved from Wollongong and every other weapon 
will be used.l 
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The unemployed as consumers were able to withhold their 
purchasing power, and even this would hurt hard-up 
shopkeepers. Commercial interests were not prepared to put 
Lowden's threat to the test and charges against the bandsmen, 
though not those against J. (Jack) Hitchen the communist 
organiser who led the procession, were withdrc.wn. 2 
Hardly had the furore over the Kurri-Kurri bandsmen 
subsided when Howarth was confronted by the problem of what 
to do with the growing nmnber of unemployed in the 
municipality. His reluctance to admit the reality of local 
unemployment, his refusal to provide shelter for the 
migratory unemployed and his unwillingness to hear unemployed 
deputations were interpreted as evidence of political bias 
and a denial of civil rights. The subsequent refusal of the 
council to sanction street meetings and processions of the 
unemployed 'to draw attention to their plight' 3 confirmed 
this suspicion, as did Howarth's blunt declaration that all 
requests from the unemployed to hold street meetings should 
be 'absolutely refused' •4 Ostensibly the reason for his 
refusal was fear of the repercussions public street meetings 
might have on local retailers. Businessmen complained of 
loitering outside their premises by the unemployed and 
alleged that the latter were leaning against shop windows. 
Whatever the council's motives, after June 1930 they 
consistently refused all requests for street meetings in busy 
1Ibid. See also, 14 March 1930. 
2wollongong Municipality Health Inspector's Repo:t Book, 
22 l\pr il 1930. 'l'he heal th inspector. was responsible for all 
prosecutions instigated by the council. See Wollongong 
Municipality Minute Books, 17 July 1930, for a statement of 
the health inspector's authority to prosecute. 
3wollongong Municipality Minute Books, 20 May, 19 June 1930. 
4Ibid., 19 June 1930. 
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T~e council's policy was immediately challenged by a 
series of street meetings and processions. Charges were then 
laid against the leaders, a procedure based on the mistaken 
assumption that opposition to council policies was the work 
of a few 'obscure extremists•, 2 and that a brief show of 
strength would restore sanity. Instead, however, the 
prosecutions created a defensive situation in which worker 
and workless could unite in a common cause. The Trades and 
Labor Council initiated and co-ordinated the protest movement 
among workers. In late July the Council established a South 
coast Free Speech Committee to preserve 'the right to express 
an opinion' •3 The committee received the support of all 
union leaders in the district and declared its determination 
to hold weekly demonstrations in defiance of the council. 4 
Organised protest, directed and controlled by the new 
committee, began almost immediately. On 20 August, S. (Steve) 
Best, secretary of the Illawarra Trades and Labor Council, 
the president of the Federated Ironworkers' Association, 
J. (John) McDonald and the Waterside Workers' representative 
on the Free Speech Committee, E. (Ernest) Briemle, led a 
orocession of 200 men marching four abreast along Crown 
~treet, the main street of Wollongong. 5 According to police 
reports the demonstration forced two cars to the wrong side 
6 
of the road and another was compelled to slow down. 
Otherwise the protest was said to be orderly and well behaved. 
As it had done previously the Council preferred charges 
1rbid., 30 June, 17 July 1930. The council initiated several 
prosecutions for loitering. See Wollongong Municipality 
Minute Books, 17 June 1930. 
2 Illawarra Mercury, 25 July 1930. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid., 24 August 1930. 
6
south coast Times, 31 October 1930. 
against the protest leaders who were convicted and 
The court proceedings were not without incident. 
fined. 1 
In 
convicting Briemle, 'the presiding Stipend.iaryMagistrate, 
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A.E. Chapman, ignored the evidence of eig:~.t witnesses who 
testified that Briemle had taken no part in the procession. 
Briemle had earned the displeasure of the court by 
proclaiming his communist sympathies and by making an 
affirmation rather than swearing on the Bible. Moreover, 
Chapman's penalties exceeded those normally imposed. Whereas 
the usual default clause for a £2 fine was seven days, 
Chapman imposed two months. Protests by counsel at the 
severity of the judgement were peremptorily dismissed by 
Chapman who is reported to have replied that 'there is only 
one place for those who break the law'. 2 
A Labor Daily editorial, most likely written by 
R. (Robert) Allen, secretary of the Wollongong Free Speech 
Committee, urged the government 'to determine who are and are 
not temperamentally and otherwise fitted to sit upon [sic] 
the Bench' and denounced Chapman for imposing a penalty of a 
vindictively severe character. 3 Although the fines were 
later remitted on appeal, the immediate result of the 
prosecution was to intensify the ill feeling between the 
unemployed and the Council and tc propel to the forefront a 
group of rank and file radicals and committed communists. 
The lines of the dispute were clearly drawn when the council, 
in a considered public statement, announced its policy for the 
regulation of street meetings. Street marches, in the 
council's view, interfered unduly with traffic and presented 
a 'grave danger to the public caused by the congregation of 
crowds of people •.• in some of the most congested streets. 4 
1wollongong Municipality Minute Books, 25 August 1930. All 
three men were fined £2 and ordered to pay £3 3s professional 
costs and Ss court costs in default of two months 
imprisonment. See south Coast Times, 31 October 1930. 
2
south Coast Timas, 31 October 1930. 
3 Labor Daily, 6 November 1930. 
4Wollongong Municipality Minute Books, 7 October 1930. 
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Having stated its objection the council enunciated formally 
and carefully its decision: 
That in pursuance of powers vested in the 
Council by the provision of Sectio~ 249(K), 
'to regulate the use by the public of the 
road', and Section 269 (1), 'to regulate 
traffic in public places', of the Local 
Government Act 1919, it is hereby resolved and 
directed that no person may hold or conduct a 
publ~c meeting in any public street within 
this municipality or do such other acts that 
will cause the congregation of a crowd on 
public streets such as delivering a speech or 
an address from adjoining private land without 
having first obtained the written permission 
of this Council, and having in view the 
preservation of the rights of the public to use 
public streets for ordinary purposes, and the 
danger and inconvenience to traffic, which the 
congregation of a crowd entails, it is resolved 
that no permit may be issued for any public 
meeting to be held on Friday nights or late 
shopping nights at or near the intersection of 
Keira Street, Crown Street and crown Lane, and 
it is further resolved that the Officers of this 
Council be authorized and directed to take such 
steps as may be necessary to carry this 
resolution into effect.l 
For a period of eighteen months following this 
proclamation of the council, the South Coast Free Speech 
Coll'lllittee openly defied the ban and held weekly Friday night 
street meetings at the corner of Church and Crown Streets. 
Despite certain prosecution and probable imprisonment the 
coll'lllittee had no difficulty finding speakers. While 
convictions were registered against the protestors in most 
cases, the fine" were later remitted after appeal to the 
:·!inister of Justice, W.J. !1cKell. Accepting the view of his 
under-secretary that the demonstrators had only committed 'a 
technical breach' 2 McKell waived the fines in all cases 
presented to him. But as the proceedings were taken by the 
Wollongong Municipality and not the Justice Department he did 
not have the authority to set aside costs. Further, since 
~he Free Speech Committee had declared against the payment of 
1Ibid. 
2Attorney-General's File, 7/809 (New South Wales State 
Archives), 27 November 1930. 
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fines, imprisonment in the Wollongong lock-up was the normal 
expectation of soap box orators. Yet ultimately victory lay 
with the protesters. Their determination 'not to bow to the 
dictates of the spineless capitalist apologists on the 
Wollongong Council' 1 proved greater than the latter's 
willingness to absorb the cost of litigation. The council 
complained bitterly that unduly long delays by the Attorney-
General and Justice Department in hearing appeals caused it 
"d bl . . 2 consi era e inconvenience and e:qiense. 
During the eighteen months in which it pursued its 
policy regardless of costs the council remained convinced 
that only by a display of firmness could it hope to retain 
control of the streets. Communistic organisations which 
sought to undermine its authority 'by deliberate acts of 
defiance' deserved no sympathy and the Council urqed the 
:-linister of Justice not to remit any further penal .:ies. 3 The 
~inister, however, considered that the Wollongong by-law was 
4 
'apt to operate harshly' and that the penalties imposed by 
the court 'did not always bear an altogether~reasonable 
:relationship to the gravity of the offence'.·' 
As the :ree speech campaign gathered momentum in the 
latter months of 1930 there emerged a readily identifiable 
:ran% and file unemployed leadership. Previously, the degree 
o: unity which existed among the unemployed had been supplied 
::rom above by trade union officials and especially :by the 
T:rades and Labor Council. The branches of the Uncmpioyed 
1-;o:r%e:rs' :-!ovement remained tied very much to the loc<; 'ity. 
The street demonstrations provided a platform for a h"\ :<! core 
o:: activists. 
L- . -iDJ.C., 14 January 1932. 
2r=id., Letter from Wollongong Town Clerk to Under-Secretary 
o: J~stice, 7 June 1932. 
-~--; ... 
----·-·· 
7 April 1932 .. 
~-- . -~~:i.e., 13 January 1932. 
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By 1932 these leaders were so well known to the police 
that when they were arrested for speaking at free speech 
demonstrations the police considered fingerprints unnecessary.l 
few of these activists were, as Howarth alleged, outsiders. 
The majority claimed communist sympathies but this did not 
mean that most of them were from other districts. It is true 
that Jack Croft, a Corrimal miner, was the only man 
prosecuted to proclaim himself a native of Wollon~''-"·J.. ',,•1deed, 
h'' went on to assert that his family had paid enoug, · .-ates 
to allow him the right of free speech in the streets. ? 
Nevertheless, a considerable number of these new leaders had 
long associations with the district. Foremost in this latter 
category were a group of coalminers; Robert Allen, Pat 
:·!cHenry, Paddy Malloy, Jack Hitchen and Jack Martin. All five 
men had, before ti.e depression years, established a 
reputation for industrial militancy and had provided the 
nucleus of the MMM on the southern coalfield. Allen had been 
dismissed from the South B~1lli Colliery in 1926 for what the 
nolice later claimed was 'persistent uefiance of the 
~anagement•. 3 After a period of une~ployment he was employed 
by the Labor Daily as its South Coast reporter and in 1928 
had been prominent in the organisation of a local branch of 
the One Big Union of the Unemployed among displaced 
coalminers, earning for himself a reputation as 'a well known 
agitator against constitutional government•. 4 Malloy, a 
colourful Scot, had a long record of militant activity dating 
back to 1899 when he was secretary of an anti-Boer War 
committee. 5 During the depression Malloy work0" 
intermittently for the Public Works Department ,, 1?ort Kembla 
and was reported by the police to be a 'man who l ,1ds very 
1Ibid., 19 January 1932. 
2Labor Daily, 30 October 1931. 
1 
"Attorney-General's File, 7/809, 19 January 1932. 
4Ibid. 
5E. Ross, A History of the Miners' Federation of Australia 
{Sydney, 1970), p.352. 
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extreme political views'. 1 Cavilled out of the coalmines at 
the same time as Malloy, McHenry likewise spent brief rcriods 
of employment at the Port KembJ.a. industries. When he was 
eventually laid-off in 1931 the employment officer noted that 
the company should 'be careful before re-employ:·,,\: him• . 2 
His home at Fairy Meadow was known .locally as a meeting place 
for the ::ommunist Party and the police knew him as a man who 
wa~ willir1g to 'agitate strong revolutionary measures and 
continually advoca. - .·.he overthrow of the present system of 
3 Government', but · •', apar':: from these habits was of quiet 
and orderly dispo~"ition. 4 Hitchen, ci Durham miner who 
migrated to Austra:1.ia in the early 1920s was clearly the most 
revolutionary of the group. Most of his fellow conununists 
. . 5 1 thought him a fanatic. A ways ready 'to declare the 
revolution on' 
mc·re realistic 
Hitchen had constantly to be restrained by his 
6 
colleagues. Combative in the extreme Hitchen 
.'t seemed on occasions to pose as a working class martyr. After 
·· he was convicted in the early months of 1930 for.· a.busive 
language he denounced a meeting of M';;:<'rs' Federation which 
had paid his fine. He had to be fore;_!; .y remo'Jed. 7 
There were several men associated with this group who 
fitted Howarth's definition of outsiders, namely those who 
came into the district after the establishment of the 
the steelworks in 1928. Perha.ps the most prominent was 
Ernest Bri~mle, a swiss born naturalised Aust:calian who had 
arrived in the country some twenty years earlier when a lad 
of seventeen. For eleven years he worked at a variety of joLs 
l Attorney-General's File, 7/809, 19 January 1932. 
2.. 1 ' 
,.,eta Manufactures Employment Cards (company f:L~<~, Port 
Kembla). 
3 Attorney-General's File, 7/809, 19 January 1932. 
4Ibid. 
5
rnterviews with Mr D. Tinunins, Mr A. 
See als•.) Work~=s' weekly, 7 September 
6Ibid. 
7
DMB, 17-18 February 1930. 
Speed, Mr L. Boardman·. 
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in Queensland and then moved to Sydney where he was employed 
for several years as a wharf-labourer, shifting to 
Wollongong in 1928.l From an early date Briemle was regarded 
as a militant socialist. In 1915 he had been arrested and 
Precautions Act and sentenced convicted for breaching the War 
to three months imprisonment. 2 Once in Wollongong, he 
established himself as an active committee member of the 
Wai:erside Workers' Union and as a communist organiser, being 
regarded by local industrialists as 'a menace•. 3 Another 
outsider to play a significant part in unemployed politics was 
L. (Len) Tracey4 who arrived in Wollongong from Western 
Australia in 1929. Unlike Briemle he was not a member of the 
Co!ml\unist Party when he arrived. Bora at Stok'<'·"'·'n-Trent in 
1899 he had, like his father before him, worked in the local 
potteries. At sixteen he joined the British army and served 
in France. After migrating to Australia following 
demobilisation, he worked initially on the Western Australian 
goldfields before moving to Wollongong in the hope of finding 
wc.,:;:k at the steelworks. By 1931 he was district secretary of 
the Unemployed Workers' Movement and an active member of the 
Communist Party. 
The first n•)table venture of this radical ·~·ro1.;,c: ·.:as in 
March when they led an unauthorised demonstration of two 
hundred members of the Port Kembla Unemployed Work:;«rs' 
Movement along Crown Street. A manifesto published in the 
Illawarra Mercury before the event defined its object as being 
to attract attention to the 'dire straits and needs of our 
position •.• to p~event us from becoming a permanent army of 
down and outs and regular stiffs'. The banners held aloft 
by the protesters proclaimed their growing frustration: they 
1Attorney-General's File, 7/809, 19 January 1932. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. see also south coast Branch Waterside: Workers' 
Federation Minute Book, G January 1932. 
4L. Tracey (or Tracy) was the dep7ession pseudonym used by 
Hr L. Boardman. 
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urged the repudiation of trade union officials, the 
abolition of 'coolie rations' and opposition to fascist and 
. l f . t . t' 1 socia ascis organisa ions. 
The growing influence of radicals was demonstrated in 
the formation of a Workers' Defence Corps in April 1931.. In 
accordance with Communist Party tactics tJ1e formal initiative 
for it came not directly from the communists but from an 
established and more respectable labour organisation, in this 
case the Trades and Labor Council. 2 T.n late Ma1:ch a combined 
meeting of trade union officials declared that the objectives 
of the Defence Corps were to protect the interests of the 
working class against fascism and social fascism, and the 
establishment of a workers' government. 3 From the outset, 
however, ~he Workers' Defence Corps was under the leadership 
of the communists who, by moving that all officers of the 
Defe'nce Corps were to be elected from among the unemployed, 
effe'c;tively debarred union officials from control of the 
movefuent. 4 A provisional committee of seven was formed and 
charged with forming further units in local centres. 5 
' ·A common tactic employed by this group was to take-over 
I . 
established relief organisations. In July 1930 the Bulli 
Shire Council established a Shire Relief Committee comprised 
of delegates from miners' lodges and local organisations and 
businesses. 6 Sub-committees were established in· each of the 
mining communities within the shire and it was the capture 
of these bodies which the Workers' Defence Corps concentrated 
'' upon. In most cases the take-over went largely unnoticed, 
though on occasions the aggressive stance adopted by Hitchen 
and Shayler alienated many men who were not yet committed to 
militancy. 
1 Illawarra Mercury, 6 March 1931. 
2rbid., 1 April 1931; Sydney Morning Herald, 14 April 1931. 
3Ibid.; Illawarra Mercury, l April 1931. 
4Ibid. 
5rb·d · 1 31 s d Morninq Herald, 14 April 1931. 1 ., 15 April 9 ; y ney 
; 6r11awarra Mercury, 7 July 1930; Bulli Shire lwlinute Books, 
7 July 1930. 
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The first open opposition to communist influence 
occurred in July 1930 at Woonona where E.L. Holmes, a local 
cordial manufacturer and later Nationalist candidate for 
Bulli, led a splinter group to form the Bulli-Woonona 
d . l Unemploye Union. Holmes had earlier been elected to the 
woonona sub-branch of the Shire Relief Committee. At a 
meeting of the Unemployed Workers' Movement called to 
formulate a joint relief programme, he had criticised the 
movement's political activities as 'likely to create open 
conflict with constitutional authority•. 2 The Unemployed 
workers' Movement responded to this criticism of its methods 
by expelling Holmes from its ranks despite the fact that he 
had never been a member. Holmes later declared it was this 
attempt to denigrate his efforts that awakened him to an 
i~~inent communist takeover and strengthened his belief that 
~· the organisation of the unemployed ought not to be left to 
fanatics such as Shayler and Hitchen. 3 
There is some evidence of both a reluctance by the unem-
ployed to accept the communist argument t~at they should reject 
;, government charity, and of active resistance to early political 
demonstrations. In July, Bulli unemployed ignored Hitchen's 
persistent advice that they should refuse to fill out a 
questionnaire as a preliminary to receiving the dole. 4 In 
September the Unemployed Workers' Movement publicly 
acknowledged that they were losing,control of street meetings. 
Workers, described by Hitchen as the 'slum element', were 
said to be forcing speakers off their platforms and throwing 
missiles. This action, Hitchen thought, was 'most useful to 
the ruling class in so far as it has given them an opportunity 
. • 5 
i I for stopping all street meetings 
' ' 
1 Illawarra Mercury, 13 July 1931. 
2
rbid., 6 March 1931. 
3Ibid. 
4
sydney Morning Herald, 26 July 1930. 
5Illawarra Mercury, 5 September 1930. 
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During the summer of 1931, however, the mood of the 
unemployed became more bitter. As the problem of unemployment 
increased the state government determined to economise in the 
distribution of food rations and complaints of harsh and 
arbitrary treatment multiplied. Families were affected by 
the tightening of regulations. Children under twelve months 
of age were no longer considered members of a household for 
relief purposes unless a doctor certified additional 
nourishment was required. 1 Moreover, the migratory unemployed 
;;ere threatened with eviction from their camps. Both the 
:iorthern and Central Illawarra Municipalities were critical 
, o: the government's failure to provide promised financial 
assistance and resolved respectively to disband and to 
restrict further entry to their 'unemployed' camps. 2 
l 
'· 
" ' 
~· 
' 
'I 
. , 
Destitution was probably greatest among the single 
unemployed. The Bavin government in July stopped the issue 
of food relief so as to compel them to 'travel' in search of 
work in order to be eligible to draw rations. The immediate 
result, however, was merely to increase the burden of the 
already struggling local relief committees. The Port Kembla 
soup kitchen, after issuing £0,000 rations of soup and bread 
and four hundred issues of bread and stew, found its funds 
exhausted and considered closure. 3 In a public demonstration 
of their growing restlessness a meeting of 'two hundred ill-
clad desperate unemployed men', as Robert Allen described them 
in his Labor Daily column, resolved to meet weekly ;o,1,; Port 
Kembla and demanded full maintenance. 4 For the filf..;; time 
the normal double rations at Christmas were not forthcoming. 5 
1Labor Daily, 16 September 1930. 
2Northern Illawarra Municipality Minute Books, 3 February 
1931; Central Illawarra Municipality Minute Bo'?ks, 
20 January 1931; Sydney Morning Herald, 12 April 1931; 
Labor Daily, 2 April 1931. 
3Labor Daily, 23 October 1930. 
4Ibid., 6 November 1930. 
5Illawarra Mercury, 3 January 1931 • 
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Those who were dissatisfied with the curtailment of 
relief now found they could make common cause with the 
;nilitants of the Unemployed Workers' Movement. Up to this 
time applications for the dole were heard weekly by local 
relief committees. On the coalfields these committees 
normally included trade union officials and administered 
relief regulations with as much leniency as possible. It was 
partly to curb such benevolence and partly to create more 
uniformity that, the state government moved, in April 1931, 
to replace local committees with relief officers employed by 
the Department of Labour and Industry. More critical perhaps 
was the proposal to introduce the police into the relief 
depot organisation. Each applicant was to be first 
identified by a local police officer and then questioned by 
t , the six re:;.ief officers. Reaction to the changes was 
uniformly hostile. After queuing in a dole line for eight 
hours it became clear, to Corrimal unemployed, that 'a great 
n~~ber of previously successful applicants were being refused 
the dole' by the new relief officers. A subsequent meeting 
of the unemployed vowed that unless their local relief 
i I 
.. 
·.• 
,'.t 
.'II' . 
committee was immediately admitted they would refuse rations 
and declare the issue black. 1 
In the event, the relief committee refused to surrender 
their authority and were removed from the relief depot by 
the police. A meeting of the unemployed outside the depot 
applauded the committee's stand, endorsed the earlier decision 
to declare the dole issue 'black' and marched to the 
2 Wollongong Labour Bureau in protest. Subsequently unemployed 
meetings at Balgownie and Bulli adopted similar resolutions 
and a mass meeting of 2,000 unemployed at Slacky Flat, Bulli, 
condemned the new procedures and proclaimed their intention 
to continue boycotting dole issues until local relief 
committees were reinstated.· The immediate indications were 
hopeful. Shortly after the boycott was declared the Woonona 
l 
-Ibid., 30 April 1931. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid • 
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relief collUllittee was allowed to distribute dole tickets. 
'· )!oreover, E. Bellemore, manager of the State Labour Exchange, 
seemed at least prepared to compromise. On successive days, 
he offered to accept two and later three members of local 
relief collUllittees as colleagues in the distribution of 
rations. Bellemore's statements, however, avoided any 
mention of police participation. More than any other single 
factor, it was the presence of the latter which presaged 
future conflict. By the end of April the unemployed were, in 
the words of Robert Allen speaking more accurately than 
perhaps even he hoped, 'red hot with indignation•. 1 To many 
of his opponents the warning of impending upheaval looked 
suspiciously like a threat. 
In early May, Bellemare returned to Wollongong in an 
attempt to win local support for the new system of dole 
distribution. On this occasion he explained his proposal 
more fully. He advocated the establishment of a new relief 
com.~ittee made up of a representative of the Department of 
Labour and Industry, a policeman and a local citizen. 2 The 
unemployed were apparently in no mood for compromise, as 
there was no response to his initiative. The main objection 
was still to police participation. 3 It was still believed 
that they would take advantage of their position to 
victimise those whom they regarded as troublemakers. Only 
the presence of local representatives would offer an adequate 
~·, check. The procedures of the new officials seemed to lend 
r : point to the view that the old system was better. In 
' Wollongong women and children queuing for food relief were 
left standing in the rain for the best part of the day. 
Applicants' credentials were carefully scrutinised and they 
were then asked t.o sign a statutory declaration as to their 
1 
·Labor Daily, 30 April 1931. 
2 Illawarra Mercury, 1 May 1931. 
3Ibid., 8 May 1931. 
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veracity. 1 At Mt Kembla, in the absence of the local rcl~.ef 
co~~ittee, youths whose fathers had work were refused food 
relief. The injustice was more keenly felt because many 
~iners were drawing their first 
some for much longer periods. 
pay in several months 
Negotiations reached a 
and 
stalemate when a lively meeting of Wollongong unemployed 
rejected a Department ~f Labour proposition that they should 
work for the dole and demanded the living wage. 2 
On Friday, 8 May, the Wollongong district committee of 
:he Unemployed Workers' Movement voted unanimously to protest 
outside the Bulli ration depot the following Monday and to 
encourage greater resistance of the new relief system. Hours 
before the depot opened a crowd, variously estimated at 
between two hundred and five hundred, had assembled on a 
vacant block directly opposite. Chaired by H. (Harry) 
Blacklock, a local communist, the customary dole-day meeting 
of the Bulli branch of the Unemployed Workers' Movement began 
at 9 a.m., an hour before the depot was due to open. 
Following the pattern of earlier protests the demonstrators 
'almost unanimously' declared the rations black until full 
power was return~d to the local committees and for as long as 
the police continued to scrutinise ration claims. 3 A new and, 
given the heated tone of the meeting, explosive element. was 
added when it was resolved to operate an eight-man picket on 
~he steps of the depot. 
Hardly had the picketers taken their stand than an 
unemployed Coalcliff miner, J. (John) Anderson, attempted to 
break through them and collect his rat.ions. As Anderson was 
being jostled by the pickets and denied entry to the depot 
two policemen, apparently on duty at the relief centre, 
intervened and attempted to arrest two of the picketers. At 
this point a group of 1:hirty or more men surged forward and 
enveloped both police and picketers. For about five or ten 
minutes 'waddies flew and batons crashed down on heads, faces 
1Ibid., l May 1931. 
? 
"Ibid. 
3 Leibe._· Daily, 9 May 1931. 
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::ind hands' 1 until about eight demonstrators -=>r><l b•v 
policemen remained struggling on a small patch of grass in 
:ront of the dole depot. But for a horse and sulky, which 
separated the combatants from the remainder of the unemployed, 
the police might have been seriously injured. In the event, 
however, both horse and sulky were knocked to the ground by 
the pressure of the surging crowd, but at the same time they 
checked the rush of reinforcements. There was enough time 
for the police to draw their guns, and for a further constable 
to emerge from the depot. As Allen, the unemployed organiser 
ar.d Labor Daily reporter, aptly, though somewhat 
disingenuously, surruned up this situation: 'three guns 
constituted a menace too great for weaponless men' •2 
Not all of the unemployed were without 'weapons'. Many 
carried lengths of piping covered with rubber hosing while 
still others had arrived at Bulli in the morning armed with 
batons. Allen's description of the state of the three 
policemen is adequate testimony of the vicious nature of the 
attack: 
Sergeant Standing [Standen) came out of the 
station bleeding and bedraggled with his gun in 
a bleeding left hand, and his baton in his right, 
making way he struck a man with the baton. The 
man hit back and it looked as if for a minute 
the previous scene would be repeated. The 
sergeant fumbled with an injured hand, presumably 
to operate his gun, and failing changed the 
weapon over to the right hand,. and telling the 
man he would get him later, returned to the 
station.3 
Later: 
.•• With his face and hands covered with blood 
which dropped down his tunic to the grou~d, the 
sergeant, with his gun in or.e hand and h7s baton 
in the other held off the closely following crowd, 
while Constable Perry, in worse condition with the 
help of Constable Smith, draggeQ Hitchen along the 
street assisting the while to :,old at bay the 
crowd of five hundred men.4 
1
rbid., 12 May 1931. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
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With the retreat of the police, the unemployed rapidly 
di£persed. Car loads of policemen were rushed to l3ulli but 
it was all over. Only Hitchen, who had been dragged 
protesting along the road, was arrested during the riot. For 
•: the remainder of the day the police scoured t.he district 
interrogating all known members of the Unemployed Workers' 
o!ovement. Transients in unemployed camps, both official and 
illegal, received special attention and many were told to 
~ove on or see their camps destroyed. 1 By evening ten men 
had been arrested and held in Wollongong and Bulli lock-ups. 
Despite later allegations of police brutality, Hitchen was 
the only arrested demonstrator to display visible injuries 
and these he alleg.ed ·were sustained not during the riot but 
later at the police station. Two of the three policemen, 
however, were treated at Bulli hospital and the third, 
Constable Perry, was admitted in a serious condition. His 
injuries, two 'large' wounds to the front of his head and 
smaller abrasions near the right temple were consistent, 
according to later medical testimony, with blows from pieces 
of piping and a series of deliberat•a kicks. 2 
It is difficult to know just what those who witnessed 
the affray were thinking. Probably sympathy for the 
unemployed and respect for law and order more or less 
cancelled each other out. There is some evidence that several 
onlookers went to the assistance of the police, either by 
drawing police attention to known communists such as Hitchen, 
or by positive intervention against the assailants. 3 Most, 
however, stood by passively as the police were attacked. The 
Bulli Unemployed Union had some ground for asserting that 
violence was the work of a minority, and that the majority 
would not be loath to dissociate themselves from the incident. 
The union carried parochialism to an almost ludicrous degree. 
They professed to regard as 'interlopers from outlying 
1Ibid., 14 May 1931. 
2south coast Times, 16 October 1931. 
3Labor Daily, 12 May 1931. 
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. . t • 1 h l' d . distric s men w o ive in neighbouring communities 
scarcely two miles distant. Further, cloaking its minority 
position, the union attempted to pose as the spokesman for 
the Bulli-Woonona Relief Committee and declared: 
That we, the Bulli-Woonona Relief committee 
consisting of the Bulli-Woonona Relief Committee, 
Woonona Relief Committee, and the Bulli-Woonona 
Unemployed Union, view with indignation the 
rioto~s behaviour shown here to-day, by an 
organized body of the Unemployed Workers' Movement, 
members who do not live here and congratulates [sic] Sergeant Standen and Constables Perry and 
Smith on their magnificent courage in facing and 
fighting off a band of ruffians estimated at over 
100. Furthermore, this committee is determined to 
stand for the preservation of law and order and 
offers all the assistance in its power to assist 
the police in the execution of their duty.2 
The suggestion that the Unemployed Workers' Movement had 
set out to provoke a battle with the police was unfounded. 
It is true that, apart from Hitchen and Culbertson, the men 
later arrested were not entitled to relief from the depot and 
had walked to Bulli to help persuade the Bulli unemployed to 
3 
refuse any dole issue until the police were removed. It was 
also true that a few like Hitchen, who later claimed that as 
a communist it \;ns 'his duty• 4 t.o serve the interests of the 
working class, came armed with Dicycle chains, batons and 
pieces of piping. Violence was, nevertheless, not 
premeditated but rather a spontaneous response in a confused 
situation to the arrest and manhandling of the pickets. 
Regarded on one side as brutal assault and on the other 
as justifiable defence, the yiolence at Bulli polarised local 
opinion. The Unemployed Workers' Movement continued to reject 
the new dole requ).ations and Scarborough, Clifton, Coledale, 
Wombarra and Port Kembla branches declared the issue black. 5 
Scuffles broke out between the unemployed and the police at 
1Ibid., 13 May 1931. 
2Ibid. 
3 Illawarra Mercury, 15 May 1931. 
4south Coast Times, 16 October 1931. 
5 Illawarra Mercury, 15 May 1931. 
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port Kembla and at Wollongong, where food relief and the new 
procedure was accepted, but they were quickly quelled. 
precioitate police action in both places provoked retaliation. 
port Kembla police refused to allow an unnamed speaker to 
address the customary dole day unemployed meeting. Batons 
were drawn and the crowd was dispersed. 1 Some measure of 
police uneasiness is evident from charges brought against 
unemployed men involved in the Wcllongong and Port Kembla 
skirmishes. Two men were arrested for having insufficient 
lawful means of support and several others for obstructing 
footpath traffic. 2 
The divisions within unemployed ranks widened after the 
riot. The Wollongong Unemployed Workers' Union declared 
support for the forces of law and ord.er and styled themselves 
'honest citizens• 3 in contrast to the Unemployed Workers' 
Movement. They announced that they were prepared to work for 
the dole and claimed a monopoly of the right to canvass 
public financial support for the workless. 4 Despite its 
considered public statement, the bid by the Unemployed Workers' 
Union for control of the jobless proved abortive. Only in 
t·lollongong where it claimed 710 members was the union 
numerically strong. 5 Elsewhere, apart from the Bulli-Woonona 
splinter group, the Unemployed Workers' Union won few converts. 
While the riot further divided local society and failed 
to achieve its immediate objective - the withdrawal of police 
from relief depots - the attack on the police worked some 
good for the unemployed. A committee representing Coledale, 
Scarborough and Clifton branches of the Unemployed Workers' 
Movement was able to extract from Bellemare on the day 
following the riot a promise to restore the local committees. 6 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid., 15 May, 5 June 1931. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid., 22 May 1931. 
5Ibid. 
6
rbid., 8 May 1931. 
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At Thirroul, Bellemare authorised the local conunit.tee to sit, 
though at first h" insisted on police supervision. 1 t:e 
later, however, promised a joint delegation from the Miners' 
Fede;:ation and Unemployed Workers' Movement that the police 
2 
"-..,uld be removed. Despite Bellemore's apparent conunitment 
the police remained. They did so, however, with a feeling of 
unease. Dole distribution at Mt Kembla was delayed while 
local policemen telephoned for reinforcements. 3 Anxious to 
avoid provoking further violence the police adopted a 
supervisory role, leaving identification to the relief 
"f. 4 o--icers. 
With the more equable stance adopted by the police, 
militant opposition to the new dole procedure lost much of 
its support. The Unemployed Workers' Movement once mare 
turned its attention to the provision of the day ta day needs 
of the jobless. Anticipating a Wollongong winter without 
adequate shelter, the district Council of the Unemployed 
Workers' Movement asked the Government to erect huts to 
replace the tents and humpies at Fairy Meadow and Port Kembla. 5 
:.1ilitancy was now confined ta words: the district council 
wrote firm lette:··5, issued stern warnings and adopted 
emphatic resolutions. They accomplished little, however, 
because governments both state and federal, preferred to deal 
with the more orthodox, if less representative local government 
relief agencies. When, in July 1931, the Federal Government 
authorised the distribution of coal to the Northern Illawarra 
destitute, whether aged or unemployed, the selection of the 
dese~¥ing was delegated by the municipality to the Women's 
Relief Guild. 6 This body with or without justification was 
1Labor Daily, 13 May 1931. 
2 . Ibid., 1 June 1931. 
3Illawarra Mercury, 15 May 1931. 
4 rnterviews with Mr L. Boardman, Mr D. Timmins, Mr W.J. 
Anderson, Mr T. Royal, and Mr H. Blacklock. 
5Illawarra Mercury, 19 June 1931. 
6tbid., 3 July 1931. 
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roundly denounced by the Unemployed Workers' Movement as an 
'anti-working class unemployed organization' .1 
In September yet a further check on the validity of dole 
aoolications was introduced. Claimants were asked to 
complete a new application form which sought even more 
detailed information and required the endorsement of an 
alderman, minister of religion, sergeant of police, town 
clerk or postmaster as witness. Moreover, a simultaneous 
tightening of dole regulations threatened to depress even 
further the living standards of the workless. In partic~lar 
:he stipulation that men must be out of work for fourteen 
days before receiving relief created consternation. Rigidly 
enforced, these regulations would debar miners working as 
little as two days a fortnight. The Miners' Federation and 
the Unemployed Workers' Movement were united in their 
condemnation of the! proposed alterations. •;hey join cly 
advised the jobless to refuse to sign the new application 
:orm and called for mass resistance. 2 
Response to this call for action was strangely muted. At 
Port Kembla, members of the Unemployed Workers' Movement 
pu..ilicly 
3 
orders. 
burnt the application forms a:·- were denied food 
On the coalfield miners refused to sign the 
questionnaire. 4 Yet despite this initial stand opposition 
faded, and within days normal relief distribution continued. 
A belated attempt by the Bulli Unemployed Workers' Movement to 
mount a demonstration against the dole regulations won 
5 insufficient support. 
A combined conference of mine lodges and the Unemployad 
Workers' Movement with a good sense of timing declared 
30 September, the day set dowr for the trial of the Bulli 
1lbid. I 10 Jul.y 1931. 
2 Sydnny Mot :·.ing: Herald, 7 September 1931. 
3lbid. I 10 September 1931. 
4
rbid., 11 September 1931. 
5Ibid. I 17 September 1931. 
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rioters, as a one-day protest strike. A manifesto issued by 
·~1 the Unemployed Workers' Movement concentrated more on the 
plight of the Bulli rioters than on specific opposition to 
the dole regulations and declared: 
On this day 12 members of our class are being 
'framed' in the capitalistic court at Bulli for 
fighting the workers' battle at that olace on 
11 May this year. Protest and demand- the 
rel.ease of these working class fighters .1 
Indivir.iual lodges, however, Wt<re divided in their reaction to 
the strike decision. Some, including th~ Mt Kembla lodge, 
rejected the proposal and returned to v•ork. The planned 
demonstration likewise evoked little support. There was no 
procession, a).though a meeting on a vacant block of land in 
Crown Street was addressed by Sydney communi•>c leaders, 
J. (Jack) Kavanagh and H. (Her~rt) Moxon. 2 This abortive 
~ demonstration marks the end of any serious attempt by the 
Unemployed Workers' Movement to encourage opposition to the 
new regulations. 
It is difficult to disc::iver convir.cing reasons for this 
lack of support. Labor Daily reports of the Unemployed 
Workers' Movement activities ceased abruptly with the 
dismissal of the South Coast reporter, Robert Allen, 
allegedly for his radical working class activities and 
continued denunciation of the Lang Labo;· •.;·overnment. Probably 
the memory of Bulli dissuaded many from c..1y further 
involvement. It is possible also that as the political aims 
of protest became more extrew~ orthodox Labor men had second 
thoughts. 
The failure of the unemployed leaders to mount a 
sustained protRst agairi. . changes in the dole regulations and 
the trial of the twelv< Bulli rioters mark a stage in the 
development of street demonstr::.cions. During the court 
proceedings the actions of the police at tne time of the riot 
and at later protest meetings were greatly criticised by the 
unemployed and union leaders alike. Certainly the police as 
in any situation of crisis or excitement t£. 0'\ded to pick out 
1Labor Dailv, 7 September 1931. 
2svdney Morning Her~, 10 October 1931. 
· .. ' 
:.( 
' 
.. 
'~ 
" 
,. 
~:· 
137 
familiar faces· - Of the evidence produced against the Bulli-
rioters, only that against Hitchen was better than 
circwnstantial. The worst example was the sentencing of 
Robert Culbertson who was convicted of assaulting sergeant 
Standen•. Culbertson was said to have hurled a piece of road 
metal as Standen was retreating ·-owards ,the police station. 
He was also charged with hitting out at the policeman with an 
iron bar when challenged. These actions occurred in the 
middle o~ a _swirling group of rioters, whose obvious anger 
ca1;sed Standen 'to withdraw once more. Culbertson was not 
identified until late that night by powder marks common 
amongst miners, which Standen claimed to have noted during 
the scuffle. 1 On this evidence alone Culbertson was 
h . ' . . 2 sentenced to t ree months imprl.sorunent. 
It was a communist tactic to use the law court itself as 
a further arena in which to hurl defiances. During the trial 
of the Bulli rioters C.A. Morgan, the solicitor appearing for 
the defendants, withdrew from the case as. a protest against 
the alleged partiality of the presiding magistrate, 
A.C. Chapman who had presided over preliminary hearings in a 
magisterial capacity, and had expressed opinions on some of 
the charges. Chapman countered by arguing that since no plea 
was taken in the initial hearing, he had not presided in a 
jt1dicial capacity. Whatever the legal niceties, the 
appellants were united in their refusal to enter a plea until 
Chapman was replaced. From the dock, Briemle claimed that 
r.hapman in previous cases involving street protestors had 
[ . ] k' l . . l ' 3 s~;.m nimself 'biased to sic wor ing c ass princip es • 
0 
· :ollowing day, continuing .'•is deliberate attack on the 
judge's authority, a meeting hastily c0nvened by the 
Unemployed Workers' Movement moved, 
That this meeting expresses its appreciation of 
the stand taken by the workers tried in connection 
with the Bulli affair in objecting to Mr Chapman 
1south coast Times, 11 Octobclr 1931. See also Appendix I: 
The Bulli Riot, 11 May 1931, pp.365-77. 
2I':.lid. 
3
rbid. 
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s .M. sitting on their cases because of h; s 
blatai;t class. bias displayed on numero•is -
occasions. dg<;-in~t members of the workL1g class 
and the vindicti~e sen~ences he has inflicted. 
we support 1;hem in their request for trial by 
ano~her.magist~ate and ask that in the interests 
of Justice their request be complied with.! 
138 
similar protests followed from the Illawarra Trades and Labor 
council and from nu.~erous trade unions. 
Common to all the protests was the assertion that the 
power of ::.he court was being used to crush all opposition 
militant or mildly critical - to conotituted authority. 
Other alleged strongholds of conservatism came under the same 
attack and demands for Chapman's dismissal were accompanied 
by attacks on the Wollongong Council in general and Howarth 
in particular. Continuing to act on behalf of the now defunct 
Illawarra Trades and Labor Council, Steve Best described the 
Wollongong council as 'composed entirely of anti-Labor 
elements' responsible for gaoling workers who defended 'our 
unalienable right of free· speech'. 2 In a similar vein, the 
Corrimal branch of the Unemployed Workers' Movement commended 
the 'free speech fighters' for refusing to 'bow to the 
dictates of the spineless capitalist apologists on the 
Wollongong Council'. 3 · Yet despite mounting criticism from 
the local labour movement Chapman did not waver in his belief 
that the legal issue involved was not the deprivation of the 
democratic right of free speech, but whether or not the 
Wollongong Municipality had power to control its streets. 4 
The demonstrators freely acknowledged that local authorities 
were invested with such authority. What they refused to 
accept however, was that this power was being exercised 
impartially. 
1Attorney-General's File, 7/809, Wollongong Unemployed 
Workers' Movement to W.J. McKell, 19 October 1931. 
2Ibid., s. Best to W.J. McKell, 27 October 1931. 
3Ib'. ' l ia. , Corr ima unemployed Workers' Movement to W.J. McKell, 
14 January 1932. 
4Illawarra Mercury, 2 December 193!. 
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To a growing number of the jobless it now seemed that 
entrenched conservatism, local government authorities, the 
courts, indeed the whole power of the state was endeavouring 
to crush the Unemployed Workers' Movement by ascribing to it 
the actions and plans of its militant minority. Men who had 
previously been quiescent now came out in their hundreds to 
defend it. Conservative over-reaction succeeded in doing 
what the communists were unable to do, that is, politicise 
the poverty stricken and convert distress into class conflict. 
The establishment in August 1931 of New Guard localities 
in Wollongong and Bulli further accentuated this growing 
class antagonism. A para-military, quasi-fascist body, the 
New Guard aimed to counter the twin evils of Langism and 
Communism. E. (Eric) Campbell, the movement's leader, 
expounded a simplistic political creed to his Wollongong 
supporters: 'A body of aliens have set themselves up as 
Communists. These imported scoundrels, these Russian killers 
who have been imported into Sydney and even Wollongong must 
be crushed. ' 1 
In the economic field the New Guard advanced old 
fashioned laissez-faire views, which had experienced a certain 
amount of revival in the face of Lang's essays in state 
regulation. There was nothing new in the New Guard's 
repetition of the old cliche - more business in government 
and less government in business - and nothing more hackneyed 
than the adoption of the right-wing desire to put an end to 
state paternalism. According to this view, social services 
killed the incentive to individual effort and thi~ in turn 
weakened the character of the people. Australia's problem 
was primarily moral and political. The depression had merely 
worsened a situation already undermined by lack of moral 
courage and national spirit. A dominance of sectional 
selfishness had brought politics into disrepute and caused 
tLe parliamentary machine to break down. Moral uplift and 
1Labor Daily, 19 November 1931. 
I 
, 
·.,.; 
140 
sound principles of government freed from party machinations 
were the sine qua non of economic restoration. 
The men most receptive to Campbell's appeal neither 
heard, nor wanted to hear, an involved exposition. Rather 
they responded to a simple call for patriotism, loyalty, 
honesty, courage, freedom and sacrifice. In Wollongong, as 
elsewhere in Australia, ex-officers of the AIF found again a 
chance to exercise their military talents for ccmmanC and 
organisation. The Wollongong locality was organised from the 
Returned Servicemen's League headquarters in Church Street. 
In December 1931 the police estimated that at least twenty-
five per cent of all guardsmen were men with military 
experience, 1 and Campbell has described most of his recruits 
as ex-soldiers. 2 By the 1930s many of these officers were 
well established as professional or businessmen. Typical of 
the former category ~re Dr N. E. Kirkwood, and J.P. Caddy, 
general manager at Metal Manufactures plant in Port Kembla. 
Kirkwood had come to Port Kembla shortly after the outbreak 
of war in August 1914 as a newly qualified, twenty-four year 
old medical practitioner. Almost twelve months later he 
volunteered for military service in the medical corps. 
Returning to the district at the war's end he set up practice 
in Wollongong. He was grandson of Russell Barton (1830-1916) 
a pastoralist, mine owner and politician. Though not 
politically active until the early depression years, he 
shared his forbear' i; cm1servatism. During the decade before 
the crash, he busied himself with his medicine and in 
community affairs. At different times he was president of 
the Port Kembla Returned Servicemen's League and the Wollongong 
Rotary Club and built up a considerable reputation as a man 
'of good standing and common sense'. His fear that the 
communists, whom he thought held sway in the coalmining 
communities, pl~nned to 'raid Wollongong', prompted him to 
support the formation of a Wollongong N -. Guard locality. 
Following preliminary meetings at Port Kembla and Wollongong, 
1NsW PP, 1931, p.1057. 
2E. Campbell, The Rallying Point (Melbourne, 1965), p.64. 
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atte!!ded in the main by Rotarians and Returned Servicemen, a 
joint meeting elected Kirkwood foundation president. He now 
describes himself as a compromise selection - 'less of a 
wild man than Mayor Howarth or Alderman Dr Ii.H. Lee' who had 
• 
sought the post. Certainly the later actions of all three 
f . h" . l men con irm t is view. 
Born at Waverly, New South Wales, in 1882, caddy 
graduated Bachelor of Engineering from Sydney University in 
1903 and after metallurgical work in Queensland, New south 
Wales and West Australia, enlisted in 1915. By the ·and of 
the war he held the rank of Major in the Field Engineers. He 
served in France and fired the mines on Russels Top after the 
last party evacuated Gallipoli, an act for which he was later 
awarded the Military Cross. In 1920 he was appointed 
Assistant General Manager at the Port Kembla copper 
r.1anufacturing plant and five years later became General 
.'lanager. At the onset of the depression he was Vice-President 
·~f the Wollongong Returned Servicemen's League, and President 
of the South Coast and Tablelands District Boy Scouts. 
Together with Kirkwood he was an active member of the All for 
i\ustralia Laag\t•~ ·.rnd a foundation member of the Wollongong 
branch of the United Australia Party, formed in 1931, and 
subsequently chairman of that party's Port Kembla branch. 
To his employees Caddy projected a militaristic, brusque 
'apparently despotic manner•. 2 
Kirkwood and caddy typify the solid business and 
professional men who approved of and helped organise the New 
1The biographical material in this paragraph was obtained 
from H.H. Lee, 'A Medical History of the Wollongong District', 
Medical Journal of 11.ustralia, Vol.2, no.10, September 1955, 
pp.353-6 an interqiew with Dr N.E. Kirkwood, l December 
1972. S~e the Aus!:ralian Dictionary of Biography, Vol.4, 
1851-1890, pp.115-6, for an outline of the career of Russell 
Barton by N.B. Nairn. 
2This biographical sketch is based on Metal Manufactures 
Directors' Reports, 29 September 1925; .Metal Manufactures 
Gazette April-May 1943, p.3; M.H. Ellis, Metal Manufactures 
Limited'. A Golden Jubilee History. 1916-1966 (Sydney, 1966), 
pp.22-3. 
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Guard locality. It is more difficult, however, to establish 
the nature of the New Guard's following. 1 It appears likely 
that guardsmen were drawn in significant numbers from among 
the salaried officials and staff employees at the Port Kembla 
industrial plants, some of whom thought they were 'expected' 
by their employers to support the New Guard. 2 support came 
also from men in business on their own account - r· ~l 
shopkeepers who felt themselves to be crushed bet en 
organised labour on one side and big business on the other 
or small farmers fearful of their property rights. Members 
of the Unemployed Workers' Movement now, as then, claim that 
3 there were no 'unemployed or basic workers' in the New Guard. 
While this was almost certainly true of the coalfields where, 
according to police estimates, there were twenty-five 
guardsmen, it was not so in Wollongong. The police considered 
that the numerical strength of the New Guard in Wollongong was 
about 1,500. This is probably an excessive figure, but it 
indicates a belief that there was widespread local support 
for the movement. 
1It is not yet possible to obtain access to material held by 
the New South Wales State Archives (Colonial Secretary's File, 
5424-S.l). The Premier's Department supplied information 
relating to the New Guard localities in Wollongong. It 
appears that in 1931 each police district in New South Wales 
was asked to report on New Guard activities in their area. 
The information so gathered formed the basis of a police 
report to the Chief Secretary. See NSW PP, 1931, p.1057. 
The extent of the district reports varies. Some contain 
complete membership .. ~sts, while o~hers merely name local 
officials and estino•~P. membership. The Wollongong report was 
of the latter type. I was shown the return but asked not to 
cite names which appeared in it. Dr N.E. Kirkwood, however, 
declared in a letter to the author (18 October 1972) , and 
subsequently in a recorded interview (1 December 1972), that 
he had been elected 'leader' of the Wollongong locality. 
The Bulli locality was led by a retired British soldier who 
had held the rank of major. Presumably, when the relevant 
files are released it will be possible, with the aid of 
electoral rolls, to establish more precisely the occupations 
of New Guard followers for at least some parts of New South 
Wales. The paragraph that follows is based in the main, upon 
material gathered in interviews. 
2Interview with Mr w. Mintorn, 2 August 1971. 
3 Recorded interview with Mr L. Boardman. See Appendix I: 
The Bulli Riot, 11 May 1931, pp.365-77. 
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The Unemployed Workers' Movement was more concerned, 
however, at the support given the New Guard by public 
officials. It seemed to receive the approval of the Wollongong 
Municipal Council. Both the Mayor, W.L. Howarth, a.id Alderman 
Dr H.H. Lee publicly proclaimed their support for it. As well 
as at least two of its members aligning themselves with a 
group intent upon establishing itself as an extra-legal police 
force, there developed or equally important, seemed to 
develop, a close liaison between the council and the police. 
Summonses to unemployed protesters were served by the police 
acting on the advice of the council health inspector, 
H.E. Gale, whose responsibility it was to initiate court 
proceedings against illegal street meetings. Gale, therefore, 
was a familiar figure at unemployed demonstrations, at which 
he was seen frequently in conversation with the police. So 
close was his identification with the police that one 
metropolitan newspaper commonly referred to him as 
Inspector Gale. 1 
Following Campbell's November address, described in the 
Labor Daily as 'comprised of fifty per cent indecent and 
filthy sex jokes and stories, thirty per cent inane platitudes 
and twenty per cent inaccuracies•, 2 the New Guard made a 
concerted effort to harry known communists. Alleging that he 
was attacked by thirty guardsmen, Ernest Briemle sought 
3 
sanctuary in the Wollongong lock-up. The first general clash 
between the New Guard and those they defined as communists 
occurred during the federal election campaign of December 1931 
when the communist candidate for King, L.L. (Lawrence) Sharkey 
was one of the speakers at an outdoor meeting in the streets 
1sydney Morning Herald, 7 September, 8 Octob•:r 1931. 
2Labor Daily, 19 November 1931. The meeting also drew a 
protest from Anglican churchman, Reverend A. Walker, who 
thought c~mpbell's speech 'against th7 basis of the Bible, 
the ethics Jf Christianity and the principles of a gentleman' • 
. Illawarra M1?rcury, 20 November 1931. 
3rllawarra Mercury, 22, 29 January 1932. 
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l 
of Wollongong· The meeting was heckled b;• New Guard men 
ostentatiously asserting their patriotism in the singing of 
'Rule Britannia', 'Advance Australia Fair' and 'God save the 
King' 2 A motor cycle noisily cut a swathe through the 
listeners and the New Guard then swarmed forward and knocked 
the speaker, Robert Sandwith, an unemployed ironworker known 
to the police as a distributor of the Workers' Weekly, to the 
ground. In the course of the general melee which followed 
two of the participants were knocked unconscious and eight 
3 
arrests were made. 
It is clear that a determined and planned effort was 
made by the New Guard to disrupt the meeting. It is equally 
clear that they were prepared, if necessary, to use physical 
force to do so. The earlier attack on Briemle and rumours 
that a further attack was to be made, induced communist 
supporters to arm themselves. Members of the Workers' Defence 
Corp walked from Helens~urgh and Port Kembla and women were 
asked to wear 'high heeled shoes with an iron tip or to carry_ 
a long knitting needle or hat pins•.4 When the dust settled, 
batons, truncheons and a long bowie knife were confiscated 
b h l . 5 y t e po \'.Ce. 
Despite a police admission during the hearing that the 
6 New Guard launched an armed attack on communist speakers, no 
attempt was made to prevent the disruption of the meeting, nor 
were any New Guardsmen arrested during the affray. A 
policeman, in giving evidence, was asked by one of the 
1ror Sharkey's role in the Australian Communist Party see 
Alastair Davidson, The Communist Party of Australia: A Short 
History (California, 1969), passim. See also Sharkey's own 
history of the party: !he Australian Communist Party: Outline 
History (Sydney, 1944). 
2Illawarra Mercury, 11 December 1931; Sydney Morning Herald, 
10 December 19311 Daily Telegraph, 10 December 1931. 
3 Illawarra Mercury, 11 December 1931. 
4see Appendix I, The Bulli Riot, 11 May 1931, pp.365-77. 
5r11awarra Mercury, 11 December 1931. 
6
rbid., 22, 29 January 1932. 
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defendants why no attempt was made to arrest Dr Lee, who had 
exchanged punches with several communists and was alleged to 
have WO! . ead on his hci.nds under gloves. The policeman 
repljed tnat he did not see Lee challenging anyone to a fight. 1 
The presumption in favour of self-defence, it seemed to those 
arrested, operated only one way. 
During the trial the police prosecutor, Sergeant Pye, 
was at pains to emphasise the communist associations and 
anti-religious stand of the defendants. He cross examined 
Charles Kelso, a diminutive twenty-one year old Scot charged 
with possession of a loaded sling with intent to do grievous 
bodily harm. Pye asked him, 'Do you believe in the Almighty? 
I beg your pardon you refused to be sworn•. 2 Earlier in the 
hearing, a police assertion that all Wollongong workers, who 
came before the court, had received a fair trial was greeted 
by uproar in the courtroom. Kelso, who was sitting at the 
front of the court awaiting his case was alleged to have 
emitted a groan. He was at once charged, convicted and fined 
3 for contempt of court. In giving evidence to support the 
charge against Kelso, the police prosecutor told him: 'This 
has been your demeanour ever since you have been in Wollongong. 
Once your pretty face is seen it is never forgotten.• 4 
Moreover, in summing up, the Stipendiary Magistrate, 
A.E. Hardwick, introduced a novel, if somewhat incoherent, 
commentary on the principles of free speech. 
This is not a country of barbarians. At all 
political meetings if the audience indicate to 
the speaker that they do not want to hear him he 
simply stops. There is no justification for a 
ferson to carry a murderous weapon like this bowie knife]. If there is to be disregard of 
constitutional authority we will get nowhere.S 
1
rbid. 
2Ibid., 29 January 1932. 
3
rbid. 
4 Ibid. 
5Ibid. 
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Both sides claimed victory. Tm" conservative press 
asserted that New Guardsmen had hounded the communists, the 
Workers' Weekly that the guardsmen were routed. 1 Wherever 
victory in fact lay, at a subsequent meeting outside the 
Wollongong stadium the Unemployed Workers' Movement was 
prepared. 
When this meeting was on the speakers were placed 
against the wall of the stadium ••• and round the 
speaker formed the Workers' Defence Corps. 
outside them was the ordinary people, and again ••• 
a ring of WDC, again the people and WDC outside 
them. These men outside were facing away from the 
m~eting. The police were there and the police 
were told that provided there was no trouble with 
the New Guard then there would be no trouble with 
us. Anyhow, the New Guard were amongst the people 
inside the two rings and when Bateman was talking 
the New Guard started to throw eggs and tomatoes. 
The police were issued with instructions that if 
they didn't stop '"lem, we would stop them. The 
result was that the sergeant, when one man threw 
another tomato, was told that if he didn't walk in 
we walkc .'l in. We walked in and grabbed this man 
and hit him as he was going to throw another one. 
The New Guard up in Globe Lane would not come 
out •••• The meeting finished and all of our people, 
thousands of them, walked up and down Crown Street 
calling for the New Guard to come out and singing 
the 'International' and the 'Red Fl~g·.2 
It is not claimed here that this is a totally objective 
report of the scene in Crown Street, Wollongong - though 
there is corroborative contemporary evidence to suggest that 
in its essentials it is. It does, however, demonstrate the 
determination and vigilance which had been aroused among 
workers by the menace of the New Guard. Nor is the later 
contention that the New Guard made little headway in the 
coalfield community, simply the product of forty years' 
hindsight. 3 Anonymity was impossible for active guardsmen on 
the coalfields. Openly taunted many soon abandoned any 
1sydney Morning Herald, 9 December 1931; Daily Telegraph, 
10 December 1931; Workers' Weekly, 10 December 1931. 
2Recorded interview with Mr L. Boardman, Mr D. Timmins, 
~~ H. Blacklock, 26 February 1972. The full text appears in 
Appendix I: The Bulli Riot, 11 May 1931, pp.305-77. 
3Ibid. 
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public connection with the New Guard. Intimidation often 
went as far as interference with property: sand and sugar were 
added to petrol tanks, car tyres slashed. Known or merely 
suspected guardsmen ·were the victims of systematic 'snow 
dropping' 1 campaigns. Certainly after mid-193', the Wollongong 
New Guard did vnry little. Scuffles at communist street 
meetings continued but were less frequent. The rendezvous 
and drill over the mountain .'lt Madden's Plain of a Sunday 
afternoon continued, however, to fire the more adventurous 
': with the notion that they might be wanted to do something 
stirring. But there was nothi.ng to approach the violence of 
the clashes in December 1931. 
Despite repeated :1:-:eats c.'f physical violence from New 
Guard hotheads on only c.ne further o· :casion did this seem 
likely. It was the custom for south coast miners to celebrate 
~lay Day with a procession and sports day on the first Monday 
in MdY· In 1932, however, May Day fell on a Sunday. The 
decision of the miners' May Day Committee to hold its 
celebrations on the Sunday met with vocal criticism from 
churchmen, leader writers and local government spokesmen. 
S.R. Musgrave, Anglican editor of the Illawarra Mercury, who 
had previously adopted a position of strict neutrality in 
local politics and industrial disputes allowed himself to take 
sides against the May Day Committee on this issue. He 
denounced the committee's decision as 
••• a direct challenge to the Churches of all 
Denominations and [it] must be taken as the 
culmination of much talk on the part of a certain 
section of the community, as to the need for 2 fighting religion no matter what denominations. 
At the Anzac Day address delivered on the Sunday previous 
to the projected May Day celebrations an attack was made on 
'those in our midst who [are] now trying to destroy all the 
things that the Diggers felt were worth fighting for' •3 
Permission to hold the procession was refused by the 
1The stealing of washing from clotheslines. 
2 Illawarra Mercury, 29 April 1932. 
3Ibid. 
> 
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(. Wollongong Council. 1 Moreover, opposition came from 
unexpected quarters. The Miners' Delegate Board refused to 
give its usual donation to the organisers. The reason for 
its decision is not clear though Musgrave in his editoria1 
had, in the view of Pat McHenry, attempted to enshrine Lowden 
'as a paragon of Christian virtu~s. pure unsullied and serene 
in his struggle to uphold religion against tne supposed 
attacks of the militant infidels:• 2 It is possible that the 
Delegate Board was acting in accordance with a general 
directive from the central council of the Miners' Federation 
to curb communist influence at the district level. But 
whatever prompted the denial of financial support, McHenry 
felt that the obvious lack of solidarity might embolden the 
New Guard and encourage physical disruption of the 
celebrations. 
In the event the procession was 'orderly and no police 
action was found necessary 13 though the Wollongong Council 
prosecuted nineteen marchers for taking part in an un4awful 
procession. Moreover, during the periou between the 
procession and the subsequent prosecutions the Lang government 
was replaced by the Stevens-Bruxner coalition. The new 
Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, Sir Daniel Levy was 
somewhat less sympathetic to appe~ls by workers for a 
remission of fines. In the case of the May Day marchers he 
accepted the conclusion of J.B. Scobie, the Stipendiary 
Magistrate, that the procession was held in defiance of the 
Council and that disregard of the ordinance could only lead 
to further prosecutions. 4 
The May Day procession marks a turning point in the 
history of p1.1blic protest by the Unemployed Workers' Movement. 
In the first instance the changed attitude of the Attorney-
General' s department offered protesters the choice between 
1wollongong Municipality Minute Books, 21 April 1932. 
2 Illawarra Mercur~, 6 May 1932. 
3Attorney-General's File, 7/809, J.B. Scobie, S.M. to Under-
secretary of Justice, 10 June 1932. 
4Ibid., 14 June 1932. 
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longer terms of imprisonment or heavier fines. Further, the 
dismissal of Lang seemed to cut the ground from under the 
feet of those workers whose demands for free speech were an 
extension of their support for Lang. conversely, with the 
removal of the New south Wales Labor premier and return of 
the Stevens government there was no further function for the 
New Guard and its organisation withered away. Pe~haps the 
same calculations operated within the Wollongong Council 
Chambers for, from this point, permi~.sion to speak in the 
streets was given more freely anu fewer prosecutions w~re 
initiated. 
Tr1roughout the political struggles of 1931-2 the self-
help programme launr:hed earlier by the Unemployed Workers' 
~lovement continued to function. By examining the composition 
of the self-help bodias and of the groups involved in 
political protest, it is possible to constru, ::. a general 
picture of the Wollongong Unemployed Workers' Movement. Most 
members were recent British migrants who brought with them a 
tougher, more radical view of politics. This is not 
surprising, and for a coalmining district the less so, since 
the policy of 'first on, last off' which operated in 
Australian coalmines meant that newcomers would be 
disproportionately represented among the unemployed. It is 
possible also to generalise about tlw :;?re-depression experience 
of the more active members. Typically, they were volunteers 
in the British army during the first world war who returned 
to Britain to find it not a land fit for heroes to live in 
but a land of grow-,.g unemployment. They migrated to 
Australia in the early 1920s and arrived in Wollongong at a 
time when work in the coalmines was slowing down. In general, 
they had little union experience !n Britain. Some were 
members of the British Labour Part.y, but few, because of the 
date of their departure, were communists before reaching 
Australia. When the depression struck, the 'typical' 
Wollongong activist was a married man of between thirty a:.d 
~. -
:(: 
thirty-five years of age with some period of continuous 
residence and not a shifting individual as alleged by the 
l h . . l ~ . :.ca aut orities. 
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The reasons '~hese men now give for having joined the 
Unt:.nployed Wor:cers' Movement are revealing, not only of their 
own motives but also of the movement's nature. All hoped 
that in Austra~ia they would leave ::-ehind them the grosser 
eviln of industrialism and capita:' .c.:::.1. Others were attracted 
by the humanitarianism and sincerity of radicals with whom 
they came into contact. To some, involveme:·· ~ in the 
co-operative ventures gave some meaning to a l.i re of enforced 
idleness. Another important characteristic was the strong 
independence with which most were imbue6 and which is 
exemplified by the very act of migration. The Unemployed 
Workers' Movement was flexible enough in its organisation to 
give these men a chance to assert themselves. It is 
instructive to note that many of these men who became members 
of the Communist Party during the rather fl'l:. 'ti circumstances 
of the depression years l· •· the party in the mid and late 
1930s when more formal idc >gical demands were made of them. 
Their political. thinking had been influenced by simple 
socialist tracts rather than by the writings of Marx or Lenin. 2 . 
A furtl..O!r characteristic of the movement became clearer 
during its decline. Tu many \dthin its ranks the Unemployed 
Workers' Movement was simply the trade union of the jobless. 
The movement's leaders encouraged this view. In the early 
months of the depression they had rejected all suggestions 
that relief wages should be reduced to allow greater numbers 
to be employed. In 1931 they refused to accept a government 
proposal that the unemployed should work for the dole, rather 
1If Bolton's assertion that the typical Western Australian 
activist was a shifting individual is true, then the 
Wollongong experience is vastly different. See G.C. Bolton, 
'Unemployment and Politics in Western Australia', in 
R. Cooksey (ed.), The Great Depression {Labour History, no.17, 
1970), p.96. 
2The most widely read of these'socialist tracts were: 
Robert Tress ell's The Ragaed '1'rousered Philanthropists and 
the works of Jack London and Upton Sinclair. 
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than accept a handout. 1 
as this proposition was 
I . . 2 n reJecting the 'Moss Vale Scheme', 
commonly labelled, the movement's 
spokesmen frequently cited the experience of Ne~ Zealand's 
3 
unemployed. 'The level of unemployment in New Zealand at its 
peak was about Ltftcen per cent of the working population or 
roughly half the Australian figure. The New Zealand Prime 
Hinister, G.W. Forbes, formulated the principle of 'no pay 
without work', for he believed the British dole system to be 
demoralising. Instead the unemployed were huddled into crude 
makeshift camps remote fr~~ the towns and worked in primitive 
fashion on road construction and land -learance projects. 
New Zealand experie:ice therefore st.?:'engthened J.<~ft-w:..ng 
suspicion that 'work for the dole' would be 'a prelude to 
Fascism'. 4 The acceptance of. s<:.<.:h a scheme would open the way 
for the undermining of trade uni<:..·:1 rates and the destruction 
of unionism. By economic consc~iption men would be driven 
into relief camps and compelled to submit to the 'dictatorship 
of camp officials. 5 
Self-help could also take the form of embryonic trade 
unionism, as in the summer of 1932-3 when attempts were made 
to organi5e seasonal blackberry pickers. In batter times the 
picking and sale of blackberries \'las a family venture which 
had the added virtue of financial gain. To the jobless or 
the oepr•~ssion blackberrying reprerented real income. 
Branches of the Unemployed W·:' .ers' Movement wanted local 
unions to restrain their men : l who were in work from 
compe.t.; .. 1 wit!;. the jobl.c:;s for · .<' :F-uit. 6 In January 1933, 
)!~. Kem?~la pickers formed an association to agitate for 
.:.;1creascC. a:id uniform picking rates and appointed delegates 
1 
•Illawarra Mer££!'_~~. l May 1931. 
2The Moss \'al~, shir.e Council was the first New South Wales 
local body to adopt the scheme. 
3 Red Le~der, 6 November 1931. 
4Ibid. 
5
rbid. 
6nMB, 16 February 1931; Mt Keira Lodge Minute Book, 
17 January 1933. 
. 
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to encourage pickers in other localities to affiliate. 1 The 
jam manufacturers and their agents simply ignored the 
association's demands. 
The seasonal nature of blackberrying militated against 
any si:.ccessful unionism amonq pickers. 
were not found among reliBf workers. 
The same problems 
In April 1932 the 
Commonwealth Government, in an attempt to co-ordinate existing 
relief schemes, moved to establish state employment councils 
•vhich would reconm1end works projects for the relief of 
'· · mployment. 2 It was not until May 1933, that money from 
',·ne Commonwealth Relief Fund began to be expended locally. 
By the end of 1933, however, almost two thousand men were 
participating in the Emergency Relief Scheme. Work was 
alloca' d according to need. Single men received six hours 
a fortnight, while at the other end of the scale a married man 
with five or 
fortnight. 3 
relief work 
six children was allotted tw~nty-six hours a 
Since trade union rates applied to emergency 
the scheme was in principle acceptabl~ to the 
labour movement though the traditional uneasiness about 
brok~n-time remained. 
:r.n its day to day operations, howeve~, the scheme aroused 
much criticism. Men out of work for long periods had neither 
the necessary clothing nor footwear and worki.ng conditions 
were uniformly bad. First-aid facilities were not provided 
and men worked without any ~rotection from the w~ather. 
There was moreover, no guarantee of a start on wet days and 
men often trudged fruitless miles to their starting points. 
Furthermore, while trade unions rates applied, margins for 
skill were not ."cknowle·iged. Advocates of unionism among 
relief workers therefore found a ready audlence. By the early 
months of 1934 Relief Workers' Associations, with a claimed 
1Red Leader, l February 1933. 
2For a discussion of the f<.-:mation and functioning of the 
Employment Councils see C.ll. Schedvin, Australia and the 
Great Depi:-essi<'r,', {Sydney, 1970), pp·. 319-39. 
3Bulli Shire Minute Books, 9 December 1933; Central Illawarra 
Municipality Minute Books, 11 October 193:1; Wollongong 
Municipality Minute Books, 5 February 1933; Northemillawarra 
Municipality Minute Books, 29 June 1933. 
ii 
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membership of two thousand members, existed in each of the 
four local government areas. The associations had three 
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' stated objectives: a one hundred per cent increase in work 
hours, better working conditions and the recognition of margins 
for skill. There were serious obstacles in the way of 
achieving these aims. Stop work meetings were prohibited. 
Since the work-force changed constantly it was difficult for 
organisers to remain in close contact with their members. 
However, opposition from local governments struggling to 
maintain ;:elief projects without recourse to their general 
funds was to prove the most difficult problem. 
The speed with which the unemployed leader became relief 
association official foreshadows later developments within 
the WQllongong labour movement and emphasises the importance 
of the Unemployed Workers' Movement. If ioeol.ogical 
commitment to the Communist Party strengthened the resolve of 
many of these leaders, the Unemployed Workers' Movement 
provided them with experience in leadership. This experience, 
together with the reputation for placing the general welfare 
of the jobless ahead of personal considerations, was to prove 
a valuable asset after 1933 as trade unions attempted to 
regain lost ground. 
It is more difficult to assess the political implications 
rf the unemployed protest movement as men joined the 
demonstrations for different reasons. Soma protested out of 
frustration. At most no more than a handful advocated 
resistance of authority. Its leaders preached relief rather 
than revolution. It was preci~ely because the prote~t 
movement was defensive in nature that it u.ttx.·a.,;ted such 
widespread support not only f:r.om the unemp2.oyed b•lt also from 
trade unionists. The protesters believed, and with some 
justification, that they were the victims of repressive local 
governments. The demonstrations and the responses of local 
authorities to them accentuated class antagonisms. 
Nevertheless, these clashes were essentially parochial ones. 
They were concerned to question the actions of local bodies 
and to obtain some say in matters affecting the everyday life 
of the jobless. The political thinking of the majority of 
~{r 
.. ~ 
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the unem~J..oyed could be summed Uf· ln one word - Langism. 
support for the New South Wales premier in a sense however, 
as we shall discover, truncated grass roots political 
protest. 
' 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
POLITICS AND DEPRESSION:l930-4 
The two issues which preoccupied Wollongong workers in 
the early months of depression, as they did those elsewhere 
in Australia, were growing unemployment and deteriorating 
woJ:"king conditions. Both were closely related and were 
J:"eflected in the political demands of the Wollongong labour 
movement. The 1929 federal elections were fought mainly on 
the arbitration proposals of the Bruce-Page government which, 
in labour eyes, were aimed at emasculating if not destroying 
the whole arbitration system. 'In New south Wales the 
Nationalist-Country Party of Bavin and Buttenshaw seemed 
intent upon balancing its ~·udgets and cutting costs by a 
series of 'economy' measures the impact of which fell 
disproportionately upon wage earners. In April 1930 the 
coalition reduced public service salaries by e~ght and one-
third per cent and repealed Lang's Act of i~<5 which had 
estarlbhed the forty-four hour working week in New South 
Wales. When this was followed by the abolition of child 
endowment for the first child, some Wollongong trade union 
officials denounced goverr- >t policy in class-war terms. 
If the attempt of norther1, ·l proprietors to reduce wages 
was an example of 'an attack of the master class on the 
conditions of the working class·, then, F. (Fred} Lowden 
declared, the Bavin administration by its handling of the 
northern lock-out and by its later a~tions had clearly taken 
'sides with the master class in this onslaught' . 1 
A few union officials, such as ;J. (.:.'im) Ward, president 
of the Illawarra Trades and Labor Cou~cil ~nd secretary of 
the Port Kembla branch off the FIA, saw _he whole situation in 
'\, 
terms of the communist doctrine of the crisis of capitalism. 
In Ward's view, unemployment was inevitable while •::<:.'.?italism 
remained in any country of. the wo~\d, and it behoved ~he 
1Illaw< · .:" Mercury, 2 May 1930. 
-,. 
' 
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workers to demonstrate against local governments, against 
parliaments and against 'other institutions of the bosses•. 1 
He did not advocate open revolt, although he suggested that 
should the working class rise, 'no power on earth would stop 
them' • 2 Some leading miners O,ften added a conspiracy thesis 
to the communist view that unemployment and economic depression 
were inherent to capitalism. Acting in concert the employers 
had, in Lowden's view, deliberately manufactured a slump in 
order to implement a policy of lower wages, longer working 
hours and harsher working conditions. The employers' task in 
tf'.) Wollongong district was made easier, or so Lowden thought, 
by the absence of strong unionism at Port Kembla. If workers 
opposed the employers industrially and defeated their 
political representatives a rapid and complete economic 
recovery would follow. 3 
While the conspiracy thesis coloured most attempts by 
workers to explain the corning of the depression, they 
nevertheless adopted an undoctrinaire position on the relief 
of unemployment calling for the traditional 'colonial' 
expedients of borrowing and increased expenditure on public 
works. Borrowing, they argued, would wipe out any budgetary 
deficits so created. These opinions were articles of faith 
for Labor supporters in Wollongong as elsewhere. A large 
measure of social legislation and satisfactory working 
conditions could be preserved only by high protection and 
heavy public borrowing. It could have been predicted that a 
federal Labor government would face much the same problem as 
those confrontirP Bavin and that J .H. Scullin and his 
colleagues would 1oon be at odds with their supporters in 
trying to reconcile traditional assumptions with current 
economic realities. 
When Scullin became Prime Minister in October 1929, much 
was expected of him. Soon after he came into office, it was 
apparent that he would not honour an election promise to open 
1
rbid., 15 April 1930. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
, 
•. 
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New South Wales northern coalfields on the miners' terms. 
His failure to do so left him open to accusations of cowardice 
and treachery and led southern miners to demand the 
disaffiliation of their union from the ALP. 1 Relations 
between the Federal Government and the Labor Party in New 
south Wales worsened when Scullin invited Sir Otto Niemeyer, 
an official of the Bank of Englaad, to visit Australia and 
report on its financial affairs. Niemeyer's report was as 
unpalatable as his prescriptions were ruthlessly deflationary. 
He maintained that the Australian policy of tariff protection 
and heavy external borrowing was an attempt to support a 
standard of living that was higher than was justified by 
economic conditions abroad and production at home. 
The drift of federal Labor policy towards the 
retrenchment and budget-balancing which was advised by 
Niemeyer opened uo gaps in the party's ranks. J.T. Lang, the 
New South Wales Labor leader, building on the conspiracy 
thesis alceady widely held by Australian workers, denounced 
federal inaction. In the early months of 1930 Lang was at 
pains to emphasise the differences between the Labor Party 
in New South Wales and the Scullin government. London 
financial interests, declared Lang, were using economic 
pressure to reduce the Australian standard of living to the 
level of agrarian Argentine and industrial Germany. 2 By 
'trucking to English overlords' 3 Scullin had placed Australia 
further in the grip of the 'mGmey power' 4 Lang waG now 
emboldened to present himself as the saviour of the people 
and by August 1930 he had developed a substantial following 
in the electorate. Moreover, he attracted th.:i support of a 
1DMB, 15 March 1930. For an explanation of Scullin's failure 
to carry out this election promise initially made by 
E.G. Theodore his deputy leader, see J.R. Robertson, 
'Scullin as p~ime Minister: Seven Critical Decisions', in 
Robert Cooksey (ed.), The Great Depression in Australia, 
pp.2S 30. 
2sydney Morning Herald, 19 September 1930. 
3
rbid. 
4Ibid. 
\tJ 
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group of New South Wales federal Labor members including the 
member for Werriwa, H.P. Lazzarini. The predicament of the 
federal government can, to some extent, b~ gauged from the 
advice Lazzarini gave Wollongong's unemployed coalminers: 
We are in the grip of the money power and 
unemployment will get worse unless we are 
prepared to lock horns with the money power 
and fight them [sic] to the death. If all 
Labour has to offer is the dole then to hell 
with Labour and get something else.l 
This was scarcely an ill-considered outburst for, little more 
than twelve months J.ater he was to help bring down the 
Scullin aovernment. 
Against this background of growing unemployment, economic 
debate and heightened political awareness New South Wales 
prepared to go to the polls in O~tober 1930. The selection 
of the abrasive Wollongong mayor, W.L. Howarth, as the 
Nationalist candidate for the Illawarra seat heralded a 
bitter local contest. 2 In elaborating his credentials to the 
Nationalist Party selection panel Howarth declared he was 
determined to prevent disorder in the streets and to 
the extreme elements and their actions definitely' . 3 
'stop 
Labor 
spokesmen reacted sharply to Howarth's espousal of a law and 
order platform: they claimed that the presence of four 
Wollongong aldermen on the panel which selected Howarth was 
conclusive proof that the town was controlled by a 
'Nationalist clique' •4 The subsequent use of the Wollongonq 
council chambers as the Nationalifit Party campaign 
headquarters emphasised, in the eyes of workers, the partisan 
character of the municipal council. 
Howarth presented himself as a local advocate whose 
policy it was to insulate the district from the worst effects 
1 Illawarra Mercury, l August 1930. 
2For the 1930 state elections the Wollongong electorate with 
slight boundary changes was renamed Illawarra. The other 
local electorate, previously known as Illawarra, was renamed 
Bulli. 
3 Illawarra Mercury, 26 September 1930. 
4Attorney-Genet~l's File, 7/809 passim. The four aldermen 
were: Dr H.H. Lee, T. Kie~nan, J.B. Wells, W.A. Lang. 
of the depression. He rejected Lang's proposals as 'vile 
and extravagant' 1 and professed support for a series of 
1 :solutions, known as the Melbourne Agreement, passed at a 
premiers' conference in August 1930. In the terms of this 
agreement state government-.s undertook to balance their 
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budgets and to avoid unproductive loan expenditure. Although 
Lang had been careful not to advocate the repudiation of New 
south Wales debts, Howarth assured Wollongong electors that a 
large sec:tion of Labor supporters did, anCl that should Lang 
be succe:osful he would prove incapable of resisting the 
repudi~tionists within his party. 2 He warned voters that the 
choice \':as between 'honour and dishonour' • 3 The existence of 
a national crisis demanded that 'rigid party allegiance' and 
'personal preferences for individual candidates• 4 be abandoned. 
He iresented the Premiers' Plan as a 'National Policy 
for Australia wit.bout catch cries or personal appeal, 
prejudice, bias or creeds'. 5 By opposing this non-party 
programme, he said,Lang and the Labor Party of New South Wales, 
werr.hindering the only effective policy open to responsible 
men.
0 To some extent Howarth's appeal above party, in the 
nar.e of a proclaimed national interest, was dictated by 
political expediency for, despite boundary changes, the 
newspapers predicted a substantial Labor victory in both 
7 Wollongong electorates. It was of greater significance th~t 
Howarth's programme reflected two ideas which dominated 
1Illawarra Mercury, 10 October 1930. 
2A repudiation resolution had been included in a five-point 
plan to combat the depression issued by the Political and 
Industrial committee of the New South Wales Labor Party in 
August 1930. The Central Executive of the party, however, 
defeated the adoption of the committee's recommendations. 
See Sydney Morning Herald, 27 and 29 August 1930. 
3Illawarra Mercury, 26 September 1930. 
4Ibid., 16 October 1930. 
5Ibid. 
6Ibid. 
7see, for example, Sydney Morning Herald, 16 October 1930; 
Illawarra Mercury, 10 October 1930. 
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conservative thinking vn the causes and possible solution of 
the depression. The first was an unqualified acceptance of 
the wages-fund theory, namely, that a fixed proportion of 
national income was available for wages. The second was the 
rejection of any artificial attempt to prevent the free 
working of 'natural' economic laws. Such measures were 
likely to result either in the collapse of free enterprise 
under the weight of excessive wages, or in spiralling 
inflation. 
The argument that the issue of the 1930 election 
transcended both state and party boundaries was pushed a 
stage further by the Nationalist candidate for Bulli, 
E.L. Holmes. According to Holmes, a Woonona cordial 
manufacturer and forthright opponent of the Unemployed 
Workers' Movement, 1 there would be lit'. le economic progress 
in Australia until the party system we:'' abandoned. Criticism 
of party politics was common during the depress.<.on. Those 
who questioned the value of the party system normally based 
their arguments on the belief that political parties 
represented the interests of particular sections o_ classes 
of society rather than those of the whole community. 2 Holmes 
was reflecting these views when he offered the electors his 
'Bulli-Policy'; an eight-point programme which would rescue 
Australia from economic disaster. The first three planks 
restated the orthodox formula for coping with the depression -
a determination to balance budgets by a general belt-
tightening. 'l'his, however, was t1r<l extent of his commitment 
to the Nationalist platform. Subsequent sect .1s of his 
policy questioned the valid of representative government 
based upon the party system .upported by t iiversal franchise. 
What Australia needed, according to Holme::;, was a great 
unive. >al party which would 'lift politics out of the gutter' 
:ind effect a political regeneration. 3 If elected he promised 
l See Chu&)ter Three, pp.12~-6. 
2For an account of these developments se~ Peter Loveday, 
'Anti-Political Thought' in Robert Cooksey (e~ ), The Great 
Depression in Australia, pp.121-35. 
3
r11awarra Mercury, 26 September 1930. 
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to plant the seed of such a party. It would have one ideal 
'the b''.,•i:terment of Australia no matter what the cost• •1 In 
this 'Letter' Australia conflict between worker and employer 
was to be forestalled by the creation of an all-powerful 
judicial body to be known as the Supreme Council of the 
National Economy, which would determine wage structures within 
individual industries. 2 
The derisive spirit in which Holmes's proposals were 
received in Wollongong was exempli·fied by a Woonona wit who 
asked whether Holmes planned to 'put false teeth in the mouth 
of the Yarra•. 3 At a Corrimal meeting he was counted out. 
To restore some semblance of order the chairman organised a 
ten-minute debate on 'Bavinism' between Holmes and s. (Steve) 
Best, the secretary of the Illawarra Trades and Labor 
·1 4 counci • 
A small but growing number of coalminers was also 
' beginning to question acceptance of parliamentary methods as 
a means of furthering the cause of labour. For some of them 
it was but a short step from the belief that the depression 
was a capitalist plot to advocating the overthrow of 
capitalism and the establishment of a workers' Cjovernment 
'similar to that enjoyed by the workers in Soviet Russia•. 5 
The nomination of two coalminers, E.H. Bostick and F. Nixon, 
as communist Party candidates was not viewed as inconsistent 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid. The 'Bl1lli-Scheme', as anno.mced to the electors was 
as follows: (l) To balance our budgets; (2) To live within 
our income; (3) To borrow no further money until the finances 
have been put in order; (4} To pledge himself to no party; 
(5) To force down the cost of living by law should wages be 
forced down in order to decrease the cost of production, 
increase employment and improve the conditi~ns of the people; 
(6) To endeavour to lift politics from the gutter; (7) To 
endeavour to form a Supreme Council of the National Economy, 
consisting of employers and employees, to govern the 
industrial wealth of Australia, and be One Industrial 
Authority; (8) To see that everybody gets a fair deal. See 
also Illawarra Mercury, 10 October 1930. 
3Ibid. 
4 Labor Daily, 24 October 1930. 
5rllawarra Mercury, 26 September 1930. 
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with this aim. The election campaign provided a forum for 
demonstrating 'the fallacy of depending upon parliamentary 
action as a solution to the presant parlous position of the 
working class' •1 Neither Bavin nor Lang, if elected, would 
be able to alleviate the position •. In prosperous times the 
Labor Party might pose as a party of re~orm, but when 
capitalism, because of the inevitable and .increasing struggle 
for markets, could no longer tolerate such concessions, it 
used the apparatus of the capitalist state to lower the 
'miserable existence of the working class •.2 Such was the 
face of 'social fascism'. Lang, despite his promises would, 
like Scullin, be a 'parliamentary manager ~: the capitalist 
3 
state'. 
4 Labor's platform was a fairly orthodox one. Internal 
borrowing would finance a programme of expansion and reform. 
In a joint mani.<::!sto W.A. Davies and A.A. Lysaght, Labor's 
candidates for the Illawarra and Bulli seats respectively, 
stressed tile restoration "f child endowment, widows' pensions 
and an increase in wor:tters' compensation. In speaking to 
dairy farmers in the ·· 1thern part of his electorate, Davies 
made much of the rural distrust of city· financiers and 
promised to stabilise rural markets. 5 Both men constantly 
reiterated the conspiracy explanaticn of the depression. 
There had, claimed Davies, been no change in the real wealth 
of the country, but only in the means of its distrih:tion; 
'the liquid cup had been locked up (sic) by London banks t~ 
bring down the standard of living by a reduction of wage~ and 
an increase in working hours'. 6 Both Labor candidates 
reminded the coalminers .that Bavin's complicity with the 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid., 10 October 1930. 
3Ibid. 
4For a more detailed discussion of Labor's platform see 
D.W. Rawson, 'The Organization of the A.L.P. 1919··'..941' Ph.D.Thesj 
(Melbourne University, 1954), pp.140-4. 
5Illawarra Mercury, 24 October 1930. 
6Ibid. 
,/ 
capitalists had been most clearly demonstrated during the 
northern lockout. 1 Davies w~rned constituents that the 
'kingdom of ~.nternational shylocks planned to reduce the 
miners to coolies and the dairy farmers to serfs•. 2 
Despite t:hanged political boundaries and fewer voten 
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in each electorate, Illawarra and Bulli voters returne•' 'Javies 
and Lysaght with substantially increased majorities. In Bulli 
the I.abor majority grew from 1, 523 in 1927 to 7, 093, while in 
Illawarra Davies increased his majority from 3,600 to 4,405. 3 
Nationalist candidates failed to win a single sub-division. 
Holmes polled more than Lysaght in only one rural polling 
boo':.h, while· Howarth finished ahead of Davies in four booths 
in the southern dairying sector. The Communist vote was 
negligible, amounting to two pi.r cent of the votes cast in 
each electorate, though appreciably higher in the purely 
coalmining communities of the Bulli electorate. In rejecting 
the economic orthodoxy off~red by Bavin, Wollongong electors 
made the same judgement as the state electorate at large 
which swept Lang into office with fifty-five of the ninety 
seats. 
Opposition to the 'money power' was a traditional 
populist apJ?';al with little danger to the candidate since it 
was beyond disproof. 4 Any subsequent failure to crush its 
tyranny served only to emphasis"' the diabolical strength of 
its empire. But i;." Lang himself had no clear plan to offer, 
there was no lack of confident advice as to the path he should 
1Ibid. 
2
rbid. 
3The Bulli figures were: A.A. Lysaght (La~r) 9,170; . 
E.L. Holmes (Nationalist) 2,077; E.H. Bo~tick (Communist) 331. 
In Wollongong the figures were: W.A. D~vies (Labor~ 8,944; 
W.L. Howarth (Nationalist) 4,405; F. Nixon (Communist) 231. 
4 . ., 
Reform of banking has always be7n part c~ labour platfo~ms 
in Australia. Especially was this so during the depressJ,(ln 
of the 1890s. see Robin Gollan, The Commonwealth Bank ct 
Australia (Canberra, 1968), pp.42-58. 
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follow. Even before La·1>0r' s victory in October 1930, 
Wollongong trade union o;:ficials advocated a return to what 
they claimed to be the Labor party's ultimate objective -
che socialisation of industry. 1 Among coalminers the 
socialisation objective was more firmly and sincerely held 
than J::y the ALP membership more generally. In the first 
place, nationaitsat~.011 was held to be the only full and sound 
method of transformir,.·· the structure and efficiency of the 
coal industry. It of1 ered a means of redur;ing the industry's 
., costs without necessarily resorting to alterations in wages 
i 
and hours. This was e11pecial.' ,. true of coal-exporting 
regions such as the sou ;hern 1. ning district. For this reason 
miners supported a motion, put forward at the New South Wales 
Labor Party 1930 Metropolitan Conference, 'to set up a 
committee to devise ways and means to propagate the first 
and principal platform of the party - the socialisation of 
Industry•. 2 Following the conference, a network of 
socialisation propaganda units, or 'socialisation units' as 
they were later calle'l, \las established throughout New South 
Wales by a ~ommittee set up at the conference 'to propagate 
~he objective of the Labor Party, i. e, the Socia'i.isation of 
3 Industry'. 
In Wollongong the initiativo in forming socialisation 
units came from the industrial and not the political wing of 
the labour movement. ·{1. />,i;gust 1930 Steve Best, secretary 
of' t:-ie Illawarra Trade;; a.ad Labor council, sununoned a 
conference of .trade unionists to put forwaru ':.3 'a remed~' for 
the ills which confront us, the socialisation of the mear.~; of 
proctu-:r.ion, disti:ibution and exci1-:•h;a'. 4 Supported by most 
l Illawarra MP_:;cury, 23 Au9ust 1930. 
2Labor .Paily, 10 February 1930 •. The m.:>tion w~s p:r;oposed by 
A. W. 'l'hompson organiser of the Mil!< Employh~s Union and 
president of the Enfield :branch of the pa' • . .Y. See Robert 
Cooksey, r.ang and Socialh:m (Canberr:i, 197 ... ), pp.6-ll.. 
3Robert Cooksey, Lanq and socialism, pp.8-9. 
411la\·1arra Mercury, 23 Augu·;:t 1930; Socialisation Call, 
4· Apr' l 1931. 
, .. 
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local unions, 1 the conference set -;ut to establis •. what 
immediate and practical steps would best prepare the way for 
the eventual achievement of the socialisation objective. 
Initially, it concentrated upon finding ways to promote the 
socialisation of the means of distribution. 'l'he -=hain of 
eight co-operative stores throughout the district provided a 
starting point for this progranune. By the winter of 1930, the 
co-operative stores were helping to shield their custmriers 
from the depression by allowing extended credit and by 
adoptiug a liberal attitude when distributing dole rations. 2 
If unionists were to trade only with co-operative stores, 
ther· it would ba possible, delegates argued, by extending the 
role of the societies, for workers 'to promote prosperity 
rather than allow the capitalists to rationalise and proQuce 
scarcity'. 3 It was proposed that the co-operative rnov:.i·snt 
should not limit its activities to the retail trade, but 
rather that it should absorb some of the economy-regul3ting 
functions which wer:: the prerogatiVbS of capitalist 
institutions. Taking Lang's stand against the 'ehcessive 
demands made by English and Australian capitalist banks', 4 as 
their examp1.e, the delegates voted to seek legislation to 
enable co-operative societies to act as bank.;,n; and insurers. 5 
Ultimately it was hoped that the growth of the co-operative 
movement would make private enterprise in the field redundant. 
Despite the stress upon evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary change there was an underlying confiJ.ence that 
socialism could be achieved 'in our time' and only by the 
Labor Party. Some delegates at the Augu$t conference had 
claimed that they could discern among the workers a general 
1unions and labonr organisations represented at the 
conference were Southern District Miners, South Bulli Lodge, 
Ht Pleasant Lodge, Mt Kembla Lodga, FEJ?FA, F~, United. 
Labourers, WWF, P.RU, Woonona Co··operative Society. Ibid. 
2 See Chapter Three, pp.108-9. 
3Illawarra Mercury, 15 November 1930. 
4Ibid. 
5J:b;cd. 
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{.: 
; acceptance of the need for 'evolutionary change for the 
socialisation of industry' •1 In January 1931, an Illawarra 
,. Socialisation Coromittee was appointed to stimulate such 
'· thinking. 2 The corrunittee organised educational classes in 
economics and current history. In the period of heightened 
political awareness iromediately preceding and following the 
election of Lang, the socialisation units made considerable 
headway especially among the coalminers. Later events were 
to bring the units into open conflict with Lang, but for the 
moment they were able to be contained as a ginger group 
within the New South Wales Labor Party. 3 
As well as stimulating increased support for the 
socialisr>tion units •. !..ang's victory at the polls, in October, 
produced a growth in political involvement at the branch 
level. New branches were formed and lapsed branches revived. 
It is difficult now to gauge the thinking of the men who took 
part in this grass-roots political revival. Oral evidence, 
however, makes some speculation possible. Men active in the 
Unemployed Workers' Movement thought, however erroneously, 
that by forming an ALP branch they might open up another 
4 
source of assis~ance for the unemployed. For others joining 
the ALP was a reflection of gennine enthusiasm for !.ai'ig. Yet 
the zeal which Lang was able to inspire in so many of his 
followers was balanced by a belief that industrial action 
offered greater scope than support for any politician. 
Apart from a handful of communist•>. few Wollongong 
workers consistently attempted to analyse Australian politics 
in class terms, or indeed, in terms of a theory of any kind. 
1Ibid. 
2The ex.ecutive members were: J. Ward (president), A. Southern 
(Woonona Co-operative Society), A.~. Hart. (educationi:l 
committee of the Woonon.a Co-operative Society), T. Silcocks. 
Members of the social committee appointed at the !:"·ame time 
were: A. Powell, J. Wright, J. Ward, S. Best, E. Hayes, 
J. Todhunter, E. Sparkes, J. Martin. See Labor Daily, 
29 January 1931. 
3The socialisation units were strongest ~n the Sydnei' 
branches. see socialisalion Call, 4 April 1931. 
4rnterviews with Mr J. McLeod, 7 June 1972 and Mr D. 'l'irnmins, 
8 June 1972. 
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Before 1931 was out, however, there were clear signs of a 
sharpening of political ideas. Neither the high degree of 
unemployment nor the division between Lang and federal Labor 
satisfactorily explains why many Wollongong workers moved to 
a more radical position. One cause may be sought in the 
dialectics of local politics. ·rhe district's ;::onservative 
leaders reacted with almost irrational horror to Lang's wilder 
outbursts, though their fears were understandably heightened 
by the strain of running businesses in depression. Some of 
these men were moved to throw out provocative, not to say 
insulting, ch?.1. 1 1'.nges to what they regarded as 'Langism' in 
the district. ::S early as 1928 Wollongong businessmen 
; . challenged the rights of workingmen, either inuividually or 
collectively, to seek positions of civic responsibility. 1 
They justified this stand by pointing to the administrative 
inehperience and financial naivety of their opponents. In 
part these criticisms reflected a long-standing attempt to 
keep polit~ cs out of local government, y<:t 1mderlying them was 
the belief, sometimes openly expressed, tha~ only thos~ with 
a 'fin::.11cial stake' in the district should vote in local 
elections. 2 Interpreted widely such a rubric might embrace 
all rate;;>ayers, but it was clear from later utterances that 
a more restrictive meaning was implied. Investors and 
busi~essmcn, who had by careful husbandry guided the district 
through the ups and downs of the 1920s, were not anxious to 
allow others a hand in their economic future. A g.coup of 
t~ese civic dignitaries, led by W.L. Howarth, the mayor of 
Wollongong, W.A. Lang and T. Kiernan, both building 
contractors, and Dr H.H. Lee formed the nucleus of Wollongong 
consei1atism. 
In early 1931 Kiernan and W.A. Lang were prime movers in 
the formation of a Wollongong branch of the All for Australia 
League, an association of conservative businessmen bound 
together by the desire to form 'a united movement' to meet, 
what they saw as •a social crisis'. 'the stated o::-jecti'l:<:!s of 
the League were: to develop a strong body of public opinion 
1 
""lllawarra Mercury, 14 November 1928. 
2Ibid. 
, 
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to ~orce governments in the direction of sane and honourable 
finance, and to demonstrate 'that Australian public opinion 
is pledged irrevocably -to a policy of national integrity' •1 
Its appeal to economic patriotism, sUITu-ned up in th•3 catch 
cry 'buy Australian', w~s calculated to gain support not only 
from traders and pro~essional men, but from all ranks of 
society. Staff and perhaps a handful of other workers at the 
steelworks responded by joining the organisation in large 
numbers apparently convinced by claims of the Hoskins brothers 
that the league sought to promote national interests and to 
t . l b' . 2 . thwar sectl.ona am l.tl.ons. Union leaders, however, were 
quick to assert that local employers were simply using the 
t .·. :oric of economic nationalism to revive declining trade 
and divert attention from an impending attack on working 
conditions. Speaking as president of the Illawarra Trades and 
Labor Council and as secretary of the Port Kembla branch of 
the FIA, J. Ward put the unions' case ~gainst the League: 
If the aims and objects of the AFAL really stood 
[for] All for Australia, the workers would be 
quite in accord with it, as we are prepared to 
adopt any proposals that mean breaking the 
imperialistic stranglehold of the money-lords 
that now have us in their grip but the AFAL does 
not ·stand for such ideals; we know it to be an 
organization operating to keep the capitalists 
on the backs of the workers and to stabilise 
their innurnane system of exploitation, with its 
attendant starvation and misery for the mass of 
the workers. The function of the AFAL 
organization is to put into effect the proposals 
of the Hoskin[s] brothers for the general smashing 
of wages, increased hours of labour, the 
organization of Fascist forces lo cvvc·throw 
constitutional government and the si;t:i.ng Uf' of a 
dictatorship of the employing class. 3 
When c. s. Hoskins, general manager at AIS, suggested that the 
steelworks could win long-term Japanese contracts if workers 
accepted a ten per cent wage cut, sceptical unionists were 
justified in their belief that the economic patriotism o[ 
the employers was a propaganua stunt to creat the impression 
1rbid., 27 Ma-rch 1931. The following w7re elected to the 
Wollongong cormnittee: w. MilJ.wc;ird, W. Mintorn, ~· Keni;edy, 
T. Kiernan, w. Macken, J. Halliday, S. Cook, R.v. Craig, 
Dr N.E. Kirkwood, A.R. Bevan. 
2 Labor Daily, 28 March 1931. 
3
rbid. 
. 
" 
that union intransigence was preventing a return to full 
1 
employment. 
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The economic ideas summarised in the slogan 'Buy 
.:i.ustralian made', were harmless enough. Ward, however, 
?ointed to the League's extreme right-wing leadership. In a 
series of explanatory articles in the Illawarra Mercury early 
in 1930, the League elaborated its political thinking. 
Starting from the premise that Australian society was in 
grave danger of destruction, 2 it exhorted the 'great moderate 
section of the thinking conununity to organize themselves into 
a powerful body' which would 'ignore the present warring 
parties' and prove Australia 'worthy of the wonderful race of 
which we are destined yet to be the most important branch'. 3 
.". less convincing aspect of this British-Australian fervour 
was the favour bestowed upon Mussolini. Ward's use of the 
term 'fascist' 4 was not wj.thout justification: the league 
professed faith in the ir.dividual, and looked for the 
emergence of a strong l<:ader. It was not without reason that 
unionists claimed to detect the cloven hoof in this spurious 
Australian patriotism. 
Wollongong labour leaders also followed European affairs 
mo~e closely during the early 1930s, but they drew a differen·~ 
set of conclusions from the All For Australia League. The 
coalminers were forthright in their der.unciation of fascism. 
A stop-work meeting of Corrimal miners, in January 1930, 
refused to work with Marco Panozza. an Italian and self 
confessed rner .. ber of the fascisti. ·'iis continued presence on 
the coalfields was, miners said, a menace to unionism. 5 
Lowden denounced fascist organisations as a 'boss class 
movement to smash the workers•. 6 The rank and file accepted 
1rbid.; also Sydney Morning Herald, 1 June 1931. 
2Jllawarra Mercury, 10 January 1930. 
3Ibid. 
4
scc p.168. 
5111awarra Mercury, 17 Januctry 1930. 
,. 
·'rbid. 
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this verdict and after listening to a lecture on fascism 'as 
l t f . l' ,l the .as pup o c~pita ism voted with two exceptions to 
give Panozza twenty-fc~1r hours to get out of Corrimal. 
Italians remaining on the coalfield felt it expedient to 
renounce fascism publicly and extol the benefits of unionism. 
Opposition to fascism was not confined to the coalminers. 
Other local unions unanimously condemned it. The FIA 
executive refused to accept the employment of Panozza at the 
Port Kembla steelworks and the Illawarra Trades and Labor 
Council supported its decision. 2 At the same time the 
normally quiescent FEDFA voted to boycott all businesses in 
Wollongong who join~d the All for Aust~alia League or who 
declared support for fascist policies. 3 
The issue which most clearly divided local society was 
the clash between the unemployed and the Wollongong Council. 4 
The street protests were not wholly, or even mainly, the work 
of the communists. Official support, both moral and physical, 
for the demonstrations came from southern district miners, 
the FIA and the Ill.awarra Trades and Labor Council. The less 
m!.litant unions such as the FEDFA and the ARU added their 
voices to the protest. ALP branches were less vociferous in 
their support, but many individual members took part in 
demonstrations as a chance to show their support for Lang. 
rt is difficult however, to do more than guess at the 
political attitudes of the majority of the demonstrators. 
The formal protests by the unemployed and their supporters to 
the New South Wales Labor Government on behalf of convicted 
demonstrators say much of the political composition and 
alleged bias of the local authorities, something about the ,
1 
protestors' expectations of the Labor government, but little 
else. 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid., 17 April 1930. 
3Ibid. 
4see Chapter Three, pp.114-49. 
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The federal election campaign of December 1931 took 
place against a background of bitter street fighting in 
Wollongong between New Guardsmen and communists1 and the 
growing realisation among New South Wales militants that Lang 
was powerless to help them. As Lang's support appeared to 
increase fears rose correspondingly among conservatives. Most 
of them continued to regard Langism and communism as 
synonymous. 
had rejected 
At a Premiers' Conference, in February 1931, Lang 
both the orthodox plan for deflation and 
E.G. Theodore's plan for releasing credit. He offered 
instead a set of proposals known as tJ-.e Lang plan. Int:;rest 
payments ca overseas debts were to be suspended, internal 
interest rates reduced to three per cent and th~ gold standard 
was to give way to a currency based on the 'goods standard•. 2 
When the premiers rejectec.. :· .. is plan Lang announced that he 
~· would make it the policy of New South Wales. 
If these actions alarmed conservatives, they also had a 
disruptive effect upon the labour movement. Labor's victory 
in New South Wales had been achieved by making clear the 
distinction between Lang's policy and that of the vacillating 
Scullin government. The Lang Plan was in part a deliberate 
attempt to keep this distinction alive. In terms of the 
party constitution it was a declaration of independence in 
matters of federal policy by the New South Wales branch. The 
challenge to the federal executive became clearer early in 
1931 during a by-election for the federal s~at of East Sydney. 
The state executive selected E.J. Ward, a young Lang 
supporter, as the endorsed Labor candidate and instructed him 
to fight the election on the Lang Plan. The ALP federal 
executive countered by ordering Ward to campaign on recognised 
federal policy. When Ward won the seat on the state programme 
the federal parliamentary Labor party refused to accept him 
as a member. In protest four MHR's, including H.P. Lazzarini, 
the member for Werriwa, withdrew and with Hard formed a 
separate parliamentary party under the leadership of 
J.A. Beasley. 3 In March, a special federal conference of the 
1 See Chapter Three, pp.143-9. 
2~, 1929-31, Vol.2, p.121. 
3The remaining two members were J.C. Eldridge and R. James. 
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.'\LP formally expelled the New South Wales branch and for the 
rest of the 1930s two Labor parties fought each other at the 
polls. After the Scullin government accepted the Premiers' 
Plan, in June, the Lang Labor Party came increasingly to 
regard it as a m:itter of indifference whether the government 
or the UAP should be in power since the economic policy being 
followed was in substance that of the anti-Labor parties. 
In November they voted with the Opposition to defeat the 
l Gov<:rnment. 
The fall of the Scullin gover;unent caught non-Labor 
parties in a state of disunity and disorganisation. It was 
only after the announcement of the election that Wollongong 
branches of the All For Australia League and the Nationalist 
Party joined ranks as the UAP. Both L ... : proclaimed obj~ ;.:tive 
and the composition of the new organisation reveal its 
conservative nature. The new party aimed to establish 'a 
united front to fight the conununistic tendencies•. 2 Four 
Wollongong aldermen took the initiative in forming a local 
branch. They hoped to rally conservatives behind the 'law 
3nd order' platform of their mayor, W.L. Howarth. Apart from 
these four local body members and Howarth, the elected 
executive of the branch contained the president and at least 
3 two ~ther members of the New Guard. 
The Wollongong brdnch was disregarded, however, when the 
UAP advisory council without any local consultation, elected 
1This paragraph is based on L.F. Crisp, Ben Chifley (Melbourne, 
1963), pp.66-85; Geoffrey Sawer, Australian FP.deral Politics 
pnd Law 1929-1949 (Melbourne, 1963), pp.5-8, 20-2, 29-30; 
D.W. Rawson, op.cit., pp.131-90. 
2 Illawarra Mercury, 4 December 1931. 
3The full execut:.ve of the branch was: chairman, Dr H.H. Lee 
(Wollongong alderman); vice-chairman, T. Ki7rnan (builder, 
previously president of the All For Australia League and 
Wollongong alderman); corrunittee, P.C. Pryor (accountant), 
G.A. Todner (clerk), J. Rogers (shopkeeper), _J. Clowes (Bulli 
Shire Councillor school teacher and orchardist), J.P. Caddy 
(manager Metal Manufactures), H.R. Lee (industrial adviser 
to the P~rt Kembla copoer companies), J.B. Wells (storekeeper), 
C. Statham (president Nationalist Associa~ion), W.A. L~ng 
(builder, Wollongong alderman), Dr N.E. Kirkwood (president 
of Wollongong New Guard locality) . 
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as the party's candidate, W.R. McNicoll, a Goulburn school 
teacher. For a time the Wollongong branch considered running 
Howarth as their own candidate. To forestall such a move 
:·!cNicoll visited Wollongong to meet with local party 
organisers. 1 The latter continued to hold out for a 
pre-select.ion ballot, terms which McNicoll and the party 
executive eventually accepted. In the event McNicoll won the 
ballot much to the satisfaction of the UAP executive which 
preferred a less controversial candidate than Howarth. 2 
:·lcNicoll 's credentials for a campaign, in which loyalty and 
patriotism were to be paramount, were impeccable. The 
principal of Goulburn Presbyterian Ladies College since 1921, 
~icNicoll had volunteered the day war broke out and sailed 
from Australia a Lieutenant. He was given command of the 
6th Batt..:lion of the AIF and was General Officer Commanding 
the 10th Infantry Brigade in France from 1916 to 1919. One 
of the first ashore at Anzac he was 
the DSO in 1915 and the CMG in 1917. 
· d' 1 3 a Bn.ga ier-Genera • 
twice decorated, 
He returned to 
receiving 
Australia 
Some Wollongong conservatives did, however, co1ubine to 
put up an independent candidate. He was M.P. Sheppard, a 
billiard saloon proprietor and SP bookmaker, who styled 
himself on 'Independent All For Australia' candidate. 
A thirty-four year old ex-serviceman, he offered a hotch-poto1l 
of conservative panaceas. He put forward a programme of 
'conservative centralism' under which a stronger non-party 
1Goulburn Evening Penny Post, 30 November 1931, l December 
1931. 
2 The Wollongong brar.Jl remained dissatisfied. The 
pre-selection bailot ·;1as conducted amidst some confusion. 
The ballot was held at a hastilv convened meeting at Goulburn. 
Many delegates atten<led the conference believing they were 
required to endorse the nomination of McNicoll. There were 
eventually four candidates Howarth, McNicoll, H.C.M. Garling 
(Sydney), G.A. Dunn (Reid's Flat). Ibid., 2, 3 December 
1931. 
3From 1934 to 1941 McNicoll was Administrator for the mandc.:.:ed 
territory of New Guinea. He was later knighted f~r his w~rk 
in organising the relief of Rabaul after a volcanic eruption 
in 1937. 
' 
{I 
:cderal government would be run on busines~ lines. As a 
corollary he opposed the new state movement and called for 
~!-'.e abolition of the t;tates, \vl.iich he no doubt viewed as 
!1arbourers of Langism. By contrast he advocated the 
strengthening of local ~overnment as providing regional 
bo.s·_ions of conservatism. 1 
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Throughout the campaign ~lcNicoll stressed both his 
,\ustralian patriotism and his loyalty to Britain. Neither 
sentiment, he asserted, was shared by Labor, whether of the 
:cderal or state variety. Under the influence of foreign 
~gitators and communists, Lang was about to dishonour 
Australia's British heritage. This was at a time when the 
:ailure of the League of Nations to curb Japanese attacks on 
C~ina left Australia peculiarly open to a 'menace from the 
Siist' . 2 McNiccll saw this new menace as both military and 
racial. It did not matter that Scullin rather than Lang was 
the Federal Labor leader for either would lead the country to 
disruption. However, by voi:ing for the UAP the electors 
would ensure tl1at Australia became 'better and whiter' 3 than 
in the past .. 
Labor voters were confronted with a choice between 
H.P. Lazzarini (Lang Labor) and M. Tully (Federal Labor). 
The federal party had little backing in Wollongong. Unions 
declared themselves for Lang, and even the local branch of 
the FEDFA, whose federal executive supported Scullin, sided 
with the state party. 4 consequently Tully had no real 
organisational support and his campaign was little more than 
a showing cf the federal party's flag. His one reported 
5 .. ' .. 
address in Wollongong was heckled. Lazzarini s position was 
a difficult one. As a member of the dissident Lang Labor 
:'action he had little that was positive to off0r his supporters. 
l Illawarra Mercurv, 11 December 1931. 
? 
-Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., 7 April 1931. 
s Ibid., 11 December 1931. 
A vote for Lazzarini was essentially a protest against the 
economic orthodoxies of the major cont~nding parties. In 
elaborating his view that the depression was man-made, he 
pointed to the apparent paradox of want in the midst of 
plenty: 
.•• nature is full to overflowing. In travelling 
through the country there is wheat, wool and an 
abundance of everything, which conditions three 
years ago would have been taken as being hopeful 
of a prosperous time. Nature has not failed us, 
the birds sing, the animals are silk and happy 
as they graze in the pastures, and man, only man, 
is prepared to starve in a land of plenty .1 
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Lazzarini blamed the Federal Labor government which had 
abdicated and allowed the bankers to govern: Sir Robert Gibson, 
governor of the Commonwealth Bank, and not Scullin ruled. He 
offered no apologies for his part in bringing down the 
Federal Labor government and declared he would 'sooner get 
out fighting than sit in a parliament playing a confidence 
2 trick on the people'. 
Wollongong electors, who went to the polls on 16 December 
1931, chose overwhelmingly to support the Lang faction rather 
than the federal Labor candidate. After first preferences 
had been counted Lazzarini (10,670) was well clear of Tully 
(1,268) and comfortably ahead of McNicoll (7,111) •3 The 
Labor majority in Wollongong was, nevertheless, not sufficient 
to e~·;ure the return of Lazzarini. The same voting pattern 
was not followed in other parts of the electorate. With 
heavy support from rural districts and a strong personal vote 
in Goulburn, McNicoll won the seat although only after 
preferences were distributed. 4 Although Lazzarini won every 
felling booth in Wollongong his majorities were less decisive 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid. 
3
cPP (Session 1932-3-4), p.114. 
4The full voting figur,~s were: H.P. Lazzarini, 18, 948: 
W.R. McNicoll, 21,762; .'!.P. Sheppar<l, 496; E.B. Tully, 4,254. 
Sheppard's preferences were distributed as follows: 
Lazzarini, 61; McNicoll, 309; Tully, 12
4
6; Tubl~yd's preferences 
went to Lazzarini, 2,933, McNicoll, 1,4 7. Ii • 
6. 
than at the previous election and reflected the division 
among Labor supporters which had led to the defeat of the 
Scullin government. 
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The confusion within labour ranks and the deep-seated 
reaction of Wollongc.ng' s conserJative groups to the threat of 
Lang are also revealed in the local goverrunent elections 
decided on 5 December, exactly two weeks before the federal 
poll. ThougP this contest was overshadowed by the federal 
campaign, anti-Labor aldermen and councillors considered it 
oin opportunity to inflict a c·: Jshi1~-; defeat upon the Langites 
and the communists. It provect to be an uneven contest. The 
Illawarra Trades and Labor Council which had, in the recent 
past, co-ordinated the effoxts of worker-candidates was now 
defunct and as a consequence Labor men campaigned more or less 
as individuals. 
By contrast, businessmen were well prepared. In the 
contest for the Bulli Shire Council where Labor 
representat.:o~ was greatest, businessmen candidates mounted 
:in exten.;ive can.paign. They did not scruple to describe the 
sitting Labor members, L.B. Kelly and T. Gibson, as communists 
of the 'worst kind', who did not preach their doctrines openly 
in the streets, but insidiously spread them through the homes 
of unsuspecting citizens. To counter this baleful influence, 
Labor's opponents offered tins of lactogen to needy families. 
Led by J. Clowes, a school teacher with interests in real 
estate and a committee member of t~e recently formed Wollongong 
UAP branch, they denounced their opponents as 'men who unable 
to make good in the old country came here and were unable to 
make good here•. 1 The accusation whatever its relevance was 
untrue. Both Gibson and Kelly were natives of Wollonqong. 
Born in Thirr.oul, in 1888, Gibson had ti:ained as a school 
teacLer and taught in various New South Wales country 
districts before volunteering during the early months of 
World war I. He was blinded while on active service in France 
and lal:er retrained as a physiotherapis'; in London before 
returning to Thirroul in 1921. 2 With Kelly he had been g 
1Illawarra Mercury, 4 December 1931. 
2This biographical sketch is based c • "'"terial gained in an 
interview with Mr T. Gib.::on on 5 Sept.eml:;;•r 1972. 
'· • 
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; \:, elected to the BulJ.i Shire Council in 1928, and was an 
executive member of the Thirroul ALP branch. Both offered 
simply to do their best for the unemployed, a policy which 
had little appeal to nervous ratepayers aroused by a 
vitriolic campaign. Both were defeated. 1 
If anti-corrununist propaganda was absurdly overdone in 
sulli, there was some ground for suspicion in Central 
Illawarra where five well-known members of the communist 
Party were nominated. 2 Led by P. (Pat) McHenry they did not. 
publish a programme and theii: campaign was barely mentioned 
in either local newspaper. They were probably seeking to 
~ircumvent the council's ban on political demonsC.rations. If 
they were returned, they would gain a platform from which 
they could criticise local authorities and expound tr.eir 
party doctrines free from the threat of arre,st. None was 
successful; all received few votes and had to put up with 
some physical opposition. 3 
In the municipality of Wollongong there w~re no official 
communist candidates nor any organised Labor ticket. However 
sitting aldermen, all of whom were now candidates nominated 
by the Progressive Association, left nothing to chance. To 
avoid splitting the conservative vote they obtained from 
sub-branches of their association an undertaking not to run 
candidates against them. Labor candidates campaigned 
against Howarth and for better treatment of the unemployed. 
On the other hand, Progressive Association candidates 
promised to provide order in the streets and 'sane' economical 
administration in the council. It was a progranune more 
likely to appeal to ratepa1•ers; indeed the entire ticket was 
returned. 4 . 
After the crushing defeats suffered by Labor in the 
federal and local body elections the criticism of Lang within 
1 Illawarra Mercury, 11 Dec"mber 1931. 
2The five corrununist candidates were: !?. McHenry, W. Blake, 
A. Curm1ck, Mz·s E. curnuck, P. Martin. 
3 Illawarra Mercury, 4 December 1931. 
4Ibid., 11 December 1931. 
.. 
.. 
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::,c labour mover.>2:.ot intensified. In December 1931 the 
Ill.:tv:arra Tr:v~e'" C\r:d Labor Council refused to uccept the 
i::19osition of a ·'::i.x of ls in the £ on wages si• ply becaus"' 
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it '''"s enacted by •: 11e state Labor government. 1 Thereafter 
the council was severely critical of the Lang government's 
tre;:n:ment of the unemployed. In July 1931 it denounce<.: the 
·.:se of ?Olice to evict unemployed tenants. It compl3ined 
J.lso that Lang, by his inaction, \'las countenancing the arres·c 
of workers who were simply defending their right to free 
. 2 
sEJeecn. !'toreover, the attempt by the New South Wales 
government to reguiate the distribution of unemployment relief 
\·:.:ts unanimously c.ondemned by the council. 
This 'council protests emphatically against the 
vicious policy of the Lang government regarding 
food orders. This policy definitely p.l.aces the 
Lang Government in line with all other 
anti-working class goverwnents throughout 
Australia whose first consideration is 
protection of ca~italistic interests. We pledge 
ourselves to stand solidly with the unemployed 
workers in their fight against the new 
r<~gula tions and for a better standard of relief 
for the unemployed.3 
By 'unempl9yed workers' the council meant the Unemployed 
Workers' Movement. l t had earlier declared its supfort for 
this body rather than the more moderate Unemployed Workers' 
U11ion. 
?!oderates were a: rmed by the influence which the 
t:nemployed Workers' Movement had est:'lblished over the workl·~ss 
:\:1ci '.:he increasingly radical demands of its spokesmen. 
''~rthGr, ·tr'1de union officials condemned the efforts of 
unem,!-'l.,yed leadei::s to mobilise workers in suppc.;rt of the 
demands of the unemployed. Some unions began to question 
· ,_,ublicl~· the alliance between the Labor Party und the 
'"xtremist.s. Port Kembla waterside workers were voicing this 
growing caution when they voted to disassociate tha!'lselvcs 
.
1 IlJid., 4 December 1931. 
2i\ttorney-General' s File, 7 /809 passim; ;!;lluwarra llercury, 
7 July 1931. 
1 
·.:-,·c:::c\· :.;orninq He·.:-.,ld, 8 September 1931. 
·---------~;~~~ :~.~ ·~"·.; 1.:. ',.~ •. 
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from the more extreme labour organisations 'such as the 
\\orkers' Defence Corps and the Workers' International Relief' •1 
In December 1931, after receiving reports from the districts, 
the Central Council of the Miners' Federation called for 
••• an immediate consolidation of the workers 
in preparation to combat the attacks now being 
made by the employers and their agents. In 
order to accomplish this objective it is 
necessary that all working-class bodies should 
co-operate on the basis of a common policy. 
With this end in view Council recommends the 
co-ordination of the unemployed movement in 
order that the divisions which now exist may be 
overcome and the best interests of all 
unemployed workers be advanced on the basis of 
a programme of immediate demands applicable to 
the whole of the workers who are now unemployed. 
We further recommend to our members now working 
to make common cause with the unemployed in the 
struggle for the achievement of their objective, 
i.e. work at trade union rates, or a decent 
standard of living for those workers who are 
now denied the right of employment under 
capitalism. The Central Executive to confer 
.with the Executive of the ALP with a view of 
acting on similar lines.2 
The reports which prompted this resolution stressed 
growing communist influence among the unemployed. Trade union 
officials were critical of the organisation adopted by the 
Unemployed Workers' Movement. Many considered that the 
unemployed should be represented by their respective unions. 
Some were also alarmed by the radical 
proposed by the socialisation units. 
stand now being 
3 In October 1931, a 
sub-committee of the socialisation un!.:c.s had brought down a 
report which suggested that the take-over of power was not 
dependent on the collapse of capi~alism, and that it could 
come only through seizure by revolutionary violence. Moreover, 
the report suggested that the revolutionary moment had come. 
1Ibid., 20 November 1931; south Coast Branch Waterside 
Workers' Feder~tion Minute Book, 12 October and lS November 
1931. 
2 ££11, 1-4 December 1931. 
3 See pp.163-6. 
' 
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once in power the working class itself could destroy 
capi;alism and initiate the social revolution. The report 
exo1orted the Labor Party to fulfil its socialisation objective 
by ;:riving a lead to the working class.l 
Alarmed by the radical proposals of the socialisation 
sub-committee and by the growing influence of communists and 
radicals Lang moved against them. In January 1932 W.A. 
Davies, now Minister of Education and an ardent Lang 
supporter, carried out a purge of the party's Wollongong 
branch. In doing so he was implementing the directive of 
p.J. Keller, president of the New South Wales Labor Party, 
t!1a t 'auxiliary bodies' were in fact off-shoots of the 
Communist Party and that no member of the Labor Party could 
2 simultaneously be a member of any auxiliary body. At a 
specially convened meeting of the Wollongong branch Davies 
complained that workers, deluded by the frequent name changes 
o: t~e communist front organisations, were being 'snared into 
becoming semi-communists': The branch had earlier, he 
alleged, gone against his advice and affiliated with the 
l'brkers' International Relief. This, however, he said would 
be the last time the communists would 'white-ant in 
Wollongong' . 4 In his view there was no need for revolutionary 
action in Australia and he threatened to uproot the 
communists by swamping the branch with five hundred new 
5 
members. The meeting then voted 
to i:n:?ll•ment the executive rulin~ 
'auxiliary' supporters withdrew. 
by tw< .:y-six to 
and the defeated 
fourteen 
1;; :'ull account of the Payne Report as it was commonly known, 
~ppears in Robert Cooksey, Lang and Socialisrr, pp.49-57, 58-60. 
2Keller named· eleven organisations: the United Front Against 
?ascism, the Workers' International Relief, the International 
Class War Prisoners' Aid, the Friends of the Soviet Union, 
the League Against Imperialism, the Militant Minority 
~!ovement the Unemployed Workers' Movement, the Anti-Eviction 
League, the August 1 Demonstration Committee, the Workers' 
Defence corps and the Young Communist League. 
3 Illawar.ra Mers;~, 8 January 1932. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid. 
6Ibid. see also Sydney Morning Herald, 7 .:i'anuary 1932. 
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in Wollongong and suppressed criticism of Lang, thereby 
depriving militants of an important forum. 
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Some of the new party branches were deliberate creations 
of the Lang political machine. The Dapto branch, for example, 
at its inaugural meeting not only proclaimed its allegiance 
to Lang, 'the only r.1an in the Cn~":' .. c r.weal th who had the 
interests of the workers ~t heart', but also expressed 
contempt for the Payne socialist section. 1 More significu•tt 
than these formal protestations of loyalty to Lang was the 
decision to establish an ALP Central Relief Committee. This 
body was to 'launch a comprehensive scheme to control relief 
distribution for the entire South Coast'. By so doing they 
hoped to squash 'sinister forces' which had 'misled' the 
unemployed. 2 This thinly veiled challenge to the Unemployed 
Workers' Movement became more explicit when the central 
relief council voted not to accept delegates from that 
organisation. 3 The ALP branches, however, proved incapable 
of financing such an ambitious relief scheme. Any chance of 
success the venture may have had was ruined by the refusal of 
trade unions to offer their financial assistance. 
These widening divisions within the Wollongong labour 
movement, and the growing disillusionment with Lang may be 
observed in the 1932 state elections. Th<l dismissal of Lang 
by the state governor, Sir Philip Game, 0:1 the 13 May marks 
the end of what one historian believes to be 'the most 
turbulent - perhaps almost a revolutionary period - in New 
South Wales political history•. 4 The initial reaction of 
Wollongong workers to this 'stab in the back' was one of 
stunned confusion. Mass meetings of coalminers at Woonona 
and Fairy Meadow declared support for Lang in his 'present 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid. 
3tbid. 
4Robert Cooksey, Lang and Socialism, p.4. 
,, 
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fight' and went no further. 1 Attention turned quickly to 
organising a campaign for the return of a Lang government to 
office in the state election made necessary by his dismissal. 
Both the Bulli and Illawarra electorates were considered 
safe Labor seats, but current trends within the labour 
movement and within the community at large made past 
performance less useful as an electoral guide. Militant 
workers denounced Davies for his role in the purge of local 
:: branches. Bulli miners criticised the failure of Lysaght, 
their ageing and ill parliamentary representative, to support 
rank and file protests and accused him of being insensitive 
to the sufferings of the unemployed. 2 Moreover, his 
resignation as Attorney-General in June 1931,ostensibly on a 
matter of principle, made Lang supporters suspicious of him. 3 
The consolidation of conservative ranks made a closer 
contest likely. In April 1932 branches of the UAP were 
formed at Wollongong and Port Kembla. To the nucleus of 
Wollongong aldermen who directed anti-Labor political 
activities was added a group of Port Kembla industrialists. 
This alliance between industry and local business was a 
... 
fragile one held together mainly, as later events ,..,, ce to 
show, by opposition to Lang. The old guard once again 
championed Howarth for the UAP nomination, but they were 
outvoted by those who thought Howarth bad been too patently 
partisan in his administration of municipal affairs to risk 
as a candidate. The Wollongong mayor had alienated many 
moderate Labor supporters, the very voters the UAP needed to 
woo if it were to win the seat. The local branch therefore 
supported p .L. Cantwell, vice··president of the party and a 
Sydney real-estate agent as 
local record to live down. 4 
l Labor Daily, 17 May 1932. 
a businessman candidate with no 
In an open letter to the 
2see DMB, for copies of letters from Lysaght answering 
criticisms by miners. 
3tllawarra Mercury, 12, 19 June 1931; interview with 
Mr W.H. Woodward, 6 September 1972. 
4 Illawarra Mercury, 3 June 1932. 
' ' 
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Illawarra Mercury, Howarth rejected Cantwell as an outsider 
and announced that he intended to run as an independent 
candidate. 1 He was later persuaded to withdraw, but the 
ubiquitous billiard-saloon proprietor, Sheppard, again 
contested the seat as an alternative consei:Vative candidate. 
Cantwell, as did the UAP throughout New south Wales, 
promised 'sane government' . He equated Lang ism with 
revolution. Lang Labor had endeavoured to bring about a 
state of chaos by smashing the Premiers' Plan, by repudiating 
interest and by defying the Commonwealth in the hope that the 
civil strife which would undo11btedly follow might open the 
way for insurrection. To secure work in the new order men 
would be compelled to join a union and hence all would be 
subjected to the dictates of the 'Red executives of Trades 
Hall' • 2 Lang's ten per cent Mortgage Tax Bill was said to 
foreshadow the seizure by the government of all homes and 
farms. 3 Under Labor New South Wales would pass from 'a nation 
of free men to the servitude of slaves under the dictatorship 
of the Trades Hall Socialists•. 4 
The effect of these scare tactics was to encourage 
physica.l intimidation of individual candidates and the 
disruption of campaign meetings. Davies claimed that the 
visit of New Guard leaders Eric Campbell and Captain F. De 
Groot was a provocative act inciting violence. Guardsmen 
from Nowra, Berry, Kiama and Wollongong endeavoured to disrupt 
Davies' election speech at Jamberoo and physical violence was 
averted only by the presence of miners with pick handles at 
the ready. 5 Intimidation was not one-sided. A Corrimal 
meeting listening to R.J. Roberts, the UAP candidate for Bulli, 
was disrupted by what his supporters termed 'insensate and 
ii. !bid. I 20 ~·AY 1932. 
2 b' I I.d. I 3 June 1932. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
5rbid., 26 September 1932. Also interviews with 
Dr N.E. Ki~kwood, l December 1972. Sec also Appendix I: The 
Bulli Riot, P.P• 365-77. 
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crude' interjections delivered in a 'foreign twang' or 'old 
country dialect', topped off by the singing of the'Red Flag•: 
The removal of Lang from off ice and the ferocity of 
their opponent's attacks, compelled both Labor candidates to 
defend past performance rather than elaborate new policy. 
Davies denounced the Premiers' Plan and reaffirmed his faith 
in his Leader. Like Lang, he found scapegoats to carry the 
blame for the depression and the Labor Party's inability to 
curb its impact. Lysaght, now ill and confident in the 
knowledge that the coalminers' vote would s .. .::ure his return, 
barely campaigned at all. 
As freely predicted by local and state press, Wollongong 
electors returned both Labor members, although wi:·.h greatly 
reduced majorities. In the Illawarra seat Davies, finished 
just 67 votes ahead of Cantwe11 and won on the second 
preferences of the Federal Labor and Communist candidates. 
The closeness of the contest, however, resulted not .from a 
splitting of the Labor vote but from a straight transfer of 
votes by moderate Labor supporters to the conservative 
candidate. The same trend is evident, though to a lesser 
degree, at Bulli where the coalminers voted overwhelmingly 
2 for Lysaght. 
1
rbid., 3 June 1932. 
2In Bulli the full results were: E.H. Bostick (Conununist) 
404; A. Bowie (Federal Labor) 460; A.A. Lysaght (State 
Labor) 7,590; R.J. Roberts (UAP) 3,634. Illawarra votes we::e 
recorded as follows: W. Blake (Communist) 353: P .L. Car.'-well 
(UAP) 7,133; w. Davies (State Labor) 7,057; J. Scarlett 
(Independent) 61; M.P. Sheppard (Independent) 201. 
Preferences were distributed as follows: 
Candidates l. 2.Scarlet 3.Sheppard 4.Blake 
excluded excluded 
Blake, w. 353 
Cantwell, P.L. 7,133 44 120 82 
Davies, w. 7 ,057 17 81 271 
Scarlett, J. 61 
Sheppard, M.P. 201 
Totals 14,805 61 201 353 
Source: NSWPP, 1932, pp.171-94. 
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The alienation of moderate Labor supporters, evident at 
the polls, was matched in succeeding months by equally serious 
inroads into Lang's support among party activists. On the 
coalfield dissatisfaction with Lang's treatment of the 
militants and his alleged use of the Labor Daily as a personal 
propaganda vehicle grew during the earlv months of 1933. The 
discontent was most clearly revealed during a by-election 
::iade necessary by the death of A.A. Lysaght, the member fo:.: 
Bulli, on 3 May 1933. A safe Labor seat, Bulli attracted 
:ifteen candidates for a pre-selection ballot by local party 
members and affiliated unionists. The nomination cf 
A.C. Willis ensured that the ballot would provide a measuring 
stick against whic, local attitudes could be gauged and 
:oreshadowed conflict with the New south Wales executive. 
A Welshman and coalminer, Willis had migrated to 
Australia in 1911 with religious non-conformism, industrial 
unionism and syndicalist socialism as the main pieces of his 
ideological baggage. By 1913 he was leader of the miners 
on the southern coalfields of New South Wales and in 1915 
became foundation general secretary of the Miners' Federation. 
l'nen the industrial section of New South Wales Labor expelled 
W.M. Hughes and set out to capture 
Willis had been to the forefront. 
Labor organisations 
In 1919 he launched the 
OBU organisation. His leadership of this socialist section 
resulted in his expulsion from the party. Readmitted in 
1923, he became vice-president of the Executive Council 
during the Lang Government of 1925-7 and in the depressiun 
government. At the beginning of April 1931 ho sailed for the 
United Kingdom to become New South Wales Agent-General. 
Prior to his departure he was considered the most powerful 
man next to Lang in the New South Wales ALP. From his 
position in the Upper House Willis had exercised a general 
c.upervision of Lang's legislation and controlled the .!&bor 
~ aily. In June 1932, when Willis was recalled to Australia 
by Lang's successor, B.S.B. Stevens, of the UAP, he discovered 
that Lang had obtained control of the Labor Daily and was not 
prepared to accommodate a man of his talents. His request to 
assume his former positi0n as manager of the Labor Daily and 
chairman of directors wa' '.·Jnored. Undoubtedly Willis saw 
-
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victory at Bulli as a first step on the road to a political 
l 
comeback. 
Lang certainly interpreted Willis's nomination as a 
direct challenge to his leadership and took steps to close 
off this avenue to a dangerous political rival. The state 
executive moved to dispense with pre-selection and invoked 
its authority to make an executive appointment. The executive 
argued that there was insufficient time for a pre-selection 
ballot and ruled that the Bulli Electorate Council would be 
acting improperly if it proceeded with a ballot. 2 The 
electorate council, however, argued that there was sufficient 
time and complained that branch autonomy was being whittled 
away by continued executive direction. In 1930 and again in 
1933 dissatisfied with Lysaght's high handed attitude the 
council had endorsed the nomination of W.H. Woodward fol 
pre-selection. On both occasions, however, the nomination was 
rejected by the executive. 3 Opposition to an executive 
appointment came also from the miners' delegate board which 
on this occasion unanimously voted to support the Bulli 
electorate council4 and threatened to run an industrial 
candidate should pre-selection be refu::;ed. 5 When the 
electorate council chose to i~nore executive threats to 
appoint a candidate and distributed ballot papers on 18 May 
the southern miners executive, in a joint statement with the 
council, announced their support and asked all contestants 
1The biographical material on Willis is drawn from: I.E. 
Young, 'A.C. Willis, Welsh Nonconformist and the Labour 
Party in New South Wales, 1911-33', Journal of Religious 
History December 1963, pp.303-12; I.E. Young,' The Impact of 
J.T. La~g on the N.S.W. Labor Party, 1929-1943' M.A: thesis 
(University of New South Wales 1963), PJ?· 105-11; Robin Gollan, 
The Coalminers cf New South Wales, passim. 
2Daily Telegraph, 19 May 1933. 
3 Illawarra Mercury, 25 February 1930; 14 March 1930; DMB, 
12 March 1930. When interviewed Mr W.H. Woodward claimed 
that Lang set aside a ballot in which he had defeated Lysaght. 
Interview, 3 May 1972. 
4Record B0ok, 6 May 1933. 
5Labor Daily, 16 May 1933. 
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in the ballot to join 'the fight against the ALP executive•. 1 
on the same day, a specially convened meeting of the state 
executive elected J.T. Sweeney as the official ALP candidate. 
only two of the eighteen votes cast went to Willis. The 
remaining sixteen went to Sweeney while none of th~ other 
thirteen candidates received any support. 2 The announcement 
of Sweeney's acceptance did not, as the Lang executive 
probably hoped, deter the Bulli electorate council which went 
ahead with its ballot. As Lang feared Willis topped the poll 
and was immediately nominated to contest the by-election. 
Despite accusations of disloyalty and executive claims that 
the ballot was rigged, the council voted by twenty-four to 
three to endorse Willis as its candidate. 3 
By selecting Sweeney, Lang hoped to tap the reservoir of 
9arochialism from which any strong local miner-candidate 
could draw. To this end he had earlier sounded out the 
southern distridt miners president, F. Lowden and later 
W.H. Woodward and L.B. Kelly, president and sncretary of the 
4 Thirroul ALP branch. Only when these approaches were 
rebuffed did Lang turn to Sweeney, the seventy year old 
retired southern district miners' secretary. Sweeney later 
polled sixty-three votes to Willis's 637 in the pre-selection 
ballot. 5 An Australian, Sweeney was born at Campbelltown 
ann lived all his life in the Wollongong district. Like 
Lysaght before him he was a devout Catholic and Lang 
undoubtedly, calculated tha.t a bloc vote by Catholics (if such 
a vote existed) could be decisive in a close poll with the 
protestant Willis. Politically, how<i>Ver, Sweeney was a 
nonentity. As a loyal Langite he had assisted in the purge 
of radicals from the Wollongong branch and had avoided 
involvement with the free speech protests. Militant 
1rbid., 19 May 1933. 
2sydney Morning Herald, 18 May 1933. 
3Ibid., 24 May 1933. 
4Labor Daily, 26 May 1933 and interview with Mr W.H. Woodward, 
6 September 1972. 
5Daily Telegraph, 22 May 1933. 
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coalminers were caustic in their criticism of his cautious 
attitude as district secretary and had earlier described him 
as a time-server with 'an eye open for a snug job in the 
social Fascist government machinery of state for his old ac;;e' 1 
The campaign provided a platform for discontented 
elements within the New South Wales labour movement. An 
unsigned manifesto circulated by trade union leaders demanded 
a greater voice in party affairs and asked affiliated unions 
and ALP branches to support a call for a special state Labor 
conference in July at which rank and file grievances could be 
aired. 2 Socia.lisation units hoped the by-electi.on would 
provide an opportunity to put their case. Moreover, the 
central council of the Mine.:s' Federation threw its weight 
behind Willis and directP,tl MLA' s representing coalmining 
constituencies to support him. 3 Lowden and Penrose, the 
leadi.'"lg southern mining officials, drew on all these grievances 
when chey gave final voting advice to Bulli miners. They 
shouJ.d vote for Willis because he was the endo';sed candidate 
supported by all southern district lodges and local party 
branches and because he was the one candidate the state 
executive did not want. A vo·;.e for Willis, Lowden declared, 
4 
was a vote for rank and file control and local autonomy. 
Willis endeavoured to harness the support of all these 
groups. The pre-selection issue enabled him to run as a rank 
and file candidate. He professed support for socialisation 
and condemned Lang's wholesale expulsion of socialists. To 
the miners he pledged to free the Labor Daily from the 
clutches of Lang and his inner group and supported such 
industrial causes as the abolition of stone-dusting. These 
promises were encompassed by a larger commitment - to purify 
the labour movement. 
Such a platform involved an attack upon Lang and the 
Lang mystique. Early in the campaign Willis tried to defuse 
1Red Leader, 5 February 1932. 
2sydney Morning Herald, 24 May 1933. 
3Ibid., 27 May 1933. 
4Illawarra Mercury, 2 June 1933 · 
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the personal issue by suggesting that Lang was a vtctim of 
the machinations of a secret junta which had corrupted the 
movement for its own ends. To condemn the body without 
impugning the head, however, was too fine a distinction for 
most Labor supporters and during the course of the campaign 
Willis abandoned it. Mindless repetition of the 'Lang is 
Right' slogan had induced in the leader, Willis claimed, a 
f . l . l state 0 mega oman:i.a. There must, he said, be an end to the 
dictatorship whether persoi1al or collective, a neat way of 
shifting his position. 
Whatever hopes Willis entertained of minimising the 
personal conflict with Lang were negated by the party leader's 
vitJperacive campaign for his own nominee. Sweeney was 
ba!:t.ly noticed during the c?.mpaign. It was Lang who featured 
on the platform and in the press. To counter Willis' claim 
tu be a miners' candidate, Lang had J.M. Baddeley, the 
ex-Labor minister of mines, open Sweeney's campaign. 
~hereafter Lang spoke each night in the mining villages 
appealing for solidarity. He castigated Willis as a dup~ of 
the conservative press, who like W.M. Hughes, W.A. Holman, 
P. Loughlin and T.D. Mutch before him, was intent upon 
splitting the labour movement. 2 Willis was a job hunter, a 
friend of an unknown 'inner group', and a top-hatted 
gentleman from the halls of Westminster whose election would 
3 
result in the disintegration of the labour movement. 
When thP. result was announced Sweeney topped the poll 
with 5,331 votes while Willis (2,758) ran third behind the 
UAP c3ndidate w.A. Buttrell (3,052) and ahead of P. Hartin 
the .. 'mmunist Party candidate (588). The result, however, 
reveals the growing discontP.nt within local labour ranks. 
1Daily Telegraph, 31 May 1933. 
2Hughes and Holman, as federal and New South Wales Labor 
leaders, split with the party to form Nationalist Ministries 
during World War I. Loughlin and Mutch together with 
Il.V. Evatt G. Cann and C.H. Murphy were expelled from the 
New South Wales Labor Party in August 1927 for opposing Lang 
in a Cabinet revolt. see Ian Turner, Industrial Labour and 
Politics (Canberra, 1965), pp.97-121; Kylie Tennant, Evatt 
Politics and Justice (Melbourne, 1972 edition), pp.64-5. 
3Labor Daily, 23, 25 May 1933. 
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The total Labor vote remained remarkably constant with that 
recorded at the 1932 state election and there was no leakage 
of Labor votes to the government candidate whose primary 
votes were down on the 1932 figure. Communist votes, though 
still few in aggregate, increased by ~wenty-five per cent. 1 
Willis supporters attributed defeat to a ·whispering 
sectarian campaign and to the presence of Lang. After sir 
Philip Game's 'stab in the back' , of 13 May 1932, Lang was New 
south Wales Labor's prophet and martyr and his repi.:J:a ti on for 
militancy was transformed into legend. Most electors 
remained unnvwed by the political wrangling and were not 
easily persuaded to vote against an official Labor candidate, 
however nominated. 
In the circumstances, it is sc~~what surprising that 
Willis polled as well as he did. His absence from Australia 
during the early depression years undoubtec '..y weakened his 
position with the miners. Even before this, however, militants 
had been vocal in their criticism of him. In 1928 lodges 
challenged his endorsement as a southern delegate to a min. ;..:s' 
convention. 2 He further alienated many miners by his 
opposition to an 'all out' strike in 1929. Militants 
regarded his support for socialisation as an election 
expedient aimed at exploiting rank and file discontent and 
advised radicals to repudiate him. 3 Communist second 
preferences were directed almost equally to and against 
Willis. 4 However, the fact that an unofficial Labor candidate 
could capture slightly more than one-third of the Labor vote 
was a measure of local dissatisfaction. 
1Primary votes cast in the 1S32 state election totalled 
12, 088 compared with 11, 817 for 1;he by-election. The combined 
Labor vote (A.A. Lysaght and A. Howie, Federal Labor) in 1932 
was 8,050. Sweeney and Willis together recorded 8,153 votes. 
The UAP vote fell from 3,634 in 1~32 to 3,078 and the 
Communist Party vote increased from 404 to 586. 
2 See Chapter one, pp.14-5. 
'Red Leader, 31 May 1933. 
4communist preferences were distributed as follows: Buttrell, 
89; Willis, 292; Sweeney, 205. 
• 
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The Lang victory at Bulli had important repercussions 
within the labour movement both locally and at the state 
level. The dispute between the Thirroul branch and the 
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state executive continued. Preliminary discussions to heal 
the breach broke up in disorder. 1 A subsequent meeting 
sununoned by the branch executive defeated a resolution to 
accept the party platform and rules, as interpreted by the 
state executive. 2 The suspension of the branch charter 
followed and a week later the state executive voted to 
'reform' the bran~h. 3 But any thoughts that the executive 
was now willing to accommoda~e the dissidents were quashed 
when members of the old br"'nch were excluded from all 
discussions. Admission to a meeting called to elect new 
officials was limited to those who had earlier signed a 
pe~ition which demanded that a new branch be formcj and 
rejected proposals to reconstitute the original branch. The 
new branch so formed lacked vitality apart from the momentum 
given it by Lang's organisers and within three months could 
barely attract a quorum to meetings. The old branch 
executive cor ,, \dered swamping the new groL'p, but opted 
instead to break completely from it. The unions which had 
previously sustained local party organisation remained aloof. 
What support the branch did receive came from a nucleus of 
Catholics who had campaigned for Sweeney. 4 
The reluctance of Bulli miners to support the Lang 
branch was symptomatic of the widening gulf between the more 
militant unionists and the state ALP. For some time the 
Miners' Federation had been in conflict with the state 
executive over the control of the Labor Daily. The refusal 
of the paper to publish election propaganda for Willis 
produced renewed criticism of Lang's leadership and accusations 
that he was using the paper for his own political ends. 
l Record Book, 25 June 1933. 
2Ibid., 9 July 1933. 
3Ibid., 14 July 1933. 
4rbid., 30 July 1933; interview with Mr W.H. Woodward, 
6 September 1972. 
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Rumours that the Miners' Federation was preparing to lead an 
industrial splinter party had been given some credence by 
7.he threats of south coast miners to run an industrial 
candidate against Swe"'ney. Lang, however, hoped that his 
victory at Bulli showed he could rely upon the continued 
loyalty of the rank and file. But while the majority of 
::,,,J:ior supporters .were not prepared to vote against an 
official party candidate most miners were sufficiently 
a'.iena ted by Lang's tactics, both during and after the 
by-election, to contemplate retaliatory action. When asked 
by their federal executive to vote on the issue of continued 
affiliation w.i. t1' Lang Labor, southern miners voted 
'ovenvhelmingly' in favour of severing connections. 1 
Simultaneously most district lodges ceased to compel miners 
to subscribe to the Labor Daily. 2 
The dis?ffiliation of the miners and the faction-fightinq 
within the labour mover.1ent weakened Labor's chances for the 
1934 federal elections. The selection of T.D. Mutch as the 
VA? candidate for Werriwa was calculated to exploit this 
division. As a victim of the Lang political machine he could 
appeal to Labor supporters who were confused and disturbed 
by the recent turmoil. A former journalist on the Worker, 
:1utch had opposed the Lang faction and _in 1924 lost a ballot 
for the party leadership to Lang by a single vote. This 
considerable body of support within the party ensured him a 
cabinet post in the Lang government (1925-i') , but his 
relationship with the party leader was a strained one. Lang 
made continued efforts, both within the party and in public, 
to discredit Hutch's administration of the Education 
Department and eventually contrived his expulsion from the 
party. After his dismissal Mutch successfully contested his 
Botany seat as an Independent Labor candidate in the 1927 
1sydney Morning Herald, 3 August 1933. 
2Ibid. 
' " 
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elections• r;., lost the seat in 1930 however, when Lang ran 
a strong candidate, R.J. Heffron, against him. Thereafter 
~!utch turned to local government1 and re-eritered politics, 
by way of an executive position in the All For Australia 
League, as the UAP candidate for Werriwa. 
The campaign as it developed locally centred on two 
issues, Langism and credit. Mutch concentrated almost 
exclusively on denigrating Lang as a 'wrecker' who had 
disrupted government, destroyed honest men, almost ruined the 
state and contemplated smashing the Commonwealth and the 
banks as his final act of political vandalism. 2 Apart from 
his personal anti-Lang animus, /.Jutch spoke in orthodox UAP 
fashion. He pledged sane government to restore business 
confidence and to accelerate economic recovery. 
Lang spoke twice on behalf of Lazzarini who continued 
to elaborate the 'conspiracy of bankers' thesis. He 
advocated the freeing of credit by placing it in the hands of 
the federal parliament. Neither candidate was much disturbed 
by the Federal Labor nominee, T.P. Lavelle. Stricken with 
pneumonia, he took no acti·1e part in the campaign. In a 
letter to the Illawarra Mercury, however, he asked workers 
to rescue the party from the grips of Langism by making 
3 Lazzarini their last preference. 
The result was closer than commonly predicted. When 
4 preimary votes were counted Mutch led by 420 votes. Federal 
Labor and Communist preferences, however, enabled Lazzarini 
to regain his seat with a final majority of 2,513. 5 Boundary 
1From 1931 until 1937 he was an alderman on the Randwick 
Council. 
2Illawarra Mercury, 17, 24, 31 August 1934. 
3Ibid., 14 September 1934. 
4First preferences were distributed in the following way: 
W. Blake (Communist) 2,610; T.P. Lavelle (Federal Labor) 
1,695; H.P. Lazzarini (State Labor), 22,561; T.1'. Mutch 
(UAP) 22,981. 
;,0f Lavelle's preferences 1,035 went to Lazzarini and 441 to 
Mutch. of the 2,610 communist preferences 2,584 went to 
Lazzarini and the remaining 245 to Mutch. 
changes1 and the influx of new Labor supporters to the 
~ndustrial complex at Port Kembla assisted Lazzarini. on 
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the other hand, the Labor victory tended to obscure divisions 
within the local labour movement. The ability of .Mutch to 
attract a relatively high poll suggests that moderate Labor 
voters, who had transferred their support to the UAP in 1931 
and in the state elections of 1932, again voted for the 
non-Labor party. It is possible also that many electors who 
had supported the Federal Labor candidate in 1931 now voted 
:or :>\utch. At the other end of the political spectrum unrest 
within the party resulted in an increased Communist vote. 
The Communist Party had not contested the Geat of 1931 yet 
Blake, a coalminer, who gained a considerable following among 
the unemployed because of his activities in the free-speech 
campnign, dc.ubled the vote he received in the 1932 state 
election. 2 His support was heaviest in the strictly 
coalmining communities and among the ill-housed Port Kembla 
workers where the communist vote trebled. 
It is difficult to assess the inroads made into the 
allegiance of moderate Labor supporters since there was a 
corresponding breakdown in the coherence of the right. Anti-
Langism had provided a r_allying point for conservatives and 
reached its cleare.st expression in the New Guard which was, 
in part, an alliance between long-established property owners 
and the recently arrived industrialists and professional men. 
To the former, membership of, or sympathy with, the New Guard 
was part of a reactionary stand not only against the 
vicissitudes of depression, but also against unwelcome social 
changes. Some newcomers of anti-Labor views showed a 
remarkable willingness to explore radical ideas of a 
non-socialist kind, whether first advocated during the 
depression or revived from earlier times. There was no 
possibility in the 1930s of this kind of eclecticism, not to 
say political dilettantism, gaining any wide support. 
1Goulburn and Crockwell, centres which gave heavy support to 
.the UAP in 1931, were removed from the electorate. 
2 See pp.184-5. 
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This trend may best be illustrated by the post-
depression careers of Dr N.E. Kirkwood, president of the 
Wollongong New Guard locality, and E.L. Holmes, the Woonona 
cordial manufacturer and sometime organiser of the unemployed.1 
Until the depression Kirkwood took little interest in 
politics. His subsequent involvement was motivated more by 
fear of Lang than by any firmly held political philosophy. 
In June 1932 with the ogre of I.ang banished he turned more 
towards seeking a non-party political 0xplanation for current 
economic problems. Like many of his. contemporaries Kirkwood 
was attracted to the Henry George League. 'No man', he later 
wrote, 'is educated in social thought unless he is acquainted 
with the teachings of Henry George•. 2 To an acquaintance with 
George he added a reading of Ricardo's Law of Rents. In late 
1933, for reasons that are no longer clear, Kirkwood split 
with the local Georgists and gave his support t.o a little-
known Western Australian group, called the Liberation League. 
Seemingly an off-shoot of the Henry George League, the 
liberationists advocated 'the socialisation of ground rent', 
the abolition of all taxation and maintained that these steps 
would rid society of the curse of interest. 3 The league 
claimed to put forward an 'Economic Program based on Natural 
Laws•. 4 Kirkwood wanted society to 'socialise unimproved land 
values'. Within the movement there was considerable 
divergence of opinion as to how this should be achieved, but 
Kirkwood thought that the government ought to redeem land 
values by crediting landowners with a bond to the unimproved 
value of their property. Mortgagors would use such a payment 
to wipe out mortgages and thereafter pay rent to the 
5 
conununity and not interest to non-producers. 
l See Chapter Three, pp.125-6. 
2N.E. Kirkwood (vice-president of W~llongong Rotary Club) 
and Harold Hewlett (assistant.secreta7yl to S.E: Armstrong 
(chairll'-':ln International serv:i.ce Comm:i.ttee Rawl:i.ns Rotary 
Club), 6 March 19:M. Dr N.E. Kirkwood kindly gave me a 
roneod copy of this letter. 
3Hamilton Lamb, An outline of Liberation {Melbourne, n.d. 
probably 1934), passim. see also Liberator, l December 1933. 
4Ibid. 
5Hamilton Lamb, An outline of Liberation, passim. 
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By securing economic justice and preventing the 
economi~ exploitation of the community liberationists hoped 
to rer:icve the worst features of party government - the 
securing of concessions for confli1;ting financial interests 
at the community's expense. Their long-term po:Lctical 
programme envisaged the abolition of state governments, the 
creation of a 'truly National Government' and the 
strengthening of local government. 1 Short-term policy of the 
movement accommodated itself to whichever party offered 
greater scope for the advancement of its theories. After 
1934 Kirkwood ceased to be a member of the UAP and the 
following year campaigned on behalf of his fellow 
liberationist G,H. Lamb, the principal of Kyneton College in 
Victoria. The latter contested the seat of Lowan as one of 
two endorsed United Country Party candidates for the 
Victorian state parliament. 2 Throughout 1934 Kirkwood 
proclaimed his liberationist theories to Rotary Clubs, 
miners' lodges and public meetings and published his own 
broadsheet, Liberation. 3 Critical of the unthinking 
conservatism of his former colleagues, Kirkwood urged them 
not to 'metaphorically put a red tie round the neck' of 
anyone who expressed dissatisfaction with the existing 
system. 4 By 1935 he thought his ideas on social justice more 
attuned to the politics of the left and joined the ALP. 
1
rbid. 
2Lamb and the other United Country Party candidate 
/.I.E. Wettenhall, a retired farmer from Toorak, were the only 
nominations for the seat. For this reason, according to 
Dr N.E. Kirkwood, the United Country Party was prepared to 
endorse Lamb as a candidate standing on the Liberation 
platform. Lamb won the seat by 6,173 votes to 5,100. See 
Argus, 15 February 1935, 4 March 1935. 
3 · l' ~ L'be t' Apart from his contribution to An Out ine o,. i ra ion, 
some idea of Dr Kirkwood's propagandist activities and his 
economic thinking may be gleaned from 'The Vi~ion Splendid: 
Rotary' s Strategical Objective' (an addr~ss "!iv7n to the 
Wollongong Rotary club) 1934; from a more ~hims7cal survey, 
'Jackass Island' , which appeared as an article in the South 
Coast Times, 5 April 1935; and from re~ular letters to the 
editor of the Illawarra Mercury, especially those of 4 and 
8 March 1935, 1 October 1937. 
4N.E. Kirkwood, 'The Vision Splendid', p.2. 
The comparat;.ve speed with which Kirkwood moved from 
~eactionary through radical right to a position left of 
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ce:1tre was not matched by Holmes. In July 1932 Holmes 
abandoned the New Guard and became south coast c.cganiser for 
the Douglas Social Credit League and e.stablished small study 
circles in the coalfield communities of Woon6na and Corrimal. 
A more prolific propagandist than Kirkwood, he wrote numerous 
articles for New Era, the League's paper, and in September 
1932 published two pamphlets: The right to live and 
australia's real wealth. 1 The latter expounded his own 
thinking while the former was a practical guide to the Douglas 
Social Credit system. Man, Holmes argued, was foi;· many 
reasons unable to adapt to a mechanised industrial world. In 
the first place, industry was in the grip of the credit 
monopoly which siphoned off the benefits of machinery and 
science which should accrue to c,,:ciety. Legislators, whether 
because they were incompetent, frustrated by monopoly 
capitalism or paralysed by the party machine, attempted 
merely to alleviate distress rather than seek a permanent 
solution. 2 Unlike Kirkwood, however, Holmes remained critical 
of Labor's socialisation policy, 3 and vehemently denounced 
the communists. Yet, like Kirkwood, he gathered around him 
a group of men who rejected, or at least questioned, the 
status quo and·opposed resolute conservatism as exemplified 
by the old guard in the Wollongong municipal council. 
This opposition to hard-line conservatism was evident 
in the local government elections held in December 1934. 
The divisions within anti-Labor ranks were most apparent in 
Wollongong. The council had continued to clash with the 
unemployed and with relief workers. The conflict came to a 
head when the council prosecuted P. (Paddy) Malloy for 
1The right to live (Wollongong, 1932); .Aust7alia's r7al 
wealth and how to use it being a practical introduction to 
the Uouglas social credit proposals (Sydney, 1932). See 
~· ~ew Era, 19 July, 13 October, 3 November 1932 and 
22 :·ebruary 1934. 
2Holmes, The right to live, p.6. 
3 New Era, 22 February 1934. 
' , 
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collecting dues from relief workers in the streets. When 
the dole had be.en replaced by relief work:s in 1933, relief 
associations collected ld pe:.: week from relief <1orkers as a 
voluntary contribution. For six .months the council had 
ignored the illegal collection of these dues. However, 
a:ter a strike by relief workers Who refused to do work 
normally performed by council labourers, the council 
· ~, prosecuted !-!alloy fo,r soliciting in the streets. The relief 
;:orkers claimed the prosecution was simply spiteful 
rct<iliation. W .L. Howarth' s threat ·•to resurrect the New 
Guard to give the workers the boot' 1 was regarded as 
C:emonstrating the council's political bias. Speaking for -=!'.e 
relief workers, R. (Bob) Allen placed the blame for .Malloy' s 
cirrcst squarely on Howarth who, he alleged, 'had gaoled 
1-:orkers on behalf of the capitalists and fascist$' . 2 Allen 
expressed the hcpe that 'some of the cows will be living when 
1-:e take over - then the boot wiJ l be on the other foot' • 3 
To hasten the defeat of 'Howarth and the fascists', Allen 
advocated that. Labor should run a full ticket in the coming 
municipal elections, but there was little response·. Yet, 
while Labor was too d 1 sorganised to hope for success at the 
local polls, divisions within the ranks of their opponents 
<illowed at least a partial realisation of their objectives. 
The Wollongong 'Traders' Association declared itself opposed 
to the 'sectional' policies of the retiring council. It 
advocated an impartial administration and refused to 
re-endorse four 5itting aldermen who, in the view of the 
<issociation, were the instigators of 'this [sectional] 
policy' . 4 
All four men were rejected at the polls. To some extent 
their defeat represents no more than the universal tendency 
1
south Coast Times, 23 February 1934. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4
rbid., 16 November 1934. The four aldermen refused 
endorsement were: w.L. Howarth, Dr H.P.. LP.e, T. Kiernan and 
W.A. Lang. 
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to punish public men associated with depression. The 
!llawarra Mercury, put this point in more positive form. It 
claimed firstly, to recognise in the col1\Il1unity a general 
desire for change. Ratepayers, considered the council to be 
'too much of a happy family' and wanted 'new ide:as and new 
l 
men'. Secondly, the paper suggested that the political 
prwsecutions instigated by the council had alienated the 
support of non-labour men. Finally, it put the unseating of 
the four al~ermen down to 'the fa~tionalism' of the anti-
Labor groups. 
'l'here is little then in the electoral behaviour of 
Wollongong between 1930 and 1934 requiring explanation which 
differs significantly from national or state trends. With 
varying degrees of enthusiasm both Wollongong state 
electorates continued to return Labor candidates. The level 
of support given Labor in 1930 and again in 1932 conforms to 
state-wide trends. The substantial majorities given Lysaght 
and Davies in 1930 were a register of the general swing to 
Labor. Similarly the near defeat of Davies, in 1932, 
indicated a general confusion among the party's supporters 
and a suspicion of Lang among the uncommitted. At the federal 
level the loss of Werriwa, while greatly influenced by votes 
cast in rural areas outside the Wollongong district, 
emphasised the disillusionment of Labor supporters. 
Nevertheless, there were some local peculiarities. The 
coming of big industry and the transformation of a rural-
mining district into a sizeable industrial centre coincided 
with the onset of the depression. The transition as a 
consequence was marked by both economic and political 
tensions. There was mass unemployment, aggravated by the 
continued influx of men looking for work. At the very time 
when local government was under increased pressure for 
assistance its revenues were in sharp decline. The gap 
l Illawarra Mercury, 11 December 1934. 
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])etween social resources and social need led to acrimonious 
political disputes and added to divisions within the growing. 
community. In Wollongong, the district's administrative 
and commercial centre, conservative aldermen representing 
the old rural and trading interests predictably clashed with 
labour leaders and also were at odds with spokesmen for the 
new industries. Fear of Lang and of the connnunists obscured 
for a while the division between industrial ancl rurz1l 
commercial interests. 
Moreover, the political behaviour of Wollongong workers 
was not solely a reaction to events in Canberra and Sydney. 
Political strength lay with the southern miners whose 
national federation was an important pressure group within 
the New South Wales Labor Party. The coalminers gave 
powerful support to independent policies, such as demands 
for a restatement of the party's socialisation objective. As 
a result Lang was convinced that to maintain his position as 
leader of the party, it was neces;,;·ry to crush the extremism 
of the regional industrial centres, a piece of mistaken 
strategy. He succeeded only in decimating the political wing 
of the Wollongong labour movement. The southern miners' 
decision to disaffiliate from the Labor Party was one form 
of protest against Lang's reluctance to accept militant 
initiatives, growing support for the communists was another. 
There were other opti.-:ins open to dissatisfied unionists. 
One course of action was to run 'industrial' candidates 
against local Labor parliamentary representatives. Recently 
canvassed during the 1933 Bulli by-election this suggestion 
foreshadowed moves to establish an alternative industrial 
Labor party organisation. However, !Uost workers pr·aferred 
for the moment to leave politics to the politicians and to 
seek remedies for their grievances in industrial action. 
202 
CMPTER FIVE 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHl\.NGE:l934-9 
The latter half of the 1930s was more than a period of 
economic recovery in Wollongong, it was a period which saw a 
fundamental restructuring of the district's economy. Steel 
production eclipsed coalmining as the single most important 
enterprise. By creating a new market for existing industries 
and by stimulating new ones itself, the steelworks very 
largely determined the pattern of subsequent growth. Earlier 
predictions that Wollongong was about to become a 'steeltown' 
were realised. Whether measured by level of output or 
employment, the Port Kembla steel industry grew spectacularly 
during the mid-l930s •1 From 1932 onwards, during a period 
when German, French and Belgian steel was being dumped on the 
British market, the Port Kembla works were forging ahead. 
Distance protected Australian steel producers from the steel 
dumpers and, sheltered by a high tariff wall, AIS and its 
competitor BHP monopolised the post-depression market for 
consumer and capital goods. Moreover, the depreciation of 
the currency in 1931 which adjusted the terms of trade in 
Australia's favour had beneficial affects in Wollongong. 
;1oney costs were lowered in a relative sense and the incomes 
of primary producers raised. As a consequence the momentum 
of industrial expansion shifted to the metal industries. By 
the late 1930s Australia was one of the lowest-cost iron and 
steel producers in the world. 2 
1see Appendix H: AIS Production and Employment Figures, 
1929-39, p.364. 
2This paragraph has been drawn from the following sources; 
Helen Hughes The Australian Iron and Steel Industry 1848-
1962 (Melbou~ne, 1963), pp.117-9, pp.126-7; c.B. Schedvin, 
Australia and the Great Depression (Sydney, 1970), pp.304-8; 
F. Strahan unpublished manuscript, 'A history of the 
Newcastle steelworks', p.4; Essington Lewis Pap~rs (Melbourne 
University Archives), Box 12, 14, 19, 21. passim. 
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Much capital expenditure was required however, before 
AIS could benefit from the improved market position. The 
?lant lacked by-product coke ovens. There were also 
insufficient open-hearth furnaces to balance the potential 
production of the blast-furnace on the one hand and the 
capacity of the blooming and structural milla on the other. 
A continuous sheet bar and billet mill was needed. The power 
generating plant was too small for the size of the works and 
inadequate transport and service departments further hindered 
efficient operations. 
The lack of funds for capital development was compounded 
by technical difficulties and short-sigr.ted or ill-advised 
admfr.istration. A sheet metal nill which Hoskins bought in 
~orth America proved troublesome and almost a liability. 
Hoskins ignored perhaps the mo'3t important technical 
innovation of the decade, the Wilputte coke-ovens. By almost 
halving coking time and doubl i.ng coke output per man-day, 
the Wilputte ovens had allowed BHP to peg production costs 
even when 'throughput' was low during the depths of the 
depression. But Hoskins chose instead to rely on the less 
efficient Semet Solway coke ovens. 1 Despite these handicaps, 
AIS continued to recover. For the year ending 31 May 1933 
steel production rose above the 1929 lev~l and the following 
year pig-iron output also topped the pre-depression figure. 
Total production remained about one-third as large as BHP's, 
and profits for 1934 reached £121,000, a record figure. But 
thereafter although the steelworks became busier, profits 
fell as Hoskins attempted to match BHP. 
Since the end of 1932 it had become clear that the two 
English shareholding companies, Dorman Long and Co. and 
Baldwins Ltd, were unable to inject any capital into the Port 
Kembla steelworks. They had been overtaken by serious 
financial crises of their own and Hoskins was compelled to 
face the possibility that he might have to negotiate a merger 
with BHP his overmighty rival. He opened negotiations early 
in 1935 and by October the terms were settled. The end 
1strahan, op.ch: .. , p.10; Geoffrey Blainey, The Steelmaster 
(Melbourne, 197].), p.118. 
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,.,.5ult was more a takeover than a merger, with control of 
the company passing into trr, hands ...,f BHP. Past rivalry 
meant that there were difficulties • 1 welding two companies 
into a united whole, and for a period the assertion of BHP 
control was pursued with restraint.l 
The amalgamation of the two steelmakers was important in 
Australia's industrial history, for it created a monopoly in 
steel. In the Wollongong Port Kembla district it marked a 
period of rapid industrial growth. Within two years of the 
merger BHP spent £5,000,000 on plant development. Additional 
open-hearth furnaces were constructed and a Hew blast-furnace 
with a daily capacity of 1,175 tons, the largest in Australia 
and one of the largest in the world, was erected. By 1938 
when the No.l blast-furnace was reconditioned to bring it up 
to date, Port Kembla produced half as much pig-iron as 
Newcastle and a year later the proportion increased to two-
thirds. The inefficient coke-ovens at Wonga·dlli were 
replaced in 1936 by Wilputte by-product ovens, though it was 
not until 1938 that the new ovens were operating. Mill 
. 
capacity was increased with a new 19-inch continuous six-strand 
billet. The shee~ bar mill was modernised and a new continuous 
18-inch mill came into operation. Loading capacity at the 
jetties was increased by the construction of a new salt water 
channel and by the installation of new iron ore handling 
equipment. New power plants, offices and laboratories and 
auxiliary equipment contributed to a fuller integration of the 
whole plant. Moreover, unlike Hoskins, BHP was able to 
finance the expansion from internal funds and barik overdraft, 
and not by new calls upon shareholders. In addition to 
stronger financial resources, BHP brought to the Po~t Kembla 
works more technical expertise and management skill than its 
predecessor had possessed. It had developed a staff training 
scheme to a stage where it could prepare men on the site for 
1BHP Annual Reports 1935, 1936; Blainey, The St~elmaster, _ 
pp.118-9. BHP provided the chairman (H.G. Darling) and tne 
managing director (Essington Lewis) for the reconstructed AIS 
board of directors. C.H. (Cecil) Hoskins (former chairman 
and with his brother A.S. (Sid) Hoskins joint managing 
director) became general manager. A.S. Hoskins stayed on as 
work's manager. 
most non-technical posts. Further, specialist staff could 
always be transferred from the Newcastle works. 
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The iron and steel industry benefited from the relatively 
low prices of southern coal. Conversely, the recovery in coal 
consumption after 1933 was both caused and assisted by 
expansion at the steelworks. The output of southern 
collieries by 1937 was f if ty-f ive per cent greater than in 
1931. But prices continued to fall under the stress of 
competitive selling. Between 1932 and 1936, the average pri~e 
of coal per ton dropped from 12s lld to lls Od. Prices did 
not recover until 1938. Assisted by a coal strike in that 
year, they rose twelve per cent above their 1935 level and 
output was approximately equal to that of 1928. 1 
The problems confronting colliery proprietors in the 
post-depression period were essentially those which had 
dominated the 1920s. There were too many mines competing on 
a market which, though improving, was inadequate. Moreover, 
the return of higher production levels created further 
difficulties. The curbing of developmental work had helped 
to keep costs down when orders were low, but after 1935 
increasea output reduced possible economies of this kind. 
One consequence of this was a fall in output expressed in 
man-days for all employees as the more accessible seams were 
worked out. Mechanisation was in time to reverse this trend, 
but the initial costs involved restricted profit margins 
further and in some instances was achieved only by incurring 
a trading loss. 2 
Recovery was accompanied by structural and marketing 
change~ within the coal industry. BHP became the dominant 
employer and coal producer in the district. In 1936 it 
purchased Bulli and Mt Keira. Together with Wongawilli, 
obtained with the takeover of AIS, these mines had a combined 
output of 500,000 tons or close to half the district's 
annual output. Until 1937 the three collieries produced more 
1Report of the Royal conunission Inguir~ng into the Question 
of Compulsory Retirement of Employees in Coal and Oil Shale 
Mines in New South Wales (Sydney, 1941), pp.10-13. 
2Ibid., pp.16-7. 
,. 
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coal than the steelworks needed for coking and BHP used 
'.;on':)'awilli, the biggest but most costly of its mine·~ to 
operate, as a reserve source of coal. 1 Self-sufficiency 
meant that for a F<=~iod the company stc·on outside the 
southern Colliery P:;;·c.prietors' Association and played li--:tle 
part in the latters' continued campaign for a more equal 
distribution of government coal contracts among the three 
New South Wales mining districts. Moreover, BHP competed 
;•.9ainst other collieries for the smaller local contracts, 
alienating itself further from the proprietors' association. 
Steel productic•n, however, soon outstripped the company's 
coal output. Early in 1937, P.R. Dyball, works secretary at 
Port Kembla,advised his superiors to buy 'all the coal we 
can'. 2 Most local mines benefited from this changed policy, 
for BHP avoided long-term contracts with any one colliery 
and spread its coal purchases as evenly as ;;>ossible. Its 
aims were to stimulate competition and push prices down. In 
the twelve months from May 1937 until June 1938, 292,000 tons 
of coal was purchased from ·'.lve collieries. 3 But this policy 
was in turn abandoned the following y~ar, as demand for coal 
jumped further ahead of supply. The coal shortage drove 
prices upward and strengthened the ne.;1otiating position of 
collieries supplying the steelworks. 4 
The 1930s were nevertheless a decade of stagnation on 
the coalfields. There was recovery but not growth. By 1939, 
production and employment figures had merely reached 
1AIS Managing Director's Business Sheets: (BHP Archives), 
File 25, No.16-30, Carton 72, 25-28 March 1936. 
2P.R. Dyball to Essir.\rton Lewis, 23 April 1937. BHP Archives, 
File No.10, Carton 68. 
3The coal orders were distributed among the following 
collieries: Excelsior, 110, 000 ton.s: Mt Kembla, 62, 500 toi:is: 
South Clifton, 54, 000 tons: Corrimal, 40 ! 500 tons; CoalcL1.ff, 
25,000 tons. Ibid., 25 May 1938. BHP File, No.?6, Carton 72. 
4Ibid., 10 August 1938. File No. 16-30, Carton 68. For 
example, average prices for New South Wales Railway contracts 
coal rose by between 2s 9d and 3s 6d per ton for large coal 
and by between 2s 2d and 2s lOd per ton for small coal. 
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9r8-depression levels.' Few C!iners were optimistic about 
the future. Many feared that the trend towards increasing 
mechanisation would result in over product~on and a fall in 
9rices. A.G.L. Shaw, writing in 1943, struck a pessimistic 
note: 
. !f the industry is to earn a 'fair' orofit antl 
pay a 'fair' wage in its slowly dccllning days, 
l.~ demands sone form of control over output and 
prices, . and a '.p.:.dnned' elimination of surplus 
capacity.2 
There was, however, rcom for a more optimistic view, 
es9ecially for the southern district, where the full im9act 
o: mechanisation was still some way off. Production on the 
southern coalfield in 1939 was only one-third as much i1S 
northern output, but there were signs of a shift in the 
geographical centre of the industry. The potential growth 
stimulnted by proximity to a steelworks suggested that 
Wollongong and Newcastle, coalfields would develop at the 
expense·of the Maitland district. This i:rend was partially 
obscured at the time by the declining importance of mining in 
the l<)cal economy relative to the steelworks. The steelworks 
surpa~ sed the collieries as "mployers of labour, and by 1937 
employed approximately 5,000 men. 3 In this experience 
Wollongong was perhaps the best example of a shift in tne 
>:ructure of the Australian economy towards the manufacturing 
sector. 4 
The steelworks encouraged the establi~hment of further 
industries at Port Kembla. The Wilputte by-product coke 
ovens gave off sulphate of ammonia, benzol and tar. The 
benzol formed the basis for a petrol-blending plant establis:1ed 
J.See Appendix E: Black Coal Production For Australian 
Coalfields 19~~5-39 p. 361; Appendix F: The number of mines 
operating ~nd men e~ployed in southern collieries, 1926-38, 
p.362. 
2A.G.L. Shaw, 'The Australian Coal Industry, 1929-1939', 
Economic Record, Vol.19, 1943, p.6. 
3see Appendix H: AIS Production and Employment Figures, 
1929-39, p.364 •. 
4For a general description of this trend see C.B. Schedvin, 
op.cit., pp.301-10. 
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in 1937 by Corrunonwealth Oil Refineries. 1 Lysaghts Works Pty 
Ltd, in conjunction with B!:IP, established two mills at Port 
xembla to produce motor-body and other high grade sheets. 
one was under its own name and the other, Coll'monwealth 
Rolling Mills Pty Ltd, in co-operation with American Rolling 
.'·:ills Corporat;,,<m, throuqh Armco (Aust.) Pty Ltd. By 1939 
Co1'1."10nwealth Rolling Mills were producing special steels, 
i.:ccluding high speed and stainless steels. 2 Service industries 
grew with the expansion of the steelworks. The volume of 
traffic handled ~t Port Kcmbla harbour increased from 390,000 
tons in 1931-2 to 1,800,000 to~s in 1938-9. 3 
Recovery in the older copper refining and manufacturing 
incustries was more gradual. C-!~tal Manufactures continued to 
puy ER & s, a shareholding comp;iny, inflated prices for its 
copper and had difficulty in competing with overseas companies 
whic" .:2re so de.;perate for markets that they cut profit 
r:iargill». A reduction in tariff rates in 1936 compounded this 
problem, as did the low world price for copper. However, 
p~riodic brief fluctuations in copper prices allowed Metal 
:-:anufactures to captu:-e more of the Australian market. Yet, 
until 1938, production and employment figures failed to match 
pre-depression performanc<'. Substantial upward movement in 
both spheres came only with the formulation in 1937 of a 
Commonwealt~ defence prograrrune which encouraged armaments 
mar"Jfacture. Recovery at ER & S was also slow. Australian 
copper-mining continued to be sluggish, and even during 
periods of high copper prices few tributors were lureJ into 
1 Port Kembla B•::).leti.n, 12 January 1938. 
2This sketch of industrial growth has been drawn from the 
following sources. B.H.P. Review, December 1938, pp.6-7, 20 
and 24; February 1939, pp.8-9; April 1939, pp.16-17; June 
1939, pp.1-5, 13-15; BHP Annual Reports, 1935-40; Seventy 
Five Years of B.H.P. Development in Industry. (company 
publication, 1960), p.18; Helen Hughes, op.cit., p.118; . 
Lvsaght Venture (Sydney, 1930), pp.67-8, 18-19; J.A. Merritt, 
op.cit., pp.210-11 . 
3John N.H. Britton, The Growth of Port Kem?la (~ublishen 
jointly by The Department ot Geogranhy, University of 
Sydney, and the Geographical Society of New South Wales), 
Research Paper No.2, December 1962, p.10. 
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the field. Blister copper from Chillagoe state smeltG:s kept 
the refinery operating, but smelting remained an intermittent 
. l 
operation. 
The impetus given to industrial growth by BHP established 
the district as the third most important growth point in New 
south Wales. By 1938 only Sydney and Newcastle surpassed 
port Kembla in the fields cf investment and employment. 
Ind•;strial expansion was accompanied also by an unprecedented 
r;te of population growth, most noticeable in Port Kembla. 
Annual surveys, taken by Port Kembla police after 1935, reveal 
an average annual increase in excess of 1,000 persons. Total" 
po?ulation within the Port Kembla police district rose from 
4,218 in ·1935 to 5,096 in 1936, and to 6,976 in 1937. 2 The 
concentration was greatest close to the industrial areas and 
more than half the 2,758 newcomers settled in the township of 
Port Kembla. These figures, however, underestimate the actual 
increase, since the camping population was only cursorily 
counted. The police acknowledged wide seasonal fluctuations 
occasioned by a high 'floating population' which did not 
·;: register at the time of the 'census'. Moreover, while the 
\', 
police district was broadly similar in area to the 
municipality of Central Illawarra it did not include within 
its boundaries a sizeable settlement at Coniston. Nor do 
these figures include those industrial workers and their 
families who chose to live in the township of Wollongong or 
adjacent mining villages. 
With more people in already overcrowded areas, living 
standards deteriorated further. The key problem was, as 
b before, an acute housing shortage. Applications for building 
permits reached a record level in 1934 and grew annually 
thereafter, but supply could not meet demand and gradually 
... _. ______ _ 
1ER & S General Superintendent's Report (ER & S Archives, 
~lelbourne) , 2 November 1937. 
2Port Kembla Bulletin, 12 January 1938. 
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fell further behind. 1 Between 1935 and 1938 the number of 
dwellings increased from 1,167 to 1,715 while the average 
number of inhabitants per dwelling rose from almost 4 to 4.5.2 
This movement though small is ye~ significant and points to 
some pressure on housing resources. Moreover, the compilers 
of the statist:.cs took no note of the quality of the home· 
they counted, c.nd included in their tally 'camps' and •other 
improvised structures' • 3 
The insati,able demand for housing resulted in 
overcrowding, jerry-building and profiteering. A worker and 
his family might huddle into a one-roomed hovel. As an even 
worse alternative, many were forced to sublet a single 
bedroom or sometimes merely the verandah of a house already 
occupied by three or four families. Landlords discriminated 
against couples with children, and rents for family 
accommodation strained even the resources of the better paid 
workers. Whereas in 1933 a tenant might, according to the 
"· commonwealth Census, have paid on the average between 14s and 
·' 
lBs per week for a 'cottage', after 1937 it was common 
4 
:or him to pay between 25s and 30s for a single room. 
enough 
While 
the plight of families was distressing, single men were 
little better off. Boarding houses advertised 'warm beds day 
and night', 5 but even on a system of rostering round the 
clock, there were still insufficient places for all. Short 
1central Illawarra Shire Minute Book5, 5 February 1935; 
Central Illawarra Shire Housing Report, 1943, pp.6-8. After 
1934 Central Illawarra functioned as a shire. The decision 
to convert the municipality into a shire was taken in July 
1934. There were several reasons for the change. First, 
th7re was no legal limit to urban or special ra~es w~i7h a 
shire might levy. Secondly, whereas the borrow7ng limit of 
a municipality was geared to the unimproved capital valu7 a 
shire could borrow three times its annual revenue. A shire 
also received end~wment in the form of government assistance. 
See Central Illawarra Municipality Minute Book, 11 July 1934; 
Central Illawarra Shire Minute Book, 4 January 1935. 
2 Central Illawa.rra Shire Housing Report, p.8. 
3 Central Illawarra Shire Minute Books, 5 February 1935 · 
4 Commonwealth census, 1933, Vol.3, pp.1934-7. 
5 Port Kembla Bulletin, 15 September 1937 • 
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of pitching a tent, the only alternative open to the single 
man was to compete with married men for bedroom accommodation 
and thereby drive rents further upwards. 
An increasing number of workers were therefore forced 
into the h1.'.l"·PY communities. The Central Illawarra Municipal 
council was alarmed at the growing untidiness and squalor of 
the camp sites as unforeseen numbers of workers were herded 
into them. Unofficial camps in the district were in at 
least as bad a state. The council could neither prevent the 
spread of shacks and hovels nor could it count them 
accurately. A camp census was compiled annually by the 
council's health inspector, but he emphasised that his surveys 
could not be regarded as complete. With this qualification, 
the census figures do nevertheless indicate the crude 
proportions of the problem. 
camp dwellers rose from 452 
They show that the number of 
in October 1936 to 566 in 1937 
and to 1,079 the following year. The 193B.census, which was 
the result of a more exhaustive survey, reveals more 
accurately the growing congestion especially in the Flinders 
Street camp. On an area of seven acres there were hurnpies and 
tents for 315 person in 1935. 1 By 1937 a further 241 persons 
had entered the camp and a year later residents totalled 700. 2 
The Reverend W.J. Hobbin, Methodist minister at Bulli, 
described in homely terms the dilemma of new arrivals who 
were seeking work and housing in Port Kembla: 
1 
'Wanted! ' Eagerly the advertisement is read. 
Work is available at Port Kembla on the South 
Coast, New South Wales. Bags are packed. Soon 
the journey is completed; the place of big 
industry is reached. Then the enthusiasm receives 
a severe blow. Where are the bags to be unpacked? 
Where will one sleep for the night? Try to r:nt 
a house? It is in vain. Seek board and lodging. 
Every place is filled. Then the stark fact stares 
at you. The only available place is with 
hundreds of other victims in Flinders street, or 
at Coniston, or on the lakeside camping area. In 
each of these places you will find men womei:i and 
children living in conditions which are a disgrace 
Central Illawarra Shire Minute Books, 17 October 1935. 
2
Ibid., 10 October 1936, 18 July 193B, 23 May l93B; ~ 
Kembla Bulletin, 12 January 1938. 
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criticism. Together with shopkeepers they were held up as 
the worst landlords. Yet not all rack-renters could be 
described as middle class property owners. There is 
evidence to show that workers frequently exploited their 
fellows. Landholders complained of workers who, given free 
use of disused farm houses, sub-let ~corns. Some demanded 
rent from humpy dwellers whom they had encouraged to settle 
on the owner's land. 1 
Local governrnen·c. authorities could do little to prevent 
sub-letting. The laws controlling the occupancy of buildings 
made overcrowding the most profitable method of rack-renting. 
Permits for the construction of new flats vL tor the 
conversion of existing houses into flats were issued subject 
to strict regulations. But the New South Wales Housing 
Council complained that: 
The person who turns an existing building into 
a rabbit warren is not required to comply with 
any conditions. Thus houses which, under 
ordinary conditions would have a rental value of 
say £3 a week for the one family they are 
intended to house, are let in separate rooms at 
a total rental of say £5 per week. Thus we get 
in thousands of cases houses accommodating a 
number of different people (often families) 
with one bath room and one w.c. to serve all 
the tenants and where the cooking is done in 
rooms that are liv~ng rooms bedrooms and 
kitchens combined. 
To restrain overcrowding and take the profit out of it the 
central Illawarra Shire council supported moves by the New 
South Wales Local Government Association to compel the 
registration of all lodgings. Moreover, it sought to 
strengthen the Public Health Act which, although stipulating 
a minimum of 500 cubic feet for all bedrooms, did not 
prohibit the ioom being used as a kitchen, bathroom, laundry 
d 1 . . 3 ai: 1 v ing room. 
1Ibid., 28 February 1938. 
2Letter from Housing Commission of New South Wales to Central 
Illawarra Shire council, 24 May 1938, reproduced in Central 
Illawarra Shire Minute Books, 4 July 1938. 
3central Illawarra Shire Minute Books, 4 July 1938. 
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As overcrowding and shack-like housing multiplied, so 
problems of water supply and sanitation worsened. Conditions 
in the inner suburbs of Sydney and Melbourne may, it is true, 
have been quite as bad as those already described. But at 
Port Kembla all happened too fast and too haphazardly to be 
controlled by weak, inexperienced authorities. Sewerage 
continued to be a major problem. Port Kembla's basaltic clay 
soil was not sufficiently porous to allow proper disposal. 
Absorption trenches in these circumstances proved worse than 
useless. They became little more than foul cesspits which 
constantly overflowed. Rubble traps merely arrested large 
solids from passing into the outlet drains. In 1935 
C.H. Webster, health inspector for the Shire of Central 
Illawarra reported: 
One can stand in the streets of Port Kembla and 
see offensive matter running down the gutters 
exposed to the sun and before it reaches the main 
outfall (if ever it does) •,>utrification [sic] 
has taken place and offensive odours are given 
off.l 
Such primitive, inefficient sanitation hastened the 
spread of epidemics such as typhoid and scarlet fever. 
:·loreover, local doctors traced to these conditions a high 
incidence of sore throats, headaches, nausea, dysentery and 
depressed conditions which lowered resistance to all 
infectious diseases. 2 But the knowledge of medical 
practitioners was limited by the general reluctance of the 
poor to consult them. There was, for example, little rJsponse 
to an offer by Port Kembla doctors to immunise children from 
diphtheria free of charge. 3 The doctors themselves suspected 
that in many cases chronic bronchitis and asthma among 
children were often wrongly diagnosed by parents as colds and 
not reported. 4 Workers and doctors alike agreed that the 
incidence of disease was greatest in the camps where 
1rbid., 30 September 1935. 
2Ibid. 
3
rbid., 4 July 1938. 
4
rbid., 19 December 1938. 
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conditions were most primitive. Unable to afford the luxury 
of sanitary dis~usal facilities, ca.mp dwellers made their 
own more or less primitive arrangements. In 1936 health 
inspectors reported that bush surrounding the settlements was 
becoming contaminated and that 'soapy drainage was lying 
about the doors of shacks'. 1 As a further discomfort, those 
workers living closest to the industrial complex could hardly 
escape the stench of industrial refuse. The slightest winds 
carried dust from coal heaps into the camps, aggravating 
asthmatic and bronchial conditions as well as spoiling food 
and soiling washing. 2 
The doctors' concern for the health of children in the 
camps was well founded for the bulk of camp dwellers were 
not itinerant single men, as was frequently claimed by their 
critics, but families. In 1936 slightly less than one-third 
of all camp dwellers were children under sixteen years of 
age. By 1938 this proportion had grown to forty-three per 
3 
cent. While it was true that most families hoped 
a short time in the shacks, few managed to do only 
to spend 
so. The 
1939 camp census reported that 'many families have been there 
years', some for 'as much as five years•. 4 for 
Each new camp added to the problems and the uneasiness 
of the local bodies. One of their fears was that the 'slum 
districts', as they named them, would spread and engulf 
adjoining areas and plunge the entire shire into an epidemic 
of plague proportions. To prevent this happening the Central 
Illawarra Shire Council brought in stricter measures of camp 
control. It tried to prevent overcrowding by stipulating 
that greater distances be left between humpie~. Where it h-d 
previously charged for the collection of sanitary pans, the 
council waived all fees. This more humane approach was 
tempered, however, by periodic threats to close all official 
camps. 
1Ibid. , 16 March 1936. 
2Ibid. , 19 December 1938. 
3
rbid., 11 October 1937, 28 February 1938. 
4Ibid., 10 October 1939. 
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council spokesmen justified suggestions that camps 
should be closed in terms of undeniable hazards to the health 
of the campers. But it became increasingly clear that some 
of them were just as anxious to remove 'unsightly blots' from 
th~ landscape as they were concerned for the well being of 
the inhabitants. To some councillors, the campers were 
beyond the pale of society - 'men who will not attempt to 
live like civilized persons•. 1 
As industrial expansion quickened in 1936 it became 
commonplace also for local government officials to question 
the need·for anyone to remain 'permanently' in the camps. 
In presenting his 1936 camp report, C.H. Webster, the Central 
Illawarra Health Inspector, expressed indignation that: 
There are persons with families who have been 
in constant employment for upwards of four years, 
who are still living in the camp. There may be 
an excuse for persons in destitute circumstances 
living under such conditions but certainly not 
for some of the occupiers of Flinders Street. 
Whilst admitting that there is a house shortage 
it would appear obvious that a person who has 
been in employment for four years has made little 
attempt .i.f any to secure a home in better 2 
surroundings for the rearing of his family. 
Webster's assumption that workers would accept sub-
standarc conditions so that they might live cheaply was put 
more explicitly by the mayor, R. (Bob) Shipp, an outspoken 
retired farmer. Some camp residents, he said, had no 
i:itention of ever trying to improve their living standards. 
/Still others, he claimed were there to 'make money'. 3 To 
/ 1 support these assertions Shipp claimed that there had 
/ developed a thriving system of exploitation in the camps. 
'Mess kitchens' were selling meals for profit, especially in 
the camp for single men, and married couples were making 
money by setting up 'boarding camps'. Both groups were 
erecting humpies and selling them, Shipp alleged, for 'an 
extortionate £40'. He denounced as unhygienic the sale of 
1Ib'. l.Q. , 18 January 1937. 
2Ibid. 
3Port Kembla Bulletin, 22 December 1937. 
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vegetables, fruit and fish from makeshift stalls in the 
camps, though there was some suspicion among the campers that 
on this point he was urged on by indignant shopkeepers. 
Indeed Shipp's 2ntire analysis reflects the reaction of 
rural propertied interests who hoped to benefit from rising 
land values and from increased trade which would follow the 
inElux of population. They neither understood the inability 
of most campers to purchase a home nor appreciated their 
attempts to provide an alternative social network outside 
the boundaries of local society. Looked at from the campers' 
viewpoint, Shipp's complaints seemed self-interested. Their 
boarders were often friends or workmates with nowhere to live. 
Married couples, who provided meals for single men, similarly 
started by helping friends and found themselves in busine~s 
to meet a need. Stalls, of course, could continue to exist 
in the camps only if they undersold local shopkeepers and 
the vehement protests of camp inhabitants against their 
threatened removal is sufficient testimony that they were 
doing so. Moreover, the sale of shacks is not necessarily 
evidence of profiteering but of the acute housing shortage. 
To weed out those he called 'imposters• 1 and to reduce 
the number of shanties, Shipp promoted a new camp policy. 
All temporary structures, whether within official camps or 
not, were registered and numbered. A levy of Ss per week 
was to be imposed on all structures and used to provide 
sanitary services and to install shower blocks. Control of 
the camp3 was to be placed in the hands of a camp steward 
who should report weekly to a council sub-committee. The 
results of this closer supervision were disappointing. When 
the scheme was implemented the campers resisted all attempts 
to collect the camp fee, some because they could not afford 
it and others because they felt life in the primitive camps 
was penalty enough. Efforts by the camp steward to regulate 
living conditions were at first more successful, but the 
continued inflow of new residents prevented any real 
improvement. In December 1939 the newly appointed health 
· J 'lorley, summed up the council's frustration: inspector, • R. " 
1r11awarra Mercury, 19 November 1937. 
Camps are getting out of control, but I want 
to be hwnane. There is nowhere else for some 
of these people 'co go. I have chased people 
from pillar to r·c~t and at last turned the 
other way, when a camp is erected in some cases -
genuine cases. However, despite what I have said 
about humanitarian methods, I say this. A man 
who will live for five years with his wife and 
family in a camp when he is working deserves to 
be chased from the district.l 
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A further argument used by councillors against the camps 
was that they harboured 'criminals', 'vand<,ls' and 
'metho-fiends' . 2 Petty pilfering did occur and was 
especially rife among construction workers. However, there 
was only one proven case of vandalism. Frustrated in its 
efforts to extract its 'camping fee', the council placed the 
collection by the camp steward on a commission basis. 
Resentment a~ the fee, however, grew in direct proportion to 
,. 
'!:", the increased zeal with \'."hich it was collected.· It was 
against this background that the camp steward's shack was 
burnt down. The older community in Port Kembla required no 
direct evidence to place the blame squarely on the campers. 
A few campers may have condemned the action, but probably all 
rejoiced when a discrepancy between the money collected from 
them and that passed on to the council brought about the 
steward's dismissal. 3 But, in the main, order in the camps 
was maintained by camp committees who did their best to 
discipline the unruly in probably ·.~ell-understood ways and by 
the only non-violent means at their disposal - ostracism. 
There was little truth in the claim that campers were 
content to live in squalor rather than pay rent. It was 
becoming clear that they could not escape from a situation 
which they were almost powerless to influence. Gradually it 
became apparent to all parties to the dispute that ultimate 
responsibility rested with the firm which attracted workers 
to the district for its own profit. It was now up to BHP to 
solve the problem it had created. Company spokesmen 
libid., 22 December 1939. 
2Illawarra Star, 28 Apr.il 1938. 
3Ibid., 5 December 1938. 
•' ' 
profe""''d sympathy for the r,cii..' .:.C. " and endorsed the 
argume:1t, presented durins the course of discussions with 
the Central IlJ awarra CC'UP.cil, that better housing would 
profii: the: e;nployers by producing healthier 
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eventually 
1 
workers. Yet beyond 
did very little. The 
expressing benevolent intentions BHP 
\leed to transfer skilled technical staff 
from its Newcastle plant on occasions over-rode ~.he reluctance 
·d h · 2 k" ':o provi e ousing. Hos ins, the general nJnager ;,:t Port 
Kembla, privately approachetJ the New south Wales premier_, 
Stevens, for more government housing aid, but without succl. 
The company, however, remained aloof from involvement in 
community life. Dyball, the company's secretary, put BHP' s 
pos ·'· tion bluntly enough at a meeting ,.,ii:h a council housing 
conunittee. It was not, h":i said, compa:1y pclicy to undertake 
housing schemes and it would never c~untenance financial 
assistance to employees. 3 Tile cold-blooded position adopted 
by the company contrasted with it.s policy at Whyalla where a 
• ' t{ 
com9any housing scheme opera\"".ed., Workers at Port Kembla 
:ound little difficulty in guessing the reason. Where labour 
was in plentiful supply .the welfare of workers was never a 
dominant concern to the company, 
oyball's statement provoked a strong reaction and 
exacerbated a growing division of interests within the Port 
Kembla cormnuni ty. When Shipp threatened to 'Let Port Kembla 
and the Au!O't;ralian L~on and Steel, Armco and Electrolytic 
Refining and Smelting go it on their own', he was speaking for 
many central Illawarra Shire councillors. In its composition, 
the council of the 1930s continued to reflec't rural rather 
than induatrial interests. The council elected in 1934 was 
almost wholly, 'non-industrial' in character. Of its nine 
members seven were farmers, one a shop assistant and one a 
labourer. In practice this rural dominance was reflected in 
1Port Kembla Bulletin, 28 June 1939. 
2
1us M<Jnaging Director's Business Sheets (BHP Archives) , 
File 25, No.16-30, carton 72, 25-28 March 1936. 
3 Port Kembla Bulletin, 28 June 1939. 
413.H.P. Review, Vol.xvi, no.5, August 1939, p.9. 
, -; 
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an ambivalent. attitude towards industrial growth. Most of 
the farmer-councillors were.pleased by the rise in land 
values which industrial growth stimulated, but all resented 
the expenciiture of more than three-quarters of council 
revenue on Port Kembla, to the detriment of rural areas. 
This dttitude was not shared by many council officials 
who were daily brought face to face wii:n the facts of camp 
life. Many of them came to accept the principle that some 
assistance should be gj.ven workers. in order to help them 
obtain adequate housing. There were two elements in this 
concern. Officials and some councillors distinguished between 
the dese·cving and the undeserving worker. Secondly, it was 
commonly held that poor quality housing caused various social 
problems,. ranging from poor health to juvanile delinquency. 
This environmental-determinist attitude was expressed by the 
Central Illawarra housing committee. 
The necessity for homes.4,s impressed on tJ-.e 
visitor of [sic] this district by the large 
number of bag and tin shanties, in w>:.ich 
employees of the various industries are forced 
to live and rear families under unhygenic [sic] 
conditions undermining the health of the 
occupants. Such environment can only lead to 
the demoralizat~on of the children destroying 
that ambition which it is desi~ed to instil in 
every Australian - to live a gn?d, noble and 
righteous life.l 
In seeking to achieve this aim the Central Illawarra 
councillors called on the state government to sponsor housing 
projects and to provide homeless families witr. a permanent 
'separate cottage'. Legislation existed in New South Wales 
for the provision of public housing but government activity 
in this sphere had all but ceased during the depression. As 
an emergency measure, the Unemployed Workers' Housi.ng Trust 
provided hou~ ,;. or building materials for especially 
destitute unemployed men with four or more children. Valued 
at slightly ~ore than £180 the cottages financed by the Trust 
lacked ceilings, were almost totally unlined and offered 
little more than basic shelter. Only twenty-seven such 
dwellings were built in the Wollongong district and there 
1central IV.awarr<i Shire Housing Report, 1943, p.l. 
·rr·u-
':·: 
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protracted delays in the delivery of_bu~lding materials. 1 
In 1935 the Central Illawarra Shire asked that the 
trust scheme be augmented. It proposed that municipal 
councils be empowered to resume crown land on which homes 
' 
similar in quality to those provided by the Trust, could be 
bui,l t. The houses should, the council suggested, be erected 
by the unemployed themselves who would subsequently be given 
the right of purchase over a period of fifteen 
Rentals were to be kept 'as low as possible' . 2 
years. 
The government 
was sympathetic and E.S. Spooner, the Minister for Local 
Government, declared that: 
The time was ripe for •.• the demolition of serni-
slum areas •.• these must be faced in the futur~ 
with a background of town planning advice if :·removal i 
were to be really successful. 3 ·· -
But despitF. this acceptance of the need for a planned housing 
programme the Port Kembla schccme was rejected by the state 
government on economic grounds. 4 
The methods of financing home-buying in the post 
depression era were beyond the rF-ach of most workers. The 
Rural Bank of New South Wales under the Rural Bank Act (1932) 
advan"ed moL!Y up to seventy-five per cent of the bank 
valuation of the house. But the bank was primarily a lending 
institution seeking the surest investment for its capital. 
It operated in the main, to serve clients with substantial 
security and therefore had little impact upon the sub-standard 
housing conditions of penniless workers. 5 The Housing 
1The houses were built at Windang, Coniston, Keiraville and 
Unanderra. For a discussion of the quality of the trust 
homes see Central Illawarra Shire Housing Report,pp.6 and 8; 
Central Illawarra Shire Minute Book, 1 April 1935. Complaints 
about delays in the provision of building mat7ria~s may be 
found in the Illawarra Trades and Labor Council File, 
especially in the few remainir;g copies of ti;e south co',lst 
relief workers' newspaper, Unity. See particularly Unity, 
12 November 1936. 
2 ' M' t B ks 13 Mav 1935 Central Illawarra Shire inu e oo , • • 
3
sydney Morning Herald, 18 July 1934. 
4central Illawarra Shire Minute Books, 10 December 1935. 
5See Report of the Housing Improvement Board, NSW PP, 1938-40, 
Vol.a, pp.47-57. 
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Improvement Act, passed in 1936, aimed to encourage home 
ownership and promote the clearance and rehabilitation of 
sub-standard housing. The procedures laid down in the act 
prevented it from having effect as an instrument of housing 
reform. The act endeavoured to promote the growth of 
~erminating building societies, with the government acting 
as guarantor • 1 
In Port Kembla the building society movement became an 
adjunct to local government housing policy. Shipp, as mayor, 
extolled the benefits of the societies in a weekly column 
headed 'Your 
l . 2 Bul etin. 
Own Home' which he contributed to the Port Kembla 
In June 1936, he called a meeting of ratepayers 
and set in motion Port Kembla's first building society. When 
it opened its doors as the Port Kembla Co-operative Building 
Society, Shipp was chairman of directors, and former AWU 
secretary, P.H. (Fred) Finch, now housing officer for the 
shire, was a co-director. Council involvement went further, 
however, than the participation of a few concerned individuals. 
At the outset clerical services were provided by the council 
staff and Finch, as part of his normal council duties, worked a 
half-day per week on society work. 3 The effort brought almost 
immediate returns. Within twelve months fifty-nine homes 
were financed by the society 
. 4 the course of construction. 
societies at Port l•:.embla and 
building of 721 homes. 5 
and a further forty-nine were in 
By 1938 there were five 
by 1943 they had financed the 
Building societies, like the banks, catered for men with 
some capital. Housing loans were limited by law to ninety 
per cent of the society's valuation which was not to exceed 
£750. The maximum advance therefore required a cash outlay 
1NSW PD, 1936, Vol.151, p.46. 
2see particularly, Port Kembla Bulletin, 22 December 1937. 
3rntervicw with Mr P.H. Finch, 22 February 1972. See also 
Port Kembla Bulletin, 22 December 1937. 
4Port Kembla Bulletin, 3 November 1937. 
5central Illawarra Shire Housing Report, p.8. 
-
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of £.65 and weekly rentals of 16s 7d pe:c week for twenty-eight 
years. If buyers could raise ten per cent of the land price, 
landowners and subdividers sometimes provided second 
mortgages. While this greater indebtedness naturally 
increased weekly repayments, the initial deposit was reduced 
to £.40. Either amount was too great for the majority of 
workers in search of homes. 
Lack of money was the main but not the only reason why a 
greater number of workers did not borrow from huilding 
societies or the banks. During his campaign in support of 
'home ownership' Shipp discovered widespread resistance among 
the workers. 1 To men who experienced mortgage foreclosure 
prior to Lang's Mortgage Moratorium Act further loan 
commitments were unthinkable. 2 Many men were not sufficiently 
confident of continued employment to put down roots at Port 
Kembla. The Reverend W.J. Hobbin noted the same insecurity: 
A very real difficulty in the minds of many 
camp dwellers is the insecurity of their jobs. 
Daily they are haunted by the fear that the 
casual work or labouring jobs might 'cut out' , 
throwing them back temporarily or permanently 
onto the unemployment scrapheap. As our readers 
will readily imagine, this sense3of insecurity militates against home building. 
After 1936 it was clear that building societies touched 
only the fringe of the problem. It was obvious also that 
substantial improvement in housing conditions could only he 
effected by a vigorous government housing programme. The 
state authorities, however, moved slowly and local conditions 
deteriorated. The slow procedures of the Housing Improvement 
Board provoked much criticism. While the board deliberated, 
Illawarra councillors grew increasingly restless. They 
demanded that the state government co-operate with the 
council in erecting cottage~ of 'moderate value' (between 
£.600 and £.650) and 'cheap but efficiently designed' bar.racks 
1Port Kembla Bulletin, 22 December 1937. 
2rbid., 19 January 1938. 
3church standard, 10 October 1937. 
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l for single men. When this was rejected, a more specific 
and more comprehensive plan was reconunended. The council 
asked to be empowered to resume crown land upon which homes 
for 'bona fide workmen' could be built. 2 The government it 
was hoped would provide a £100,000 loan at normal interest 
3 
rates. 
The increasing council concern was in large part a 
response to growing demands among workers for better and 
cheaper housing. Organised agitation for housing reform had 
its origins in the <lnti-eviction campaign which gathered 
momentum in the early months of 1934. The influx after this 
date of workers, some with money in their pockets, made 
eviction a real alternative for landlords. In March workers' 
organisations complained that evictions were increasing and 
demanded that the state government should grant Wollongong 
workers 'a rent allowance to compensate landlords and 
property owners whose houses are occupied by dole workers •.• 
unable to pay rent' •4 Between March and July, anti-eviction 
leagues were established by the Unemployed Workers' Movement 
at Port Kembla, Fairy Meadow, Balgownie, Corrimal and 
Coledale. After a series of fourteen public meetings 
throughout the district, a Rent Allowance Housing Scheme and 
No Eviction Organisation was formed. 5 
The housing reform movement became the vehicle for the 
social protest which had earlier found expression in the 
Unemployed Workers' Movement. At the head of the movement 
were men who had previously been officials in the Unemployed 
Workers' Movement and who were now active in organising 
Relief Workers' Associations. Especially prominent were 
R. (Bob) Allen, P. (Paddy) Malloy and P. (Pat) McHenry 
who employed the tactics of public protest they had 
learnr.d during the free speech campaigns in 1931-2. 
1central Illawarra Shire Minute Books, 5 July 1937. 
2Ibid,, 27 September 1937. 
3Ibid, 
4 South Coast Times, 16 March 1934. 
5Ibid., 13 July 1934. 
,"' 
' 
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comparisons with the Unemployed Workers' Movement and the 
memory of earlier and sometimes violent 'anti-eviction' 
clashes between the unempl9yed organisation and the police 
worked against the new organisation and its protests were 
dismissed by most property cl"ners as the 'agitation of the 
reds' •1 
To broaden the movement's basis attempts were made to 
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win the support of influential middle class spokesmen. Little 
headway was made until 1936 when congestion at Port Kembla 
reached an intolerable level. There was an upsurge of 
interest in housing schemes after that date leading to the 
establishment of a 'homes for the people' movement. This was 
a loose alliance of unionists, militant activists and a 
handful of concerned middle class ratepayers. The movement 
prodded councils into improving the services provided for 
the unemployed camps and petitioned the state government to 
stabilise rents by re-introducing a Fair Rents Act. 2 Its most 
significant achievement, however, was the formation, in late 
1936, of a South Coast Housing Committee. The committee 
drew together groups agitating on the coalfields and at Port 
Kembla. It was successful also in attracting the support of 
a greater number of middle class reformers including the 
editor of the Illawarra Mercury, S.R. Musgrave, and the 
Reverend W.J. Hobbin. By so doing it improved its 
effectiveness as a pressure gr.cup. Sub-committees were 
appointed to investigate living conditions and to publicise 
3 the housing shortage. The findings were predictable enough. 
They criticised the government's inactivity, accused Stevens 
of 'playing off local governments against the building 
societies', which they denounced as the worst form of 
racketeering in New South Wales, profiting only 'the land 
1Port Kembla Bulletin, 10 July 1936; and interview with 
Rev. W.J. Hobbin, 19 February 1973. 
2
south Coast Times, 6 September 1936. 
3
'.l'he investigation committee comprised A.R. Southern, 
J.R. Cranston, W.J. Penrose. Rev. W.J. Hobbin, S.R. Musgrave 
and W. Duncan made up the publicity committee. See Illawarra 
Star, 16 October 1937. 
... 
' 
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l 
shark and the banks' . The conclusion reached by the 
committee, though put more forcibly, was not dissimilar from 
that of local bodies. The government should make available 
cheap 'workmen's homes•. 2 
In October 1937 the conunittee, with the support of the 
Illawarra Trades and Labor Council and local trade unions, 
summoned a public meeting to discuss the housing problem. 
The meeting called upon munic,ipal and shire councils, 
churches, public bodies, political parties, trade unions and 
businessmen to support housing reform and resolved: 
That we citizens of the South Coast, demand the 
inunediate institution by the State Government of 
a housing scheme to cope wit.h · ·e need for homes 
by the people of this district. 
In carrying out this scheme, we demand 
1. That people living in Flinders Street Camp, 
Port Kembla be adequately provided with 
proper houses by the Government on land 
resumed for the purposes of such a housing 
scheme. 
2. That the Government make provision for the 
purchase by the workers of homes under this 
housing scheme at a weekly rental 
conunensurate with their weekly incomes. 
3. That we call upon the Government to 
immediately re-enact the Fair Rents Bill 
and thus provide protection for the people 
against the present exorbitant rentals. 
Further, that the Government inunediately 
institute an inquiry into the renjals now 
being charged on the south Coast. 
The committee also consciously adopted a more moderate 
stance when criticising local governments and avoided open 
confrontation with them. When the Bulli Shire council 
prosecuted workers for erecting shacks in the Coledale 
stockyards, 4 the Illawarra Trades and Labor Council asked for 
leniency. It acknowledged 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid. 
3B·lli Ghire Minute Books, 18 October 1937. 
4The 'stockyards' were a disused holding area for livestock 
being transported by rail to or from Sydney. 
T . . . 
• .. that the council has definite responsibilities 
in connection with the building of houses and 
that it is not desirable that houses that do not 
conform to decent standards should be built. At 
the same time it is pointed out that it is 
instinctive for people to seek a shelter of their 
own and that such would be preferable to the over 
crowding which1the chronic housing shortage has brought about. 
227 
councils were asked to accept responsibility for providing 
workers with housing and urged to play a more active part in 
~he housing reform movement. They were chided for 
prosecuting the 'victims of vicious circumstances' . 2 
One point of agreement between local governments and 
the housing committee was ~he belief that BHP was to blame 
for much of the problem. Contrasting the worsening social 
' 
conditions with th~ capital outlay on machinen, the committee 
accused BHP of attempting to create 'a reserve army of labour 
that can be called on day and night 1 • 3 The company in its 
view, had acted irresponsibly, attracting large numbers of 
people to the district but displaying 'greater interest in 
providing elaborate housing for machinery than for human 
beings'. 4 
In common with housing reform movements throughout 
Australia the Wollongo.ng group attracted clergymen and others 
who objected on religious grounds to poor housing and its 
It was from such men that the most acid consequences. 
denunciation of BHP came. 
their number in Wollongong. 
Hobbin was the most outspoken of 
He arrived in Bulli in 1936 
after four years•work in the Methodist Inland Mission with 
his base at Mt Isa. 
of dwellings at Port 
To him the 'unplanned makeshift growth 
Kembla' contrasted badly with the orderly 
township at Mt Isa with its hundreds of two-storey homes 
1
nulli Shire Minute Books, 22 August 1938. 
2Ibid. 
3
south Coast Times, > December 1937. 
4 Illawarra Star, 3 August 1938. 
5Letter to the author from Reverend W.J. Hobbin, dated 
10 January 1973. 
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built by the company in planned streets and equipped with 
electricity, sewerage and running water. 1 Reflecting on his 
first impressions of Port Kembla, Hobbin wrote recently: 
W!1y the authorities, State and Local Government 
and the industrial magnates failed to anticipate 
the mushrooming of this ugly situation continued 
as a growing conundrum in my mind the more I 
reflectec upon conditions in the mineral ridges 
of western Queensland. The more the authorities 
poured their fulsome appreciation and praise 
upon belching chimney stacks and rolling mills 
to turn out miles of steel the more an\'':Y I 
became at so little attention being pa~d to the 
dehumanising conditions in which manpower, so 
necessary to ensure that smoke and steel were 
forced to exist.2 
At the time anger prompted Hobbin to align himself with 
the Legion of Christian Youth, a small group of churchmen 
who advocated social reform. Headed by the Anglican Bishop 
of Goulburn, E.H. Burgmann, the legic• was made up of men 
from the Methodist, Presbyterian and Anglican churches and its 
progranune included slum clearance, improved treatment for 
juvenile delinquents and the preservation of world peace. 
Its members supported the South Coast Housing Conunittee by 
speaking at public meetings and by assisting with research 
projects. 3 In September 1937 Hobbin established a South 
Coast Branch of the legion in Wollongong. Like its parent 
body the branch was composed of churchmen, especially from the 
4 Salvation Army, aided by a handful of young church followers. 
1ror a discussion of company-housing at Mt Isa see Geoffrey 
Blainey, Mines in the Spinifex (Sydney, 1970), pp.158-9. 
I 2Letter to the author from Reverend W.J. Hobbin, dated 
10 January 1973. 
3The Legion, according to Reverend Hobbin, never exceeded ten 
in number and included, in addition to Bishop Burgrr.ann and 
Bobbin, the following: A. Barkeel (a Sydney solicitor), 
A.J. Dalziel (later private secretary to H.V. Evatt), 
W. Matthews (registrar at Sydney Teachers College), N. Bagnall 
(a student for the Methodist ministry from Brisbane) . 
4 The office-holders of the south Coast Branch were as 
follows: Presicent, R. Barton (Woonona); secretary, W:J. Bobbin 
(Bulli); conunittee, w. Stocks, Adjutant Pac~er, Captain. 
Townsend, Miss J. Thomas, G. Lawler, F. Ellis, C. Hutchinson. 
Illawarra Mercury, 17 September 1937. 
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Hobbin launched an all out attack on BHP. In an article 
which he contributed to the Church Standard headed 'Humanity 
crucified' he wrote: 
The company [BHPl ••• has been interested in 
homes - that is,-their own homes, with chromium-
pla ted ki tci•ens and liquor bars. These are 
situated on a hill which has been given a very 
significant name GREEN HILL. From this hill one 
is able to look down on the camps where dwell 
the toilers. Long ago humanity, in the Person 
of Christ, was hun9 on a hill. Today he is 
certainly crucified over and over again in the 
awful conditions in which hundreds of human 
beings were forced to live on the South Coast of 
!\ew South Wales.I 
There was an immediate government response to Hobbin's 
3 llegations. Spooner and H.M. Hawkins, Miaister of Social 
services, who had previously rejected invitations from the 
south coast Housing Committee to examine housing conditions in 
the district, made a hurried and unheralded visit to Port 
Kembla. In practical terms, the result was an offer by the 
government to provide temporary barracks for single men and 
three-roomed cottages for families. 2 Most workers, however, 
were dissatisfied with Spooner's proposal and described it 
3 
as a 'move from =amps to huts'. The majority of Central 
Illawarra Shire councillors were similarly displeased. T·:ne 
indefatigible Shipp denounced the scheme: 'Port Kembla and 
district do not want slum areas and unless this question [sic] 
be opposed we will have in our midst another steel town only 
f . d 4 o greater magnitu e. 
Assurances from the government that Spoonerville, as the 
settlement was named, was a temporary expedient appeased some 
opposition. In the event reservations as to the quality of 
the housing were well grounded. Constructed with half-can•1as, 
1 Church Standard, 10 September 1937. 
2 Port Kembla Bulletin, 19 January 1937. 
3 Illawarra Star, 11 October 1937. 
4 Port Kembla Bulletin, 22 December 1937. 
the name given to the collection of shacks 
had been erected close to the steelworks. 
'Steeltown' was 
and b;nts which 
Housing at Port Kembla, 1943. 
~·· ·-
Housing on the.beechfront near Port Kemble, 1943. 
• ~· ~· 
• 
, . 
. · ...... 
Spoonerville 'cottages' 1 1943, 
Shire of Central Illawarre 
Housing Report, 1943. 
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half-timber walls, the cottages were of makeshift design. 
In the bedrooms, canvas blinds, which did service for gla~s 
windows, prev£!nted adequate ventilation on wet days, and 
bathrooms were not provided. The barracks fo£ single men 
were even more rudimentary. Each barrack -,;as divided into 
cubicles, six feet six inches by five feet, totally devoid of 
storage space for clothes or fo.,d. Moreover, as the 
partitions separating the cubicles did not reach the ceiling 
there were no safeguards against theft and privacy was almost 
non-existant. 1 Condemnation of the completed buildings was 
universal. Shipp made a plea for their removal and single 
men in the Flinders Street camp refused to move into the 
barracks despite threats by Spooner to turn them out of their 
camps. The opening of the new settlement was delayed for 
four months until improvements were made. Bathrooms were 
added to the cottages although bathwater still had to be 
carried from the open fireplace. cubicles in the barracks 
were made more private. 
These minor improvements made the accommodation more 
acceptable to some of the campers, but many remained 
reluctant to enter Spoonerville. In the long-run, howeve~, 
they were forced to lower their expectations and make the 
best of what was offered them. With some improvisation 
families found that they could make the huts tolerably 
comfortable. It was possible by lining the walls with old 
sacks and then covering them with a layer of brown paper to 
retain some warmth. The huts, however, were constructed on 
a hillside and those on the higher slopes were exposed to 
cold coastal winds. consequently, wherever por>sible families 
2 
sought the huts on the more protected lower slopes. By July 
1939, however, Spoonerville's sixty-five cottages and twenty 
barracks were occupiP.d.-
1 Illawarra star, 12 Jani1ary 1939, 22 June 1939, 4 July 1939. 
2Interview with Mrs J. McKenzie, 8 June 1973. 
3 Illawarra Star, 4 July 1939. 
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The state government's decision to provide temporary 
accomDodation at Port Kembla may be counted the only immediate 
achievement of.. the housing reformers. It also marks the 
beginning of the disintegration of the South Coast Housing 
Committee. After 1938 middle class supporters tended to fall 
away. S.R. Musgrave, the editor of the Illawarra Mercury, 
summarised their thinking when he declared that m~re would be 
gained by direct appeals to state and local governments 
without political or ideological overtones. In his view, 
Spoonerville wac; proof that the government was now aware of 
Port Kembla's special problems and that further agitation was 
not needed. 1 
Support from the camp dwellers also declined. They were 
often as suspicious of the housing reformers as they were of 
local government authorities. Both, in different ways, 
represented a threat to the only security campers felt 
them!'-\Ves to possess. Moreover, the horrors of Spoonerville 
intensified this suspicion. As a consequence public meetings 
called by the South Coast Housing Committee during 1938 and 
1939 were fortunate to attract an audience of forty. 2 
Nevertheless, labour leaders continued to dP.nounce the housing 
shortage. In Hobbin's view Spoonerville would 'ever remain 
as a monument to the socially biased minds of those 
responsible for the scheme' •3 
The housing reform movement, however, should not be 
judged a failure. In the first place, the combined effect of 
the housing reform movements throughout Australia did force 
governments to launch official enquiries and establish public 
1Illawarra Mercury, 4 March 1939. 
2Interviews with Reverend W.J. Hobbin, 19 February 1973; 
Mr F.H. Finch, Housing Officer for the Shire of Central 
Illawarra, 16 February 1973. Evidence of the c~p dwellers' 
distrust of the housing reformers may be found in Ill..::· '1arra 
Star, 6 July 1938. 
3Daily News, 17 Januar:r 1939. 
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. th . . 1 housing au orities. ;,Joreover, the dominantly trade union 
nature of the Wollongong movement reveals the extent to 
which continued deprivation sharpened working class 
consciousness. Opposition to the housing committee indicates 
the readiness with which most middle class spokesmen 
rationalised the rejection of legitimate social grievances 
by crying 'communism'. The fact that many of the housing 
reformers were committed also to the 'anti-war' cause2 made 
this labelling seem more plausible to such men. Robbin 
writes of the communist participation ,· n the housing reform 
and peace movements. 
The commit' ·•es [for housing and against war] 
were not u~cd by them [the communists] even 
though our opposi tio:. l'<;ed all sorts of smear 
tactics including th.... ':avourite claim that 
everyone who supporte · Lther of these goals 
was an obvious red,3 
Spooneiville, however, was tl1e full extent of government 
housing aid at Port Kernbla and viewpoints expressed by 
government officials reveal a limited grasp of the district's 
problems. Speaking of Port Kembla and New south Wales 
• industrial areas more generally, Spooner offered an 
explanation for· their unhealthy state: 
In the past towns have been thrown together in 
a hurry when an industry was established and 
there was no certainty as to its permanence. 
These condi ti(' ... :; have remained and a second, 
generation 01 chird generation has accepted them 
as normal. 4 
As an expl.anation for the origin and continued existence of 
1Public housin<"! authorities were formed in Victoria (1938), 
New South Wale~ (1942), Queensland (1945), Western Australia 
(1947) • For a discussion of the formation of the housing 
authorities ~.ee M.A. Jones, Housing and Poverty in Austra.tia 
(Melbourne, .972), especially pp.l-14. The New South Wales 
government als' launched an enquiry into rents. See 
Illawarra Mercury, 16, 23 June 1939, for a report of the 
government's investigation in Wollongong. 
2 See Chapter Seven, pp.316-32. 
3Letter from Reverend W.J. Hobbin to the author dated 
10 January 1973. 
·.. 
4sydney Morning Herald, 15 August 1938. 
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most Australian slu~ areas, Spooner's dtatement was accurate 
~nough. Port Kembla was not, however, an old industrial or 
residential area and little effort was made by the New south 
Wales g·overnment. to avoid the earlier mistakes now diagnosed 
by Spooner. He proposed to rationalise local government 
boundaries so as to elimi::ate overlapping functions and 
reduce administration costs. As a result he hoped more money 
could be directed to improving social amenities. Spooner 
foreshadowed such a move when he described the population 
growth at Port Kembla and the smaller norther.n villages as 
merging 'into one large settlement that should ·lend itself 
admirably to group treatment of ccnununal services' •1 In 
early .:.J39 he put forward " South Co&.' t Development Plan. 
The plan aimed "to improve local government strength and 
stability 01; the upper south coast' o.,:,d to create separate 
authorities for the coalfields, th" Wollongong-Port Kembla 
industrial area and for the dai:rying districts to the south. 2 
He proposed a city of Woll.-:>ngong to extend as far north as 
Corrimal and to the south of Port Kembla with an immediate 
population of 35,000. The remaining coalmining coll'll\unities 
north as far as Waterfall and the southern dairying district 
' d h' 3 were to be constitute separate s ires. 
Spooner's plan reduced the number of local government 
areas from four to three and avoided the overlapping of rural 
and industrial interests which existed in Central Illawarra. 
Unfortunately it foundered on parochial jealousies. Port 
Kembla industrialists were firmly against 
them Port Kembla was 'the goose that lays 
amalgamation. To 
th" -oolden egg• 4 
anci they did not wish the industrial area ., , . !.l into the 
Wollongong basket. Thciy countered Spooner's recommendations 
by proposing that Port Kembla should it~elf constitute a 
municipality or shire. This proposal reflected the old 
1Ibid. 
2 . Wollongong Advance, 2 March 1939 • 
3Ibid. 
4Illawarra Star, 20 April 1939 . 
• 
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grievance that Port Kembla, which paid the g.reater part of 
central Illawarra rates., was represented by only three 
councillors. When asked to vote on Spooner's proposed 
amalgamation, Port Kembla ratepayers were almost unanimous in 
rejecting the scheme. 1 The Bulli Shire Council raised r.0 
objections since it stood to gain new rate revenues by the 
inclusion o" Mt Keira and Mt Kembla collieries within its 
boundaries. It sought, nevertheless, to extend its southern 
.boundaries so as to obtain the townships of Corri.mal and 
Bellambi. 2 The Northern Illawarra Council predictably enough, 
since the projected amalgamation would throw it out of 
existence, thought the changes 'too drastic 03 and summoned a 
protest meetin~. Wollongong aldermen were divided in their 
response. Most were amenable but some, such as R.F.X. Connor, 
·> predicted that local taxation would rise rapidly. He claimed 
that Bulli was to gain all the revenue from the collieries, 
while Wollongong would be asked to bear the expense of Pokt 
Kembla. In the event Spooner rejected the attempts of 
industrialists to declare Port Kembla a municipality, but at 
the cost of his amalgamation project. 
',' '.~ 
!he housing problem which has been outlined is probably 
as gocid an indicator of living standards as levels of 
employment and wage rates. The threefold increase in rents 
ensu~·ed that the average workingman remained very close to the 
subsis~ence level at a time when he was surrounded by visible 
evidence of the increase in the wealth of the ~~players. To 
most wage earners 
living standards. 
this must have felt much like a decline in 
It seemed that the workers' share in the 
1seventy-nine per cent of those who voted rejected the scheme. 
A total of 2,788 votes were cast against the proposal, 468 
were in favour and 127 informal votes were recorded. 
J.llawarra Star, 4 July 1939. 
2111awarra Mercury, 10 March 1939. 
3Ibid. 
,,r 
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'Port Kembla Boom' was 'rapidly increasing prices, increased 
rents, bad working conditions, hovels (such as Flinders 
street) and everything to make life a burden•. 1 After a 
period of depression in which the workers felt that they had 
borne a disproportionate share of the burden, this seemed 
like a travesty of a promised land. 
Unemployment continued to be a fact of life although 
its incidence was much debated. The monthly registration 
:igures at state labour exchanges only provide a rough index 
of unemployment. There was no permanent downward trend in 
the number of men registered as unemployed in the Wollongong 
district before May 1934. After this date the figure fell 
from 3,400 to 942 in 1939. 2 Some idea of the experience of 
those men who did not readily find a permanent job may be 
gleaned from the government statistician's unemployment 
survey undertaken late in 1936 among relief workers. 3 The 
survey reveaJ.s that during the three years after 1933 the 
average work history of 2,598 men included twenty-nine months 
of unemployment. For 3.7 months of this time no income was 
received, twenty-one and a half months was spent on relief 
work and a further 3. 7 months on food relief. Of the seven 
months in employment less than half-a-mon~h was spent on 
municipal relief works, one month working on government 
unemployed schemes and five and a half months working for a 
private employer. 4 
y, Contemporaries, however, especially those who wished to 
close the camps frequently denied the existence of 'genuine 
local unemployment'. It was a convenient if specious 
argument to claim as Shipp did, that as, 'not one' camper 
was unemployed, all should be evicted. 5 The 1938 camp census 
1steel & Metal worker, 14 January 1937. 
2Report upon Emplovment and Unemplovment in the State of New 
South Wales (Sydney, 1937), pp.41-8. 
3Ibid., pp.41-8. The questionnaire reached a sample of 
ninety per cent. 
4tbid. 
5tllawarra Mercury, 24 December 1937. 
~~~. 
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conducted by the Central Illawarra Shire set the number of 
unemployed residing in temporary camps at forty. 1 
Metropolitan newspapers likewise claimed that there were no 
unemployed at Port Kembla. The Sydney Morning Herald.under 
the headline 'Port Kembla Boom, No Employable now Unemployed', 
wrote that great prosperity prevailed and that not one 
'employable' unemployed could be found in the town. Workers 
and trade union of fici~ls nevertheless estimated unemployment 
at between 1,000 and 1,500 and pointed to queues of as many 
as 7 00 men looking for work daily 'on the hill' at the 
steelworks. 2 
The argument turned mainly upon the definition of terms. 
Local government officials considered part-time relief 
workers as 'in employment•. 3 Moreover, Central Illawarra 
councillors interpreted the expression 'Port Kembla residents' 
literally and narrowly to suit their purposes. Men who 
camped on the outskirts of the shire, or who slept near the 
steelworks during the week ana returned to their homes at the 
weekend, were discounted as not genuine residents. Yet the 
council later conceded that hundreds of casual labourers 
drifted into the town in search of construction work at the 
steelworks. 4 The number of 'floating' unemployed remained 
constant at between 700 to 1,000 although the men involved 
varied. As construction work slowed after 1938, the inflow of 
unskilled men continued. Nevertheless, large scale dismissals 
of construction >.Jorkers was common, as many as l, 400 men 
being dismissed at once. 5 
In contrast with the high degree of unemployment 
experienced by unskilled construction workers, the situation 
J.'j of coalminers improved markedly. Wollongong Labour exchange 
:'..': 
1central Illawarra Shire Minute Books, 18 July 1938, 
19 January 1939. 
2steel & Metal Work.:z·, 14 January 1937 • 
3central Illawarra Shire Minute Books, 6 January 1937. 
4sydney Morning Herald, 12 January 1938. 
5wollongong Advance, 25 May 1939, l June 1939; Steel & Metal 
Worker, 14 January 1937. 
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figures demonstrate the position. Of the 747 adult males 
registered, thirty-eight or less than five per cent 
coalminers. 1 Undoubtedly this does not reflect the 
were 
full 
extent of unemployment among coalminers, as many mine-workers 
did not seek re-employment at the Labour Exchange. In 
addition, others r.ad abandoned their calling during the 
depression years. This was particularly true of youths 
trained in the coal industry and dismissed when they reached 
twenty-one years of age, if not earlier. By 1937 they were 
found in disproportionate numbers among the unskilled workers 
at the steelworks. Employers at Port Kernbla, as elsewhere 
throughout Australia, complained of a shortage of skilled 
labour. They claimed that the high wages paid to unskilled 
labourers deterred youths from entering apprenticeships. 2 
Yet Wollongong miners at least had this alternative. Youths 
on the northern New South Wales coalfield were not so 
::'ortunate, and by 1940 close to 2,000 of them were out of 
work. 3 
The conditions and employment of relfef workers did, 
however, improve throughout the period. At first emergency 
relief work was available only to men eligible for food 
relief, but the restrictions were gradually reduced. After 
March 1935 the allocation of work was changed from a daily 
to a weekly basis; and the permissible income clause was 
suspended. 4 At one end of the scale single men worked one 
week in five while at the other a married man with four or 
more children worked four weeks out of five. 5 The change 
1Report of the Royal Commission on Compulsory Retirement of 
Employees in coal and Oil Shale Mines in New South Wales 
(Sydney, 1941), pp.55-6. 
2Illawarra Star, 7 September 1939. 
3Report of the Royal Commission inquiring into the Question 
of the Compulsory Retirement of Employees in Coal and Oil 
Shale Mines, p.56. 
4suspended in March 1935, the permissible income clause was 
re-imposed in October because of a large increase in 
applications for work. 
5Report upon unemployment in the State of New South Wales, 
pp.24-5. 
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was made principally to assist local bodies to organise 
their relief works more efficiently, but it also helped 
improve relations between the relief workers and their 
employers. It had.been hard for men to build up any 
enthusiasm for a job at which they might work for a couple 
of days, and for which, by trade union standards, they were 
grossly underpaid. In 1936, however, it became possible for 
local bodies to employ relief workers on a full-time basis at 
trade union rates. The scheme was introduced by t.he Minister 
for Public Works, E.S. Spooner, and offered special ~rants 
to local councils for unemployment relief projects, prv•ided 
they borrowed equivalent sums. In this way, men were put 
to work at better than makework projects building bridges, 
culverts and constructin;J much needed drainage channels. Many 
of these schemes, such as the construction of the Lake 
Illawarra bridge which linked the industrial area of Port 
Kembla with Shellharbour and opened up new and cheaper land 
for housing development, directly benefited workers. 1 
The 'Spooner scheme' as the new relief programme was 
labelled, depended to a considerable extent for its continued 
existence upon Spooner's authorisation. He not only 
sanctioned local government relief projects but also, as 
Minister for Local Government, approved their applications to 
borrow the capital needed to finance them. 
the faction-fighting which developed within 
For this reason 
the 
Australia Party - country Party Coalition after 
United 
1938 is of 
particular significance. The joint administration of local 
government and public works enabled Spooner, an ambitious 
accountant, to gain virtually complete control of the 
expenditure of relief money and an effective power base from 
which he could assert his claims for leadership of the UAP. 
Both Stevens and M. Bruxner, the Country Party leader, were 
anxious to curb his growing power, if not to be rid of him. 
A brief downs~'ng in the economy in 1938 pushed unemployment 
upward and provided the occasion Stevens and Bruxner wanted. 
They supported the argument of the treasury that a deficit 
1south Coast Times, 8 April 1938. 
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could only be avoided if government expenditure on P?blic 
works was cut drastically. Spooner countered with demands 
for increased government relief work, but his views were 
ultimately rejected by the cabinet. The treasury's· vi•;tory 
tieant the repudiation, or at least the postponement, of 
approved works at Port Kembla and elsewhere. The fall in 
relief work expenditure coincided with a lull in construction 
work at the steelworks, and the number of unemployed at Port 
Kembla rose rapidly. 1 
Although the recession proved temporary, it did not 
seem so ac the time and the memories of the previous ten 
years lent urgency to the demands of 1'oth trade unions and 
local bodies. In Ju,,_~· 1939, after repeated requests for 
assistance had failed, the Central Illawarr.a Shire Council 
moved: 
That in view of the large number o~ Jnemployed 
in the District that representations be made to 
the Premier to have reviewed in full, the 
qualifications necessary for employment to be 
obtained under Government Relief Schemes and that 
a major National work be commenced immediately 
in this area. 2 
Some appeals for work were put more forcefully. Shipp 
condemned both the decline of unemployment relief and the 
lack of government housing assistance and contrasted both 
with increased government expenditure on defence. 
An Australian is at least entitled to a feed 
and a decent home. The Government can find 
millions of pounds to blow men to pieces s~rely 
to God they can find a few thousand to ass~st . 
those who are without a home •••• 3 
Full employment, however, came only with the outbreak of war 
in September 1939. 
1The material for this paragraph was drawn from Don Aitl:in, 
The Colonel: A Political Biography of Sir Michael Bruxner 
(Canberra, 1969), pp.226-36. 
2central Illawarra Sll.:.re Minute Books, 31 July 1939. 
3Port Kembla Bulletin, 9 November 1938. 
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The long experience of insecurity manifested itself in 
various ways. For some, as noted earlier, it produced a 
/: reluctance to accept home ownership. Others hoarded their 
.savings in pillow cases and obscure hiding places rather 
than place their trust in banks. All feared loss of work 
whether by dismissal or sickness or misadventure. A woman 
who provided for her husband and child through three years 
of unemployment by working as a domestic servant in Sydney 
returning monthly to their bush shack has described this fear: 
I got up one morning early. I thought it's 
time for Jock to go to work. Got him up and 
down he went to catch the bus. His father had 
the milk run. He was delivering the milk and 
his Dad called out, 'Is that you Jock? What 
are you doing here. It's only three o'clock in 
the morning you've got two hours to wait.' In 
case he would lose work in the morning you went 
to bed with [this thought] on your mind: hope 
I don't sleep in in the morning because it's 
the day's wages.l 
The coalm.iningvillages were, however, saved from the 
virtual extinction which befell similar communities on the 
northern New South ~•ales coalfields by the development at 
Port Kembla. 2 In the first place, increased steel production 
required more coal and, while this demand was at first 
satisfied by BHP collieries, o~ders eventually spilled over 
to other mines and helped regenerate the stagnant mining 
villages. Secondly, steelworkers and their families moved 
northwards as far as Helensburgh in search of accommodation. 
The combined effect was to promote changes in the character 
of the coalmining communities. The most obvious was a gradual 
breakdown in the isolation and the almost exclusively mining 
nature of the villages. This trend was accelerated by a 
tendency for fewer miners to work at the colliery around 
which their village had grown. This had profound effects on 
the lives of those involved. For a great number of miners 
travelling became a way of life. A Coledale Miner working 
1rnterview with Mrs Jean McQuire, 15 January 1973. 
2F d . ' or a escription 
Smith's Weekly, 26 
of poverty on the northern coalfield see 
November 1938. 
•,•· 
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'dog-watch' at Wonga;.i: · . left home at 9.50 a.m. to start 
work at 2.30 p.m. Aftt a twelve mile and forty-f.i.•re minute 
train journey to Wollongong, he waited several hou .:or a 
bus to take him the remainder of the journey. ~he =eturn 
journey was even more protracted since the 11.40 p.m. train 
travelled only as far as Thirroul, leaving the miner a 
further two miles t·..'> trudge home. As the numbers of mer1 
working at Wongawilli grew, the Jri.ners hired buses and, at 
an individual cost of 25s per fortnight, halved their 
travelling-time. The 
travelling to work by 
steelworkers were also commuters, most 
. l train. 
The need to commute and its cost limited social life. 
For most, playing cards or listening to a neighbour's wireless 
was the normal way of spending an evening. Moreover, the 
rapid gr0wth of population strained existing recreativnal 
f::.;;iJities. In common with most poor communities Wollongor:g 
workers sought in the proxy life of thE. !" ;.lver screen the 
excitement that life failed to provide. At Port Kembla, it 
was almost impossible despite additional improvised seating 
to obtain picture theatre tickets after 7 p.m. each evening. 2 
Sometimes, as the last straw, the hotels ran out of beer. 3 
Playing fields were needed and union leaders canvassed 
employer's support for their provision. The latter, however, 
were not anxious to commit themselves. 'If what they [the 
workers] 
BHP, 'is 
have in mind', commented the general manager of 
not outrageous we may be able to help a little.• 4 
The surf remained a continued attraction and surf clubs 
which had foundered for lack of patronage during the early 
1930s revived and new ones were started. 
1This paragraph is based on an account of a W~ngawi~li mi~ers' 
day in smith's weekly, 6 August 1938, and on interviews with 
several coalminers and steelworkers. Especially useful was 
an interview with Mr J. McQuire, 2 February 1973. For a 
discussion on work-travel by the steelworkers see 
J.A. Merritt, op.cit., p.230. 
2sydnev Morning Herald, 12 January 1938. 
3Illawarra Trades and Labor Council File, 19 August 1939. 
4AIS Managing Director's Business Sheets, BHP Archives File, 
No.916-30, 15 August 1939. 
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Nany observers accepted the view that BHP had converted 
Port Kembla and Wollongong from 'sleepy country hamlets' 
into 'thriving cities'. 1 Some, as noted earlier; stopped to 
count the socia: cost as measured by the housing shortage 
and by deteriorating livi .g conditions. Others denounced 
drunkenness and gambling as social evils which had sprung up 
with the coming of the industrial wo~kers to Port Kembla. 
The charges were commonly levelled at the unskilled workers 
and casual labourers. It was asswned by the men of property 
J 
who conunonly made such assertions that as men often in 
steady employment lived in deplorable shacks anQ not in 
proper housing they must dissipate their wages in excessive 
drinking or gambling. 
Naturally there was some truth in the gambling charge. 
Illegal off-course or SP (starting price) betting grew in 
the 1920s, as possession of radio sets became more common. 2 
Its appeal was principally to the workers who could not 
afford to attend the race course. Customarily the bil ~iard 
room and barber shop were fronts for SP bookmakers. But in 
the mid-1930s the bookmakers became more brazen, and at 
Wollongong and Port Kembla 'stands' were set up at the rear 
of hotels. 3 Smith's Weekly has described SP organisation at 
a Port Kembla hotel: 
Like the others, [hotels] the Commercial Hotel 
in Wentworth Street, Kembla - the main street 
of the new steel city - is being remodelled, 
and in the courtyard, fortuitously provided by 
the new architecture, there was a betting ring 
on Saturday reminiscent of Royal Randwick itself. 
A crowd of approximately 500 milled on the 
concrete square in the anxious manner of punters 
on the course, but what mattered more was that 
they had up-to-the second information. 
Within a small room, opening by window on 
to the courtyard, was a bookmaker with the broad 
wager book of the type us,d by registered 
1
smith's Weekly, 27 November 1937. 
2The first Australian radio programme was broadcast on 
23 November 1923. 
3
smith's Weekly, 9 October 1937. 
·:.: 
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bookmakers at Randwick. Assisting him were 
four clerks, and as fast as they could work 
the 'steelies' and others were set for anything 
from sixpence to a 'fiver•.l 
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The local hotel remained the centre of social life for 
most work~rs and also the focal point of other forms of 
gambling. On the Sunday mornings of pay-week the courtyards 
of hotels on the ~oalfield echoed to the noisy banter of 
mine~s placing side-bets on quoits contests. It was common 
also for whippet races to be arranged at and conducted near 
the local hotel, although after the mid-l930s these events 
were superseded by greyhound racing conducted by official 
clubs. 2 By engaging in such escapist pleasures as petty 
gambling, drinking and cinema-going workers were seeking to 
bring some relief to an otherwise dismal existence. 
1Ibid. 
2The Wollongong Greyhound Racing Club held its first meeting 
in January 1934. See Illawarra Mercury, 5 January 1934. 
CHl'PTER SJX 
THE RISE OF MILITANCY: 19'.'4-9 
The period of economic recovery after 1934 witnessed 
the emergence of a more militant trade union movement. 
Unionists wanted compensation for hardships suffered and 
guarantees against further depression. To achieve these 
objectives it was first necessary to rebuild the labour 
movement especially at Port Kembla where trade unions had 
almost disappeared during the depression years. In 1934, 
there were formidable obstacles in the way of such 
reorganisation. Unemployment, although diminishing, 
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continued to place limits on union action. The social 
cohesion which fortified unionism on the c~alfields developed 
only slowly at Port Kembla. Yet ultimately the contra~t 
between industrial expansion and the continued deterioration 
of living and working conditions gave added weight to the 
arguments of those who urged more militant union tactics. The 
militants won their first victory on the coalfields. 
Employment at southern colJieries improved continuously 
after 1933. The deterioration of working conditions below 
ground which took place during the depression, however, 
continued 1mchecked for much of the 1930s. The darg had 
been lifted or abandoned at most pits. At all mines workers 
saw no alternative to accepting sub-standard conditions as 
an inevitable part of the crisis in the coal industry. Low 
profits made employers cautious of any expenditure not 
directly related to increased production. Colliery 
proprietors acknowledged a need for improvements but claimed 
in evidence before the Davidson Commission 
.•• that most of the collieries in the South 
Coast are not in a financial position to lavish 
money on things that they would like to do, 
perhaps, for the benefit of the workers i~ the 
industry. They have been through depression 
periods and other hard periods, until to-day 
there is sufficient trade available. We find 
ourselves in a position to-day that we are not 
getting proper working time from our collieries 
and thus we have not yet got the necessary money 
'!"'"f:~'.:7 . 
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to affe7t the repairs or improvements which we 
would ll.ke to do ••. out of about ten collieries 
there are four of them stopped idle •... If some 
arrangement could. be. made whereby we could 'get 
a reasonable continuity of work in these 
collieries there would be a larger amount of 
money spent on irnprovements.l 
The statement reveals two aspects of the policy adopted by 
the employe:i::>. The first was an attempt to relate minimum 
standards for working conditions to the current profits of 
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the coal industry. The sec(Jnd was an endeavour to shift the 
area of dispute between workers and employers away from 
questions of conditions or safety to those of industrial 
relations. Both arguments were ultimately ;;ejected by Judge 
Drake-Brockman, in 1938, as irrelevant. Before his judgment was 
delivered howevet these tactics were regarded as legitimate 
by all southern colliery ow1: ars. The claims of miners for 
improved conditions were rejected as too costly or, in cases 
where safety measures involved additional payments, the 
matter was treated as one concerning wage rates which could 
be held up indefinitely. This is not to say that all 
colliery proprietors stood resolutely agains·): all or ar.y 
safety reforms in mining practice but that, wherever possible, 
they used temporising tactics to put off the spendi•1g of 
money on permanent improvements. 
While the owners fought for t~me, conditions worsened 
as maintenance was neglect·' 1. In some mines the air-flow in 
underground workings diminished, timbering standards declined 
and dust levels rose. Leakages of air resulted in too weak 
a supply of air reaching the work-face. Th·e 1938-9 Royal 
Conunission singled out South Clifton colliery for particular 
criticism. At this mine two-thirds of the air intake was 
lost within half a mile of the pit-top. In the view of the 
Conunission the state of the colliery was deplorable: 
••• There is no reasonably safe way of access to 
the mine coal dust from the screens enters the 
intake t~nnel in large quantities throi!gh a 
doorway. The roof of the tunnel, for 
approximately 50 yards from the entrance, is 
1oavidson commission, evidence of W.F. McNally, appearing for 
the southern colliery Proprietors' Association, 13 December 
1938, p.423. 
only about four feet six inches high, and 
the men, after negotiating this impediment, 
walk a considerable distance in a travelling 
way ~- a reasonable height with intervals of 
low roof, before proceeding to the workina 
place by means of roadway" with· roofs io·~er 
than the '•!;trance tunnel. This accurnul<<.tion 
of improprieties and diff: cul ties waJ.Lun':;; every 
pressure being brought tr ;Jear on the 
proprietors to remodel th.: working conditions •1 
2.16 
T: ·· majority of small m· --, (defined by the Royal Commis,,i.on 
a~ ~hose employing fewer than twenty men) continued to use 
furnace rather than fan ventilation. Sincu the tendency was 
for the furnace to dwindle during the latter stages of a 
shift, this method led to a gradual reduction of the air 
current. The comnission also condemned the trend towards 
the use of cheaper brattice doorways rat.her than wooden stops 
to prevent dangerous rushes cf air. 2 
The greatest danger arose from inadequate timbering. 
Nost deaths in New South Wales mines were caused by roof-falls. 
Of the 113 men killed i~ New South Wales coalfields in the 
period between 
h . 3 t is source. 
accidents were 
1928 and 1939, eighty-seven were traceahle to 
Si~ilarly, 237 of the 567 non-fatal underground 
attributed by the Commission to roof falls. 4 
Faulty timbering was not only the most dangerous shortcoming 
of mining practice in the 1930s, it was also the most 
contentious. The erection of props involved the questi~n of 
additional payments. Disputes about timbering were 
therefore commonplace and their pattern was a familiar one 
in coalmining where 'on the spot' negotiations between 
worker and employer were more frequent than in most other 
::ndustries. 
The decision to put in props lay in the last resort with 
the management. If a mi.ner, in the interests of his own 
safety, erected props without the agreement of a deputy he 
1Report of the Royal commi:-;_·5i!,n on S~fety and Health of 
Workers in coal Mines, Goveuwent Printer, Sydney, 1939, p.96. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., p.56. 
4Ibid. 
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might be refused payment for the job. In these circumstances 
mine-safety often became a matter of calculated bluff on 
both sides. A miner would ask permission to erect props and, 
when refused, threaten to do so regardless of whether or no• 
he was paid for the task. He t ,& established the dispute 
as one about safety and not one about payments. These 
tactics were sometimes successful since they placed the 
owner in the position of appearing to refuse adequate safety 
precautions, and of possibly endangering life. However, few 
miners in the 1930s were preparad to challenge a deputy whose 
decisions were endorsed by the manager. Yet the reluctance 
of employers to authorise the closer setting of props near 
the coal-face was cited by the Royal Commission as being 
responsible for most falls. After an accident underground in 
which a miner was killed, ·a check-.i.nspector reported as 
follows: 
At the place where the fall occun·~d the roof 
was timbered by means of ~raps and ·~ads on each 
side of the roadway. The stone can, ;way 
.between the props. If slah ~imber had been set 
across the roadway the fal:~ .::iuld not have taken 
place. Generally, the root in this ~ection of 
the mine has been of a hard nature but due to the 
close proximity of pillar extraction a chang~ had 
taken place in the nature of the roof. The 
management should have noticed and altered the 
system of timbering.l 
~e same check inspector argued that the majority if not all, 
fatal accidents resulted from the failun· of the employers 
to authorise the placing of slab~. 2 
The incidence of miners' sil.iccsis was anothe.:. .::onstant 
grievance among southern minel:s. Th"Y soug>::. to have the 
complaint recognised as a 'com.)l'"f.at :.1ble' disease. Coalminers 
suffering ~rom diseases caused by inhaling dust could apply 
tc thf' Pneumvconiosis Medical '.'.••:.;.r.d to b•• examined for 
compc ·. •.•tion. In the twelve y·,k·;·;; betwee!"l 1926 and 1939, 
acco.:·:··i:ing t') figures prc . .>en<·r:d by southern miners' officia:.s, 
2::9 •1•iners applied. Dm:ing the same period forty-L.7e of 
1navidsc:;,1 commission, evid·ence of A.T.R. Emery (district 
check-in<:r;~ctor, southern dist!!'ict) , 20 September 1938, p. 43. 
2Ibid. 
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these miners died from the disease, while 147 on being 
rejected continued to work despite the affliction. Only 
forty-rr,-ven received comr·ensation. 1 . Appeals to the 
Pneumoconiosis Board were protracted affairs and the 
litigation expensive for the union which acted on behalf of 
its members. Workmen suffering some degree of disability 
but who were not totally incapacitated presented an equally 
serious problem. Since the owners were not required by law 
~o provide light work for men certified as ~artially affected 
by dust, many miners were forced to ret•\.r~ " : their previous 
jobs and thereby forfeited their right •> cumpensation. 
Frequently they found themselves incapable of work after only 
a short period. Low rates of compensation and lack of 
provisj ans necessary to make ·Jood the loss of inc ·ie between 
accident and award were further legitimate grievances. 
Southern miners urged the government to improve the financial 
plight of injured or compensated miners but met with little 
success. 2 
As the demand for coal increased in the late 1930s 
underground workings were pushed out inro new ~oal deposits 
at greater distance from the sttrface. ·rhis placed increased 
strains upon ventilation systems and aggravated existing 
evils as well as creating new ones. Few southern collieries, 
for example, provided a transport system for men working 
underground. By the mid-lr3os it was common for a miner to 
walk as much as three miles from the pit-mouth to the work-
face laden with powd~r tin, picks, a drill, water bottle 
and 'tucker tin' . 3 T.1e return journey often involved a steep 
climb to the surzace. At Wongawilli colliery the long 
unde=ground walk to the pit-face was pc·ec~ded by a one mile 
climb from the bathrooms up a steep hill, whose gradients 
read,ed one-in-three, to the pit-top. In the summer months 
men reached the mine entra•1ce covered in sweat, or as one 
1 Ibid., evidence of c. Nelson, 14 September 
1938, p.17. 
2r :..:ord Book, 17 September 1934. 
3see Smith's Weekly, 6 August 19:S • 
• 
" 
miner descrir~d it, 'like grease'. The winter increased 
•.. the cha~ces of a man contracting sickness 
thro1_1ah goJ.ng up there and landing at the pit 
top J.n wet clothes ••• and working his shift in 
wet clothes. Th~c~ is no provision at the 
pit top, [for shelter] only a shed - r have 
measured it - anything from 27 to 30 feet by 
about 12 feet, to house 300 men at the pit top 
J.n the mornin~, ~nd it is not nearly enough. 
The ,. T\ are SJ.ttJ.ng around under stones and 
busL. · ·· .7iing to get some protection from the 
elemer.· · · 
Coming, as it often did, after a two-hour journey by train 
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and on foot, the climb up the hill added to the miners' general 
state of fatigue. According to medical testimony a man in 
this state was more liable to lung disorders. Moreover, 
union officials claimed that the climb up the hill was at tr.e 
back of most stoppages at the pit and the ca·..tse of much 
absenteeism. Men, they dec1_:-.red, rather than climb the hill 
·> 'have come home and lost shifts - they have been that tired 
when they got there that they did not care whether they went 
to work'. 2 
The high incidence of lung disorders among southern 
miners was aggravated also ~y the ageing of the work force. 
·-~ 
A sample taken from a number of southern collieries in 1938 
indicates that 30.59 per cent of all mine employees were over 
fifty years of age and U.2 per cent were over sixty years of 
age. In (;'"JC un.::ertain 1930s 'retirPment' was a luxury which 
'• .'• 
few miners could afford. It was alleged that one screen-
3 
worker was still on the job at the ripe old age of 104. 
For employees working underground where the risk of disease 
was greatest the proportion of 'aged' 
slightly lower. Twenty-fi\•e per cent 
workers were more than fifty years of 
workers was only 
of all underground 
4 age. These average 
1navidson Commission, evidence of M.M. Fitzgibbons, 
6""Dec.~mber 1938, p.350. 
2Ibid., evidence of s. Platts, 2 December 1938, p.340. 
3Ibid., p.177. G.M. Hindmarsh later gave evidence of ten men 
still working at Mt Keira colliery who ''"re all over 80 years 
of age. Most of them had worked at the same pit for fifty 
<i or sixty yeai,s. Ibid., 2 February 1939, p.681. 
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figures, presented in the Royal Commission's report probably 
understated the general position. They were based on 
figures supplied by the larger mines which, when re-employing 
workers after 1934, favoured experienced younger men. In 
the smaller mines the percentage of 'aged' miners, in some 
instances, reached seventy-five per cent. 1 
Mine owners attributed this 'ageing' to the miner''• 
seniority rule. This was a sp~~ious .rgument, however, for 
while colliery proprietors generally preferred to employ 
younger men, they had at the same time dismissed youths as 
they became eligible for adult wage r.ates. Whatever the 
reasons, the result was a work-fore~ which had been exposed 
to mining diseases for several decades. Perhaps the worst 
example pointed to by medical experts was that nearly all 
miners aged more than fifty years suffered from emphysema. 2 
The southern coal proprietors proved reluctant to 
engage in joint discussions on questions of safety and health. 
In 1925 the establishment and maintenance of rescue stations 
had been made mandatory in each mining district. Each 
colliery proprietor was required to establish a telephone 
link with this central rescue ~tation and to maintain rescue 
equipment at each pit. Yet despite the persistent dangers 
associated with mining, safety consciousness amongst 
employers and employees alike began only slowly in the 
southern distric·~. Some owners formed pit-safety committees 
but they were exceptional. During 1936 and 1937 the 
southern colliery proprietors rejected requests by the miners 
for a district safety committee. 3 When the Royal Commi11sion 
later recommended the ostablishment of a similar body, the 
owners equivocated. They eventually suggested that the 
membership of any safety committee should be confined to 
colliery managers who alone possessed the necessary technical 
competence. The proprietors conceded that such a committee 
1Ibid., evidence of G.M. Hindmarsh, l February 1939, p.664. 
2Report of the Royal Commission on Safety ana Health of 
Woi·kers in Coal Mines, p .17 5. 
3Davidson commission, evidence p.422. 
l~ ;:; 
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would accept suggestions from the miners. 1 ':the special 
problems confronting southern miners were, howeV•.?r, partially 
recognised by the appointment of their president, F. (Fred) 
Lowden, as a member of the Royal commission. Lowden's 
special knowled,ge of the dust problem and of safety issues 
more generally, together with his deep understanding of 
compensation law, ensured a hearing for the special 
grievances of southern miners. 
It is against this background of worsening conditions 
that unionists were compelled to reconsider their position. 
MMM activists now found a more receptive audience for their 
policy of direct action. Deplorable conditions in the mines 
added point to their criticisms of federation policy. They 
condemned union leaders for their passivity, for their 
failure to listen to rank and file demands and for accepting 
the conditions imposed by an industry in crisis. By 1934 
some of these militants had won lodge of:Lces and were able 
to launch a successful campaign for the election of their 
candidates to the executive of the Miners' Federation. In 
January 1934 southern district vot•~ helped W. (Bill) Orr, 
chairman of the western district MMM, to defeat A. (Arthur) 
T~ece for the general secretaryship of the Fede=ation. 2 six 
months later after the death of D. (Don) Rees, the 
federation's president, the southern district supported the 
successful candidate, C. (Cb·,.rlie) Nelson who had partnered 
Orr in the western district MMM. 3 
support for the movement's candidates sprang from a 
growing belief that the old leadership had failed and from a 
parochial distrust of another northern-based federal executive 
which had existed from the foundation of the federation in 
1916. 4 There was, however, no comparable change of 
1
rbid.' p.423. 
2Labor Daily, 30 January 1?34. 
southern district Orr received 
Of the 20J2 votes cast in the 
788 and Toece 573. 
3
sydney Morning Herald, 24 August 1934. 
4The desire to replace the northern executive wa- tressed 
by most miners interviewed on this point. 
.·· 
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leadership in the southern district. The initiative 
nevertheless remained with the communists, Orr and Nelson, 
and their supporters. Moreover, Lowden was no moderate. His 
genuine concern at the worsening conditions in the mines was 
shown by his determined efforts on behalf of compensated or 
sick miners, and by his persistent attempts to publicise the 
problem of dust in southern mines. His views on these topics 
brought him into broad sympathy with the communists and he 
eventually joined the Communist Party. 
Criticism by militants had not been confined to the 
old leadership. Men who had experienced ler·Jthy periods of 
unemployment attributed the decline in working conditions to 
the 'job consciousness' , 1 as they put it, of those who 
remained at work. These men were, in the view of the 
militants, wedded to the proposition that in bad times strikes 
would achieve no useful results. To counteract this attitude 
the new leaders of the federation embarked on an extensive 
propaganda programme. Pamphlets such as Coal: The Struggle 
of the Mineworkers, Coal Facts and Mechanisation: Threatened 
catastrophe for Coalfields, explained official policy at some 
length and were printed in editions of thirty thousand or 
more. 2 
I Coal: The Struggle of the Mineworkers, a thirty-two 
p ,ge pamphlet, nrr a,,d Nelson set out their analysis of the 
difficulties fac.Ln·g mi1;.;,workers. Despite a general return of 
prosperity conditior:s in the mines were deteriorating. 
Anarchic competition among c-. .e employers kept the price of 
coal at an impossibly low level and miners suffered as the 
owners sought by speed-up to increase production. 
Mechanisation, they predicted, would further reduce 
e'.nployment, increase speed-up, ush"r in a new series of wage 
cuts and pave the way for another attack on working 
conditions. To avoid such a calamity the federation officials 
l Red Leade~, 8 June 1934. 
2w. Orr and c. Nelson, Coal: The Struggle of the Mineworkers 
(Sydney, c.1935); w. Orr, Coal Facts (Sydney, 1937); 
Mechanisation: ~'nreatened Catastrophe for Coalfields (Sydney, 
1935). 
· .. ·_· 
proposed a general policy of direct action coupled with 
specific recommendations. Unemployment and speed-up could 
be eliminated by a shorter working week and opposition to 
mechanisation. Working conditions could only be improved if 
the miners launched an extensive campaign for increased 
safety in the mines. The immediate need, however, was to 
restore the 1929 twelve and a half per cent wage cut. 
The programme was, as Gollan writes, 'carried out with 
more energy anc a clearer sense of direction than at any 
time in the history of the union•. 1 But mobilising rank and 
file miners disheartened by three years of chronic 
unemployment was a different matter. Lecving aside the 
potentially divisive political issues, there was considerable 
reluctanc~ on the part of many miners to fall in behind the 
new leaders. 
The difficulties experienced by southern militants in 
matching programme with performance are clearly shown in 
their attempts to eliminate rationing or work-sharing. In 
January 1935 a stop-work meeting of South Bulli 101!.ners 
accepted a motion that rationing should be abolished at the 
pit, without dismissals. 2 Militants had long opposed 
rationing on several grounds. They believed it to be a prop 
for dying capitalism allowing the employers to maintain 
profits by eli~inating absenteeism and encouraging speed-up. 
The constant changing of workers, they contended, contributed 
to the increased accident rate. Ir the case of ·south Bulli 
colliery, rationing had been introduci:" in 1931. Complaints 
of inequalities in its operation were a constant source of 
friction between the miners and their employers. Opposition 
to rationing was linked with the question of mechanisation. 
In 1934 coal-cutting machines were about to be introduced to 
the pit with the prospect of displacement of shiftmen. To 
the militants the introduction of the machines merely 
strengthened their argument that rationing was not a 
1Robin Gollan, The Coalminers of New South Wales, p.200. 
HI:! ullows the possible exception of the J.M. Baddeley-
A.c. Willis leadership (1917-22). 
2Illawarra Mercurv., 4 January l~~s. 
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humanitarian device to share available work, but an attempt 
by the owners to reduce costs and increase production at the 
expense of the worker. 
All miners probably acce~ted this argument in theory 
but a great many realised that their tactical position was 
weak. Throughout the depression years the proprietors had 
defended rationing as the only alternative to a reduction of 
the work-force. When the manager of the south Bulli pit, 
I. Scobie, reaffirmed this view, the miners unanimously 
resolved 'to stand together against any attempt on the part 
of the management to dismiss any man' •1 After a joint 
conference the owners agreed to abolish rationing ~nd the 
miners' delegates accepted, in principle, the dismissal of 
193 men. 2 The miners threatened by dismissal were urged to 
'stand firm' for the principle of no-rationing, but personal 
3 
sacrifice of this order was not r,eadily accepted. A 
petition circulated among all South Bulli miners by those 
employees 'under notice' demanded a secret ballot on the 
rationing issue and indicated a willingness on the part of 
some to accept a modified form of work-sharing. In the 
subsequent poll which attracted a high turnout of voters, 307 
miners supported the decision to accept dismissals while 251 
d . . . 4 vote to continue rationing. 
The decision created considerable bitterness and lodge 
officials whose quarterly appointments were rarely contested 
were challenged at ': .e next elections. All but one of the 
officials were returned ,._.ith large majorities but there 
remained a residue of ,iiscontent. 5 support for rationing was 
1Ibid., 11 January 1935. 
2Ibid., 9 February 1935. 
3Ibid. 
4This decision to accept dismissals must have been the result 
of some 'hard talking' by those opposed to rationing but it 
has proved impossible to locate any accounts of the meeting. 
5Ibid., 22 February 1935. A. Hayter (470) defeated J. Price 
(88) for the presidency. W. Poole (459) defeated s. Beresford 
(100) for secretary. In a four way contest for two check 
weighmen. c. Lacey an encumbent was defeated votes recorded 
were M. Boland (232), J. Robson (182), C. Lacey (99), 
P. Smith (41) . 
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not confined to the South Bulli men facing dismissal. In 
November miners at Old Bulli colliery voted unanimously to 
••• appeal to the management for the adoption 
of some system by which all enrolled w·, ~h the 
colliery-miners wheelers and surface hands -
would be absorbed not necessarily at full time 
but at least for a few shifts of every week.l 
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The dismissal of South Bulli miners provided anununition 
=or opponents of the communist leaders. They pointed to the 
episode as evidence of a lack of interest on the part of 
officials in the unemployed. Some of this criticism was 
political in origin and was first demonstrated at Coalcliff 
colliery in September 1934. The ostensible reason for the 
challenge was a refusal by the Coalclif f lodge to abide by 
the district seniority custom. 2 Such disputes were common 
enough. The seniority procedure was cumbersome and vague on 
points of detail. Seniority was dependent upon quarterly 
registration with a lodge or with the district office, and 
there was a thirteen-week restriction upon continuous work 
outside the mining industry. Moreover, seniority could not 
be transferred from one mine to another and was li.mited to a 
particular category of work. Wheelers, for ex"111ple, might 
not be promoted to mining work while miners remained 
unemployed. Accordingly, disputes about seniority were often 
internal union affairs requiring a district official to 
ad;udicate between the claims of individual workers. Some 
cases were diffJ.., ··.lt to decide and southern district 
officials considered incorporating t}e seniority procedures 
in the district rules and registering them under the Trade 
Union Act of 188? • 3 Colliery managers frequently ignored 
seniority claims and promoted men into new categories when 
such a step would be more economical than employing 
additional labour. Moreover, they also often ignored 
seniority 
an older. 
claims by employing a younger man in preference 
The Coalcliff dispute, however, centred on the 
1sydney Morning Herald, 18 November 1935. 
2Record Book, 3 September 1934, 
3Ibid. 
to 
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refusal of lodge officials to imolement district seniority 
customs. The reason for their reluctance to comply with a 
generally accepted tradition is not clear. Lowden, however, 
had no difficulty explaining the conflict. 'Malcontents', 
he said, 'were leading the lodge away from the Federation' . 1 
He urged the central council to intervene and appealed to 
lodge members 'to dump' these leaders. Failing this, Lowden 
felt, the lodge should be expelled. 2 
Lowden's comments and the dispute which provoked them 
reflect the fight going on within the Labor Party which was 
necessarily projected back into the politics of the union. 
The southern miners had cancelled their affiliation with the 
Labor Party in 19~3. 3 The election of Orr and Nelson, to the 
executive pc . .i.tions of the Miners' Federation in 1934 
emphasised the division within th~ union between those who 
still supported Lang and those who supported the communists. 
Anti-Lang members of the ALP were working closely with the 
latter. The factions were most clearly revealed in the 1934 
elections for the central council. In an attempt to wrest 
control of the Miners' Federation from the communists, the 
Lang faction no~inated candidates for the positions of 
. 4 
president and secretary. In a bitter campaign C. Anlezark 
and J. Logan, the Lang 
tactics as being those 
1ccM, 2-6 April 1935. 
2Ibid. 
nominees, denounced the 
of 'abuse and skj.te' . 5 
3 See Chapter Four, p.193. 
communist 
They offered 
4It was alleged by the Sydney Morning Herald, that Lang had 
'personally taken charge of the campaign against the miner's 
leaders'. He addressed meetings in the northern district in 
support of C. Anlezarit and J. Logan who opposed Orr a:nd 
Nelson. several reasons were given for the move (1) That 
the Unions are thre~ .. ,,'ned by Communist control; (2) that. Orr 
and Nelson as membe~& of the MMM were Communists; (3) that 
the only p;litical party which could help the miners was the 
Lang Labour party; (4) that the only 'rank and fiJ..1 
candidates are the pledged Lang Labour nominees•. G9e Sydney 
Morning Herald, 29 October 1934. 
5Manifesto Miners' Central Council Elections pamphlet 
(Organised Labor Movement), Sydney, 1934. 
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instead a policy of co-operation with the Labor Party a~d 
promised to work towards a reconstruction of thf coal 
industry. 1 By adoptin~ the communist 'policy of exclusion' 
from the Labor Party, Anlezark and Logan claimed, that the 
miners would be 'beaten to their knees•. 2 Further, since the 
coal industry was fighting for its very existence 
•.• talk of 'struggle' and 'organization' and 
other mass rallying cries without some constructive 
method of demonstrating how the coal mining 
industry is to be restored, is only to fool the 
workers in the industry. That is what our 
opponents are trying to do, but we do not think 
you will be fooled on this occasion.3 
~lilitants, they decl<:.red, were placing 'struggle' ahead of 
. 4 con.~ern for the unemployed. 
As positive policy the Lang nominees advocated closer 
organis?~ion to resist attacks upon wages. They appealed 
directly to the old socialist element in the federation and 
promised to develop 'One Big Union' within the coal industry. 
They also offered to reorganise 
... the coal mining industry to protect the home 
market for coal, to develop electric power 
resources of the Commonwealth on the basis of coal, 
to develop the oil and by-produc~ resources of 
cc·al under national ownership, · :;.rge-scale 
development of the shale-oil in~ustry, and 
provision for the transfer to other industries of 
every unemployed miner not absorbed in this 
scheme of reorganization.5 
In answer to this attack the south coast MMM condemned 
Anlezark and Logan as 'splitter:;' who \•rished to use the union 
· · . t ' 6 Th 'as a milking cow for political opportunis s • ey 
denounced the policy proposals put forward by the Langites 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid . 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
5
r.bid. 
6Against the Splitters, pamphlet issued by South Coast 
District Militant Minority (Wollongong, 1934). 
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as 'more suited to the coal owners than the miners•. l 
To speak of transferring the unemployed miners 
to ~the7 in~ustries in the present stage of 
capitalis~ ~s.to betray bankruptcy and subjection 
t~ refo7mist 7llusions. The real fight of the 
miners is against speed up and mechanisation and 
for a shorter w.:>rking week and a guaranteed 
weekly wage.2 
The communist leaders had little time to consolidate 
their position before the challenge of the Langites. 'l'hey 
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had, ho• er, achieved a degree of success in all districts 
and were ;ble to campaign with some justification on their 
record. In the southern district, strikes at Wongawilli and 
Scarborough had won concessions from the employers. Moreover, at 
Wonthaggi in Victoria, where the MMM·was dominant and where 
none of the bitter divisions bE•tween Lang.ites and communists 
existed, the Federation scored a rajor victory to which it 
could point as an illustr-' .. on of the success of its tactics. 
In the event, southern miners supported the return of the 
communist leaders. Support for Lang, although always a 
factor to take into consideration, wus not sufficientl.y strong 
to offset the prevailing disillusion with politics and 
politicians. The return of the communists marks the 
beginning of a consistently mil •. tant policy by southern miners. 
support for the cow.munists did not automatically carry 
with it endorsement of counsels of direct action. The 
reluctance of many miners to s~rike was often based on a 
realistic appraisal of the tactical situation. Throughout 
the latter part of J.934 there was a series of disputes at 
various collieries centred on the issue of seniorit¥ which 
culminated in a strike at Mt Keira during November. In 
September Mt Keira miners had voted 'by an overwhelming 
majority not to allow wheelers to be promoted [to mining] 
while there are unemployed miners•. 4 The incident which 
2central Executive Ballot, Federation Grows Stronger. 
Bankrupt Reformists Make Lying Charges, Sydney, 1934. 
3Record Book, 10 September, 22 September 1934. 
4Ibid., 23 September 1934. 
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eventually provoked the strike was the refusal of the company 
'" engage the district check inspector who was next in order 
of seniority for re-employment as a shiftman. 1 At a meeting 
to discuss calling a strike, some miners wanted to know how 
the policy of direct action was to be implemented and what 
financial support they could expect from the federation whose 
leaders were alleged to be 'the chief advocates of direct 
. ' 2 action • 
The questions revealed the ,_'oubts of the majority of 
lodge members. On the o~her hand, their militant colleagues 
had gr .: sceptical of district policy which sought to 
isolate grievances and pursue strike action only on a limited 
front. Many, remembnring the defeat of 1929-·30, wanted the 
federation executive to state whether they intended to order 
a general strike or if they planned to confine disputes to 
a single district. Questions of funds were inseparable f~om 
those of tactics. In 1931 the central council of the Miners' 
Federation had instructed the districts to assume financial 
responsibility for their own strikes. 3 Unless the central 
council reversed this decision their pleas for solidarity 
were likely to fall on deaf ears. A promise by Orr to 
subsidise any district strike-levy won over some of the 
doubters. ~~t, when speaking to Mt Keira miners, he would 
not be drawn into any statement as to whether direct action 
opened the way for a general strike, or simply indica~ed a 
greater willingness by the federation to support local 
strikes. such a qu(,stion, he considered, was premature and 
was a matter for the central council to consider. He defined 
council policy as 'not for arbitration, but for conciliation 
ar.;1 when that failed for direct action'. 4 At Mt Keira these 
ta·•~tics were successful., but hardly in their own right. The 
•:olliery ]1".d just obtainec' d contract with the railways 
1Ibid. 
2Illawarra Mercury, 30 November ~934. 
3 See Chapter Two, p.67. 
4Illawarra Mercury, 30 ~~vomber 1934. 
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• department and the propriet-=-=s were anxious to fulfil it. 
In these circumstances '.:he miners were able to win some 
concessions. 
The new fed-::ration executive, how._,.~.-:, envisaged more 
~han piecemeal concessions. During 1935 and 1936 they 
'( prepared a comprehensive programme of reform. !t was 
() directed towards increasing wages, safety and employment. 
Orr outlined the programme in Coal Facts: 
1. Working hours to be thirty per week 
underground <ind thirty five per week on the 
surface. 
2. Wages ·, ' be paid at the minimum rate of 
25s. pe:i:· a~.:1 underground and 2ls. per day on 
the surface, with a restoration of the 12312 per 
cent wage cut for all contract workers. 
3. Immediate creation of a permanent Safety in 
Mines Bureau to enforc' new and safer methods 
of working. Immediate amending of the Coal 
:-tines Regulations c..1d Electrical Special Rules 
to ensure a maximum of safety ~nd health 
pxotection, including an amen..::.ent to prohibit 
the employment of safety officials in production. 
4. The establishment of a Pensions Fund for the 
retirement of old men on a weekly pension of not 
less than £2 (two pounds), in addi\:ion to the 
amount of the Old Age Pensions allowable. The 
Pensions Fund to be raised by a levy of 3d. per 
ton on production and supplemented by a grant 
from royalties. 
5. The drafting and reinforcing of regulations 
to compel the adoption of hydraulic stowage for 
the conserving of coal resources. 
6. Review and substantial reduction cf coal 
f:i:e:i.ghts re1'ate t~· be not less than ls. per ton. 
7. Immedia+:"' commencement with the development of 
the coal and shale oil industries. 
8. The drafting of a Coal Bill to legalise '.:he 
first seven points of this programme and to 
control the production, prices 01.nd marketing of 
coal.l 
In 1937 the southern district sf:nt representatives :o a 
state conference of the Miners' Fedaration to pr&pare a log 
of claims, which was subsequently presented to the owners 
towards the end of June. The submission of the log was 
accompanied by stop-work meetings and resolutions of support 
1w. Orr, coal Facts (Sydney, 1937), p.31. 
I 
I 
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from the Illawarra Trades and Labor Council and from local 
unions. The keynotes of the campaign were firmer organisation 
and communication with union members. Speaking to aggregate 
meetings of southern miners, Orr rebuked those who encouraged 
'petty stoppages' for their shortsightedness. 1 Economic 
conditions, in his view, favoured militancy more so than 
they did in 1929. The federation was financially sound, 
although for the moment any s'>;rike should be confined to New 
South Wales 'as a sectional fight to dete:cmine the genera.l 
position'. 2 Mindful of the resentment aroused among southern 
miners in 1029 at the refusal of the federation to declare a 
state-wide coal strike, Orr made it clear tha'c any future 
direct action would involve all districts. He admitted that 
r. it would not be possible to guarantee strikers full food 
relief payment . , but p.romised sufficient relief to ensure 
'men could not be starved back to work'. 3 
On 19 JuJ.y BHP rejected the log, although other 
proprietors returned equivocal answers. The company's stand 
was no surprise to southern miners. Lowden predicted that a 
strike was inevitable and preparations for the coming struggle 
were stepped up. Some miners cautioned officials against 
permitting the dispute to go to arbitration. In their view 
the wage cuts implemented in 1930 proved conclusively that 
the court was concerned merely with regulating the econcmy 
and not with dispensing wage justice. However, at a 
comp:ilsory conference caJ.led by the New South Wales Industrial 
Commission before Judge Cantor the federation accepted a 
compromise. By agreement, an awar<l was registered which 
granted the uni~n's wages claim in part, but none of the 
other points of the log. In effect, the wage-cuts made 
during the 192!"-30 lockout were restored; contract rates were 
increilsr,:d by ten per cent and offha:.d labour by five per cent. 
A supplementary agreement negotiated with southern proprietors 
resulted ,;_;-; f.urther gains. y~,--·. hs received incr·aases of 
1Illaw.:.rra Mercury, 9 J•.!ly 1937. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
I i7T 2 m 
betw~en fifty and eighty per cent and the minimum rate for 
deficient places was increased by ls 6d per day with a 
similar gain in water money payments.I 
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Sou~hern district officials through the Illawarra Trades 
and Labor Council congratulated 
••• the leaders of the Miners' Federation upon the 
successful.outcome of their campaign for a better 
deal for mine workers. The gains made represent 
an impor.tant advance in the standards of the 
miners and are clearly the result of a splendidlv 
organised campaign ..'..n whir.:h able and courage0'1s • 
leadership combined with unity discipline and 
orc:,·anization on the part of the men artl this led 
to victory.2 
At the same time they foreshadowed further initiatives by the 
''> federation and declared that 
The determination of the union to continue the 
agitation for a shorter working day, better 
w0~king ~unditions etc., has the full support of 
the Council and together with the gains already 
made should serve as an incentive to the workers 
in other industries to join in a movement for 
the 40 hour we~ higher wages and improved 
d . . 3 ...... con itions. ·.,"·, 
Most miners accepted 't:ne outcome as a federation victory. 
Criticism of the compromise came, however, from the Langit~ 
faction and from some militants. The latter argued that more 
would have been gained by st:r i.k.i.ng and were contemptuous of 
the willingness with which Orr and Nelson bowed to the court. 
The L~,ngites for their part made political capital of the 
apparent inconsistency of men professing to oppose 
arbitration and accused the officials of duplicity. In his 
defence Orr tolt'. southern miners that Judge Cantor had acted 
aA a conciliator and net as an arbitrator and that the end 
result was a consent agreement not an award. 4 There was in 
!:act little new in these tactics. Officials of ':.he federat5.on 
had traditionally combined a profession of faith in direct 
1NSW Tndustri•'l Gazette, Vol. lii, pp. 624-6, 1937; Common 
Cause·;· 4 September lffi'. 
2 Illawar,8L.,l-..~~ury, 20 August 1937. 
3 Ib' -).'\ . 
4Ib~1., 27 August 1937. 
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action with recourse to the Arbitration Court v.'hen there 
was some inunediate and concrete gain in view. 
In the event better wages ensured that neither criticism 
undermir . .,,d support for official policy. There were always 
those who counsell~d strike action and the ranks of the 
Langites were thinning. It soon became clear, moreover, that 
acceptance of the c:ompromise was only the 'first round' -
a 'second round' was to follow. In early 1938 a systematic 
campaign against mechanisation was begun. Coal-cutting 
machines had been in use in southern mines for some time and 
there had not been substantial opposition to their use. '.·'.et 
disputes over payments to the men working behind the cu·c '."rs, 
filling skips, were common. Si~ce the introduction of 
cutting-machines involved the displacement of miners at a 
' time wh~n thousands remained unemployed the resistance of 
work~rs grew. Moreover, on the southern coalfield, as in 
the north, miners were aware that BHP planned the me~hanical 
cutting and filling of coal. The first action by u, ~ company 
was in the northern dist~ict and southern miners feared 
similar s~eps would be taken at the company's Wc~longong 
collieries. 
A handful of left wing communists led by J. (Jack) 
Hitchen argued against the conununist-led federation policy 
and declared tha.t miners should welcome mechanisati:m. 1 Its 
acceptance in their view would sharpen the conflict between 
workers and capitalists and hasten th;; revolution. 2 With 
varying degrees of commitment, most southern miners •.·1ere 
prepared to st.~ike against further mechanisation. The 
majority, however, conceded that fur.ther mechanisation was 
inevitable and sought to impose conditions upon cheir 
acceptance of it. In the short-term, they wanted 
res·ci:ictions upon the use of coal-cutting machines for the 
extraction of pillars, greater efforts by the owners to ease 
the dust problem ,,'·.·,:.«> '.he machines <.ggravated, and 
guarantees that < ' · .·. ,~.Loyment of machine workers the 
l,.,.J..d., ':Tl 19~"' 
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uni>m' s seniority ruling.s would be accepted. To avoid long-
term dis~l~~ement of men they demanded shorter hours and a 
pen~ion scheme with :etirement at sixty. Their cl~j_ms were 
expressed in the slogan: •p., Want Two Hours Off the Day and 
Nothing Off the P<J.y; we want Holidays, Safety and Pensions 
too'. 1 
In August 1938 southern delegates attended a national 
cor.vention to formulate a log of clai.~s embodying these and 
other points. As served on the Commonwealth and state 
governments and all coalowners on 23 August the log demanded: 
1. That a five-day week of 6 hours per day be 
recognized as a full working week for all coal 
and shale employees without reduction .·i; pay; 
2. That all workers employed on piece work or 
contract work sha;.1 be guaranteed a minimum wage; 
3. That the government introduce a special 
Compensation Act to cover the coal mining 
industry; 
4. That all mine workers on reaching the age of 
60 years be pensioned off with £2 per week; 
5. That all employees be paid for 14 days' 
holidays ~nnually; 
6. That all wages be paid weekly. 2 
When the 14 days' notice had expired, a national coal strike 
was declared. Many southern lodges did not wait for the 
official declaration of the strike but stopped work 
immediately. By 9 September all southern district miners, 
apart from those employed by two non-union pits located 
outside the Wollongong area, had struck. Within a week these 
collieries accepted the federation's offer of relief 
payments equal to thoue given miners at union pits and 
joined the strike. 3 
1Ibid., 8 August 1938. 
2The Australasian coal and Shale Employees Federation, The 
Federated.Enginedrivers' and_F~remen's A7sociatio~ o~ 
Australasia The Federated Mining Mechanics Assoc:i..ation of 
Australasia' The Amalgamated Engineering Union and The 
I • d Blacksmith's Society of A1rntralasia an J. & A. Brown and 
Abermain Scaham Collieries Ltd and others (1939), 40 CAR, 
p.368. 
3rllawarra Mercury, 16 September 1938. 
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The formal compilation : presentation of the log of 
claims at the national level was not sim),Jly the work of an 
energetic, clear-sighted leader.ship. 1-:-:o.: and Nelson were the 
spokesmen of rank and file discontent: which they successfully 
harnessed, but of which they remained a part. By late 1937 
men who had been prominent organisers in the Unemployed 
Workers' Movement were returning to work in greater numbers. 
Reputations gained in advocating the cause of the unemployed 
quickly won them lodge positions. To their union activities 
these men brought not only a tougher attitude towards the 
employers in pit-head negotiations but also a greater 
appreciation of the need for organisation and a clearer 
understanding of how this could best be achieved. 
The first step was the creation of· 'area committees' 
throughout the coalfield communities. 1 To each area committee 
representatives of the lodges which drew workers from the 
area were elected. 1'he organisation of miners by residential 
area rather than by work-place was a reali~t;).c appraisal of 
how they might best Le held together in a strike. The 
changing employment opportunities within the coalfield meant 
that more and more lived at some distance from their work 
and any given neighbourhood might "ontain miners from several 
collieries. on this village bas',;', an area committee might 
be called together and act in a matter of hours without any 
significant cost. 
Preparations for the strike were more thorough in the 
smaller villages such as Coledale where whole communit~es 
participated in committee activities. 2 There is a clear 
parallel between the area committees and the self-help units 
of the Unemployed Workers' Movement. In anticipation of a 
prolonged strike, which most now accepted as inevitable, 
rabbiting and fishing teams were appointed, firewood camps 
established and communal gardens prepared. Demonstrations 
1Area committees were formed at Helensburgh, Scarborough, 
Coledale Thirroul, Bulli-Woonona, Corrimal, Balgownie, Wollcngo~g, Mt Keira, Mt Kembla, Figtree_and Dapto, see 
£g!!)filon cause, 10 September 1938. · 
2common cause, 3 and 10 July 1938. 
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aimed at winning more general support throughout the 
community and at maintaining rank and file enthusiasm were 
organised in most villages. The banners carried during a 
demonstration at Thirroul reminded local shopkeepers that 
'When Labor Starves Business Goes Bankrupt' • A procession of 
floats depicted the sub-standard housing and the crude 
makeshift conditions under which women laboured in the homes. 1 
Preparations for the strike also reveal a greater 
awareness of the need to counter boredom and stimulate 
community spirit. ~.ost area groups established committees 
to organise sports tournaments and social events. Classes 
were held to discuss strike tactics and to encourage the 
~ participation of younger miners.~ An adjunct of this 
educational programme was a special staging of Clifford 
Odet's strike-play 'Waiting for Lefty', and 'Where's that 
Bomb' a series of skits on patriotism and loyalty. 3 The 
forw~tion of a women's auxiliary organisation in late 1937 
was a development which underlines the degree of community 
participation engendered by the miners' campaign. A Coledale 
housewife M. (Maudej Hitchen urged women to prepare for the 
strike and to consider the miners' demands for better 
conditions as part of their own 'log of claims' for social 
justice. 4 Writing in common Cause she asked 
... Are our housing conditions and c;, .... .aral 
environment satisfactory;,> •.. A camera would 
reveal some appalling things about our 
dwellings here in Coledale and other mining 
villages! Leaking roofs through which rain 
pours on the beds; broken windows patched up 
with rags and bits of packing cases to prevent 
the wind blowing us out of bed; no baths; no 
laundry conveniences; and for these shacks, in 
which often enough the floors are unsafe due 
to depredations of white ants. (of~en the 
lining of bags and paper falling i~ tatters) , 
many rr.iner·s and unemployed are paying from 
10/- to 12/- rent per week. 
1r11awarra Mercury, 12 August 1938. 
2Ibid., 19 August 1938. 
3rbid., 12, 19 August 1938; Common cause, 13 August 1938. 
4
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In these places is it any wonder that epidemic 
diseases play such havoc with child life. In 
addition to th~s horror of dwellings here in 
Cole~ale a sanitary depot, opposite the 
hospital, dumps tons of night-soil into the sea 
which washes up all along the beaches where ' 
our children, children of mine workers and 
unemployed are infected with filthy diseases· 
these1 flies invade our hovels and pollute ou~ food. 
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The formation of the auxiliaries demonstrates the social 
dimension ~f the strike. Most miners had welcomed the 
stoppage at the outset. The rest were won over to whole-
hearted acceptance by the skilful presentation of a 
comprehensive humanitarian case. Strike leaders were 
concerned not merely ":'..ith a series of work-grievances but 
with the whole living standards of miners and their families. 
What had been grimly endured in 1931 could no longer be 
tolerated in 1938. No miner 1r•ould deny the iron logic of 
six years• experience. 
Most miners were aware that the granting of all their 
claims would constitute something approaching a social 
revolution on the coalfields. Accordingly, they anticipated 
a lengthy strike followed by a protracted period of 
negotiation. 2 For the owners to accept all or even some of 
the proposals there must be in advance government acceptance 
of the changes involved and a willingness to underwrite them 
in financial terms. Since conservative governments held 
power in Canberra and in Sydney miners saw the dispute as 
having a political dimension. ~or this additional reason 
negotiations without the threat of a strike would have been 
fruitless. Yet it should not be overlooked that the stoppage 
was as well managed in its timing as in its strategy. The 
threat of war had stimulated the manufacture of armaments and 
coal was in great demand, especially at the Port Kembla 
steelworks. Orr was confident that miners could maintain 
d . . 3 themselves 'longer than the country could o without coal'. 
1Ibid., 3 July 1937. 
2r11awarra Mercury, 5 August 1938. 
3sydney Morning Herald, 8 September 1938, 
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The conservative press denounced the strike threat as 
'brazen economic blackmail' . 1 The Sydney Morning Herald 
declared the stoppage a 'wild-cat' one and claimed that a few 
agitators were 
... responsible for the calling of the coal strike. 
What is more there is every reason to believe that 
the general run of the miners themselves while 
they stand by their ur.ion have no e: . .:husiasm 
whatever for 'direct action' resorted to by their 
leaders. How little the strike is really wanted 
by the men would prc::.iably be revealed most 
illuminatingly if their attitude were exoressed 
not by mass meetings - when opposition to 
'fighting' demands is extremely difficult - but 
by secret ballot. This order to strike is no 
spontaneous manifestation of industrial feeling but 
a worked up 'stunt', a part of the bargaining game 
which now threatens to get out of hand. It is 
unwanted one might shrewdly surmise by those very 
officials who have declared it.2 
After six weeks with no sign of the miners wtlting, the 
dispute was brought before the Commonwealth Arbitration Court. 
Aggregat·, meetings of southern miners were at first prepared 
to resist a return to work. In the event, they accepted 
assurances by their officials that the ntate government would 
honour its promises of immediate legislation to improve 
safety in the mines and to provide for compensation payments 
to 'dusted' miners. Moreover, before the strike had begun, 
the New South Wales government appointed a Royal Commission 
on the Safety and Health of Workers in Coal Mines with 
Mr Justice Davidson as chairman and Lowden, the southern 
district president, as a commissioner. 
The delays were many, and miners' suspicion of a 'double 
cross' increased. But the reforms eventually maGe were, as 
Gollan writes, the 'greatest ever made to the advantage of 
the workers in th-~ mining or any other industry'. 3 The 
changes were embodied in two awards: the first, give.n by 
Judge Drake-Brockman on 29 June 1939, and a subsequent award 
of a October 1940 which consolidated a series of judgments 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid. 
3Robin Gollan, 'l'he Coalminers of New South Wales, p.213. 
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and interpretations made by the full court and by individual 
judges. The final award granted a forty-hour week for all 
underground employees, to be worked in five days of eight 
hours, bank to bank. Surface workers, however, continued to 
work eighty-six hours a fortnight. Ten days annual leave was 
conceded for men on forty hours and eleven days to men 
working more than forty hours. The gains were achieved, 
however, at some cost to union principles. Days lost by 
unauthorised stoppages Were to be subtracted from leave 
entitlement. The holding of pit-top mee~lngs, refusal to 
work on Saturdays by surface workers and the rejection of 
overtime were to be similarly penalised. 1 
The report of the Royal Commission on Safety and Health 
promised reforms which m~t most of the miners' clauns. Among 
its most important recommendations were detailed rules for 
the improvement of air circulation and the prohibition of 
ventilation by furnace in all but small mines employing not 
more than eight men. The commission accepted the miners' 
argument that the owners should provide protective equipment 
such as helmets, shin guards, g::iggles and safety boots. 
Lowden's efforts ensured that subsequently the Workmen's 
Compensation Act was amended to bring practically all lung 
diseases contracted by miners under its provisions. 2 
The claims for compulsory retirement with a pension at 
60 years were placed before a further commission which 
eventually recommended weekly pensions of £2 for a miner, 
£1 for hiE wife and Bs 6d for each dependent child. In 1941 
the coal and Shale Mine Workers Pensions Act implemented the 
commission's recommendations although the pension payable to 
a man and wife was 5s less than suggestec. Miners were 
disappointed also with the decision to fund the pensions by 
equal contributions from the government and from the min~.rs 
themselves matched by equal contributions from the coal 
140 CAR, p. 387. The penalty prc:-·risions involving loss of 
holiday rights in the case of strikes or absenteeism were 
withdrawn in 1941. See NSW Industrial Gazette, Vol.lxiii, 
pp.546-9. 
241 .QIB, p.37. 
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proprietors. The miners had been hopeful that the scheme 
would be financed solely by an excise duty on coal. 1 
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Unionism among the coalminers of the Wc..-longong district 
survived however tenuously during the depression because it 
was firmly rooted in the social fabric of the mining 
communities and because the miners were steeped in its 
traditions. Tr 'ition was different. for the iron and 
copper workerr ... aditions of the kind evident all'.ong 
coalminers had -.at the time to take root at Port Kembla where 
unions almost disappeared during the depression and working 
conditions deteriorated markedly. By 1934 some precarious 
progress had been made in rebuilding the ironworkers' branch. 
T. (Paddy) McDonald, for example, claimed twenty-eight 
financial members in 1934. 2 There were serious obstacles in 
the way of a union revival. First, the crowds of men looking 
for work 'on the hill' did not noticeably diminish in number 
until the outbreak of war in 1939. It is possibly true, as 
Merritt claims, that an undue 'proportion of single men and 
unruly wanderers' who had settled at Port Kernbla were always 
ready 'to fight the bosses•, 3 but this was more with words 
than deeds. The despairing rather than belligerent attitude 
of these itinerants is clearly evident in a piece of 
doggerel which appeared in the ironworkers' paper Steel & 
Metal Worker: 
We're working for the B.H.P., we have slipped 
our swags awhile, 
We're just in from off the track, after tramping 
many a mile; 
Shifting muck on construction work, or building 
machinery, 
we live in a tent in Flinders Street, amongst 
the misery. 
, 
·.{eport, r.p.13, 45-7; see also A.G.L. Shaw and G.R. Bruns, 
The Australian coal Industry (Melbourne, 1947), pp.132-3. 
2Illawarra Mercury, 20 March 1934. 
3Merritt, op.cit., p.226 • 
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'l'he bosses he~·e speed us up its sweat and 
grease and grille all day, ' 
And the stink of fumes from lhe , 1rnace stacks, 
rot our lungs away. 
Or working in the rain all day with nothing to 
keep us dry, 
And home at night to a tent that leaks, enough 
to make you cry. 
It is two days on and five days off, half our 
time on the hill, 
Living in hopes of a permanent job, so that 
we can pay our bill. 
They say we're lucky to have the work they 
don't mention the pay, ' 
Little enough, 1a full week in, let alone missing a day. 
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Yet McDonald was especially conscious of 'Woolloomooloo Joe' 
or 'Surry Hills Tim', married itinerants from Sydney who were 
.., 
ready to 'crawl' for ·•ark.~ BHP was no less careful to 
scrutinise those it employed than Hoskins, and victimisation 
of unicnists continued, according to McDonald, to inhibit 
3 
union growth. 
Nevertheless membership rose with the expansion of the 
steel plant. By 1937 the Port Kembla FIA branch had 750 
4 members. There are several explanations for this progress. 
A nucleus of staunch ex-unionists waiting their chance had 
persisted in the spun pipe department. Coalminers now 
entering the steelworks needed little persuasion to join the 
union. If conditions among coalminers were bad .in the early 
i 1930s they were in many respects worse at the steel-works 
but among the unorganised hands genernlly there was not the 
will to rise above passive acceptance of their lot. The 
~xpansion of the plant had the ironic effect of intruding 
just that element of staunch unionism that the ironworkers 
had lacked. To the mechanical advantage of numbers was added 
an even more important advantage of spirit. Deplorable 
1steel & Metal Worker, 3 December 1937. 
2Ibid., 3 September 1937. 
3Ibid. 
4 1~37 council F.0port (FIA), p.6, cited by Merritt, op.cit., 
p.223. 
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living conditions were a constant reminder of the social 
cost of industrial progress. M~Donald contrasted the 
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expansion in the steelworks at Port Kembla with the deprivation 
faced by workers. • 
To give life to the drive for raising our living 
standard, we must approach the question from the 
angle of recognising our economic pcsition 
today, and what it was in 1929. In the short 
space of time which has since elapsed we have 
lost up to 25/- per week in wages, due to what 
some people who are ignorant of the economic 
cause called depression, speed up is more 
rampant since the return of so called 
'prosperity' which has caused so much jubilation 
amongst capitalists and l~ndlords, but we find 
the position of the employed worker has not 
improved. All round increases in the price of 
food, clothing and rents are taking place. In 
these circumstances the basic wage of £3.10.0 
is below subsistence for a family. Have we not 
evidence of this on the Sou~h coast., particularly 
at Port Kembla and Wollongong districts to day? 
Take the question of rent here we find workers 
forced to pay up to 35.1-. and £2 per week in man~· 
cases ••• real wages az·~ considerably lower than1 the actual 25/- per week reduction represent!.;. 
The failure of wages to keep pace with the cost of 
living increased suspicion of 'big-business'. All large-scale 
industry, McDonald argued, sought by speed-up and by 
victimisation to promote further expansion. To McDonald this 
process was self-perpetuating and could lead only to the 
continued exploitation of the workers. Since BHP was 
virtually without competition as an employer at Port Kembla 
the workers were unable, McDonald pointed out, to escape its 
d . . 2 ominating power. 
The company was fr, 1uently clescribed by laboui: spokesmen 
as a government-protected colossus trampling rough-shod over 
the interests of workers. It WM' this that the federal 
member for Werriwa, !1.P. Lazzarini, had in mind when he 
declared: 
The psychology of its management is such that it 
believes that its employees should submit to 
industrial conditions which prevailed in Eo,~rope 
1steel & Metal Worker, 18 December 1936. 
2Ibid. 
•• 
"' 
~ century ago .. The conditions of labour in this 
ind~stry consti~ut7 a menace to the majority of 
tho~e employed in it. The workers of Australia 
have been conceded the right to organize 
themselves, and to form trade unions· but an 
official of a union comprising emplo~ees of this 
company cannot notify the management of decisions 
reached by the organization without being 
dismissed •..• It is urgently necessary that the 
hours of .labour observed in the works at Port 
Kembla shculd be reduced ... men are engaged for 
twelve hour~ a day, and overtime which should be 
resorted to 01,:i y in special circumst;inces, has 
come to be rega. r:i.::'.'l "" normal. If the men 
decline to work overtime ti,.::" are sacked. The 
very long hour~ of labour ar~ w.::"rying and cause 
hardship and '1?.ngers which no empl .... :•ees should 
be expected LO endure .... The works arc ~nown in 
the district as 'The Butcher's Shop', or 'The 
Slaughter Yards' •.•. The management tries 
persistently to convince the employees that, if 
they object to their conditions of employment, 
they will be discharged. It knows only the 
psychology of the big stick. Much of the work 
is unskilled and the company knows that thousands 
of men in the locality are in want of employment.l 
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There was little exaggeration in Lazzarini's allegations. 
Conditions at the steelworks were primitive. The increased 
building activities after 1935 added to the general 
untidiness of the plant and accidents increased in number. 
There were no lockers or washing facilities or dining rooms 
and no roads or footpaths around the mills. As noted earlier 
a growing number of steelworkers lived some distance from 
the ~~eelworks and that while most northern villages were 
linked by rail to the steelworks, in most cases getting to 
work involved cbnsiderable time and effort. In winter a 
steelworker might, as Merritt writes, 'leave home in the _ 
dark ••• trudge a mile and a half througll mud and rain, dry out 
in front of a furnac, eat his meal on the job, be instructed 
to work overtime and then return home in the dark, wet, cold 
and dirty•. 2 He nad to begin work again next morning at 
7.31'. The systematic workjng of overtime was a major 
grievance. Men were seldom told that overtime would be 
1!;;,gQ, 1936, Vol.149, pp.383-4. 
2Merritt, cp.·:it., p.230. 
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necessary until they were actually working their shift anC: 
to refuse 'to work another hour or two'l was to risk 
dismi.,,sal. The provision of an evening meal .for men on 
overtime was guaranteed by law but there were no safeguards 
as to its quality. The meal often c<msisted of door-slab 
sandwiches smeared with peanut butte.c-, or stale, cold pies. 
Frequently the food arrived late. 2 An iron••orker describes 
the announcement of overtime: 'Work on boys we have sent for 
some crib .•• and the crib arrived late, very late, you may 
as well take ic home.• 3 
Dissatisfaction was not confineci to the ironworkers. 
Skilled craftsmen harboured grievances also. The district 
organiser of the AEU, J. Ward, made continued .requests 
throughout 19:::4 for 'a more stringent application of safety 
principles•. 4 A Safety First Conunittee established by the 
engineers was }.gnored by the company. As an itinerant 
organiser Ward could do little without local backing. On 
paper he appeared to have weight of numbers on his side. 
Membership of the Port Kembla sub-branch had doubled since 
1932 and by 1936 claimed 419 members. 5 However, by no means 
all were financial and along with other craft unions the 
AEU was compelled to appoint McDonald, the FIA secretary, to 
check on unfinancial members. At the same time Ward, 
anxious to mobilise support whe.c·~ he cot<ld, declared he 
would back any union which oppo5ed systematic overtime. 6 
This is not to say that divisions 
the craftsmen did not exist. Men 
not, for example, 
between the ironworkers and 
whose job V.tlS to maintai.n 
be expect€u to lend much machinery could 
support for the growing opposition to mechanisati.on amor.g 
1steel & Metal Worker, 12 February 1937. 
2:rnterviews with Mr E. Arrc·.15mith, 14 April 1973; Mr W. Frame, 
26 Apri.l 1973. 
3steel & Metal Worker, 26 February 1937. 
4AEU Monthly Reptrts, May 1934, pp.23··4. 
5:rbid. , p\'.iolished accounts, i:h>ptember 1334. 
6Ibid.,. l'lay 1934, pp.23-4. 
-----------;•--.,;,,;,._. . ...:--..... _._ ...... ____ ......;.~ 
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unskilled labourers. 
l 
According to Ward, however, they were 
'prepared to scrap' for the elimination of overtime which 
prevented more men from gaining employment, for improved 
safety and for preference to unionists.2 
The craft unions were called upon for their support 
sooner than they anticipated. On 24 January 1936 Port Kembla 
ironworkers and BHP became involved in their first head-on 
conflict. The occasion of the dispute was the dismissal of 
a union delegate in the 36-inch mill. N. (Norman) Annabel, 
the man concerned, refused to work overtime. The award 
under which ironworkers and craftsmen were working at Port 
Kembla provided for eight and three-quarter hours' work per 
day. Yet in early January the company fixed ten hours' per 
day as the standard for men working in the 36-inch mill. 
A meeting of the m:..11 •·s shop committee voted unanimously to 
refuse all overtime. It was as the conveyor of this decision 
to the mill superintendent that Annabel was dismissed. 
A stop-work meeting on 31 January organised by the FIA voted 
for a complete stoppage unless Annabel was reinstated and 
overtime eliminated. The mo>.nager C. (Cecil) Hoskins refused -
to discuss either demand and the ironworkers struck. A 
conference of all unions with members at the steelworks waz 
held in Sydney on 3 February. There was a unanimous vote to 
support the strikers and to withdraw all labour from the 
plant. 3 Work ceas<.id at the steelworks on 4 February. Port 
Kembla watersiders refused to handle any material for the 
company, and whe;: BHP attempted to shift coal supplies from 
its collieries and coke from its coke ovens, miners and 
cokeworkers ;it the pits joined the sti::ike. 4 
Throughout the dispute BHP refused to consider the 
reinstatement of Annabel. The willingness of the company to 
1Ibid., December 1935, p.20. 
2Ibid. 
3unions involved in the stoppage were: Engine Drivers and 
Firemen's Association, Amalgamated Engineering Union, 
Australasian Society of Engineers, Electrical Trades, 
Moulders, Boilermakers, Blacksmiths, Bricklayers and 
Carpenters. 
4Illawarra Mercury, 7 February 1936. 
.. 
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make a stand for compulsory overtime is difficult to 
understand even in its own terms. It appeared, however, to 
consider that by limiting the employment of skilled workers 
and by imposing overtime, its costs would be lowered and 
efficiency increased. 1 In negotiations with the unions the 
company offered to place Annabel elsewhere in the plant. 
BHP suggested also that men not wishing to work overtime 
should transfer to another section, which was an evasion of 
the issue of adequate wages for all workers in the plant. 
Requests by the unions for a conference to discuss other 
grievances were ignored. The Industrial Commission declined 
to deal with the dispute until the men returned to work and 
instituted deregistration proceedings against the FIA. 
Justice Cantor allowed the order to remain unsigned for 
:ourteen days but when the strikers did not return to work 
the union was formally deregistered. 2 
The strike cor,tinued for ten weeks before the combined 
unions' corunittee, which was co-ordinating the strike, 
declared that 
.•• after surveying the struggle and recognising 
the heavy financial burden to the unions 
involved, it was satisfied that the results 
~btained from the struggle were worth while, in 
that it accomplished the stabilisation of trade 
union organization by completely organising all 
workers employed, by checking the spread.of 
overtime and for~ing the company to real~se that 
in future diffe ,nt methods of superintendence 
of workers would have to be established and that 
the elemental rights of workers would have to 
be recognised.3 
The corrunittees assessment of the outcome was as far as it 
went, accurate enough. BHP offered to re-employ Annabel, not 
1when iron and steel production had started, the employers 
claimed that overtime was necessary to make up for the 
shortage of skilled workers. The depressio1• had interrupted 
training programmes within the steelworks. See Helen Hughes, 
op.cit., p.124. 
2NSW Arbitration Reports, 1936, p.31. 
3Report and Balance Sheet of the Combined Unions Committee 
on Port Kembla Dispute {Sydney, 1936). Illawarra Trades and 
Labor Council Balance Sheets, Wollongong. 
"''" ., 
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in the 36-inch mill but elsewhere in the plant until his 
case was decided. The company further guaranteed Annabel 
!'ermanent employment whatever the outcome of these 
discussions. For its part the FIA agreed to refer all future 
d:csputes with the. company to the Industrial Commission. In 
subsequent negotiations the union failed to have Annabel 
re-instated to the 36-inch mill. overtime, however, was 
substantially reduced. 
In the short-term, the ironworkers had won a partial 
victory. The importance of the strike, however, lay not so 
much in the achievement of the immediate objective as in its 
wider implications. As the first exercise in direct action 
at the Port Kembla steelworks its outcome helped consolidate 
the position of the union. McDonald reported ·ci,at, in the 
first week of the strike, 415 men joined the branch. 1 Most 
of them probably did so to gain strike assistance. 
Nevertheless the stril;.e was i!!'Otr:.:m.;ntal in rallying 
permanent support for the union. By 1938 the branch claimed 
2,212 members, making it the third largest branch of the 
FIA. 2 This growth was achieved with some difficulty. The 
rapid turnover particularly among construction workers 
continued to be a problem. The poverty-stricken camp 
dwellers remained difficult to organise. Yet despit~ these 
handicaps the trend after the Annabel strike was t•)wards 
more complete union coverage among the ironworkers. Craft 
unions shared a similar experience. The AEU, for example, 
appointed a full-time secretary for the Port K·~mbla branch 
to cope with increased membership. 3 
The involvement in the strike of workers from BHP 
collieries provided an opportunity for the development of 
closer links between the ironworkers and the coalminers. 
They already had much in common. Displaced coalminers now 
working at the steelworks provided a point of contact. 
McDonald and other FIA officials had during the depression 
1
_Illawarra Mercury, 13 March 1936. 
2Merritt, Iro_nworl<ers, p. 223 • 
3AEU Monthly Journal and Reports, June 1937, p.10. 
·, ~: 
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years been in constant contact with the more politically 
active miners especially through joint involvement in the 
Unemployed Workers' Movement. Among their former allies 
there were several militants who were now beginning to win 
lodge positions and influence district policy. Moreover, 
mineJ:s and irnnworkers were united in their hostility to BHP. 
During the Ann;1bel strike, McDonald depicted the company as 
" 'huge steel octopus endeavouring to ·"!!'" _,,; <,-;ery vestige of 
working class organization•. 1 In doing so he was expressing 
the conunon view held by miners of the district's harshest 
employer, whose monopolistic tendencies he went on to 
denounce in forthright terms: 
This vast monopoly principally owned by a small 
gang of parasites principally residing in 
Australia, but linked with the Steel Monopoly of 
Britain, has a stranglehold on the economic and 
political life of Australia ••• and every effort 
is being made [by the companyl to gain the same 
grip upon the coal mining industry.2 
The miners had their own special reasons for hating the 
company, and for joining forces with its other employees. At 
BHP's Wongawilli colliery, new employees were carefully 
screened to eliminate 'trouble-makers', and victimisation was 
a conunon practice. 
McDonald asked the advice of the miners' officials on 
strike tactics and organisation. Orr spoke at length to a 
meeting uf ironworkers of the need for 'collective self-help' 
to sustain the strikers and explained the system of relief 
employed by the Wonthaggi miners in Victoria. 3 He hedged 
when asked whether BHP would capitulate sooner if the strike 
were extended to the company's Newcastle steelworks. He 
admitted that sectional strikes often failed to place 
sufficient pressure on the bosses but pointed out that such 
tactics were sometimes successful. 4 The steelworkers 
1r11awarra Mercury, 7 February 1936. 
2steelworkers' strike Bulletin, No.7, n.d. probably February 
1936. 
3rllawarra Mercury, 27 March 1936; Common Cause, 11 April 
1936. 
4 rllawarra Mercury, 27 March 1936. 
,. 
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accepta:l Orr's suggestions for the relief of men on strike and 
did not seriously consider extending the strike to Newcastle 
in the face of his lukewarm response. 
Reaction to the strike by the Wollongong community at 
large indicates the increasing 
to the local economy. Support 
quarters. Some chu,ch leaders 
of a prolonged strike on those 
importance of the ironworkers 
for the men came from many 
expressed alarm at the effect 
living in the humpy 
. . l 
communities. They had received little assistance from the 
company in their campaign for housing reform and were 
inclined initially to be sympathetic towards the workers. 
This sympathy however diminished the more prolonged the 
stoppage became. To some extent, however, McDonald 
anticipated this particular criticism by arranging special 
2 
sustenance for the campers. 
A more serious charge which threatened to undermine 
such community support as existed was the claim that union 
leaders were at fault in not accepting under protest BHP's 
offer to re-employ Annabel elsewhere in the plant. It was 
alleged by the Illawarra Mercury that the strikers might take 
their case to the court with t.7'.e prospect of public support. 3 
This was an opinion which some ironworkers came to share as 
the strike reached :.ts sixth week. A contnwersial, ex-Welsh 
coalm.iner D. (Dan) .Jones called a public rnee·~. :, g at which he 
urged strikers to return to work and accused •.'dJonald of 
'glory hunting' . 4 He called for twenty-five f:i.nancial 
members of the FIA to summon a meeting of all union meml:.,rs 
to elect 'respectable, honest, intelligent delegates• 5 who 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid., 7 February 1936. 
3
rbid., 20 March 1936. 
4 Ibid. 
5Ibid. 
/ . 
. · r 
·'· /' :! . 
'-! 
would discuss an immediate settlement. In his view the 
strike was the work of 'Sydney's Trades Hall communists•. 1 
Although Jones's allegations cut little ice, support 
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for a negotiated settlement increased as the strike continued. 
After the strike had been in progress for two weeks a public 
meeting was called by the mayor of Wollongong, J.J. Kelly, 
a man of moderate Labor sympathies. He made attempts to 
bring the company and the workers together. BHP lost much 
public sympathy when it rejected his proposal for a 
conference in the following terms: 
The ~ompany cannot see any go0d purpose by a 
conterence at present but v.ould suggest the best 
course would be for the strikers to advise us 
when they are prepared to resume work on the 
terms advised.2 
Support for the strikers went further than expressions 
of sympathy. Many Wollongong citizens contributed to the 
strike-fund and local businessmen were ready to accept 
strike-coupons. Self-interest explains much of this 
co-operation but the fact that many found it expedient to 
accept the disruption of normal business points to the growing 
importance of the steelworkers within the local economy. 
Shopkeepers and local government officials were less willing 
now to disparage the steelworkers as 'outsiders' and 
'trouble-makers'. 
The common experience gained du:.:ing the strike and its 
partial success paved the way for closer union co-operation 
between all metal trades unions within the steelworks. In 
the past individual unions had gained little from separate 
negotiations with the company and there had been few attempts 
to work out common tactics. Indeed in some areas where craft 
1Ibid., 13 March 1936. For some years Jones had been an 
outspoken if somewhat querulous critic of strike-proponents 
within the Port Kembla FL~ branch. His constant criticism of 
the bran,-:h leaders enlivenetl r:ieetings. The officials did 
little to discourage him as they considered that the prospect 
of a fiery speech from Jones enticed many men to meetings. 
They did not, however, entirely di~count him as a possible 
rallying point ~or di:c~n~ented ~nion members. The~ were 
suspicious of his activities during the Annabel strike and 
some felt he was in the pay of the company. Interviews with 
Mr E. Arrowsmith, 14 April 1973 and Mr W. Frame, 26 April 
1973. 
2rllawarra Mercury, 14 February 1936. 
l 
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barriers had become blurred unions competed for members. 
McDonald contrasted division in the workers' ranks with the 
u·end towards monopolistic capitalism exemplified by the 
Port Kembla 'Steel Cartel'. 1 
Th7 nee~ for clo7er unity among the metal trade 
unions is essential when you view the strength 
of the Steel Trust opposed to us. During the 
last f7w y7ars the S~eel and Metal Companies 
operating in Australia have undergone a continual 
process of amalgamation until to-day we see a 
huge Steel Cartel with interests not only in the 
steel and metal ir/iustries but in Banking, Coal, 
Shipping and other financial concerns, and an 
example of their activities in this direction is 
the recent amalgamation of the B.H.P. and the 
A.I. and Steel Ltd.2 
He proposed a conference of all eleven unions with members 
engaged in the Port Kembla metal industries to consider the 
formatiof; of a joint body, to be known as the Metal Workers' 
Council. The principal function of the council was to oo the 
supervision of a campaign 'to oust non-unior.ists and bu.ild 
up 100 per cent financial unionism'. 3 Each member unL:m was 
to elect two delegates to the council. Decisions reached by 
it were to be transmitted to the members by job committees 
established in each section of the works. Conversely, it 
was hoped that the views of members would be conveyed from 
these committees to the council. To encourage this process 
and to co-ordinate the activities of the various job 
committees, a works council at each Port Kembla plant was 
planned. 4 Negotiations proceeded slowly but eventually, in 
December 193~ something approaching the structure envisaged 
by McDonald though with a looser framework, was established 
, 5 
as the South Coast Metal Trades Group. 
For McDonald the establishmen1t of the trades group was 
a step towards indust~ial unionism. Skilled craftsmen and 
1steel & Metal Worker, 11 September 1936 • 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4
rbid., 8 October 1937. 
5
rbid., 3 December 1937. 
. f. 
>? 
:'.~ 
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their union officials were not enthusiastic supporters of a 
move which, if carried to its logical conclusion, would put 
an end to their special status. Job committees were most 
successful in those areas of the steelworks, such 
coke-ovens, where craft divisions intruded least. 
the craftsmen were reluctant to concede that their 
as the 
Elsewhere, 
particular 
grievances could be understood or adequately represented by 
their less skilled workmates. In an ?.ttempt to win over the 
craft unions McDonald pointed out rather speciously that 
mechanisation was already weakening their bargaining position 
0:r reducing employment for men skilled in older techniques. 
When these arguments failed to gain the desired response, 
McDonald accused the craft unions of deliberately obstructing 
'working class organisation• 1 within the steelworks. 
A grievance revealed by the Annabel dispute which 
served to divide further the ironworkers and the skilled 
craftsmen was BHP's policy of offering staff positions to 
key workers in each department. Machine operators who were 
on the 'permanent staff' and foremen had continued to work 
during the Annabel strike2 and union officials regarded them 
as potential strike-breakers in later disputes. The issue 
came to a head in the middle of 1937 when, in accordance with 
a directive from its Melbourne-based directors, the company 
proposed to appoint a further 127 workers to the staff. 3 
These appointments were to be distributed throughout the 
plant, but with heaviest concentrations at the open-hearth 
and at the 36-inch mill. 4 At the same time bonus payments 
were introduced for process workers in the brass-foundry. 
1Ibid. 
2Illawarra Mercury, 26 February 1936. 
3BHP Archives Managing Directors' Minutes - Business Sheets 
(AIS), File No.26 (Carton 72), 22 July 1937. 
4The appointments were to be dist:ibut7d as follows: ~last­
furnace, 7: open-hearth, 33; s?aking-pits, 6; _bloom-mill, 6; 
36-inch mill, 16; 10/13-inch mill, 12; spun-Ripe, 7; roll-
shop, 5; jetty, 4; yard and haulage,.2; ~achine-shop, lt 
foundry 4. electrical-shop, 4; fabrication-shop,_l: 
blacksmith~, 1; power house, 6; brick~ayer~, 2; r~gger~, 3; 
pla::c .. ·".1ill, 2; express drivers, 3; weighbridge, 2. Ibid • 
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In the hope of avoiding industrial trouble the company chose 
' . l h 1 to sunp Y putt e extra money in the [pay] envelopes•,-
rather than announce the new payments. Neither action, 
however, passed unchallenged. McDonald described the new 
policy as part of a wider programme to increase profits by 
speed-up. He foresaw an all-out attempt to split the workers 
and smash the unions by building up a work-force capable of 
carrying on production during a strike. These, he declared, 
were the methods of American capitalism, directed towards 
the eventual establishment of company unions. 2 
There was an element of truth in McDonald's accusations. 
As a pre-requisite for a position on the staff, the company 
required men to resign from the union to which t:tey belonged. 
A mass meeting of ironworkers resolved 
••• that in our considered opini,n recent staff 
appointments in the Port Kembla steelworks ••• 
[are] an attem~t to undermine trade unionism and 
that they [sicj refuse to issue clearances to 
prospective staff men. Further, we decide that 
because of the issues involved to treat all 
staff men who are doing work covered by the 
unions concerned as non-unionists.3 
The union's grievances were put before Judge Cantor at a 
compulsor;r conference. Cantor proposed that men appointed to 
the staff ''hould retain union membership, and that men 
already on the staff should be free to rejoin a union. BHP 
refused to accept either proposal but agreed to pay overtime 
rates to staff, and where possible to eliminate overtime. A 
stalemate resulted: BHP proceeded more slowly with its 
campaign to recruit new staff members and ~~e workers 
. . t' 4 continued their opposition to over irne. 
While these disputes continued, dissatisfaction among 
the men mounted. Some bitterness at the outcome of the 
Annabel strike remained. At the time of the strike a minority 
1
rbid., 30 September 1937. 
2steel & Metal Worker, 24 September 1937. 
3
rbid. 
4BHP Archives, Managing Directors' Minutes - Business Sheets 
(AIS). File No.26 (Carton 72), 22 October 1937. 
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of ironworkers had sought an extension of the strike to the 
Newcastle works. Others were embittered by the deregistration 
of the union. In their view the FIA was deregistered 
because it dared to oppose the will of BHP, and the 'no-strike' 
clause in the negotiated settlement was imposed by the court 
to help the company in the future. Moreover, other 
decisions handed down by the court reinforced their 
preference for direct action. In October 1935 the FIA had 
applied for a 3s increase in the marginal rates of semi-
skilled and unskilled labour, but Judge Beeby refused to hear 
evidence. 1 In April 1936 he refused a request by the FIA, 
the ETU and the Sheet Metal Workers to confine their awards 
to unionists. 2 McDonald cited the court's treatment of 
Sydney foundry workers as evidence of its bias. The court 
had rejected claims for a 5s per week general increase and 
granted moulders 3s per week and ironworkers 2s per week. To 
McDonald and many others this was proof that the court would 
not 
••• take genuine measures to restore wages. The 
decision will undermine further the system of 
compulsory arbitration, which once again is 
shown to be loaded in favour of the employers 
•••• Certainly the decision of Judge Beeby 
cannot have stemmed the tide of revolt against 
low wages, if such was his intention. The 
decision can only have the effect of fanning the 
flames of revolt~ leading to wage struggles in 
the metal trade." 
Sydney foundry workers achieved wage increases rather 
smaller than those they sought from the court, but they were 
able to extract ~hove-award rates from their individual 
employers. In an attempt to follow this example of direct 
action AEU and ASE members working in :?ort Kembla industries 
called a one-day stoppage on 25 June. They demanded a twenty 
per cent increase in wages and imposed a ban on overtime. 
The Port Kembla companies were, however, in a stronger 
134 ~. pp.460-2. 
235 CAR, pp.688-90; 36 CAR, pp.73-5 and 78-80. 
3steel & Metal worker, 26 March 1937. 
:.Yi ~-
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position than their Sydney counterparts to resist these 
claims. Competition between employers for labour, a critical 
factor in Sydney, was virtually abse~t at Port Kernbla. The 
employers were well aware that Port Kembla was 'practically 
a watertight compartment of its own' anc it was predicted 
by their spokesmen that united action wculd 'defeat the 
effort of ~he unions•. 1 During the course of the dispute 
tactics which were later to become familiar emerged. To the 
smaller companies the logical course seemed to be to range 
themselves behind BP..P. They fully realised that the steel 
company would resist in order to prevent the demands 
spreading to other sections of the plant. For its part BHP 
apprec.\ated their support. Essington Lewis, the general 
manager·• applauded the decision cf the smaller companies to 
stand firm. 2 Against this degree of co-operation by the 
employer!' most union efforts faltered. 
The comparative ease with which BHl' checked these 
demands confirmed union leaders in the belief that nothing 
short of an all out strike in the steelworks would force 
concessions from the company. In mid-JunP- 1937 painters and 
riggers struck against the employment of a non-unionist. 
Anticipating a confrontation, McDonald threatened a general 
stoppage, but the individual concerned took out a union 
ticket. The riggers were placated and a wider crisL:; averted. 
Unrest was, however, still widespread. A timely announcement 
by the federal court of an increase in the basic wage to acme 
extent allayed this dissatisfaction. The court felt 
that the increases were justified by current prosperity and 
the existing circumstances of industry. It added a 
'prosperity' loading of Gs a week to federal award wages. 
These adjustments gave all FIA members 7s to 9s more than 
they received in 1936. To the steelworkers these increases 
1A.J. Burgess (industrial adviser, Australian Mines and ~etal 
Association) to Sir Colin Fraser, l July 1937. Broken Hill 
Associated smelters Pty Ltd File, Gro~p.l, p~rsonal ~apers 
of Sir Colin Fraser l/150 (Melbourne U;uversity Archives) . 
2Ibid. 
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were a welcome if belated acknowledgment that tt.e industrial 
?regress at Port Kembla had so far been achieved at some 
cost to living and working conditions. Most, however, felt 
more was needed. 
One clear sign that union leaders were out of touch with 
the discontent of their members was the almost complete 
victory of the communist ticket in the branch elections of 
December 1937. 1 Led by P. (Pat) McHenry, the communists won 
all execut~.ve positions except that of assistant secretary-
treasurer. Their success was aided by trends within the 
labour movement both locally and nationally and by their own 
efforts. As advocates of direct action they could illustrate 
the success of such methods by recent examples. McHenry, 
himself an ex-coalminer, cited the tactics of tPe miners. As 
he interpreted the 'first round' of their 
miners had defeated BHP without a strike. 
campaign, the 
This did not mean 
that they avoided direct action, as their policy still 
included negotiation with the empl0vers and an aversion to 
the court. 2 It was, McHenry assertt!d, the imminent threat 
of an organised strike which prompted the court to save face 
3 for the owners. Regardless of the validity or otherwise of 
this assessment, it was one that was now shared by a growing 
number of ironworkers. 
One explanation for the success of the communists 
within the unions during the late 1930s suggest~ that, so 
general was opposition to the arbitration system and so 
confused were the political groupings within the New South 
Wales labour movement, that precise political colourings 
were not always obvious. 4 However valid this view is of the 
experience elsewhere in Australia - and there must be serious 
reservations about such a generalisation - it is substantially 
misleading in Port Kembla-Wollongong. The near total 
collapse of unionism at Port Kembla during the depression was 
1steel & Metal worker, 3 December 1937. 
2Ibid., 20 August 1937. 
3Ibid. 
4See, for example, o.W. Raws~n, in J.E. Isaac and G.W. Ford 
ed., Australian Labour Relations Readings (Melbourne, 1966), 
p.162. 
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an indication of its previous fragile hold and the relative 
youth of the industrial community. In a very real sense 
therefore the Unemployed Workers' Movement filled the vacuum 
left by the disintegration of the trade unions. It provided 
militants with experience in the organisation of social 
protest. McHenry's career is an epitome of working class 
politics in the 1930s. He progressed from rank and file 
militant to unemployed leader, and so to organiser of 
doleworkers and finally to tr~de union official. After 
migrating to Australia in the early 192Us he worked at 
Mt Keira colliery until he was 'cavilled-out' in 1928. He 
later secured a few weeks emploYlnent at Port Kembla but was 
thereafter permanently unemployed. One of the leaders of 
the Wollongong Unemployed Workers' Movement, McHenry publicly 
proclaimed his communist beliefs during the free speech 
campaign in the North~~n Illawarra municipal elections. 
There was no mistaking his politics. 1 
The background of other members of the communist ticket 
were broadly similar to that of McHenr·_·. None shared his 
coalmining experience but J. (Jim) M1-. ·r. ·--~ 11ad partnered 
McHenry in the unemployed protests. l\« ex-c,eam;m he ·.1as 
largely responsible for the 'closf,d sh0p' among the riggers 
and had led their strike against ·:he employment of a 
non-unionist. J. (Jim) Carrabine, W. (Bill) Frame and 
E. (Ted) Arrowsmith were more fortunate in their depression 
experiences. All worked in the spun-pipe section of the 
steelworks and therefore had only short periods of 
unemployment. Their contacts with the Unemployed Workers' 
Movement had been few, but they built l.lf• a reputation for 
militancy both by their attempts to imp:i:c,ve conditions and 
their outspoken opposition to the company. 
This is not to say that all ironworkers accepted the 
communist policy in full, but merely that most recognised 
the untiring work of particular communists to improve their 
conditions. Their efforts on behalf of the workers spa~ned 
1see Chapter Three for McHenry's ac~iv~~ies in the Unemployed 
Wo:i:kers • Movement and p.177 for J:tis involvement in the 
Northern Illawa:i:ra municipal elections. 
, . 
. J: 
a wide range of activities. They proclaimed the right to 
free speech, were to the fore in self-help programmes and 
active in the !'0'.•sing reform movement. These actions in 
themselves may have been sound communist tactics but the 
• 
workers did not need to accept them as such, and events 
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showed that most of them did not do so. Chance also played 
its part in the victory of the communists. Shortly befcre 
the 193'7 branch elections, 
a motor-cycle accident. 1 
McDonald was seriously injured in 
Consequently he did not campaign 
in the election and was not again active in union affairs. 
If McDr'.'lald' s virtual withdrawal made victory a somewhat 
hollow one, the unopposed return of McHenry's entir~ team the 
following year ~ade their position secure. 2 
Tha new committee concentrated on increasing union 
membership within the steelworks, and on extending union cover 
in the Port Kembla industries and in Lysaghts fact•)ry. 
Before the election of McHenry the FIA had made li.ttle 
progress at Lysaghts. The plant wa~ new and union leaders 
needed time to establish themselves. McHenry, however, had 
some success in encouraging more active unionism within 
various departments. In July 1938 men in the pickling and 
galvanising section struck against a proposed roster system 
for continuous operation within the plant and against 
speed-up within the works. The strike, which lasted three 
weeks, was complete and the negotiations which followed a 
return to work removed anomalies from the roster system. 
Following the example of the Annabel strike this success 
boosted the growth of unionism among workers at Lysaghts. 3 
These advances were not matched .'.n the copper industry, 
among those men who were members of th'" AWU. During the 
depression the AWU branch at Port Kembla had virtually 
disintegrated. After 1934 the branch staged a slight 
recovery in membership and by 1938 claimed 400 financial 
1steel & Metal Worker, 3 December 1937. 
2tbid., 18 November 1938. 
3tbid., 12 ~ugust 1938. 
1 
' . :~. 
) . 
'· 
f 
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members in a work-force of 600. 1 The branch received very 
little assistance from its federal executive although a 
full-time organiser was appointed in 1936. There was much 
cl.issutisfaction among the membershio when in 1936 the uni' on 
- , , 
negotiated agreements with the Port Kembla companies which 
contained few gains for workers. During the two-year 
currency of the agreement the union remained relatively 
quiescent but local discontent was aroused by cuts in bonus 
rates. Workers complained also that intermittent operations 
at the refinery were used to practise victimisation. 2 
Dis;;atisfaction with ·the AWU opened up the possibility 
of the FIA moving into the copper industries. In 1938 
McHenry and Mackie applied to the court for 'right of entry' 
to Metal Manufactures and to ER & s. The companies opposed 
both applications as they saw the FIA as a 'particularly 
militant union' • 3 The court, nevertheless, allowed both men 
entry and McHenry immediately began a campaign aimed at 
gaining equal preference with the AWU in the plants. At 
first McHenry concentrated more on Metal Manufactures. There 
we>:"e good reasons for this. 
some classifications at the 
In the first place, there were 
plant which overlapped with 
those of the federal ironworkers' award. Secondly, there was 
considerable pressure from within the works for the AWU to 
negotiate a compr0mise with the ironworkers. In November 
1938 after a series of meetings between FIA and AWU 
officials a demarcation agreerr.ent i·ms arranged. The AWU 
conceded that employees in certain departments should come 
under the FIA award. 4 , The unions further agreed to elect a 
joint committee made up 
Manufactures and.ER & s 
of AWu representatives from Metal 
. 5 
and delgates from the F!A. In 
practice the ironworkers were the senior partners in this 
.
1tllawarra Mercury, 27 July 1938. 
2steel & Metal Worker, 18 November 1938. 
3Mctal Manufactures Notes of Meeting, 11 November 1938. 
4steel & Metal Worker, 18 Novem_ber 1938. 
5Ibid. 
2:!0 
co-ordinating body whose formation represents a significant 
step in the forging of a cohesive labour movement in the 
district, distinctly militant in spirit. 
The influence wielded by the ironworkel.'s-encouraged 
McHenry and the FIA federal executive to push ahead with 
their plans to obtain equal preference with the AWU in the 
Port Kembla works. In May 1939 when the current agreement 
between the AWU and the companies expired both the FIA and 
the AWU filed a log of claims for all classifications within 
the works. 1 The award, as handed down by the additional 
conciliation conunissioner Kavanagh in December, rejected the 
FIA claims for equal preference. There was much 
dissatisfaction with the subsequent award and a series of 
stop-work meetings passed resolutions demanding the 
restoration of allowances for certain classes of work. The 
AWU disclaimed all responsibility for the stoppages and 
alleged that they were instigated by FIA officials who 
••• having no legal responsibility in this matter, 
[have] sought occasions to encourage the employees 
to strike against the Award and set up a condition 
of tyranny within the works as a means of forcing 
the employers into compliance with their decision 
to have recognition granted to the Ironworkers' 
Union. On each of these occasions the AWU has 
advised the employees to remain at work and to 
ignore the tactics of the Ironworkers' Union 
which were designed to blackmail the court and 
the employers into granting a recognition of the 
Union which had been' excluded by the highest 
indu~trial aut~orit~ of New south Wales on all 
previous occasions. · 
The employers came to the same conclusion. They claimed that 
the stoppages were an attempt by 'the conununistic element in 
the Ironworkers to involve the industry in a shut down•. 3 
1Metal Manufactures: Hotes of Meeting, 11 May 1939 • 
2circular Letter, Re Inter-Union Dispute, Metal Manuf;'.·:tt.7es 
Ltd Port Kembla. Explanation of position by the Aus1;•,i:c,J:.;m 
Workers• union (W. Anderson organising secretary, New 3t»U~.h 
Wales Branch), n.d. circa November 1939. Metal Manuf<:Lc:·:~m:·es 
File, Port Kernbla. 
3N . otes on Meeting, 13 November 1939, M0tal Manufactures File, 
Port Kembla. 
;[ 
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The dispute between the FIA on one side and the AWU and 
Port Kembla companies on the other was a protracted one and 
need not be described in detail here. In 1942 the 
ironworkers were granted equal preference with the AWU. The 
inter-union dispute, however, revealed clearly that a 
considerable number of AWU memb<;rs were anxious to throw in 
their lot with the FIA. To many workers it appeared that 
the AWU was in collusion with the company and a protest 
meeting at Metal Manufactures declared AWU officials black. 1 
There is also evidence to suggest that some local AWU 
officials prepared the way for an FIA take-over. To some of 
the more militant-minded branch leaders there were good 
reasons for doing so. The FIA had the largest membership of 
any union at Port Kembla and had shown the advantage of 
numbers. L. (Len) Boardman, the communist AWU organiser who 
had learnt his union skills alongside McHenry in the 
Unemployed Workers' Movement, called step-work meetings at 
Metal Manufactures and ER & s. For his "-Spousal of the 
ironworkers' position 
leaders as a 'blatant 
his union position. 3 
Boardman was denounced by other AWU 
urger• 2 and eventually dismissed from 
To Boardman the entry of the FIA into 
the copper industries promised a more coherent Port Kembla 
uni0n coverage and brought industrial unionism a step closer. 
Most AWU members, however, transferred their allegiance to 
the FIA in the hope of more immediate and more tangible 
gains. Whatever motives led men to support the FIA's 
invasion of the copper industries, the result was to 
strengthen union organisation at Port Kembla and to open the 
way for more concerted action between unions. 
1An ooen Letter to the Employees of Metal Manufactures Ltd 
(Port-Kembla Printery), 5 August 1941. 
2circular Letter, Re Inter-Union Dispute, Metal Manufactures, 
op.cit. 
3rnterview with Mr L. Boardman, 14 April 1973. 
'P!M 
".,<I. 
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The organisation forged at Port Kembla between 1934 and 
1939 was distinctly different in character from that which 
existed a decade earlier. The changes which had taken place 
were not simply a function of size but were shaped by 
depression experience and subsequent developments. Since 
most Port Kembla unions were born during the depression they 
were peculiarly open to the influence of current radical 
attitudes. There, were no established leaders and traditions 
to dampen militan,_ tendencies. Leaders were able to 
construct a unionL;m whose most distinctive features were 
primarily the work of a group of dedicated leaders who 
themselves provided an example and foretaste of the wider 
solidarity towards which they were striving. They maintained 
personal friendships and loyalties across formidable union 
barriers while not losing sight of the needs of rank and file 
unionists who supported :·.hem. 
The re-establishment of the Illawarra Trades and Labour 
Council in September 1935 was both cause and effect of this 
closer unity. 1 When the council had ceased to meet in 1932 
s. (Steve) Best its secretary continued to protest in its 
name on behalf of the unemployed. Aided by the southern 
district miners, Best began to reconstruct the council and by 
1937 he had built up a membership of sixteen affiliated 
unions 2 and helped it regain general recognition as the 
chief spokesman for trade unions in the district. This 
position was cemented by the council's support for the 
Annabel strike of 1936 and for the coal strike of 1938. 
The growing importance of the council during this period 
indicates the changing nature of industrial organisation. 
From its formation in 19283 the council had relied heavily 
upon the support of the coalminers, but in the 1930s it came 
to reflect the growing strength of the metal trades unions. 
McDonald and later McHenry served terms as president of the 
lillawarra Mercury, 8 September 1935; Common Cause, 
11 January 1936. 
2r11awarra Trades and Labor council Minutes, 13 January 
1938. 
3 See Chapter One, p.40. 
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council. Both men encouraged the extension and consolidation 
of unions within the district. ?articular attention was oaid 
to establishing trade groups covering unions with members- in 
the same gener.al industry. The formation of the Metal 
Trades Group had been encou2·aged by the coi:i.ncil as was a 
building trades group. 1 There was some success also in 
bringing together workers in the food trades: meatworkers, 
shop assistants, bakers and breadcarters. 2 The council 
endeavoured to establish links with other New south Wales 
labor councils. In particular, close relations 
established with the Newcastle Trades and Labor 
were 
·1 3 counci • 
Wollongong had much in common with Newcastle. Both were coal 
and steel centres of national importance. Migration to 
Newcastle and back was not uncommon; during the Annabel 
strike numbers of WolJ.ongong ironworkers returned to 
Newcastle and Lithgow to live with friends or relations. 4 
These vertical links between council and individual 
unions and horizontal links between ~he district and the rest 
of the state mark the entry of Port Kcmbla into the 
mainstream of New South Wales industrial labour. It was no 
longer a remote weakly-held outpost but a labour citadel in 
its own right. By 1938-9 an organised labour movement had 
emerged from a struggling collection of separate unions 
whose horizons were circumscribed by parochial problems. Men 
were beginning moreover to take roots in their new 
surroundings and create their own social cohesion. What 
tensions remained could be contained within this new 
organisation. Differences continued to exist between the 
skilled and unskilled and between the miners and their 
deputies. The exclusivism common among coalminers irritated 
1r11awarra Trades and Labor Council Minutes, 17 and 30 March 
1937, 24 August 1938. 
2
rbid., 13 March 1937 • 
3rbid., 17 March 1937, 30 March 1938. 
4 rllawarra Mercury, 27 March 1936. 
• 
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other union leaders. 1 Yet what had taken place was more than 
a radicalisation of an active minority. Union leaders were 
no longer confronted with a'.\ apathetic membership. There 
existed among Wollongong-Port Kembla workers a general 
consciousness of ~heir ywn interests and ~spirations, as 
distinct from those o.f other sections of the commur.ity. Z.iuch 
of this 'consciousness' was indeed conferred by common 
hostility to the 'inhuman face' of BHP capitalism, as it 
glowered down upon their daily lives. What was at issue was 
not so much the size of this industrial colossus as the 
social effects of its capitali!etic zeal directed 
unimaginatively to increased production at the cost of its 
workers and their f~milies. This questioning of social as 
well as economic priorities was for many workers a reaction 
to harsh cc·ntlitions at home and at work from which escape 
had once seemed almost impossible. Their determination to 
bar every possible road back to depression was at the swne 
time compelling them to take new atticudes in politics. 
l__ · · d men who were FIA officials in the 1930s 
-wnen interviewe . · · bl th 
commented that while the ::oal~iners were invar7a y e 
f · t · to vote assistance for a strike they clung irs union group Interviews with 
steadfastly t~ their ind7p1e~~;~ceMr w. Frame 26 April 1973. Mr E. Arrowsmith, 14 Apri • • 
~···· 
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CF.APTER SEVEN 
THE WORKERS A~'D POLITICS: 1934-9 
Preoccupation with industrial concerns was a predictable 
response to the social and economic circumstances of the 
post-depression era. As a consequence there was a declining 
concern with politics and a continued suspicion of the Labor 
Party. The decision of southern miners to disaffiliate in 
l 1933 had rested on the hostility of militants to Lang and 
on a more general belief that with Lang in control of the 
Labor Paxty in New South Wales there was little hope of 
defeating non-Labor state and federal governments. But the 
social and industrial conditions a.round which unionism was 
rebuilt also generated new political attitudes. The long-
term social reforms which workers demanded had to be achieved 
and maintai~,ed by political means. It was easy enough to 
damn all current parties and politicians out of hand, but 
politics would not go away. Sooner or later, industrial 
workers would have to come to terms with the parliamentary 
~ystem. This realisation can be seen in a succession of 
statements .after 1935. Miners' officials described the 
success of their campaigns for pensions and better working 
conditions as political and class victories. 2 FrA leaders 
declared that to challenge BHP was to call into question the 
political alliance between government and big business. The 
proponents of housing reform attacked what they described as 
established priorities in government spending. The language 
used was frequently communist rhetoric, but the sentiments 
were widely shared. 
In 1935, however, there remained serious political 
divisions within the Wollongong labour movement. While Lang 
was leader, the ALP remained as unacceptable to the more 
militant trade unionists as it was to the communists. 
l See Chapter Four, p.193. 
2Illawarra Mercury, 7 October 1938. 
' 
-'tt\ 
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Further, the majority of workers displayed little enthusiasm 
for party politics while the state-federal party split 
continued and anti-Lang and pro-Lang factions faced each 
other in New South Wales. Individual communists may have 
been supported as trade union officials mainly on personal 
grounds but, for the majority of workers, the communist Party 
remained an unacceptable political alternative. The history 
of Wollongong working class politics in the years immediately 
following the depression is largely taken up with attempts 
by the contending factions to impose some sort of political 
consensus. From this struggle there emerged unity of a kind, 
but not the kind sought by any one of the factions. 
The organisation and voting behaviour of workers in the 
1935 state election provide a useful measuring stick by 
·..:hich political attitudes may be gauged. ALP activity in 
both local electorates was weak. Many of the party's 
branches which flourished during the 1931 and 19321 had 
ceased to exist, and others functioned only fitfully. In 
practice, all that remained were two branches, one at BulJ.i-
Woonona and the other in Wollongong. Each was assiduously 
cultivated as a centre of local influence by the respective 
members, J.T. sweer.ey and W.A. Davies. Union leaders stood 
apart from the election campaign and meetings were, by 
comparison with 1932, poorly attended. It was estimated 
that fewer than 150 attended the opening address of Davies' 
campaign and the Illawarra Mercury reported that not one 
question was put to him. 2 In Bulli, apart from a series of 
unreported street-corner meetings, Sweeney barely campaigned. 
This was in large part, however, due to the failure of 
non-Labor parties to run a candidate against him. Sweeney 
did not fear his communist opponent, P. McHenry. 
The campaign strategy employed by McHenry and his fellow 
communist candidate for the Illawarra seat, J .R.K. Cranston, 
illustrates the party's changing attitude towards the Labor 
Party. The stated objective of both men was to encourage a 
1see chapter Four, p.166. 
2r11awarra Mercury, 3 May 1935. 
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united front with their Labor opponents. They proposed a 
?rogramme of joint struggle against the capitalists and 
suggested a series of general demands including better 
treatment of the unemployed and a shorter worYing week. In 
addition, they advocated specific local refor:;.:.o such as 
improved housing. 1 
Their decision to stress common goals rather than 
elaborate ideological differences was based partly on an 
interpretation of locol social reality, and par~ly on 
changing Comintern2 policies. The distance between communists 
and militant unionists on industrial _matters was narrowing, 
as witnessed by the election of communist leaders in the 
l•liners' Federation. Political differences between them had 
never been a« great on the coalfields as they were elsewhere 
in Australia and they had diminished further during the 
Jepression. Few Wollongong corn.~unists were so uncompromising 
in their commitment to world revolution as to cut themselves 
off from the :,ustralian mainstream of socialist thinking in 
the Labor Party. Their tactics were also in accord with the 
drift of communist Party policy away from attacks on 
bourgeois democracy towards co-operation with the ALP. In 
December 1935 the Communist Party of Australia formally 
adopted 
to such 
a united front policy, but the ALP failed to respond 
3 
overtures. 
In the event, the two sitting members were returned 
with increased majorities. 4 In Bulli almost one-sixth of the 
1Ibid., 3 May 1935. 
2see Alastair Davidson, op.cit., p.74, for a discussion of 
the Seventh Comintern Congress. 
3For a discussion of the change in Communist Party policy see 
Alastair Davidson, op.cit., pp.72-97. 
4voting figures f<)r the Bulli electorate were: J.T. Sweeney 
(ALP), 8,382; P. McHenry (Communist), 2!002. There were 
2,323 informal votes. The bulk of the informal vote~ were 
probably cast by conservative voters who had no candidate to 
vote for. voting figures for the Illawarra seat were: 
W. Davies (ALP), 8,086; W.L. Duncan (UAP), ~,659; A.E. Rowe 
(Independent), 327; J.R.K. Cranston (Communist), 659. 
NSW PP, 1935-6, pp.569-70. 
' :>I ~~· 
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vo~es went to the Communist candidate. Support was heaviest 
in the small coalmining com.'l\unities, such as Wombarra and 
Scarborough, where two votes in three went to McHenry. For 
some, supporting McHenry was made easier by the absence of 
any real threat to the Labor candidate. It is likely also 
that, as secretary of the Corrirnal Relief Workers' Association, 
McHenry commanded a considerable personal vote. Cranston, 
however, did not poll nearly so well in the Illawarra contest. 
He doubled the party's 1932 total, yet received only 659 
votes. The circumstances of the Illawarra contest were, 
however, somewhat different from those in Bulli. The sitting 
Labor member had failed to gain a majority of primary votes 
in 1932 and held the seat on Communist second preferences. 
Rather than endanger Labor's hold on the electorate men who 
were otherwise dissatisfied with Davies felt constrained to 
vote for him. The basic considerations were local and 
tactical, not ideological. 
Labor's improved vote in Wollongong was in accord with 
state-wide trends. Twenty-nine Labor candidates were 
successful, five more than in 1932. 1 This performance, 
however, did not dispel the belief that with Lang at its head, 
the party's electoral chances were negligible. Defeat at the 
polls in fact strengthened pressure from within some 
branches for a reform of party procedures. The gravamen of 
the reformists' charge was that an inner group was c?ntrolling 
the party in a systematically corrupt fashion. In particular, 
they alleged pre-selection b.'l.llots were being manipulated and 
that group representation at the party's annual conference 
left some industrial groups under-represented. 2 These 
1Total seats gained and the percentage of the valid vote 
cast for each party was as follows: State Labor, 29 seats 
and 42.41 per cent; UAP, 38 seats and 33.09 per c7nt; 
Country Party, 23 seats, 12.92 per cent. See ~o~in A. Hughes 
and B.D. Graham, Australian Government and Politics, 
pp.450-1. 
2The AWU and the Miners' Federation each made up a gr~up.by 
itself but the other groups (e.g. Land Tra~sport, Building, 
Manufa~turing, Public Utilities) eac~ con~ained a number of 
unions. on the representation of unions in the l\LP generally 
see D.W. Rawson, op.cit., pp.116-8. 
; 
' 
grievances were supported by a group of dissatisfied Labor 
politicians, and what emerged was a proposal for a special 
conference to revise the system of reoresentation at the 
party conference and to remove 'the causes of present 
apathy' •1 
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Wollongong ALP branches declared against the proposed 
reforms. The Woonona-Bulli branch re-affirmed its 'complete 
confidence in the leadership of J.T. Lang•, 2 and complained 
that the demands for a special conference were 'contrary to 
. 3 
the best interests of the Labor Movement'. Southern 
district miners' officials, however, commended the proposed 
reforms although they had no sympathy for a suggestion that 
future representation oi unions on all party bodies should 
be lirnited. 4 · 
The growing opposition to Lang from within the party, 
together with the decision of the Co.nmunist Party to work 
with the ALP, encouraged southern miners to seek 
re-affil!.ation. The way for such action was further cleared, 
in February 1936, when Lang concluded a unity agreement with 
the Federal Party. Among other things, the agreement 
recognised the supremacy of the Federal ALP executive, 
guaranteed continuity of membership to those who had joined 
the Federal ALP since the split in 1931, and set up a system 
of appeals to the Federal executive. 5 
In April, the southern miners' delegate board, 
unanimously adopted a motion from the Helensburgh miners' 
1Labor Daily, 24 June 1935, 12 August 1935. The demands 
emanated from the Marrackville branch and were sponsored by 
c.c. Lazzarini, a brother of the federal member for Werr~wa, 
H.P. Lazzarini, and R.J. Heffron. See D.W. Rawson, op.c~t., 
p.177; and I.E. Young, 'The Impact of J.T. Lang on the N.s.w. 
Labor Party, 1929-1943', M.A. thesis (University of New South 
Wales, 1963), pp.202-69. 
2woonona Branch Australian Labor Party Minute Book, 21 May 
1935. 
3Ibid., 27 August 1935. 
4Labor Dai)i:, 24 June, 29 August 1935. 
5For a more detailed treatment see L.F. Crisp, Ben Chifley 
(Melbourne, 1960), pp.101-2. 
lodge proposing re-affiliation with the ALP. The motion 
upon which re-affiliation was to be 
It asked for written assurances from the ALP 
enumerated co;;:: i. tions 
negotiated. 
that it would: 
•.• upon gaining political power immediately 
re~eal ~he Crimes Act, the Transport Workers 
(~icensing) Act, the ban upon working class 
literat~re, the present censorship, the war 
Precauti~ns.Act, the Illegal Associations Act, 
the Permissible Income Regulations (which have 
o~erated so harshly against many of the 
mineworkers not cnly in this district but 
against workers in all districts of the mining 
fields and elsewhere) , and the removal of all 
anti-working-class legislation from the 
statute books of Australia. 
We also insist on a guarantee that the 
iniquitous wages tax will be abolished, a new 
and up-to-date workers compensation act 
introduced that will provide adequate 
compensation for all industrial diseases; also 
a new coalmines regulation act that will clearly 
and unmistakeably g·ive the mineworkers the right 
to erect any timber they may deem necessary for 
their own safety so as to prevent any repetition 
of the Helensburgh dispute. 
Also a guarantee is required that all members 
who may have been deemed to be outside the Party 
through the Bulli by-election, be at once given 
continuity of membership and the leagues and 
unions in this district in future have the right 
to nominate their own candidate for 
parliamentary positions. 
Another condition is that none of our members 
will be expelled from the A.L.P. because of 
their belonging to any other working-class 
party, such as the ILD., The Friends of Soviet 
Union, and the Movement Against War and Fa<:-' sm, 
and that in the event of any such member::c ~.·•·! ;. 0 
elected to represent us at. any conferenv0 .,,..~ ~., 
they will be allowed to.take their sea~s.thereat 
unchallenged, irrespective of what political 
opinions they· may hold.l 
30() 
Until the final paragraph, the resolution contained little 
more than a combination of traditional union requests for 
legislation to improve working conditions and demands for 
more say by the rank and file in party affairs. Insistence 
upon the admission of members of communist auxiliar7 groups, 
1comrnon cause, 25 April 1936. 
'II!!' 
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however, made certain the proposal would be rejected. 
A further approach was made in June. on this occasion 
it came from Wollongong party branches. After 1935 militant 
unionists joined the ALP to regain control of the local 
political organisation from the Langites, and, hopefully, 
to influence the direction of party policy. By 1936 some 
branches were dominated by unionists. This was especially 
so at Corrimal where S. (Sam) Blakeney, a Scarborough 
coalminer, and E. (Ted) Arrowsmith an FIA official, led a 
branch comprised, in the main, of miners from the South Bulli 
colliery reputed locally to be a militant 'Durham oit'. 1 It 
was this branch which pro9osed the establishment of a south 
coast district assembly composed of representatives from all 
Wollongong labour organisations. The creation of such a body 
was sanctioned by ALP rules but the proposal was opposed by 
the Lang branches in the Bulli electorate. The Woonona-Bulli 
branch officials rejected the suggestion because they felt 
that 'the different political elements in the Trade Unions 
would render the assembly inoperative•. 2 The same officials 
held the executive positions on the Bulli Electorate Council 
and were able to win sufficient support to ensure th.'?: defeat 
of the Corr:L~al motion. 3 
After June 1936, as more militants entered the branches, 
it was increasingly difficult for Lang supporters to dampen 
local complaints. Their difficulties became clear during a 
clash between Lang and 
of Labor Daily funds. 
the Miners' Federation over 
Lang planned to establish a 
newspaper and to transfer the control of Radio 2KY 
from the state Labor council to the state ALP. The 
the use 
Sunday 
Sydney 
southern 
miners' delegate board condemned both proposals and calJ.ed 
upon Davies, Sweeney and all Labor politicians rP.presenting 
coalfield c?nstituencies to oppose Lang's attemp~s to cement 
1According to the oral testimony of several miners, a 
number of Durham miners, many of whom were related, held 
lodge positions at south Bulli throughout the 1920s and 1930s. 
2Illawarra Mercury, 12 June 1936. 
3woonona Branch Austr~lian Labor Party Minute Book, 3 May 
1936. 
...... 
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his personal control of t~e paL~y. In reply, Davies 
endeavoured to carry a motion through the Illawarra 
Electorate Council commending Lang's attempt to float a new 
paper. He met unexpected opposition. The council declined 
to take any action until it had listened to a delegation 
from the coalminers. After hearing the miners' case it 
decided to take no further action.l 
The council took a more definite and hostile stand when 
Lang expelled a number of Labor politicians and union 
officials for attending a conference to condemn his actions 
and to suggest ways of reforming the party. It denounced 
the expulsions and called on Lang to 
summon a special conference as provided by rule 
48, delegates be properly elected by affiliated 
unions, A.L.P. Leagues, Councils and District 
Assemblies. Soecial conference shall consider 
expulsions from A.L.P., Federal pre-selections, 
rules of A.L.P., and paper dispute, and any 
other matters that special conference may desire 
.. : consider. 2 
Trade union officials were more critical. At a 
conference called by the Illawarra Trades and Labor Council 
they declared D<"Ties and Sweeney out of step with the 
industrial movement. 3 The conference condemned the 'fascist 
element' in the party which, it alleged, had by its 
'ruthless and dictatorial control of thP- central machinery of 
the movement' , 4 lowered the party's prestige. It called for 
a restoration of unity 'upon a solid democratic basis' , 5 and 
pledged to end the 'period of Fascist dictatorship operating 
6 . h' d . t within the movement'. To achieve tis en a commit ee was 
formed composed of one representative from each attending 
'.lnion. 7 
1111awarra Mercury, 3 July 1936. 
2Ibid., 2 October 1936. 
3Ibid. 
1 1bitl. 
5
rbid. 
6Ibid. 
7 lhid. 
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These criticisms may be seen simply as a part of the 
faction-fighting within the labour movement. certainly most 
Labor supporters consic.~red them a part of a ccntinuing 
struggle for influence within the party among trade union 
groups and between the unions and some party branches. It 
was a struggle moreover which mo5t felt could only further 
weaken the party. Demands for change in par'.:.:-r organisation 
iP the name of reform were not just part of a battle for 
control of the rarty between the 'ins' and the •outs'. In 
Wollongong the anti-Lang position came to represent an 
aH:ernative policy closely related to the wants of local 
workers. This is most clearly revealed in the emergence of 
a 'united front' programme during the early months of 1935. 
United front proposals were the result of two separate 
initiatives. The first came from union leaders who saw 
existing political divisions as hindering more militant 
industrial policies. The second was a product of the 
Con~nunist Party's desire to stimulate working class 
consciousness. Both attitudes may be observed, at the grass-
roots level, in disputes between the Northern Illawarra 
Council and relier workers' associations during 1935. 
Discontent among relief workers was general. Conditions of 
work were bad and jobs often pointless and tedious. 1 Used 
to venting their grievances at stop-work meetings, unemployed 
coalminers did not readily accept regulations forbidding such 
stoppages by relief workers. The local bodies who 
administered the programm" found relief gangs difficult to 
control. Gangers appointed from the .ranks were frequently 
unable to manage men who were bored and n·ften disinclined to 
work for low wages. Some gangers ma<l,~ little effort to do 
so and simply followed the dictates of their gang whose 
gr.ievances they shared. It was the dismissal of one such 
ganger that precipitated t~e first united front agitation in 
Wollongong•. 
In February 1935, the Northern Illawarra Council dismissed 
a ganger w. Taylor. His gang had, contrary to relief work 
1see Chapter one, pp.47-53; Chapter Five, pp.237-8. 
~ )-::::5?.-
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regulations, held a stop-work meeting. The men objected to 
being placed on curbing and guttering work unless award 
rates were paid. A policeman was called to order the men 
back to work, and the gang reluctantly complied. ,'l.t this 
point Taylor was dismissed presumably for allowing the 
stop-work meeting, although it was later said that he was 
'cheeky' to the council engir.eer. 1 To the relief workers 
t:his seemed a clear case of victimisation. Taylor• s cause 
was taken up by the southern miners' delegate board, by lodge 
officials at the three pits within the ~unicipality (South 
Bulli, Corrimal and Mt Keira), by the Corrimal branch of the 
ALP, by the relief workers' association and by the Communist 
Party. 2 
As the campaign for Taylor's reinstatement progressed, 
new complaints were added. The first concerned a state 
government proposal to place Wollongong's unemployed single 
men in relief camps at 
south of Wollongong. 3 
Cambewarra mountain, over fifty miles 
The men were to be employed on Main 
Roads Board work constructing a scenic highway from Nowra to 
Kangaroo Valley. Opponents of the scheme offered three 
00jections. The first concerned proposed working conditions. 
Men at thif camp were to be assigned to one of two working 
parties. Each group was to work a daily five-hour shift for 
four days a week, with a four-hour day on Fridays. Gangers 
and drivers were to work a ten-hour day. Wages for the 
majority of workmen were pegged at £2 lOs a week and 
marginal rates, which normally applied for such work, were 
not paid. Unemployed leaders declared that there were 
obvious speed-up possibilities in the scheme. The two-
shift device introduced a ten-hour working-day which 
benefited the government by reducing overhead costs, and left 
tbe way open for a permanent extension of the working day. 
The second objection related to the hardships involved by 
moving men away from families and friends and to the cost 
l For tr.e 
Northern 
17 April 
2u . ni.ty, 
3Ibid. 
0rigins of the dispute see Unity, 5 March 1935; 
Illawarra Municipality Minute Book, 13 February, 
1935. 
5 Marcli 1935. 
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involved when men wished to retucn heme at weekends. 
Finally, some expressed the view that the ~cheme would soon 
be extended to married men with families.! 
The campaign met with only limited success. Taylor was 
eventually reinstated, but the relief camps scheme continued. 
Another outcome was a decision to nominate E.R. Browne, 
vice-president of the southern district of the Miners' 
Federation, as a united front candidate for a municipal 
by-election in November 1935. With the support of all groups 
involved in the Taylor-relief camp protest, Browne scored a 
comfortable victory. 2 The communists were quick to <:>.pitalise 
upon Browne's success and claimed that the tactics employed 
in Northern Illawarra held lessons for all Australian workers. 
Writing in the Workers' Weekly, W. (Bill) McDougall, a party 
organiser who came to Corrimal from Sydney in 1935, pointed 
out that the 
[corrimal] United front was not accomplished by 
'correspondence', nor by dealing with 
generalities.· It was accomplished by Conununist 
activists and A.L.P. activists along with non-
party workers, resolutely leading the workers 
in the locality in their day to day demands.3 
His analysis of the Corrimal united front was accurate enough, 
but, since his remarks were intended also as an exhortation 
to fellow conununists, he exaggerated the role of his party. 
Nevertheless, the central point remains valid: the Northern 
Illawarra campaign witnessed a high degree of co-operation 
between the conununists and Labor supporters. 
The example of Northern Illawarra provided the momentum 
for further united front proposals. In 1936 a conference of 
united front supporters called by the Illawarra Trades and 
Labor council put forward the following ten-point progranune: 
1. 
1Ibid. 
To assist in the campaign for the 40-hour 
week, in conjunction with the Miners' 
Federation demand for a 30-hour week and 
also a 25 per cent increase in wages. 
2The votes recorded in the by-election were: E.R. Bro~me, 
645; w. Shaw, 191; T. Silcocks, 89. See Illawarra Mercury, 
8 November 1935. 
3workers' Weekly, 12 November 1935. 
i' 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Necessary_ amendments to the Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
A~terations and amendments to the Coal 
Mines Regulations Act. 
Deleti~n of anti-working class clauses of 
the Crimes Act. 
Inci;e<;se in food relief seal .s fol'" 
recipients. 
Full time and award rates for relief 
workers. 
Abolition of the permissible income 
regulations. 
For full democratic liberty of the people. 
io stru~gle against the schemes of warmongers 
and against the development of fascism in 
Australia. 
10. To develop united action and organization 
among the people for the overthrow of the 
Lyons and Stevens governments and the 
election of Labour governments on the 
principle of the support for the above 
demands.l 
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The conference, under the chairmanship of Sam Blakeney, 
elected a provisional committee to examine ways to publicise 
the programme as a basis for common action. The only report 
of the meeting does not include a list of delegates. It 
seems clear, however, that the lead in all discussions was 
taken by the men who had organised the united front campaign 
in Northern Illawarra. 2 E.R. Browne, one of the successful 
united front candidates for the Northern Illawarra Council, 
proposed that the initial emphasis should be placed on 
industrial rather than political concerns. Particular 
attention was to be paid to improving the working conditions 
of relief workers. The programme, however, encompassed most 
l Illawarra Mercury, 16 October 1936; Common Cause, 10 and 
17 October 1936. 
2The provisional committee was made up as follows: S. Blakeney 
(Scarborough miner), s. Creighton (Helensburgh miner), 
E. Arrowsmith (FIA), P. McHenry (~epresex:il'.il:1g the Communist 
Party and Corrimal Relief Workers Association) and s. Best 
(secretary of the Illawarra Trad7s and Labor Council). . 
Others to attend the conference included: E.R. Browne (vice 
president of southern district miners and alderman on the 
Northern Illawarra council, F. Martin (alderman on the 
Norther~ Illawarra coun~il), s. Platts (Helensburgh miner). 
Ibid. 
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grievances and the conunittee was prepared to work with 
diverse groups• The demand for improvai housing, for example, 
found support from the middle class housing reformers and 
eventually led to the formation of the south coast Housing 
. . l 
conunittee. 
The provisional conunittee's first political venture was 
the organisation of a full ticket of Labor candidates for 
the 1937 municipal elections. United front spokesmen argued 
that workers erred when they dismissed local politics as 
being of little importance. On the contrary, lack of concern 
on the part of workers in the past had allowed the 'onslaught 
on democracy now in progress by the apologists of Fascism•. 2 
Primitive housing conditions and rack-renting by 
'conscienceless landlords were depriving workers of their 
freedom to live' •3 Unless Labor men concerned themselves 
with municipal affairs there would be no counterweight to the 
'propertied and exploiting interests•. 4 Labor candidates 
were put up in each of the four local government areas. 
The composition of the Labor teams reveals the degree 
of political involvement of the industrial workers and also 
the willingness of moderate Labor men to work with them. 
Nine of the twelve Labor candidates for the municipality of 
Wollongong were trade union officials. Among their number 
were F. Lowden and W.J. Penrose, president and secretary of 
southern district miners, and T. McDonald and W. Frame, 
secretary and assistant secretary of the Port Kembla FIA 
branch. In Northern Illawarra, five of the nine Labor 
candidates were com:11unists. By contrast in Central Illawarra 
and Bulli the united front committee endorsed as candidates 
sitting Labor councillors, some of whom were declared Lang 
supporters. 
The industrial workers were disappointed with the 
results achieved. TWO candidates were successful in 
1see Chapter Five, p.225. 
2 &_outh Coast Times, 7 December 1937. 
3Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
308 
Wollongong. Both men h 
• O\,·ever, were moderate ALP suooorters 
who, in the past, had declined to contest municipal :~ections 
on a party political programme. 1 Similarly, in Central 
Illawarra and Bulli moderate Labor supporters were returned. 
In Northern Illawarra, two industrial candidates were 
successful but they replaced retiring industrial aldermen. 2 
There was a comparable degree of co-operation between 
the trade union men and Lang supporters during the 1937 
federal election campaign. Wollongong trade union leaders 
expressed their confidence in John Curtin, the federal Labor 
leader. 3 On the other hand in September 1937 a conference of 
union branches and mine lodges advocated co-operation with 
the Lang branches as a means of returning a federal Labor 
government. It offered Lazzarini 'moral and material support' 
and affirmed 
•.. the urgent need for the defeat of the Lyons' 
Government and for the return of a Federal Labor 
Government pledged to support a broad programme 
of working class demands such as the 40 hour week, 
1
see Chapter .One, pp.43-4 for a discussion of the 
attitudes· of workers to municipal elections and of the 
reluctance of some who claimed to be 'worker representatives' 
to stand on a political ticket. 
2The following were Labor candidates for the four local 
government areas. Where candidates were also union officials 
or held executive positions in ALP branches the name of the 
union or branch is given in brackets. Wollongong 
Municipality candidates; H.T. Fowles (FIA), W. Frame (FIA), 
J. Hayes (United Labourers), F. Lowden (Miners' Federation), 
T. McDonald (FIA), w. Penrose (Miners' Federation), 
R.F. Pinch (AEU), J. Powell (Boilermakers), J.W. Richmond 
(United Labourers), J.J. Kelly, E. Heininger. Northern 
Illawarra Municipality candidates; R. Allen, s. Beresford, 
s. curnuck P. salmon, T. Silcocks, D. Smith, T. Street, 
c. Hester, 1 A. Russell. Central Illawarra Municipality 
candidates· A. Jones, A. Lewis, J.J. Matthews (AWU). Bulli 
Shire candidates; A. Egan (ARU), T. Gibson, L. Kelly (ARU), 
C. Quilkey (Woonona-Bulli ALP branch, president), E. Mccarter 
(Woonona-Bulli ALP branch, secretary). Successful Labor 
candidates were: J.J. Kelly, E. Heininger (Wollongong); 
J. Silcocks, T. Street (Northern Illawarra); L. Kelly, 
C. Quilkey, T. Gibson Bulli Shire; J.J. Matthews (Central 
Illawarra). see Steel & Metal Worker, 10 November 1937 and 
!llawarra Mercury, 10 December 1937. 
3rllawarra Mercury, ll June 1937. 
a sho:ter working day for miners, Non-
Con~ribu~ory N~tional Insurance and other 
legis~ation which will give greater economic 
security to the masses.I 
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Individual unions assisted ALP campaign conunittees and 
industrial branches and urged a co-ordination of union and 
party efforts. 2 The unionists clearly expected concessions 
in return for this support. They once more unsuccessfully 
raised the question of a district assembly 'as a means of 
bringing the political and industrial sections of the 
movement closer together' . 3 Further, they were able to 
extract from Lazzarini a promise of more regular 
consultation with local union officials. 4 
The trade union leaders were well aware that promises 
made by politicians before elections were of doubtful value, 
but their dissatisfaction was not so much with Lazzarini as 
with their state representatives. The uneasy truce which 
existed between the industrial unions and Sweeney and Davies 
became open conflict, as attacks upon Lang intensified. In 
November 1937, Wollongong trade union officials attended a 
conference organised by the Sydney Labor Council to consider 
ways of removing him. At the same time, Lowden called once 
more upon Davies and Sweeney to support those wishing to 
5 
'cleanse' the labour movement. 
Politics was becoming too important to the trade 
unionists to be left to the politicians or more precisely to 
I.ang. Their inability to defeat Lang by moves within the 
party left them with one course of action: to oppose Lang at 
the polls. It was this thinking which led Wollongong trade 
union leaders to join with other dissatisfied industrial 
groups and form an Industrial Labor Party. At the new 
party's inaugural conference in January 1938 E.R. Browne, 
1steel & Metal Worker, 24 September 1937. 
2Illawarra Mercury, 11 June 1937. 
3steel & Metal Worker, 24 September 1937. 
4r11awarra Mercury, 11 June 1937. 
5rbid., 26 November 1937. 
, 
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vice-president of southern miners, was elected to its 
provisional executive. Wollongong's unionist-dominated ALP 
branches declart',.J their alli;giance to the new party. on 
3 February the North Wollo'1gong branch resolved that 
Becaus7 ~he 'I~ner Group' by its many acts of 
m~ladmi~istration and consistent policy of 
disrupting and weakening the Labor Party has 
caused extreme dissatisfaction within the 
movement, and because of the corrupt methods 
adopted in the holding of country ballots it 
is impossible to vote the 'Inner Grouo' out of 
off~ce this branch has decided to fali in 
behind the proyir; ·.~".Oil executive elected on 
22 January ..•• ~ 
At Corrimal, Arrowsmith carried a motion that the branch 
place itself 'in the hands of the new organising committee•. 2 
Si.~ilarly, the North Wollongong branch voted to 'take all 
future directions and suggestions from the newly appointed 
general secretary, :-tr W. Evans' . 3 
On 27 February a conference of Wollongong unionists met 
to discuss further action against Lang and to work out the 
details of local organisation. The delegates began by 
affirming the declaration of aims made by the Sydney 
conference of 22 January. After declaring itself 'the only 
4 
true expression of the Labour movement in New South Wales' 
the conference had voted to 
••• repudiate the 'Inner Group' which has 
consistently pursued a policy of disrupting 
and weakening of the Labor Party so that they 
could retain control of the Party machine. 
We declare that the fight we have undertaken 
to cleanse the Labor Movement and remove the 
'Inner Group' dictatorship will continue until 
1common Cause, 19 February 1938. 
2Ibid. 
3rbid. Evans had been a Newtown coun7il employee and was 
associated with J.R. Hughes, the president of the new ~arty, 
in the socialisation units during 1931-2. He was prominent 
in the Municipal Employees' Union. See I.E. Young, 'The 
Impact of J.T. Lang on the NSW Labor Party, 1929-1943', M.A. 
thesis (University of New South Wales, 1963), p.238. 
4 rllawarra Mercury, 4 March 1938. 
·~· 
• J 
its personnel is expelleo from the movement 
and the La~~ P~rty_is made the virile strong 
and democra~ic institution it should be.l 
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The Wollongong conference then turned to the problem of 
establishing the necessary organisation to perform this task 
and elaborating general policy. What was proposed was a 
committee of thirty made up of an equal number of unionists 
and ALP branch members. To prevent the dominance of any one 
particular union group, each branch and union was to be 
limited to a single representative. On matters of policy 
the conference took a stand 'four sauare upon the traditions 
of the Labor movement•. 2 • -It then attempted to translate 
these traditions, as it understood them, into a seven-point 
policy: 
(a) Reduction of hours in the working week to 
a 40-hour week. This can be achieved by greater 
Trade Union activity assisted by a virile Labor 
Government; (b) increased wages to offset rising 
prices; (cl a progressive policy to grapple with 
the youth problem; (d) a rural policy to assist 
the struggling farmer; (e) revision of the 
Arbitration Act to introduce Labor policy; 
(f) restoration of rural awards; (g) coal 3 industry reform and other important questions. 
The finer details of these policy guidelines were to be 
worked out by the executive in discussions with Labor 
politicians. 
It was in defining their relationship with the Labor 
politicians that the unionists experienced most difficulty. 
The main object of the industrial party was to seek the 
return of a New South Wales Labor government and, as they saw 
it, this could only be achieved by replacing its existing 
leader. They were prepared to oppose Labor politicians where 
bo ,4 this was in the 'best interests of the la ur movement • 
What these best interests were depended greatly upon local 
circumstances. Wollongong unionists were, however, uncertain 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid • 
" 
312 
in their attemots to assess the local l't' l 't · 
- po i ica si ua tion. 
Some were of the opinion that with caref l · t' u organisa ion 
industrial candidates could defeat the sitting members. The 
opposing view was put by Sam Blakeney, a corrimal ALP 
delegate. He agreed that Sweeney and Davies had alienated 
themselves from the trade union movement by their continued 
support for Lang, but considered that there was not 
sufficient time to p:cepare a successful campaign against 
them. A final resolution of the question was postponed by 
the appointment of a sub-committee to ask Sweeney and Davies 
again whether 'they would support the Provisional Executive' . 1 
In the event of a further rejection the sub-committee was 
instructed 'to consider nominating candidates to contest both 
2 
seats' . 
In the negotiations that followed, Sweeney and Davies 
expressed agreement with the genexal policy of the unionists 
but were not anxious to commit themselves further. Despite 
this rebuff, the sub-committee baulked at nominating 
industrial candidates. There were rumours that F. Lowden, 
president of the southern district miners, would run against 
Sweeney, but after he publicly disavowed political aspirations 
the sub-committ~e announced that 'no candidates representing 
the Trade Unions and Labour Leagues opposed to Lang would 
contest Bulli or Illawarra•. 3 Many unionists were 
disappointed with the decision. Most miners had resented 
the manner in which Lang had imposed Sweeney upon them in 
1933, 4 and there was reason to believe they might move 
against him. Moreover, the announcement that the non-Labor 
parties would not nominate candidates fv£ either Wollongong 
seat removed any possibility of a Labor defeat. No reason 
was 
was 
given by the sub-committee 
no public dissent from it. 
1
rbid. 
2Ibid. 
3
rbid., 18 March 1938. 
4see Chapter Four, pp.186-91. 
for its decision and there 
Most like~y they accepted the 
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argument that the election was too close for adeauate 
campaigning and that it was there~ore t t" 11. · 
, · ~ , ac ica y wiser to 
avoid a direct confrontation with well-established local 
members. It is possible also that they wanted unity as much 
as they wanted to be rid of Lang. Moreover, the 'big fella' 
still commanded substantial support.l 
In the elections which followed Davies was therefore 
returned unopposed. Sweeney, however, had two opponents; 
J.B. Miles, a Communist Party official, and an independent 
candidate, E.J. Ryan, a local school teacher and president 
of the Bulli Shi=e Council. The industrial leaders gave no 
direction as to how unionists should vote, although they 
dissociated themselves from Ryan's attempts to present 
himself as an anti-Lang workers' candidate. 2 In the event 
Sweeney won from Ryan with Miles running last. 3 The anti-
Lang faction was well pleased with the result. They 
calculated that the sizeable vote assembled by Ryan probably 
included some of the dissatisfied Labor supporters who could 
not bring themselves to vote for a Communist Party candidate. 
Although the industrialists4 had hesitated to break 
with their parliamentary representatives they continued, 
nevertheless, to organise support for the provisional 
executive. 5 While the election campaign was still in progress, 
the Corrimal ALP branch accepted a charter from the 
1In an interview, on 1 June 1973, Mr E. Arrowsmith, the only 
surviving member of the sub-conunitteP ,. confirmed these 
suggestions. He also said that the C·.:>mmunist Party was in 
agreement with this decision since it left them free to run 
a candidate in Bulli where they were confident of obtaining 
a reasonable percentage of the vote. There was, on the 
other hand, lJ.ttle to be gained from opposing Davies. 
2 Illawarra Mercury, 18 March 1938. 
3The full voting figures were: Sweeney, 7,380; Ryan, 3,413; 
Miles, 2,731. NSW pp (1937-8), Vol.l, pp.552-3. 
4The trade union-dominated breakaway group 
referred to as the Industrial Labor Party. 
were referred to as 'industrialists'. 
was at the time 
Its members 
5The Industrialists ran six candidates. Two were successful: 
c.c. Lazzarini (Marrackville) and R.J. Heffron (Botany). 
The ALP won 28 seats, one fewer than that won by State Labor 
in 1935. 
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- , e ~ranch secretary, provisi:;,nal exec11tive. A~rowsmith th '"' 
- - consis en~ wiw ear ier 'leclared that the act; on ~ aken was · t · · ~h l" 
branch support for the socialisation units and advocated 
that the Labor party should return to this objective. 1 The 
Wollongong North branch gave much the same reason when it 
announced support for 'Industrial Labor'. 2 In the months 
in the that followed the election, most industrial unions 
district affiliated to the provisional executive. The 
Illawarra Trades and Labor council offered to provide 
administrative assistance and to promote the formation of 
3 further branches. To co-ordinate the activities of the 
branches and to ensure that they remained in close contact 
with the unions, a South Coast District Assembly was formed. 
Special provision was made for unemployed and relief worker 
representation on the assen~bly. By December 1938, new 
branches had been formed at Bulli and Coledale and members 
were able to claim that 'inner group contamination was 
confined to the Bulli-Woonona branch'. 
4 
With the establishment of the district assembly, the 
control of political and industrial labour organisation in 
Wollongong was in the hands of t11e unionists. This in turn 
promoted closer co-operation in the industrial sphere. 
United action on political issues was now more possible than 
at any time since the dismissal of Lang in 1932. This was 
1common Cause, 19 February 1938. 
2Ibid. 
3wollongong union branches to sig~ify_support.for ~he 
industrial party were: southern district of Miners Federation, 
South Coast Branch of the Waterside Workers' Federation, 
Australian Workers' Union, /\RU (South Coast), FEDFA (South 
Coast) AEU cokeworkers. Individual mine lodges to send 
delegates t~ the unity Conference in June were: Mt Kembl~, 
Coalcliff, wongawilli, Bulli, Scarborough. As well Corrimal, 
North Wollongong and the Port Kembla AL~ branches sent 
representatives. see Minutes of the Unity Conference held 
25 June 1938 (Labor Daily Print), pp.7-14; common Cause, 
2 April 1938; Illawarra Trades and Labor.council Mi~utes, 
17 March 1938; south coast Branch waterside Workers 
Federation Minute Books, 11 July 1938; Steel & Metal Worker, 
24 September 1938. 
4naily News, 13 December 1938. 
certainly the view of Arrowsmith, now secretary of the 
c1i.·.; ::rict assembly· In an appeal to fellow steelworkers, 
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he 
pointed to the industridl successes at Port Kembla and on the 
coalfields as examples of what militant union action could 
achieve. There was no reason, he argued, why similar 
successes should not follow from concerted political action. 
Indeed, local conditions made political action imperative. 
According to his analysis of economic trends, another 
depression was imminent. There were steps which workers 
might take to prevent a returr. to the conditions of 1932. 
They should demand legalisation to shorten the working week 
and greater expenditure on public works to ensure that the 
burden of the next economic collapse was not )O".)rne bY them. 
They should also agitate for further social legislation to 
protect themselves from the vicissitudes of unemployment. 1 
Arrowsmith's assessment was neither optimistic in its 
prediction that united political acnion was possible, nor 
unduly pessimistic in its economic forecast. There was 
evidence at hand of grass-roots political involvement. The 
new industrial party was one example, but there were others. 
The campaign for better housing was political, and not simply 
in a parochial sense. Housing reformers argued not only for 
housing as a temporary and local necessity, but as a long-
term goverrunen~ responsibility to alleviate poverty 
throughout Australia. The miners' demands for shorter hours, 
improved working conditions and pensions were similarly 
2 
viewed as part of a wider political struggle. 
Moreover, the unionists' political programme was closely 
related to workers' demands. Of paramount concern was the 
development of a social insurance programme. Demands for 
some form of safeguard against unemployment became more 
insistent after 1936. The federal government responded to 
these demands by proposing to amalgamate existing state and 
federal legislation so as to create a uniform system of 
social services throughout the Commonwealth. Trade unions 
1steel & Metal Worker, 21 October 1937. 
2Illawarra Mercury, 7 October 1938. 
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were critic~l of the government's early suggestions. Their 
.x principal objection was to the prooosed contributory nature 
cf the government scheme. Labour wanted the cost of such 
le<oislation to be borne by the government and the employers. 
There was also opposition to a suggested means test and 
t.o a qualifying period before payments began. In 1938 tr.e 
federal government introduced ~ National Health and Pensions 
Insurance Bill which offered a system o~ 'mpulsory insurance 
for all employe-1 persons on the basis of , ·;ntributions from 
consolidated revenue, from employers and employees. It was 
to provide funds for the payment of age and invalid pensions, 
disablement allowar1ces and for medical and pharmaceutical 
benefits •1 Wollongong trade unio11ists protested and demanded 
increased benef5.ts and the inclusion of an unemployment 
benefit and the removal of the compulsory contribution 
clause. The Illawarra Trades and Labor Council appointed a 
committee to public~se the defects of the act. 2 Opposition 
gradually gave way to qualified acceptance. Trade union 
leaders dec-ided that, inadequate as the act was, it at le.-,s~ 
went part of the way towards meeting their demand~. 3 The 
legislation was, however, eventually abandoned, but for 
reasons other than criticism by workers. The government was 
unable tc win the co-operation of the medical profession. 
Mounting cost estimat.:;,s, particularly in :.alation to growing 
defence expenditure, strengthened the position cf opponents 
to the scheme within the government. Ulti.Jnately the outbreak 
of war caused the abandonment of the bill. 
A further strand in the political thinking of the new 
industrialist party was opposition to war. After 1935 the 
Australian labour movement began to define its attitude 
towards events in Europe and the possibility of Australian 
lCPD, Vol.155, pp.787, 1327, 1764; Vol.156, pp.2086, 2307; 
Vol.158, p.1546; Vol.159, p.534; vol.160, pp.1515, 1859. 
2Illawarra Trades and Labor council Minutes, 19 October 1938. 
(ANU Archives T31/7} • 
3Manifesto to s0 uth coast workers on Nativnal Insurance (Mercury Print), 1938; steel and Metal Worker, 20 August 
1937. 
·• ·, 
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involvement. At first th 
• e only voices raised were those 
of the communists and their sympathisers. In taking this 
position Australian communists were responding to changing 
Russian foreign policy. In Septembe:. 1934 Russia had joined 
the. League of Nations in a move designed, in part, to 
postpone a predicted attack on Russia 1).J Germany. \/ollongong 
communists accepted this analysis and preached the immediate 
danger of a new world war in which the USSR would be the 
victim and Germany, Italy and Japan the aggressors. 
Australia would, they claimed, side with 
In this 
coming war 
~ . l ~ascists. 
the 
To promote this view Wollongong communists, in March 
1935, began an anti-war campaign. At first there was no 
strong response, although the coalminers made opposition to 
war and fascism the theme of their 1935 May Day celebrations. 
Lodge resolutions stressed the internationalism of the 
workers' struggle and the miners declared their 'solidarity 
with the workers of t:11~ world against Fascism and 
Imperialistic Wars, particularly [with) the German workers 
and their heroiG fight against Hitler Fascism'. 2 Apart from 
these sporadic instances there was, however, no sustained 
concern with Eu~.copean affairs. 
Events in Europe, particularly the outbre<>k of the 
Spanish Civil War, provided new material for the anti-war 
exponents, and especially for the communists. The Spanish 
government 
government 
was defended by the communists as a 
of the United Front variety. They 
legitimate 
denounced the 
attempted military coup as a fascist uprising and urged that 
Australia should indicate its support for the Spanish 
government. Wollongong non-communist trade union leaders 
placed much the same interpretation upon events. T. (Paddy) 
McDonald, FIA secretary at Port Kembla, told ironwork~rs 
that the Spanish civil War was a 'Workers Fight'.
3 
It was 
1For a detailed treatment of this change.see Alistair 
Davidson, The conm.unist Party of Austr<;lia, PP· 7~-93; 
E. Andrews, Isolaticnimt and Aooeasement in Australia, pp.9-10. 
2Illawarra Mercury, 3 May 1935. 
3steel & Metal Worker, 28 August 19.;. 
. \ 
' 
also, he pointed out, a struggle which held lessons for 
Australian workers: 
The worker of Australia or any ~ther countr 
need h'?ld no illu7ions of the f~ct that they 
employing class will allow a workers' 
Government to Govern in the interests of the 
mass of people unless given mass support. In 
other words Capitalism will allow a workers' 
Governme~t t'? introduce social legislation as 
long as it will not interfere with profits 
and before.the will.of the masses of the p~ople 
can be achie~ed we 7n,Australia may be 
confron~ed with a o;;imilar situation of [sicl 
that which to-day is taking place in Spain.1 
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The Illawarra Trades and Labor Council agreed with McDonald's 
interpretation and voted to support the Spanish Relief 
Committee established mainly by Sydney communists to raise 
funds and conduct propaganda in ~upport of the Spanish 
governmeD . At least two communists from Port Kembla, 
J. (Joe) Carter and J. (Jim) McNeill, are known to have 
fought in the International Brigade and reports in union 
journals of their experiences and of war atrocities kept news 
of Spain before the workers. 2 
The issue of the Spanish Civil War became inextricably 
mixed with faction fights within the labour movement. Lan~ 
through the Labor Daily which he still controlled, was 
equivocal. He made a parade of left-wing rhetoric concerning 
the Spanish civil War, but supported the policy of Empire 
non-involvement. The Miners' Federation was uncompromising 
in its stand and declared that 
We, the delegates of t~e Central Cou~c~l of the 
Miners' Federation affirm our recognition of 
the fact that the fundamental cause of the 
present conflict in Spain is the determinat~on 
of the European Fascist Power and the reactionary 
elements in all countries that the popular and 
legally elected Government of that country must 
be crushed because it stands for peace, democracy 
and progress and hence menaces Fascism's war 
plans; realising this we unres~rved~y.condemn the 
barbaric brutality of the Fascist military forces, 
1Ibid. 
2rb'd 21 October, 23 September, 18 November 1938; Illawarra Tra~e~' and Labor council Minutes, loc. cit., 19 October 1938 • 
.. 
the 
and 
send our congratulations to the sterlin 
defenders of democracy call up th g 
f d . • - on e governments o emocratic countries to end F · t 
· t · ascis in ervention, and pledge ourselves to do all in 
our power to rally support for the workers and 
peas~nts of ~pain now in the front trenches of 
the international struggle against reaction.l 
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Lowden and Browne, southern district representatives on 
central council, were consistent advocates of this policy 
their views were shared by the Illawarra Trades and Labor 
Council. Their position was strengthened when the ACTU, at 
its annual conference in July 1937, took a definite stand on 
the issue of involvement or non-involvement in matters 
external to Australia. 'fhe council saw the threat to world 
peace as coming from, 'German and Italian aggression in 
Spain, German aggression in China directed against Russia, 
and the domination of the Pacific and Australia•. 2 To cope 
with this threat the ACTU advocated the organisation of the 
masses against war, support for 'Collective Security' through 
the League of Nations and opposition to the re-armament 
policies of the Baldwin and Lyons Governments. After the 
ACTU statement of policy the Illawarra Trades and Labor 
Council spoke out more strongly against appeasement and for 
a collective stand against 'fascist aggression' 3 In the 
same month the unionists won control of the Labor Daily and 
'-?•:,re able to promc .. e their views more freely. 
The unionists' campaign won few converts for an 
interventionist policy. There was rather a hardening of 
anti-war sentiments, which found a focus in criticism of a 
federal government decision, taken in 1937, to increase 
expenditure on defence. Condemnation of re-armament appeared 
to be in logical opposition to interventionist proposals. 
The advocates of collective security argued, however, that 
the technical problems of re-armament were inextricably linked 
1
ccM, 8 May 1937. 
2Minutes ACTU Conference, 20 July 1937, pp.22~8. 
Robin Gollan, work-in-progress paper, Australian 
University, 1973. 
Cited by 
National 
3 Illawarra Trades and Labor Council Minutes, lee.cit., 
30 March 1938 . 
• 
with the political. for the strengthening of Support 
defences Australia's coastal and the increasing production 
of munitions should de d 
· pen upon the political purposes to 
which each would be out c 11 
- • o ective security required 
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re-armament but the re-armers could not be trusted. 
Accordingly, in Wollongong where opposition to re-armament 
proposals became an integral part of the housing reform 
movement, union leaders opposed increased defence spending on 
the grounds that it was being given priority over social 
reform and over the provision of higher w~ges for workers. 
To Wollongong unionists these arguments were sharpened 
when, in May 1936, BF.P's Newcastle plant started to produce 
steel cases for 18 pounder-guns and anti-aircraft guns. 
Suspicion of BHP was constant and widespread among 
Wollongong workers. Involvement of the company in 
re-armament programmes was viewed by workers as further 
evidence of BHP's scant regard for the welfare of its 
employees. 1 The Reverend W.J. Robbin was expressing this 
attitude when he wrote: 
If Governments can find time for anti-human 
armament concerns and can co-operate with large 
industries in policies which enable the 
machinery of these industries to be switched 
over to the merchants of death, then that 
government needs to be told in unmistakeable 
language that it was elected to serve the people, 
not to be used as a tool in the hands of large 
armament firms.2 
By 1938 Wollongong workers were more persistent in 
political action and possessed an organisational structure 
which could direct and publicise their demands. Leadership 
was given by the unionists, who now dominated the industrial 
and political movements. A series of grievances, some 
peculiar to Wollongong and others shared by the labour 
movement in general, assisted this consolidation. There were 
th · f d"sc ntent The f:i."rst concerned the ree ma3or are~s o :i. o • 
need for legislation to L~prove working conditions and 
' 
1steel & Metal Worker, 21 October 1938. 
2church Standard, 10 September 1937. 
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safeguard continuous employment Th d 
· e secon centred on the 
need for more attention to the soc· 1 lf ia we are of the districts' 
workers; the provision of better housing, pensions and 
unemployment benefits. Finally, it was considered that 
involvement in war would lead to further deprivations for all 
workers. These grievances were directed at state and federal 
governments, and at the capitalists whose interests they 
were held to represent. Opposition to BHP as the largest 
local capitalist enterprise drew strength from and helped to 
shape these grievances. 
These political demands and deep-rooted suspicions came 
together in a dramatic way in November 1938, when Port Kembla 
waterside workers refused to load pig-iron bound for Japan. 
Their protest was against the Australian government's trade 
in 'munitions materials' with an aggressor nation which might 
turn on Australia itself. Fear of the Japanese and a belief 
that Australian defences were totally inadequate were common 
complaints of industrial labour in the late 1930s. Militants 
within the trade union movement had come to take a stand 
against any involvement in imperialistic wars. But, as the 
Japanese increased the tempo and severity of the attacks 
against China, anti-war sentiment gave way to fears about 
coming developments in the whole Pacific area. In 1937 Port 
Kembla watersiders claimed to view 
.•. with horror the unprovoked and murderous 
attack of the Japanese Militarists against th~ 
Peace loving Chinese People & lodge an emphatic 
Protest and demand the application of the 
League covenant be put into operation against 
Japan. Furthermore, we as members of the . 
Australian working class a7e p7epared ~o asRist 
the Chinese workers in their fight against 
Fascist Japan.l 
Japan, however, was too important a trading partner, 
d l for many in official circles to especially in wheat an woo , 
lsouth coast Branch waterside Workers' Federation Minute 
Books, 11 November 1937. 
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treQt her openly as a potential threat to national security. 
When the ACTU called for a nation-wide boycott of Japanese 
goods and an embargo on the exportation of scrap iron to 
Japan, support came mainly from the militant sections of 
the trade t don movement, peace bodies, some church 
organisations, some intellectuals and the communist Party. 
By 1937 the central issue in trade with Japan was the 
sale of iron ore and related products. Newspapers weighed 
the financial rewards of the trade against the domestic need 
for materials currently being sent abroad, against the 
possibility of retaliation if Japanese offers to buy were 
refused and against the contribution which might be made to 
Japanese aggression by the continued sale of such products. 
The specific question of strategic materials came to 
overshadow all else after the Japam~se entered into an 
agreement to extract iron 0re from the rich Koolan Island 
deposit in Western Australia. In October 1937 the Freemantle 
Lumpers' Union refused to load a Japanese whaling ship, and 
in the following months waterside workers in various 
Australian ports declined to load 'munitions materials', in 
spite of assurances by the Japanese that scrap metal would 
not be used in the manufacture of war materials. Nor were 
they initially cowed by government threats to apply the 
Transport Workers' Act introduced by the Bruce-Page government 
in 1929. The act permitted anyone to obtain a licence to 
work on the wharves and provided a method by which employers 
could by-pass the unions. After an official threat by the 
government to apply the Act to the Sydney port, however, the 
Waterside Workers' Federation agreed to load all cargoes 
offering, but opposition continued, and was not significantly 
diminished by a government ban on the export of iron ore in 
May 1938. 1 
The official reason given for the ban was that Australia 
had to conserve supplies of iron ore for her own bl~st­
furnaces. Geoffrey Blainey, however, has presented evidence 
1see Sondra Silverman, 'Politic~l Movements. Three Case 
studies of Protest', Ph.D. thesis (Australian National 
University, 1966), pp.329-45. 
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to suggest other motives.l According to his account, Lyons 
in a private conversation, in March 1938, with the general 
manager of BHP, Essington Lewis, warned that he would most 
likely prohibit the export of iron ore. He told Lewis that 
'the Japanese base' 
the event of war. 2 
at Yampi Sound would be very awkward in 
In Blainey's view a ban on the export of 
iron ore 'was the simplest way to expel politely the Japanese 
from Yampi Sound and to conserve Australia's iron ore for 
3 future needs'. He concludes that 'fear of a Japanese 
foothold on an isolated Australian harbour was probably the 
4 strongest motive for the embargo'. But whatever the 
g:;vernment' s reas ,s for banning the export of iron ore, it 
continued to permit the expor~ of pig-iron probably to make 
it easier for Japan to accept the major prohibition. 
By itself, the existence of opposition to the continued 
sale of pig-iron to Japan, does not fully explain why Port 
Kembla watersiders refused to load the Dalfram, nor why they 
successfully resisted government coercion until 21 January 
1939, at a cost to strikers of £100,000 in wages. 
Contemporaries either applauded the patriotism of the 
watersiders, or condemned the strike as the work of a 
communist minority. In 1939 sir Isaac Isaacs, a former 
Governor-General of Australia expressed his 'unbounded 
admiration• 5 for the watersiders and wrote 
that [Port] Kembla with the stur~y but peaceful 
and altogether disinterested atti~ude of ~he 
men concerned, will find a place in our history 
beside the Eureka Stockade as a noble stand 
against executive Dictatorship and against an 
attack on Australian Democracy. 6 
lGeoffrey Blainey, 'The cargo Cult in Mineral Policy', 
Economic Record, December 1968, pp.470-9. 
2Ibid., p.471. 
3
rbid. 
4Ibid. 
5Australian Democracy and our Constitutional system 
(Melbourne, 1939), p.25. 
6Ibid. 
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the strike to the Historians have subsequently attributed 
propensity of maritime unions to strike or to the machinations 
of a communist leadership. 1 
odds with both the attitude 
Such an interpretation is at 
of the Waterside Workers' 
Federation executive and that of the Port Kembla branch. In 
1937 A.E. Turley, gene~al secretary of the federation since 
1928, was defeated by a communist candidate, J. Healy. under 
Healy's influence, a conference of the union did establish 
for the first time a national policy, and obtained the 
promise oi: adherence to it by the branches. It is also true 
that this policy pointed to a greater acceptance of direct 
action. Throughout 1938 Healy, however, had grave doubts 
about crossing swords with BHP, as he feared this 'would give 
Lyons and Company an opportunity to rush in with some kind 
of intimidating action' •2 In December 1938, by his own 
admission, he 'could not see eye to eye with the branch 
decision to strike'. 3 
Shortly after Healy became general secretary, E. Roach, 
who was also a member of the communist Party, became 
4 
secretary of the Port Kembla branch. Throughout the 1930s 
he had been consistently critical of official federation 
policy. He stressed the need for constant economic and 
political action to improve working conditions at Port Kembla 
and for the Australian working class more generally.
5 
Despite 
Roach's miJ.itancy, the Port Kembla watersiders did not have 
a reputation for industrial action. Indeed, the branch's 
1see for example I.E. Young, 'The Impact of J.T. Lang on 
the New South Wal~s Labor Party 1929-1943', M.A. Thesis 
(University of New south Wales, 1963r p.249. 
2J. Healy to J. Lonergan, Tasmanian State Representative, 
Waterside workers' Federation, 16 February 1938. WWF Filer, 
ANU Archives. 
3 G~neral Secretary's Report to the 4th Biennial National workers' Federation of Australia, 
Co11:erence of the Waterside 
15 September 1952, p.40. 
4south Coast branch of the Waterside Workers' Federation 
Minute Books, 20 July 1937. 
5Ibid., 15 March, 20 July 1937, 17 January 1938. 
'.
' 
. 
. 
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most striking characteristic was its weakness. This was due 
in large part to the construction by the Port Kembla 
industrial companies of their own jetties, which were worked 
by their own casual labour. The branch had constantly sought 
the help of the Illawarra Trades and Labor council to compel 
the companies to concede preference to its members. In 1931 
G.W. Sloan, then branch delegate to the council, resigned 
because, he said, 'the courcil in no way functioned for this 
b h ' l W'th ' · ' ranc • l. some misgiv1 ngs the watersiders elected a new 
delegate, but warned that unless the Council assisted the 
union to win preference for work on the company jetties they 
wou}_d withdraw from the Council. Before such a step could ha 
taken, however, the Trades and Labor Council, a victim of the 
depression, itself ceased to function. 
From its incep· ion in 1915 the branch in fact had 
operated rather like a club to which admission was gained 
with difficulty and almost by hereditary right. The union 
secretary's brother operated one of the larger stevedoring 
comp<i.nies and as a consequence those who sought change within 
the union were easily disciplined. Men assembled outside th<i 
stevedoring company's gate and 
••• a timekeeper or foreman would inspect them 
as you would cattle at a sale and select the 
men r.equired, based on their capacity to work 
and the amount of money each had placed in his 
[the foreman's] mug at the local pub.2 
Selection gav<:i a man the right to work a 23-hour shift, 
8 a.m. to 7 a.m. the next morning shovelling coal, coke or 
iron ore. Upon completing such a shift man~· 'backed up' for 
another twenty-four hours and some were known to have worked 
continuously for seventy-two hours. Union officials made 
little attempt to ensurs that available work was equally 
shared by all watersiders. G. Vardy, a Sydney watersider who 
came to Port Kembla in 1928, presented a 
from the viewpoint of an outsider trying 
the branch: 
1
rbid., 31 July 1931. 
picture of the union 
to gain entry into 
2Joe Howe, A Tribute to Ted Roach (r~neod, 
Branch of Waterside Workers' Federation . 
n.d.), South Coast 
·-
I 
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Things in their branch are put .d d 
officials stand for them and ri an the 
has tried to rectify thi;gs h anybemember who 
t I as en starved ou •..• can tell you that I h d . ave not averaged 
TWo pou~ s t7n shillings per week while I have 
worked in this Port .•.. A few members of the 
Bran7h are well to do and should n t be 
working for a living, and I have t~ld three 
of them that they should turn up trimming bu~. 
lwo o~ them are ~elations of the stevedores 
and will ~ake a Job ahead of a member who is 
only working for a bare living.! 
The increasing activity of the port after 1935 as 
industry at Port Kembla picked up brought renewed pressure 
for changes within the union. Port Kembla companies complained 
that an inadequate wharf labour-force was creating delays in 
the 'turn round' of vessels. In 1937 the firms asked 
A.E. Turley to intercede on their behalf and persuade the 
Port Kembla branch to open its books to new members. A 
special meeting of the branch was summoned to discuss this 
and other proposals. Port Kembla wharfies were sceptical and 
many thought that Turley was acting as an employers' emissary 
in an attempt to 'flood the branch'. 2 They supported 
instead a counter-proposal, advanced by Roach which aimed at a 
more equitable distribution of available ·.vork. He sugge,,':ed 
that men who had worked eight hours in the previous 
twenty-four hours were ineligible for further work until all 
who had not worked during this period were offered 
employment. 3 A roster was subsequently established to 
implement this scheme for union members, and later a similar 
roster was established for casual labourers. On the question 
of admitting new members the branch moved with caution. Men 
on the casual roster, however, gradually found their way into 
the union. 
The introduction of the roster was a considerable victory 
for the militants and paved the way for Roach's election as 
1G. Vardy to A.E. Turley (General Secretary Waterside Workers' 
Federation), 28 October 1935. 
2south coast Branch waterside Workers' Federation Minute 
Books, 15 March 1937. 
3Ibid. 
. ~.' 
.. "·· 
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branch secretary. Moreover, th · 
e union became increasingly 
active with the admission of new and sometimes militant 
members. Amon1 them were a number of ex-coalminers, the most 
orominent of whom was R Allen In addi" t · th 
• • • ion ere were some 
displaced waterside workers from Sydney and Queensland ports. 
But i:. 1938 th,cre remained divisions and serious obstacles 
in the way 0[ any projected strike action. Unionists viewed 
men on the casual roster with suspicion1 and the dispensing 
of work on the industrial jetties remained a company 
prerogative. The watersiders were therefore in a relatively 
weak position to sustain any lengthy stoppage, particularly 
a political strike. To be successful, any waterfront strike 
would require the support of company wharf labourers and 
this had not been achieved before, not even during the 1928 
waterfront dispute. 
Wnen Port Kembla watersiders refused to load pig-iron 
aboard the steamer Dalfram for Japan, they stated that their 
grievances were political not industrial. Roach claimed 
that the watersiders were refusing to load the pig-iron 
because 'success to the Japanese Fascist militarists in China 
will according to their own statements inspire them to 
further attacks on peaceful people which will include 
Australia'. 2 
The watersiders received the immediate support of the 
Illawarra Trades and Labor Council which resolved: 
That this council fully endorses the determined 
stand taken by the Waterside Workers Union, in 
the cause of peace by their refusal to load pig 
iron on the Dalfram for shipment to Japan for 
war purposes. This.co~ncil declares that the 
attempt to export pig iron to Japan 
undoubtedly to be used for the latter's war of 
aggression against China, place7 the.Lyons . 
Government in the position of violating.Article 
16 of the covenant of the Le~gue of.Nations and 
clearly exposes the pro-fascist policy of the 
Federal Government.3 
1 · Mr J. McKenzie, 7 June 197 3, a casual wharf Interview with 
labourer in the late 1930s . 
2s d M · Herald 18 November 1938. See also Port 
v ney orning ' hl t d Ill warr Kembla Wharfi~s state Their case, pamp e • n. ·• a a 
TraGes and Labor council File, Wollongong. 
3~llawarra Mercury, 18 November 1938. 
'' 
·'. 
Day to day organisation of the dispute wa~ placed in the 
hands of the council's combined d" 
. isputes committee. The 
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committee endorsed Roach's d~·cision t t · h 
- o res rict t e work ban 
to the Dalfram and other ·.vork continued on the wharves. The 
federal Attorney-General, R.G. Menzies, made the position 
the government clear in a telegram to Roach which read: 
Referrinr5 ·.o refusal waterside workers Port 
KemJ;>la to ~oad pig iron for shipment abroad, 
desire.not7fy [sic] your attention to notice 
appeaT.ing in press of intended action of 
C<..mmonweal th Government. Government's 
intention is on 6th December next, to apply 
Transp~rt Workers' Act to Port Kembla and to 
w~terside.work7rs in that port and at the same 
tim7 appoi~t l7censing officer for that port. 
Notice action in hope that prior to date fixed 
waterside workers at Port Kembla will realise 
that their action is inconsistent with the 
principle of democratic government and will 
resume loading. In latter event notice will 
be withdrawn. l 
of 
A stop-work meeting on 29 November replied with a unanimous 
decision to stand firm. 2 
on 9 December, as 
introduced licensing. 
he had earlier threatened, Menzies 
But throughout tl'. a stoppage not a 
single licence was taken out. The government countered this 
continued defiance with the claim that the dispute 
represented an attack on democracy. Menzies and Lyons took 
the view that unions acted irresponsibly when they used 
industrial action to achieve political ends. The essence of 
representative democracy, Menzies asserted, was that 
obedience should be renderen to government founded on a 
popular vote. Menzies developed his argument further on 
specific as well as general Jrounds. If tolerated, the ban 
would ~5tablish a precedent whereby a section of the 
community could 'usurp the functions of Government' and 
constitute a conflict with 'the recognised principles of 
order.1.y g::>vernment and international trading'· If the 
government allowed such action to succeed, then international 
pressures could be used to effect changes in other spheres 
1Ibid., 2 December 1936. 
2Ibid. 
also. Moreover, political 
status quo under which the 
1 
operate. 
strikes tended to disrupt the 
authorities were accustomed to 
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The principal strategy adopted by the strikers was that 
of non-extension. Rank and file militants demanded a 
general strike of miners and industrial workers at Port 
Keml.;la, but strike leaders made no call for such a move. 
McHenry was adal141nt that the dispute should be confined to 
the waterfront. He denied that the waterside.rs were on 
strike; they had simply refused to perform one specific duty 
(to load pig-iron), and they were willing to carry out all 
other duties. The government's introduction of the 
licensing system, not the action of the watersiders, had 
brought the entire waterfront to a standstill. 2 
This argument was presented as much in the interests of 
self-creservation as to embarrass the government. An 
€:~{tension of the strike to include the steelworkers would add 
a /urther 5, 000 men to the strike list. Unionism at the 
steelworks had consolidated but, while steelworkers 
contributed to the strike-fund and refused to work the 
company wharves or shift pig-iron outside the plant, there 
was some doubt about their willingness to accept a long 
struggle with the government fcir a purely political objective. 
To widen the dispute to include steelworkers would have 
rEJquired a wict;,ning of the strike issues. Such a step, as 
the strike leaders well knew, would diminish the political 
effectiveness of the strike. 
During the strike, as throughout the entire controversy 
surrounding continued export of iron ore, and later pig-iron, 
to Japan, BHP' s position seemed to its opponents, at L,ist, 
illogical. Essington Lewis, general manager of the company, 
believed that Australia would indirectly strengthen her own 
defences by employing the profits L Jm the trade in pig-iron, 
which yielded higher profits than did iron ore, to strengthen 
1sydney Morning Herald, 18 November, 22 December 1938. 
2steel & Metal worker, 18 December 1938; Sydney Morning 
Herald, 18 December 1938. 
;_:. 
her own defences. 1 To many workers there was sufficient 
proof of collusion between cornoany and go t 
• "' vernrnen . 
Elaborating this view, .McHenry alleged that BHP agreed, in 
~lay 1938, to an embargo on the export of iron ore from 
Australia, to reap the higher profits offering from the 
continued sale of pig-ir~n.2 
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On 17 December, BHP made the move strike leaders must 
have feared, yei .. ei-·:·ected. Production, the company said, had 
been brought to a standstill by the waterfront dispute, and 
dismissals were inevitable. Within a week more than 4,000 
men were put off. To McHenry and to t:'e majority of Port 
Kembla '"' :~··ers these dismissals were incontrovertible 
evidence .,, the power of a 'vast monopoly owned by a small 
gang of parasites'. BHP possessed a stranglehold on 
Australian eco~omic and politic~l life. 3 Though the strike 
continued for a further month, the economic implications of 
the company's move forced the watersiders to capitulate, and 
on 21 January they agreed under protest to load the Da}.fram. 
The Port Kembla watersiders eventually loaded the 
:::-. ·.fram but by their actions they had compelled the federal 
government to revie'·" its policies. Part of the reason for 
this success was that their stand was supp,,:::-ted by many 
patriotic UAP supporters thr~ughout Australia. It is 
probable also that some government members were belatedly 
cominq to accept th<:> need for such a ban. Equall" as 
impor~aiit in the battle to win public su.:1port was .·.1e ability 
of the Trades and Labor council to maintain a disciplined 
strike body. Their organisation had been quickly built ·..1p 
after 1935. Militant unionists controlled the major unions, 
influenced the policy of the Illawarra Trades '~"d Labor 
lSee Geoffrey Blainey, The Steelmaster (Melbourne, 1971), 
p.139. 
2 
. ld -Sydney Morning Hera._, ~ 
3 Steel & Metal Worker, 18 
December 1938. 
December 1938. 
,· 
.. '-
' . 
I. : •. ··.·.-.· .:r:__ .. ( 
331 
cc·, .. ncil and dominatec: 'che political wing of 
movement. They were therefore able · quickly 
the local labour 
to mobilise 
watersiders. Apart from some initial .c;upport for the 
difficul-c.y with AWU officials who considered providing men 
to work company wharves, the leaders gained the full suppo;t 
. , 
.)f all di.<trict unions.•· Within a week of the imposition of 
licensing, the coalminers had re-established the area-
committees used as relief and propasanda outlets during their 
'second round' campaign. 2 Railwaymen refused to handle 
scrap-iron, this effectively blocking any attempt to shift 
the pig-iron to Sydney for loading there. FIA officials 
guaranteed that their members would not work the company 
wharves. Moreover, :che strike leaders displayed considerable 
singlene~s of purpose in their handling of the dispute. 
They opem!d all wat1arside worke.i:s' meetings to casual wharf 
labourers and arranged to assist the crew of the Dalfram. 
Above all they refrained from overplaying their hand and 
rejected :>ressures to turn the strike into an all-out attack 
on BHP. 
The militants may have controlled the institutions of 
the Wollongong labour movement, but when the man who 
symbolised the hated government policies appeared on the 
scene, the spontaneous anger of individuals could not be 
restrained - nor was any attempt made to do so. When Menzies 
travelled by the coast road to Wollongong in January 1939, 
to meet with the combined disputes committee, his progress 
through the coalmininq ;,i.ic.ages was halted by demonstrators. 
Declaring the day a holi<}J ·, cQalminers and their families 
lined the roadside in }· ... ..,, · ·, against the continued exp~ 
of pig-iron. A crowd of 1,000 'men women and children' 
waited his arrival in Wollongong and barred his way to the 
Town Hall., The placards of the demonstrators reveal the 
diverse aLcitudes which prompted work.ers to support the 
lillawarra Mercur~, 9 December 1938; Daily News, 16 D6cember 
1938. 
2Daily News, l6 December 1938; common cause, 14 January 1939. 
3Illawarra Mercury, 13 January 1939· 
1 
I 
332 
strikers. They demanded 'work and peace', 'homes not war' 
and that 'the question of Pig Iron~ J be 1 ·· . ~o aoan out to the 
people' • It was cleai: ':hat- the · · - -- pig-iron strike was as much 
a social as a political s~rike. 
It is difficult, in any particular case, ':o determine 
exactly the steps by which social discontent is transformed 
into political protest. Yet it is possible to follow a 
sequence of events in Wollongong which distilled from the 
general misery a series of specific demands for reforms in 
living and working conditions, and eventually led to a 
political strike. The Wollongong labour movement was itself 
shaped by the depression. Most of its leaders gained their 
initial organising experience and developed their tactics in 
the Unemployed Workers' Movement. The pig-iron dispute is 
linked with the struggles of the unemployed through the 
miners' campaigns for pensions and improved conditions, 
through the union consolidation at Port Kembla and through 
the campaign for improved housing. It was the work of 
Wollongong's 'depression generation•
2 
and involved in its 
ramifications practically the whole of a working class 
community. The unity of 1938-9 was the result of a regrowth 
of interest in politics as a means of achiev:Lng trade union 
aims first in industry and then in social policy. This 
renewed interest in politics paralleled union growth and in 
the pig-iron dispute unions demonstrated the inter-
relationship by showing themselves to be a useful means of 
political organisation. 
1Ibid. ~See Don Aitken, Michael Kahan and sue Barnes 'Wha~ Ha~pened 
to the Depression Generation' in The Great Deoression 7n 
Australia (ed.) Robert Cooksey, P~·l?~-82. Th~ybq~es~ion 
whether the expe~ience of depretshsion ~~;;~~n~~llapes:v~~u~he 
th 1 
·t r and suggest that e ec en or a e th r than exacerbate class 
1930s may have 't7nde~ to mute ~a tally misle~ding for 
antagonisms' • This view seems o 
Wollongong. 
•' 
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CONCLUSION 
The Wollongong labour movement was ill-equipped to meet 
the problems arising from the depression of the 1930s. Not 
only were the coalminers, who dominated the industrial and 
political wing of the local labour move t men , confronted by 
an economic crisis within their industry, but the onset of 
the depression also took place against a wider background of 
disorienting social and economic change. ·until the 1920s 
Wollongong had been essentially a rural-mining district. 
More than sixty per cent of the district• s male work-force 
depended for their livelihood upon the coal industry. The 
establishment of a steelworks at Port Kembla in 1928, however, 
marked a new era in Wollongong's history. Within a decade 
steel production had surpassed coalmining as the single most 
important enterprise and ironworkers outnumbered the miners. 
By creating new markets for existing industries and 
stimulating new ones, the steelworks established Wollongong 
as the third most important industrial area in New South 
Wales. 
This transformation from a rural and mining community to 
a steeltown added a dL~ension to the district's depression 
experience. After 1928 the dominant social, political and 
economic forces were essentially the products of an 
increasingly urban environment. At first, all sections of 
the community welcomed the coming of the steelworks as an 
augury of better times. It was generally anticipated that 
the demand for coal at the new plant would assist a recovery 
of the local coal industry. Businessmen expected to profit 
from the increasing demands of a growing population, while 
all property owners were gratified by the resulting rise in 
land values. 
Economic collapse, however, exposed the doubts and 
hesitations harboured by some sections of the community about 
the impact industrial growth would have upon local society. 
The inability of local authorities to regulate industrial and 
residential expansion resulted in haphazard, unplanned 
development and appalling living co11ditions. This obvious 
i 
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confused and social deterioration provoked a series of 
contradictory responses from all sections 
governments which, in the main, reflected 
0£ society. Local 
the attitudes of 
conservative business and propertied interests grew more 
uneasy as they were called upon to assist the jobless who 
flowed into Port Kembla in search of \·:ork. some local body 
me!!Wers, like W.L. Howarth, the controversial mayor of 
Wollongong, reacted sharply and disclaimed any responsibility 
for the plight of all newcomers or outsiders as they often 
preferred to call them. In adopting this position they did 
not simply reject industrial society as necessarily evil or 
even undesirable. Rather they advocated an embargo on men 
entering the district until the return of better times. 
In the early months of the depression this viewpoint had 
a wide appeal and was shared by local unemployed who saw 
neHcomers as competitors for available work. It soon became 
clear, howe~~r, that the prime concern of many councillors or 
aldermen was to keep the jobless off the streets and if 
possible to isolate them on the outskirts of the community. 
The term 'Qutsider' lost its original and literal meaning and 
became a convenient label used by some local authorities to 
denigrate their critics. Such tactics were part of a wider 
and more ardent defence of the old rural-commercial order 
which formed an important strand in the think.ing of 
Wollongong's New Guard supporters. 
The accelerated economic and social change aftJr 1934 
highlighted the contradictory responses of rural and 
commercial interests to the transformation of local society. 
On the one hand local authorities, who had previously been 
inclined to regard the jobless as an unwanted drain upon 
their finances, came to see them as the nucleus of a 
:·1·::om;tructed industrial community. Yet these views were 
t b l.·ncreasi'ng fear that as the industrial empered y an 
community grew the 'slum districts' would spread and engulf 
S me i·n official positions were more adjoining areas. o 
anxious to remove these unsightly blots from the landscape 
d for the well-being of the inhabitants. than they were concerne 
· · t the humpy dwellers reflected, in part, Their outbursts agains 
· ld rder was being swamped by a new and the belief that an o o 
less desirable society. 
The conflicts produced by these social changes were 
expressed in the response of the labour 
movement to the 
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depression. Like other sections 
the new industries. 
of the community the workers 
'1ad welcomed Their doubts increased, 
however' :,s work prospe-::ts diminished. They came to see the 
deterioration in livi·ng d"t· con l. ions as an inevitable and 
offensive consequence of industrial society. Moreover, the 
belief grew among Wollongong workers that Hoskins were using 
the economic crisis to smash trade unionism. The subsequent 
almost total collapse of unions at Port Kembla seemed to 
establish the validity of their claim. 
The coalminers shared this view ana, although they 
possessed greater organisational resourc1;s than workers in 
the metal industries, they were in a tragically weakened 
position. Throughout the 1920s they had been compelled to 
come to grips with the _o>rc•blem that was later to absorb all 
unions namely, what policy could unions adopt when confronted 
with widespread unemployreent. Most coalminers, whatever their 
public protestations, accepted the view of their officials 
that a prudent policy of co-operation wi'.11 :.>.,; Arbitration 
Court might be the wisest. They placed th"' i ;: red.th also in 
the election of state and federal Labor governments which 
they hoped would revive and restructure the coal industry. 
Despite the enormity of the crisis which engulfed the 
labour movement, trade union officials in Wollongong, as 
elsewhere, were criticised for accepting too readily the 
terms of their employers. According to this view, first put 
forward by militants within the unions and to some extent by 
historians, union leaders 
administrative ability to 
lacked the necessary foresight and 
accommodate themselves to so 
' catastrophic a phenomenon as the depression.... Whatever 
validity of these allegations in other areas they would 
represent too harsh a judgement of most Wollongong trade 
U · ff" · l At Port Kembla, where unionists were nion n icia s. 
confronted with the task of constructing a new labour 
organisation, concentration on the inunediate problems of 
1 L J Louis Trade Unions and the 
See, for example, · · . ~ 193o-l932, passim. Depression: A Study of Victoria 
the 
'· 
The traditional 
strength of unionism on the 
union survival was all that was possible. 
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. . coalfields' however' gave 
southern mining officials a stronger b ase. Fred Lowden for 
example, was able to formulate long-term ' objectives and go 
some way towards realising them. His foremost concern was to 
keep as many men at work as possible, to arrest the decline 
in working conditions and to eliminate desperation strikes. 
g exercise until Accordingly, he planned a holdi." n · · 
circumstances favoured more positive policies. If he 
length of <·.his defensive period, underestimated the probable 
many shared his error. 
depended for its 
This was of ten not 
Even Lowden's rather limited policy 
success on vigilance at the lodge level. 
forthcoming. Officials at individual pits negotiated 
agreements with their proprietors against Lowden's wishes. 
;:est lodges, for example, lifted the darg - a limitation of 
output which equalised available work between miners and 
prevented speed-up. At other pits men accepted overtime. 
such decisions, as Lowden well knew, were hardly calculated 
to appeal to unemployed miners and tended to reinforce the 
latter's belief that there were now three classes - the 
bosses, the workers and the workless. 
The improving economic circumstances after 1934 aided 
trade union recovery. nut the successful reconstruction of 
the Wollongong labour movement between 1934 and 1939 was not 
based simply on an improved negotiating position. Rather it 
was che product of a greater degree of purposef1·. -ess and 
organisation. The unemployed workers' Movement .as most 
influential in the formulation of these new attitudes and 
techniques of organisation by the unions. In effect the 
movement filled the vacuum left by the disintegration of 
trade unionism during the depression. It provided militants 
with experience in leadership and a reputation for defending 
the rights of workers which enabled them to win 1.•.nion 
positions. The movement also provided a point of contact 
between ironworkers and coalminers. The personal friendships 
forged during the unemployed struggles helped to break down 
formidable union barriers and assizted the creation of an 
organised and united labour movement from a struggling 
collection of sepa:cate and parochial unions. Moreover, the 
•, 
. ' 
~-· 
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new leaders possessed a view f 
o the unions' role within the 
labour movement which went '--
"-""Yond the work-place. They saw 
more clearly than most that to achi'eve t d · · ra e union aims in 
industry and in social policy, political as well as 
industrial action was required. 
As a consequence the reconstruction of the Wollongong 
labour movement after the depression was paralleled by a 
regrowth of interest in politics. Wollongong workers had 
entered the depression with high hopes for the recently 
elected Federal Labor Government. The coalminers looked to 
Scullin to revitalise the coal industry, end the northern 
loc! ut on the men's terms and undo the work of the Bruce-
Page government which they claimed had perverted the 
arbitration system. Ho•: "-'er, in power, Federal Labor was a 
disappointment. Scull adopted the anti-Labour policy of 
imposing wage-cuts to stabilise the capitalist economy and 
failed to fulfil his promise to end the northern lockout 
within two weeks of being elected. 
The drift of federal Labor policy towards reti:enchment 
and budget-balancing led most workers to pin their hopes on 
~'"' New South Wales premier, J. T. Lang. Partly under the 
inspiration of his left-wing rhetoric the depression 
produced a heightened political awareness. There were, for 
example, demands for a return to the party's ultimate 
objective - the socialisation of industry. Among coalminers 
in particular the socialisation objective was more firmly 
and sincerely held than by the ALP membership more generally. 
Nationalisation was held to be the only full and'sound 
method of transforming the coal industry without resorting 
to alterations in wages and hours. Lang, however, became 
convinced that it was necessary for his own survival to curb 
the radical views expounded within the Labor Party. His 
expulsion of the militant element from the party decimated 
the local branches, provoked the disai£iliation of southern 
miners and increased the growing disillusion with politics 
u.nd i;nliticians. 
d t t movement was a further reflection The unemploye pro es 
Of . d l't'cu.l awareness evident during 1931 the heightene po i i . 
l •t' l •~plications of the demonstrations and 1932. The po i ica ~" 
,, 
•-1 
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are difficult to assess as men prot t d f · cs e or different 
reasons. Many demonstrated out of f t t" 
rus ra ion. Few advocated 
resistance of authority. With some justification many 
unemployed believed themselves to be the victims of 
repressive local authorities. The clashes between the 
demonstrators and local governments w~re, however, essentially 
parochial ones concerned to criticise the actions of local 
bodies and obtain some relief for the jo~less. It was 
because of their, defensive character that the protests 
received such widespread support not only from the unemployed 
but also from trade unionists. Yet the demonstrations and 
the responses to them did accentuate class antagonisms. The 
clashes between the New Guard and the demonstrators reflected 
in only slightly exaggerated form the growing divisions 
within Wollongong society. With the dismissal of Lang, 
however, the labour movement became immersed in a s.:uggle 
between those who supported the New South Wales premier and 
thosr ·-no saw him as a hindrance to the formulation of a 
coherent political programme relevant to the needs of workers. 
After 1934, however, it is possible to trace the process 
by which this schism was healed and depression misery was 
translated into a politically articulate and conscious set 
of demands and priorities. The initiative in formulating 
these new goals came from militant trade unionists some of 
whom were communists. Union leaders saw existing political 
divisions as a hindrance to more militant industrial 
policies. The communists wanted to stimulate working class 
consciousness. These two initiatives converged in the united 
front programme of 1935-9. The degree of co-operation 
between communist and non-communist in the united front 
period reflects the bankruptcy of the formal ALP organisation 
d f t ompai"gn became the only in Wollongong. The unite ron c~ .. 
effective means of organised protest on a wide range of 
l."ssues d" f demand for better working conditions, exten ing rom a . . . . 
~mprovements in housing and living conditions, to the need for ~" 
fasci"st aggression in Europe. The degree to to opposition to 
· d · l protest were fused was 
which political, industrial an socia 
1 trike of 1938 and most amply demonstrated in the coa s 
forcibly in the pig-iron dispute. 
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~: .. role of the communists within the unemployed 
Work.,:r~' Movement and in the creat of this new labour 
organisation ra:!.ses the general quLstion 
within the Australian la.bour movement. 
of their influence 
Rank and file apathy 
has been commonly presented as an explanation for communist 
can·:l.idates winning union elections. The communist successes 
c·f the 1930s havP. been attributed to the confused nature "= 
New South Wales politics which allegedly made it difficult 
for union members to know the precise political colourings 
of candidates for union positions. 1 Whatever the validity 
of these explanations elsewhere they are inaccurate for 
Wollongong. The communists on the united front ticket which 
was successful in the 1937 FIA branch elections at Port 
Kembla, made no attempt to hide their political affiliations. 
McHenry, who headed the ticket, had led unemployed protests 
during the depression <.:.n':. proclaimed his communist beliefs. 
He was known to his employers and to the police as one of 
Wollongong's most prominent communists. Moreover, he had 
also contested municipal and state elections as a Communist 
Party candidate before he became secretary of the Port Kembla 
FIA branch. Those ironworkers who voted for the united 
front ticket in 1937 knew McHenry's politics. Wollongong 
workers were not duped into choosing communist leaders, 
rather they elected individual communi.~ts because of their 
record of involvement in worker affairs. 
The role of the communists in instigating and leading 
strikes has also been exaggerated by their critics. Southern 
' district militants discovered, when they sought to put an 
end to rationing, that the depressed state of the coal 
industry placed limits upon the adoption of a consistently 
militant policy. Most coalminers accepted in theory the 
argumen~ that rationing was not so much a humanitarian device 
to share available work as an attempt by the owners to 
d t . n at the expense of the reduce costs and increase pro uc io 
workers. However, when south Bulli miners sought its 
l See, for example, D.W. Raws~n, 
(ed.), Australian Labour Relations 
p.162. 
in J.E. Isaac and G.W. F~rd 
Readings (Melbourne, l9u6) 1 
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abolition the proprietors presented them with a harsh option: 
rationing or retrenchment. The lesson of this abortive 
attempt to gain a measure of reform at the lodge level by 
threaten' ng to strike was not lost upon the communist 
of ficiaL;. Subsequently, to achieve the reforms in 'dork ing 
conditions so desperately need.ed in the coal industry, they 
pursued the traditional policy of the Miners' Federation -
recourse to arbitration backed by the threat of strike action. 
The latter course was followed only after careful organisation 
and after an extensive propaganra campaign both within the 
union and more generally. As a result the 1938 coal strike 
was one of the best organised strikes in Australian history. 
The changing circumstances of the post second world war 
society - full employment and comparative affluence for. some -
have not yet obscured the tensions first apparer._ in 
Wollongong during the depression years. In some areas 
continued industrial development has ;:.mply aggravated the 
problems which confronted the community in the 1930s. The 
expansion of the steelworks has led to sustained population 
growth. The decision to recruit workers from southern Europe 
has not, however, been accompanied bY better social planning. 
The migrants of the 1970s huddle in the unplanned industrial 
suburbs which were spawned three decades earlier to house the 
depression poor. The residents of mc1ern day Cringilla face 
the same problems as the humpy-dwellers of Steeltown and the 
inhabitants of Spoonerville. 
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APPENDIX B 
PRODUCTION AT METAL MANUFACTURES, 1927 - 1936 
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Al'PEND!X D 
POPllI.ATION CH;..:;•2 IN WOL.T"ONGotlG. 1921-33 
---··----
The follcwing table.;; ani; grephs have been compiled from 
the 1921 and :,'.j33 ~onwealt;."\:l Census. Fi;:iure l gives the 
total p~Qulaticn growth between 1921 and i933 for each local 
government area in the Wollongong district. The extent to 
which this growth was the result of migration is shown in 
Figure 2. The vital statistics method was used to calculate 
the net growth by migration. The natural population increase 
is establishei by calculating the annual excess of births 
over deaths. The difference between the total excess of 
births over deaths and the total increase in population is 
the net growth by migration. The net migration figures 
obtained are inflated to the extent that the total number of 
deaths includes migrants. However, since the greater 
proportion of the migrants were in the 20 to 29 age group 
Csee Figure 3) this is likely to have produced only a 
relatively slight exaggeration. 
The tables showing the graduated number of males and 
females by quinquennial age groups for 1921 and 1933 
{Figure 3) provide the raw figures for ~~e series of pyramid 
graphs which follow. These show that the 1>opulation influx 
was greatest among males in the 20-29 age group. see 
Chapter One, PP· for an analysis of these figures. 
Figure 1. POPULATION GROWTH 1921-33 
Approximate Local 
Population Population Percentage Government 193:; Increase Area 
·-
Central I~l.-:1'..11~:.:ra 
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Source: census cf the 
census cf the 
)921 
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14,113 15,026 7 
commonwealth of Australia, 1921; 
commonwealth of Australia, 1933. 
Figure 2. 
Year 
1921 
-~ .· 1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
192B 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
roTAL 
Year 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
' 1925 
1926 
1927 
l92B 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 I 
TOTAL 
MIGRATION TABLES 
(a) Municipality of Wollen~ 
Males 
Number Number Excess 
Of Of Births Total 
Births Deaths Over Population Deaths 
126 50 76 3,309 
110 42 68 
lOB 41 67 
113 3B 75 
113 35 7B 
116 45 71 
103 44 59 
125 !:'2 73 
133 4B B5 
12B 47 Bl 
101 39 62 
124 41. BO 
1116 5:0 54 5,77B 
1,506 577 929 2,469 
' 
Females 
Number Number 
Excess 
Births Total 
of of over Population 
Births Deaths Deaths 
9e 44 54 I 3,399 102 27 75 
99 36 63 . 
l (,,: 37 G7 I 107 26 81 ).o-:. ! 45 61 I 12~ 28 94 
119 40 79 
] '. :: 39 84 
J 1;,_ 32 77 
90 33 65 
82 40 42 
112 46 66 
!:;, 6~:5 
1,381 473 90B ! 2,226 
345 
Net 
Migi:.ation 
i 
! 
+1,540 
Net 
Migration 
" 
, •.. -
I 
' 
i 
' 
I +l, 318 
., 
·-~ 
I , 
-1,, 346 
., 
' 
(bl tlY.'licioality of Central Illawarra 
Males 
Number Number Excess 
Year of of Births Total Net 
Births Deaths Over Population Migration 
'"leaths 
1921 62 1, 43 2,906 1922 71 lo 53 
1923 67 17 50 
19~~ 72 17 55 
1925 69 21 48 
1926 71 19 52 
1927 85 32 53 
1928 83 33 50 
1929 94 37 57 
1930 92 40 52 
1931 82 36 46 ' i 
1932 84 33 51 
1933 99 27 72 4,763 
TOTAL 1,031 :;11 ('\ f>82 1,587 +905 
Females 
Number Number Excess Births Total NP-t Year of of over Population Migration Births Deaths Deaths 
l'~ ;1 66 7 59 2,566 
1922 -;o 15 55 
1923 65 19 46 
1924 Jl l6 55 
1925 79 14 65 
1926 66 10 56 
1927 78 27 51 
1928 101 31 70 
1929 96 25 71 
1930 81 25 56 
1931 90 31 59 
1932 83 26 57 I 42 ' -3,383 1933 59 17 
263 742 1, 3l:• +575 TOTAL 1,005 
347 
(c) Bulli Shire 
Hales 
Number Number Excess 
Year of of Births Total Net 
Births Deaths Over Population Migration Deaths 
1921 194 41 153 7,320 
1.922 165 146 19 
1923 164 146 18 
1924 181 175 6 
1925 175 173 2 
1926 155 173 -18 
1927 162 70 '32 
1928 167 67 100 
1929 .:_49 97 52 
1930 159 71 88 
1931 140 72 68 
1932 125 77 48 
1933 115 63 52 7,982 
TOTAL 2,051 1, 371 680 662 -18 
Females 
Number NUl"ber E:;cess Births Total Net Year of of over Population Migration Births Deaths Deaths 
1921 176 45 131 6,793 
1922 166 75 91 
1923 170 I 111 59 
\ 1924 148 107 41 
t925 155 95 60 
1926 ).28 107 21 
1927 151 55 96 
1928 161 54 107 
1929 163 54 109 
1930 127 46 81 
1931 125 38 87 
1932 136 45 91 
1933 131 38 93 7,044 
870 1,067 25.l -816 TOTAL 1,937 
348 
(d) Municioality of Northern Illawarra 
Males 
Number Number Excess 
Year of of Births : .. .:ital Net 
Birt!-,;; J:;e .~hs Over Population Migration Deaths 
1921 78 23 55 3,212 
1922 87 19 68 
1923 76 13 63 
1924 87 17 70 
1925 70 18 52 
1926 90 24 66 
1927 80 29 51 
1928 93 34 59 
1929 86 35 51 
' 1930 79 35 44 
1931 74 27 47 
1932 73 33 40 
1933 59 32 27 4,191 
TOTAL 1,032 339 693 979 +286 
Females 
Number Number Excess Births Total Net Year of of over Population Migration Births Deaths Deaths 
" 
1921 87 7 80 2, 876 
1922 75 13 62 
1923 88 21 67 
1924 81 18 63 
1925 93 16 77 
1926 94 20 74 
1927 77 26 51 
1928 79 30 49 
1929 61 25 36 
1930 71 23 48 
1931 62 13 49 
1932 60 24 36 
1933 72 26 46 3, 587 
262 738 711 -27 TOTAL 1,000 
,f 
"i 
i 
' 
' 
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Figure 3. POPl!LATION STRUCTURE 1921-33 
Age 
0-4 
5-9 
10-14 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60-64 
65-69 
70-74 
75-79 
B0-84 
85-89 
90-94 
95-99 
i00-105 
Source: 
(a) Gradua~ed Number of Males and Females in 
Quinguennial Age Grouos for 1921 
Central Northern 
Illawarra Illawarra Wollongong Bulli 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
345 320 461 404 408 365 953 933 
319 336 447 424 403 39B B72 93B 
290 292 369 375 326 413 734 776 
254 243 246 230 259 30B 477 530 
23B 201 234 206 232 2B5 466 475 
236 197 221 204 237 253 554 5B2 
243 201 272 203 261 267 692 5B9 
19B 157 2;.2 214 23B 244 646 546 
1B2 169 179 149 231 170 479 391 
146 12B 143 124 196 124 356 317 
129 9.:S 115 101 lBl 105 305 214 
122 77 105 -c lOB BB 2B6 160 '-· 
94 61 73 77 94 51 197 140 
52 35 64 39 62 40 162 9B 
:> .'.l 26 32 23 37 22 67: 
16 14 13 10 19 12 40 ~4 
12 12 9 10 7 5 15 8 
4 1 1 3 4 2 2 3 
-
l 1 1 3 1 1 -
- -
-
1 -1 - -
-
- - -
- -
- -
Census of Commonwealth of Australia, 1921, pp.550. 
Age 
0-4 
5-9 
10-14 
15-19 
I 20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60-64 
65-6'.'l 
..,0-74 
7 5-7':1 
80-84 
85-89 
90-94 
95-99 
100-105 
Source: 
350 
(b) Graduated Number of Males and Females in 
Quinguennial Age Grouos for 1933 
I 
! 
Central Northern 
Illawarra Illawarra Wollongong Bulli 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Hale Female 
479 463 392 329 513 497 681 648 
471 477 442 403 521 558 810 733 
438 404 476 473 543 549 861 797 
406 359 403 361 512 531 766 725 
375 319 377 264 554 548 646 535 
425 303 332 264 594 520 555 518 
394 306 288 254 513 378 521 445 
358 257 281 232 397 391 473 461 
343 253 264 233 383 369 590 508 
<98 190 260 215 333 327 581 504 
267 195 210 168 278 284 482 373 
155 121 146 121 218 220 323 274 
136 99 117 95 176 165 262 184 
98 67 93 63 98 106 195 139 
69 33 55 49 74 95 116 93 
27 18 27 30 39 42 69 66 
•. 8 12 9 20 22 21 13 
1 3 4 8 2 11 7 8 
1 - ' 2 1 2 - -
1 - - -1 - -
-
1 - - -
-
.. 
-
Census of corrunonwealth of Australia 1933, Vol.l, 
pp.4-23. 
:: 
Figure 4. POPULATION STP.UC'l'URE 
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(b) WOLLON~NG MUNICIPALITY 1933 
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(c) MUNICIPAILTY OF CENTRAL ILIAWARRA 1921 
75+ 
70-74 
65-69 
60-64 
55-59 
50-54 
""' 5 45-49 
P!i 
~ 40-44 
"' 
..J 
;:; 35-39 ,,. 
~ 
0 30-34 
z 
5 
0 25-29 
20-24 
15-19 
10-14 
5-9 
MALE 
PERCENTAGE 
353 
FEMALE 
~· 
' 
i 
·' :' 
~· 
). 
(d) MUNICIPAILTY OF CENTRAL ILLAWARRA 1933 
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(e) BCLLI SHIRE 1921 
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(g) MUNICIPALITY OF NORTHERN !LLA\~ARRA 1921 
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APPENDIX E 
BLACK COAL PRODUCTION FOR AUSTRALIAN COALFIELDS 
1925-39. . ' 
.. 
Total District Production Year Australian 
.• -., 
Production South North West. 
1925 13,626,777 2,052,963 7,637,953 l,705,2S3 
1926 13,275,003 2,024,520 7' 257' 598 1,603,648 
1927 13,522,960 2,155,461 7. 145 •. 1,825,537 
1928 11,839,780 1,817,225 5,978,48lJ 1,652,490 
I 
1929 10,365,319 2,258,808 3,019,693 2,339,837 
1930 9,531,359 1,529,674 3,715,805 1, 84'1' :;,76 
1931 8,401,260 981,964 4,161,798 1,288,620 
1932 8,585,858 1,112,686 4,398,253 1,273,222 
1933 9,091,976 1,218,014 4, 6: 1,483 1, 248, 9.;o 
1934 9,579,033 1,344,669 5,2'.<.7,647 1,300,864 
1935 10' 887' 954, 1,588,282 5,1"~9.802 l,'!60,495 
1936 11,370,409 1,626,143 6,197,554 1,375,769 
1937 12,074,274 1,880,440 6,674,362 1,496,717 
1938 11,680,159 1,831,408 6,:'94,213 1,445,309 
1939 13,535,142 2,160,'!17 7,365,981 1,669,134 
Source: Mines Dep~•tment Reports, 1925-40. 
,. 
•; 
;.~ 
A?PENDIX F 
'l'HE NUMBER OF MINES 0PE!1ATING AND 
[:¥.{:c>l EMPLOYED IN SOUTHERN COLLIERIES, 
1926-38. 
Number 
Year of Men 
!-lines Employed 
1926 13 5,293 
1927 1 0 4,959 
1928 
·' -
4, 788 
1929 20 4,816 
1930 15 4,291 
1931 18 3,195 
1932 19 3, 132 
1933 19 2,822 
1934 18 3,206 
1935 17 2,971 
1936 17 3,288 
1937 19 3,839 
1938 19 3,970 
Source: ts 1926-40. Mines Department Reper ' 
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APPENDIX G 
~VERJ\GE NUMBER OF DAYS WORKED PER MO~rrII 
IN ·rim PHINCIPP•L cor.i;,IERIES or THE SOU'rll.ERN COAI,FIBLD 
--
~lonth 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 l9:'J2 1933 
,Junuar:')' 17 .8571 15.4285 16.5714 15.31 10.6000 11.7148 9. ,571 
Fchrua.::y 17.0000 11.7142 18.0714 19.62 10.4660 12.7857 10 • .<:..357 
:·1L,rch 21.2857 13.7857 16.8571 16.92 9.1333 12.5000 11. 7142 
l\pril 15.1428 10.5000 18.4285 13.98 9.5333 11. 7851 11.3571 
l·1ay 17.5000 16.9285 20.7857 13.60 7.3333 9.4285 9.4285 
June 16.1428 11.0000 17.3571 9.48 8.3330 11. 3571 11. 3571 
Jul.y l.2. 857 l. l.2.3571. 21.. 3571. 9.00 l.0.5333 l.3.21.48 l.4.6428 
l\ugust l.4. 7 l.42 l.3.5000 20.7142 8.98 11.0000 14.7142 13.78!''.'.' 
sc1)tcmber l.5.0000 1l..142ll 20.5714 11.66 9.4666 12.8571 10.1428 
October l.4. 0714 14.7857 21.2857 J.0.60 8.2666 11.9285 10.7857 
November 16.0714 15.71.42 16.0000 7.75 7.5333 12.7142 14.6428 
December 13.5000 12.9285 17.0000 9.33 9.2666 10.8500 11.2857 
Calculated from figures provided in Mines Department Reports, J.927-33. 
/\PPENDIX H 
AIS PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT FIGUHES, 1929-39. 
Coal Coke r.;_g Iron Steel Ingots Average 
Year Consumption Proclu.c.tion Production Production number of daily 
-
( '000 tons) ( '000 tons) ( '000 tons) ( '000 tons) 
employees 
1929 247 41 130 72 750 
1930 348 78 121 72 750 
1931 201 29 47 34 800 
1932 188 34 37 43 1,000 
1933 306 115 74 74 1,500 
1934 318 130 141 121 2,500 
19'.::5 341 120 177 166 3,500 
1936 307 113 186 186 4,097 
1937 415 152 2'10 296 5,251 
1938 520 254 365 312 4,473 
1939 558 380 560 306 4,478 
Source: 1\XS Annual Reports 1929-40. The employment figures were supplied 
by the company. 
~;:~~~ 
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APPENDIX I 
THE BULL! RIOT, 11 MAY 1931 . 
The 
Timmins, 
1972). 1 
following is the text of an interview with Mr Dan 
Mr Len Boardman and Mr Harry Blacklock (26 February 
All three men were prominent members of the 
Unemployed Workers' Movement. Dan Timmins was born in West 
Bromwich in 1898. He worked in the coalmines before serving 
in the British army in France and Belgium during World War I 
In 1922 he migrated to Australia and, after a short period in 
Melbourne, settled in Coledale. Len Boardman, born in 1899 
at Stoke-on-Trent worked in the local potteries be: -ce joining 
the British army when still sixteen years of age. He 
migrated to Australia in 1920 but did not settle in 
Wollo:-igong until 1928 (see Chapter Three, p.123). Harry 
Blacklock was born in 1901 at Bolton, near Manchester, and 
.;orked in the local cotton mills. In 1915 at just fourteen 
years of age he enlisted and served in Egypt for two years. 
He migrated to Australia in 1926 but did not find a permanent 
job until enlisting for garrison duty in 1939. 
The combined recollections of these three men are 
valuable in so far as they provide an insight into how three 
avowed militants now view their depression experiences. 
Moreover, because of the remarkably accurate recall of events 
and the names of people involved in them, the interview is 
itself a testimony of the impact the depression had upon the 
three men. 
Len Boardman: 
We had to go in the Old Council Chambers or J:l>llli Niners' 
Hall and in that period Steve Best was one of the dole 
officers and our people used to come up, and the dole 
officers used to, in some instances, when new applicants came 
tl,em and ask them various questions and along, interrogate • 
1r acknowledge 
and conducting 
f Dr J.A. Merritt in organising the assista~ce o 
this interview. 
- -_ ! 
hand them the dole and tell them they would be registered 
so forth. This went on for quite a while and there were 
certainly many great arguments at that period, but no 
366 
and 
systematic attack on them. Throughout the Coast, some of the 
officers made complaints to the authorities that they didn't 
feel too safe and the police came over and took charge. 
Actually took charge of the issuing depots, one sat at the 
table and another policeman would be outside and another 
policeman would be inside walking around as our people came 
up. The moment they made any statement that wasn't 
acceptable to the Issuing Officer and said things back to the 
Issuing Officer, the policeman would step in and harass them 
and do all sorts of manner of things. This led, in one 
instance, to an actual fight between the applicants and the 
police, with some of our people joining in. This happened at 
Bulli and then our people had meetings right throughout the 
place on this question. And at this period with the police 
being there, many of our 
the dole - that had been 
people were actually being refused 
getting it. The resul-+: 
our people had meetings and so forth and decided 
was, that 
that they 
weren't going to play with the police. That the police have 
got to get out of these places. 
For instance, one of the instanc~s happened up in 
Scarborough. The officer there with the police refused to 
give two men their dole. One of the men who is dead now, by 
the name of Woods, and Checker Smith, were in front of the 
dole-keeper. I was with them remonstrating regarding their 
dole and so forth - their circumstances - and Woods picks up 
the stamp, the ink pad and the rest and he said, 'If you 
aren • t going to give rr.:) the bloody dole, then no other bastard 
· · t any'. And he threw the stamp and the pad and is going to ge 
everything else over the cliff into the sea. 
Harry Blacklock: 
· t i"f the dole officer could not harass you The poin was, 
h h ld l Ve the matter to the policeman and the enoug e wou ea 
· k for some means of identification. policeman would as you 
I rn~dn that some of the fellows were going under another name, 
I have had instances of fellows corning to me getting dole, and 
hold three union tickets so they could get and asking could I 
- I 
.. ,,,J. 
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the dole. But that was what haopened 
ld 
, • • If the dole officer 
cou n t harass you enough he would hand it over to the 
policeman and the policeman would nave the file and say 
whether you got the dole or not. 
Len Boardman: 
Not just these people that Harry . is talking about now. 
No, the two men I am stating were actual residents of 
Wombar::-a - Scarborough. Had been for years, were well known 
and well known identities to the police and this was 
happening to locals y u • l 
- , o see. We 1, this started it. And 
then at this period questionnaires came 
decided the questionnaire should not be 
out and our people 
filled in because 
there were - was 't s· t · • ix een or n~1eteen questions on the 
questionnaire? 
Harry Blacklock: 
How many? 
Len Boardman: 
Nineteen. There were a lot more, but these were the 
ones that had a lot to do with us mostly, were about nineteen 
questions and they went down right from whatever you had; 
whether you own your own house; whether you got any money; how 
.,, many in your family; did you have any fowls; did you have a 
garden; how many children you had; what ages they were; 
whether one was working; where they were working; would they 
be able to leave home; wou;l.d they be able to look after 
themselves; whether they suffered any illnesses; all manners 
of things by which our people could be dep::cive·.: of "the dole. 
For instance, a boy over the age of sixteen was not giver. the 
dole if he stayed at home. He could go and get work where 
there was some, or as we called it, 'carry a swag' from ?lace 
to place looking for work. These were the things that 
started the fer-.\.~ntation and action which led up to burr ~11g 
of the questionnaires there on Slacky Flat, Bulli. Members 
walked from Port Kembla to Slacky Flat, walked from 
Helensburghto slacky Flat, Bulli and I can say thousands were 
at Slacky Flat. A :OOnfire was li.t and an effigy of the 
Premier of New south wales [B.S.B. Stevens] was burned with 
,.,. 
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all the police of the South Coast · f · · . rein orced by ~ division 
from Sydney standing by waiting for t · 1 . 
. ac ion. It was il V":.!ry 
close call during that period be · · cause, if the police 1·1ad 
attacked, the unemployed had a Workers' D f e ence Corps which 
was fully aL"'1\ed with batons and other weapons of defence. 
This went off O.K. with the leaders and other members 
' prominent members, being picked up after the meeting had 
finished, put in gaol and arraigned in front of the court. 
After this, further intimidations went on and this Jed up to 
~ Bulli Riot. At that period many of our members were in 
,. ol. I was one of them. 
Harry Blacklock: 
= 
Well, from there we had a meeting outside the Bulli depot 
in regard to the questionnaire and the burning of it and the 
policeman on the table. I chaired the meeting across the 
road from the dole depc: and a resolution was carried that tho 
dole be declared black. And nobody even offered to go into 
the dole depot, with the exception of a fellow named Anderson 
from Bulli who, rightfully I believe, was not cnti.tled to the 
dolc. 2 There were two pickets standing on the door and the 
sergeant was standing there as well. Two pickets pushed this 
fellow Anderson back and the sergeant told him to go again. 
With the result the pickets threw him back again and Anderson 
grabbed one of the pickets. Another policeman stepped in, 
what was his name? = Con~table Perry from Bulli. The sergeant 
attempted to pull his baton out of his pocket and somebody 
took it out of his hand and bashed him over the head with it 
and then a riot started just below the steps. I think the 
only thing that saved constable Perry anc the sergeant at the 
time was a pony and sulky there which got pushed over on the 
top of them. There was a constable inside, I won't mention 
hi.;; name, but he refused to come outside anyhow. After that 
they arrested a fellow named Jack Hitchen and bashed him 
coming up the street with the batons and the sergeant at the 
1 dm · h onfusing the dole questionnaire of May Boar an is ere c 
1931, with that of September 1932. 
2 t · 1 true for Anderson was a Coal~liff This is almost cer ain Y 
miner. 
pl 
----· . 
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time pulled his revolver out and threatened a bloke with 
powder marks on his face. And Dr Palmer, the doctor at Bulli, 
rushed out and said: 'Don't shoot, sergeant, for Christ's 
sake. They will kill you.' And with that they dragged 
Hitchen inside the police stati"on and, we were led to believe 
anyway (and it was proved afterwards) , that they bashed hell 
out of Hitchen with the batons. His head was streaming with 
blood. From t~en on the police came down from Sydney, the 
21st Division, the Basher Gang commonly known, and of course 
we scattered and they went around trying to pick the leaders 
up. That night I was in one of the fellow's houses playing 
cards with a fellow named Bobby Culbertson. He had powder 
marks on his face similar to this fellow the sergeant was 
goi: ' to poke his revolver at, and they surrounded the house 
and suddenly I heard the knock at the door and I said: 'This 
is the Johns', and I made out to go out the back and there 
was a policeman peeping around the corner ar.d he said: ' It' s 
no use running away.' I said: 'I'm not running away. I'm 
going to the toilet.' He says: 'Come here a minute. Weren't 
you in the riot this morning?' I said: 'No'. I said: 'I was 
waiting across the street as a matter of fact.' He said: 
'I suppose you are one of these commas.' I said: 'Who said 
that?' He said: 'Well, I suppose you think you can use your 
fists. ' I said: 'i\y, if some)"•)dy has a smack at me I' 11 have 
a smack back.' With the result this fellow from Sydney gave 
'1le a couple of cl.ou'. across the face and I stuffed my hands 
in my pockets, and constable Smith came over and says: 'He 
wasn't in the riot.' And with that they pinched Bobby 
Culbertson and arresteu hL'11 for this bloke who was supposed 
to have thrown some stones at the sergeant of the policn, 
Standen of Bulli. This was a fellow with blue marks on his 
face, but from that on I don't know any more. They were 
going around the town trying to pick the fellows up. They 
went to this ·house at Thirroul that was being picketed and 
they raided the place. But from that there is :· . ..ii.:ning more 
that can be said about that. 
*This is almost certainly a slip. 
formed after the second world war 
Sydney. 
The 21st Division was 
to stamp out thuggery in 
'' 
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Len Boardman: 
After the police had what they called cleaned up after 
the Bulli riots the Councils, under police mandate, decided 
that no further meetings should be held i· n ,_.·,1 e - streets by the 
unemployed or by anyone associating with them. This lhcn led 
to what became known as a Free Speech campaign of the South 
Coast. Meetings were held in defiance of the pol ice outside 
dole depots and so that the police would not be able to attack 
us we held the speakers · · in private houses or front yar 3~ ~"ho 
speaker woul<;l be in the front yurd of " house opposite cne 
dole depot, be speaking from there, und the people would be 
stunding around outside the dole depot. When the police 
tried to shift them they said that they were waiting for their 
dole, and that is why they were there, and naturally this did 
not last too long. The police in some instances picked us up 
after we finished the mec~ings for creating disturbances. 
This led then to us holding meetings in Wollongong, the corner 
of Churc~, Street, meetin,;s in Cor".'.imal, -'it the corner of 
Station Street, opposite Green's baker shop, which led also 
to fights with the police in some instances, gaolings of 
speakers and speakers being dragged off the boxes. Also at 
this period there was the formation of the New Guard and the 
New Guard down here was very lively at that period. Dr Lee 
was one of the leading members. other members were leading 
lights in the industrial sections here and others were 
members of the 'silvertail' groups as we call thzm down here. 
None of them was actually unemployed or actually basic 
workers. They used, if possible, to attack when a small 
meetins was on. When there was a large meeting they stood 
outside and taunted our people to try to get individuals so 
that they could 'r.ash them up. This W<>S not successful on 
their part, so much so that at the corner of Church Street 
one night in October 1931 we h·eld a meeting at the corner of 
church street near Globe Lane and they attacked. Some of our 
1 
· th alleyway a 1 O' gside Globe Lane and as they peop e were in e - · 
attacked, our people came out and there was a f.igh~. They had 
d Op
le had weapons, including ~lcycle chains, 
weapons, an our pe 
batons and all manners of weapons, such as this. So much so, 
d fl.·ni·~hed very very disgruntled. Some of that the New G1nr ~ • 
h 
-t b t mostly our people that wel'.e caught 
our people were u. , u 
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were hauled up into Court, Wollongong Court, and were placed 
in front of the ntipendiary Magistrate, Chapman. one 
instance that I would like to recall is this. A boy by the 
2 inches, one of the name of Kelso, he was about 5 feet 
smallest of the people amongst us. He was arraigned and so 
much s6 that he could hardly look over the box in the court. 
When he came out the prosecuting sergeant said: 'This man is 
~ stormy petrel. He is a violent man. He is a man that has 
ca•_,,. ·.:l great damage to various people.' And he ;:;:r.r<:.ic<;1ed 
some of the New .:::•'lrd as witnesses and these men were 
anyt,hing from 6 feet t.c- 6 feet 2 inches. This man, for being 
so small, got six months in ~aol. This of course then led 
up to a further meeting, in the late October or the beginning 
of November in the same place (at Church Street) at which 
Lawrence Sh;irkey, Bateman and local speakers spoke and our 
people walked from Helensburgh to Wollongong, Port Kembla to 
* Wollongong. The Workers' Defence Corps was brought out and 
our womenfolk were issued with a reco1mnendation that all cf 
them should have high heeled shoes with an iron tip on them. 
Dan Timmins : 
or carry a long knitting needle or hat pin. 
Len Boardman: 
When this meeting was on,. the speakers were placed 
against the wall of the stadium (it was the Stadium at that 
period) and round the speaker formed the Workers' Defence 
corps, outside them was the ordinary people and again in the 
centre was a ring of \'1JC, again the people and WDC, outside 
them. These men outside were facing away from the meeting. 
The police were there and the police were told that provided 
there was no trouble with the New Guard then there would be no 
the New Guard were amongst the trouble w.i.t;.1 us. Anyhow, 
d h n Bateman was talking the people inside -the two rings an w e . 
t d t throw eggs and tomatoes. Ths police were New Guard star e o 
issued with instructions that if they didn't stop them, we 
* 
reference to the addr~ss given.by . 
h. federal election c:;mpaigi:i in w~~ the Co!'1lnunist Party candidate 
This is probably a 
L.L. Sharkey as part of 
December 1931. Sharkey 
King. 
for 
;_~;~~:: 
'".>>: 
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would stop them. 
man threw another 
we walked in. We 
The result was tha:: thi? ':ergeant, when one 
tomato, was t·'ld t• .. a+-_ ; f- · d · d 't lk · ~ - - :~e i n wa . in, 
walked in and grabbed th::.'.! man and hit him 
as he was gc.•ing to throw another one. The ~'ew Guard up in 
Globe Lane would r.:'t come out. They asked us to come out. 
The meeting finished and all our people, thousands of them, 
walked up and down Crown Street calling on the New Guard to 
come out, and singing the 1.!nternational' and the'Red Flag'. 
That was the beginning of the end c:: the New Guard here. some 
cf the actions that were taken against them were their tyres 
were slashed, especially Dr Lee's. Other cars had sand and 
sugar put in their petrol tanks and their Lars were dislocated 
in many, many ways. Other people that could not be got at 
like that were definitely taunted and definitely driven out 
of the New Guard. That was the position on the South Coast 
in 1931-32. 
Dan Timmins: 
But it was also at that period when they held meetings 
over the mountain. We had young boys up there watching who 
they were, who was in the New Guard and at the meetings. The 
boys were supposed ·~o be hunting birds or just looking for 
mushrooms. 
Len Boardman: 
r '11 tell you also what happened during that period. 
got word that €he c'lew Guard "'<'.IS very, very good up in 
Jamberoo. so we then got a team of our people, over a 
hundred, and went up 
dole at Jamberoo and 
to Jamberoo whcu they were issuing 
held a meeting up there and defied 
the 
the 
New Guard to come ou.~·. This was C.one in quite a m:.mber of 
d w ~"e South Coast was places and wh~;n the New Gu:ir sa "· · 
We 
determi.nec> that they were not goir.:g to do anything, they 
thel.·r heads. That is what happened down here. actually buried 
Dan Timmins: 
to the Free speech, right after that there was In regards l tbing was that every person wno 
really no trouble· The on Y · 
got up 
liable 
to 
to 
speak 
get a 
t aken and \le was t"ld he was his name was . 
t herwise his namr;i -.ms listed. sUll'.mons or o 
\ 
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It didn't matter what nati."onali."ty h 
e was or it didn't matter 
if he was a member of the Li."beral p * arty. He was branded as 
a Commo and his name was placed on the list as a Communist. 
Well, gradually it was overcome and the speeches were allc'•iEd 
to go on because it went from instead of having one speech a 
week in Wollongong we were going up to three speeches a week 
and it would have got more until the heat was called off and 
so it was allowed to go on. 
Len Boardman: 
I can remember at that period the arrests were 
indiscriminate. W£ were putting up stickers banning the 
Labor Daily which had turned against us. I was away at 
Newcastle at the time and I came back and the police constable 
came to my house where I was boarding and he said: 'You have 
been summonsed here for putting up these stickers.' I poi~ted 
out that I was in Newcastle, but was arraigned in front of the 
magistrate and the magistrate said: 'Have you got any 
witnesses?' I said: 'Yes .. ' He said: 'What are they? Miners?' 
I said: 'Yes,' and the magistrate said: 'The miners will swear 
to anything. You can get iourteen days.' Another time, a man 
was arraigned in front of Chapman. Evidence was given, the 
man was asked: 'Have you anything to say?' The man said: 
'Yes', and Chapman pickeC: up the Sydney Morning Herald, read it 
until the man had finished, and then he said: 'I find you 
JUilty and oen.tence you to fourteen days.' Those were the 
per.iooQ where law was not on the side of the people whatsoever. 
Harry Blackloc~: 
Wh<>n I tirat 5t;i.rted getting the dole in 1927 and this 
was a matter of 9oing t.o the polic= station at Bulli and 
satisfying the pdl.iceman th;re 1J1dt I had been looking for 
work. It didll't. matter where 1 had to go, I had to go and 
look for work. I was constantly harassed by thi~ policema~ at 
Bulli and evon threatened to be put inside repeatedly, ¢.lld l 
told the pol:l.cellliln he could put rne inside as far as ); W'<H• 
*Presumably he means the UAP or country Party. 
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concerned, he would :;till have to 
would still have to feed the wife 
my goat that much ~hat eventually 
heard a job was going down 
give me the dole and he 
and kiddies, but it got 
I took to the track. I 
on 
at Kiama. However, I walked down 
there from Bulli and how I managed · t I d • i on t know, but I 
finally got down there and the 'lai· n R ~ oads Board was calling 
men up. And I applied at-. the depot h h 
_ , w en t ey were calling 
the men Up and the officer there that was taking the men on 
asked me where I came from. I said: 'From Bulli. • He said: 
'Well, I' rn sorry but this ,_· s only for men at Kiama, unemployed 
at Kiama.' I said: 'Well, look, will you sign my dole ticket 
that I have been round here looking for work?' He said: 'Why?' 
I said: 'Well, the police at Bulli reckon I am not looking for 
worJ.>. ' He said: 'I'm not going to sign any ticket.' He said: 
'Anyway, if the policeman has another go at you, you refer 
him to me, at the Sewerage E')ard and the Main Roa(s Board, and 
I'll <tell him you were down here looking for a job. ' Well, 
I was naturally thinking my wife would get the dole at the 
police station, but she went on the dole day and the policeman 
asked where I was and she told him I was down at I<iama looking 
for a job. He said: 'Well, I'm sorry I can't give you the 
dole. Your husband has to apply for the dole.' Of ~curse I 
didn't know this while I was down there. I thought the wife 
was getting fed. Eventually I had to come back. I couldn't 
get a job, and found out that the policeman had refused the 
• .fe the dole. ·But in the meantime one of our friends from 
Thirroul had been up to the policeman and played merry hell 
with him, until eventually he gave the wife the dole and I 
went to the sergeant then. sergeant - I forget his name 
anyWay. I went to him and I said: 'Look.' I ""id: 'Why did 
d 1 ?' He said: 'It wasn't me, it was you refuse my wife the o e. 
constable Becker.' I said: 'Well, I've been down Kiama 
looking for a job.' I s~id: 'I was offered the dole down 
there by the sergeant. I wouldn't take it on the understanding 
the wife was getting the dole while .r was looking for a job.' 
He said: 'It'll be alright now, Harry. I'll see that you get 
the dole.• But he didn't know I had been to the local J.P. 
and the J.P. had got in touch with the secretary in Sydney and 
'Anyway, ' he 
pair of dancing the secretary had had a go 
says: 'How are you off for 
at the sergeant. 
shoes?' I had a 
I 
.. 
., 
•; 
EQSra 
;JU.'llps on at the time with ct i.'ic; hole in the sole of them, 
I picked them up and he said: 'You• d better cane up to my 
I think we can fi.· t you O"t wi· th · ' 
""' ~ a pair of shoes . 
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so 
. 'Ind. he also gave me ct pair o{ pants. r must suy after thut 
happened, and the incident of the wife's getting refused the 
c;· dole, r never got harassed bl; .Secker or the police sergeant 
:; "gain. I. did get the dole. rt wcis only " ticket to 'run up' 
~.; certain articles that lverc mar.ked on the ticket. No tob.:icco 
£! :illov·:ed. It \./as good of t1".1.e ~torekecpe.r if you could wheedle 
:o:o ounce of tobacco is;.stc;id of ,; ti.:; Qf jam or: something like 
t:i~\~. That's the way Y'J~ ll;\c.\ t.o ~:~~:-k 3<)Ur tobacco out, but 
\·:e 111.~v1~r ~ot a:ly :\tO;".c.y £er t·llt.~ rlL>lt".. I t0L~get t11e exact 
:!f'lo~nt. I thir.k it ~:":!..'.'}Hnt ... •c! ~'.) tv.;el\ .. e !.Dl:) for the wife u.nd I 
·· ;tr-.J i""'ur l:.ids in groceric!; '.;·;"· :<:f1 t.:;)sri 1 t VC'!;y mucl1. I know it 
\oJ~nt i.n ~ \V'2!C~ ar.d '¥-'£· \Jere :;catte;:i11g J.-ound ~nd pinching nevJ •.; 
~ 
.. 
'· 
pot.: .. ,;ocs i:rom the C1'1ineso 13zirdcn in lio~pit~l Rond, ond 
TJ-.a dole ilcpa::; WP.re set up about in th1: iieginning of 
! 92:1. They were ~.et up by ~;he Government and local peopl.e, 
civi.lict~:o, co-ope:rati•1e 1;odi.es, ;>eople ,J"no wei:c well-1'.nowi\, 
!'or i:1:';.t,>tlCQ Best, ~he :;ecrt!tury of \;he Trades µnd Labor 
Coun<:.i.l, tll!itc, pi:e~.~dent of a colliery l.odge, an<:l otl':er 
-. 
. ,
" ' _ \1exc or .. t ...crnj ... . 
.:;;. D.Jn TLl1~1~!)£: 
. , 
:.• 
!Ic :-.vi~~t.\!) ,i:~,.s ol"· t.l-n.! r!t.~nt.r:;.tJ. Col.·.r~cil I-Qi· tlte M..i.?\~:t"$ 
. , 
rcderat.ionj • 
Len Boardman: 
l\nd other people were se1',t. !::r1:') ot:.tSidt: • 
in here at that period when the dol~ h~c c~mc 
Mo police we:t-c 
through and we 
have got to say this, never at ah}' p!!l:°~(>d was the dole 
For l.·nst"nce, six shillings to keep a single man sufficient. ~ 
for a week and he only got these dole coupons. In Bulli for 
. . t to the Woonona Co-op and most of our instance, they ("ere sen . 
tivc society to do this and the 
oeoole went to the co-,operil . 
· · . of our oeople ilt thu t period and 
co-operative assisted milny .• . _ b 
Of. debt wc1·e incurred in th the Co op y quite lilrge amounts 
. •11 11'1LurJlly, our own people were 
our pcoi)lc bccLtusc, we .. . 
. , .. 1 tivc socLcty. uircctors of the co-opcr, ·r11is went on fo1· .:t 
., 
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considerable period and quite a lot of thieving went on 
because when the soup kitchens started many of our boys went 
dowh and got l;ih.eep from various plaees. One am·.,,, J.ng incident· 
I can recollect was of a New Guardsman who was a butcher in 
Corri.mal, Ziems.* He had sheep ar.d pigs and so forth there, 
an<l the ba~s went down to grab one of these and they had the 
~~g alright, but the pig was squealing so loud that old Ziems 
, .. amn out vtl.'th hJ.· 4 ~ ,.·.··"-'.' ... '.·•. ' t k h' • h b 1 · ~ ~ - ;,.1u s .oc w ip ana e was e .. ting the 
'tr=i·.!r.; "ith tl\e stockwhip while they were trying t::i get over 
t:>•! fence. They didn't get any pig that night. But other 
;>lac4"s they dict and this went on and it was shared by the 
1j ;.eople here <ln the dole. It was cut up and given out by the 
;; 
people that were on the dole. For instance, I myself like a 
lot more were doing work amongst the unemployed. Some daya 
we would be living in various houses night after night, going 
from place to place. One night you would possibly get some 
lamb, maybe a bit of pork. The next night it would be a 
piece of dripping, just according to what meat had been got 
or what had been got in the house. Sometimes it would only 
be a cup of tea you would have in the morning and this was the 
situation. But there was one thing that I can say that during 
that period the people on this coast got together, stood by 
one another, had concerts, had dances and all in all were as 
close together then as in any period I have seen them since L 
have been in this district. I think you will agree w:i,tl> the.t, 
Harr:'. 
Harry Blacklock: 
Yes, we ran sports. 
Dan Timmins: 
t t Slacky Flat and we gave prizes to ti>e We ran spor s a 
· 11 t d £10 worth of coupons to buy tile pri:i:ed, 
winners. We co ec e 
We had boxing and "restling. We had <tll We had foot races, 
k Fla t and we made a good day of it. sorts of things at Slac Y 
* · the municipality of Northern R. Ziems was an alderman in 
Illawarra. 
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Harry Blacklaclt: 
! fully endorse Len·~ statcrnent regarding the 
co-opcra:tive soci<!ty ;::>:: Wc:mona. '1. was getting my dole <;.here 
and n1> ro.at.ter whether yo,1r dole tid;et l1ad run out you ce>llld 
still go and get something. As a matter of fact, some of the 
assistants got into strife for handing out extra b~ead. lt 
you wanteQ bread they would hand you a check to go round to 
the baker just round the mck ot the Co-op and you asked h,im 
for a loaf of bread and they would give you t'rlo checks in!ltead 
of one ~~d only book one down. Until eventually the manager 
found ou~ alx>ut it and some of them was promised the sack if 
they didn't. curtail this giving out of bread tickets. I ran 
a debt tfiere of ah:>ut twenty quid and I never managed to pay 
that off until 1939 when I joined the army - the garrison -
and I wa~ getting a bit of dough then and the wife was getting 
the allotment and I was able to wipe this debt out, which I 
greatly appreciated at the time because it had rtSsisted us a 
lot in the w~•st part of the defression. 
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